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Abstract 
 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is one important response to the increasing 
amounts of criticism levelled at corporations. A number of studies have focused on CSR 
in a range of industries; however, some contentious industries, e.g. the gambling 
industry, remain unexplored. Mobilizing CSR in a novel setting not only enhances the 
knowledge of CSR and gambling, but also provides an overview of this industry itself. 
 
This thesis attempts to investigate three questions: to what extent does the gambling 
industry disclose CSR-related data, how is CSR understood in this industry and why 
does the gambling industry engage in CSR? This thesis provides a general overview of 
the international gambling industry and an in-depth investigation of Macao’s gambling 
industry. The research design of the thesis employs mixed methods: content analysis 
and semi-structured interviews. The principal research is based on 49 interviews.  
 
This thesis advances three main arguments. First, it will be argued that there are 
relatively low volumes of Corporate Social Disclosure (CSD) and Responsible 
Gambling (RG) disclosure in the international gambling industry, which can be viewed 
as a legitimising strategy. Second, in Macao’s gambling industry, it is argued that 
organisations in this industry tend to place a greater emphasis on positive social impacts, 
while obscuring such negative impacts as gambling addiction and health-related issues. 
Third, this thesis holds that organisations in Macao’s gambling industry engage 
symbolically, rather than substantively, with CSR and RG in order to manage 
stakeholders’ perceptions in an attempt to gain different sources of legitimacy and in 
turn to enhance its economic interests. In conclusion, the gambling industry does not 
entirely conform to the institutional environment, which poses a challenge to the 
organisational legitimacy literature. This thesis introduces a necessary caution into the 
discussions about the extent of CSD, CSR, and RG in this industry more generally. 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction  
1.1.1 CSR  
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is an important response to increasing amounts 
of criticism levelled at corporations. Many scholars, authorities, and organisations have 
defined CSR in various ways. Dahlsrud (2006) compares and contrasts 37 definitions of 
CSR and identifies that the most widely cited CSR definition is suggested by 
Commission of the European Communities (2001, p. 6). This defines CSR as “a concept 
whereby companies integrate social and environmental concerns in their business 
operations and in their interaction with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis”. In the 
academic literature, CSR has been widely discussed. There have been a number of 
academic studies on defining CSR in numerous ways, including conceptualisation of 
CSR from the perspective of shareholders, stakeholders, and society (Friedman, 1970; 
Carroll, 1979, 1991; Freeman, 1984; Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Mitchell, et al., 
1997; Van Marrewijk, 2003). The literature also links CSR to its wider context of 
corporate citizenship, business ethics and sustainability (Crane and Matten, 2007; 
Young and Tilley, 2006). Chapter 2, Section 2.2 explains why there are various 
definitions and different perspectives of the term CSR.  
 
CSR has been discussed in many different areas of management studies. In particular, 
this term is often associated with the gradual increase in the corporate reporting of 
social and environmental policies, practices, and performance. KPMG (2011) reports 
that 95 percent of the largest global 250 companies in the world report on their 
corporate social responsibility and this is often known as “Corporate Social Disclosure 
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(CSD)”. A number of studies have examined the relationship between corporate social 
performance (CSP) and corporate financial performance (CFP) (Ullmann, 1985; 
Richardson, et al., 1999; Griffin and Mahon, 1997; Orlitzky, et al., 2003; Margolis and 
Walsh, 2003). The various studies draw substantially different conclusions and the 
results tend to be positive, negative, mixed, or neutral effects, but this depends on 
various factors, such as measures, samples, and methods (Cai, et al., 2012). Recently, 
CSR has also been linked to Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) and Environmental 
Social Governance (ESG).  
 
CSR not only has been widely examined in management studies, but has also become a 
global phenomenon. Corporations, especially MNCs, often integrate CSR into their 
business strategy. CSR has become a mainstream of business activities and global 
business practices (Levy and Kaplan, 2008). Corporations tend to “do well by doing 
good”, which means that they can perform well in financial terms, in business 
operations and can be responsible for creating a better society (Kurucz, et al., 2008). 
This is often known as “the business case”. The business case appears to provide a 
number of advantages for corporations: competitive advantage, corporate image and 
reputation, cost reduction and synergistic value creation (Kurucz, et al., 2008; see 
Chapter 2, Section 2.2.3).  
 
Nevertheless, “the business case” for CSR appears to be under a “win-win” and 
“business as usual” scenario with the underlying assumption of operating good 
organisations and enhancing shareholder value (Banerjee, 2008). Not all scholars agree 
with the business case, and some assert that CSR engagement is largely based on the 
financial initiative rather than an ethical initiative. Friedman (1970) argues that a 
16 
 
socially responsible corporation must maximise shareholder wealth. Corporations 
appear to have no legal requirement to serve the public interest (Crane and Matten, 2004; 
Banerjee, 2007). The debate is generally based on the notion of capitalism, rather than a 
win-win situation. The behaviour of the large, influential, and powerful corporations, 
especially MNCs, tends to suggest that they do not assume responsibility for their 
economic action and their behaviour can gradually affect society and the environment 
(Gray, et al., 1996). In other words, corporations often engage in CSR activities in order 
to pursue financial interest, without seeking to change the structure of capitalism (see 
Chapter 2, Section 2.2.4). 
 
Corporations, especially MNCs, are becoming increasingly influential, powerful and 
dominant in business and society. MNCs have the ability to choose their stakeholders 
(see, for example, Freeman, 1984; Donaldson and Preston, 1995) and shape CSR in 
ways that are beneficial, rather than the impact of their business operation (Bondy, et al., 
2012). CSR is possibly “windowing dressing” for irresponsible behaviour (Banerjee, 
2008), or a “smokescreen” for deregulation (Hanlon, 2008). In other words, CSR can be 
seen as an important device for organisational legitimacy.  
 
Due to various cultures, there is no particular CSR template for international 
corporations (Birch and Moon, 2004). Over the past five decades, a number of studies 
have extensively investigated CSR in developed regions, notably North America and 
Europe (Maignan and Ralston, 2002; Matten and Moon, 2004; 2008; Carroll, 2008). In 
the last decade, a growing number of CSR studies have been conducted in developing 
regions, for example Asia, Africa and Latin America (Crane and Moon, 2007; Visser, 
2008). Matten and Moon (2008) suggest an explanation of “implicit” and “explicit” 
17 
 
CSR to analyse CSR in national institutional contexts. Globalisation and free trade may 
thus increase MNCs’s explicit CSR in the developing regions, where there may be weak 
institutions or poor governance (Matten and Moon, 2008; see Chapter 2, Section 2.5).  
 
Despite the increasing body of CSR literature over the past decades, several studies 
have focused on CSR in such particular industries as oil (Coupland, 2005), banking 
(Scholten, 2009) and retailing (Kolk, et al., 2010). However, controversial industries 
remain largely unexplored. For example, little attention has been paid to such 
controversial industries as tobacco (Pava and Krausz, 1997; Palazzo and Richeter, 2005; 
Tilling and Tilt, 2010; Fooks, et al., 2013) or brewing (Quaak, et al., 2007) and 
gambling. The gambling industry, a further example of a controversial industry, has 
received relatively little attention in the CSR literature. Few CSR studies have indeed 
concentrated on the gambling industry (Hing, 2001; Jones, et al., 2009; Lee and Park, 
2009; Li, et al., 2011; see Chapter 2); however, these studies have not examined the 
construction of legitimacy in this industry. The gambling industry appears to be a source 
of tension and conflict. Examination of CSR in the gambling industry provides a novel 
setting to investigate the complexity and subtlety of business and society and deepening 
the understanding of the nature and development of CSR (see Chapter 2, Section 2.4).  
 
Controversial, contentious or sin industries have been defined as those which are often 
associated with “products, services or concepts that for reasons of delicacy, decency, 
morality, or even fear, elicit reactions of distaste, disgust, offence or outrage when 
mentioned or when openly presented” (Wilson and West, 1981, p. 92). A controversial 
industry’s products and services are highly contested. The level of cognitive beliefs 
concerning its products and services helps to constitute product acceptability and 
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reconfigure a controversial industry’s legitimacy (Galvin, et al., 2004-05) (Chapter 2, 
Section 2.3).  
 
Arguably, the construction of legitimacy in the gambling industry cannot be simply due 
to laws and societal norms. First, the industry may or may not be legalized. According 
to Galvin, et al. (2004-05, p. 69), “The struggles over industry legitimacy are less about 
the activity of gambling per se, and much more about the authorised organisations and 
locations in which these activities take place”. Therefore, gambling is subject to 
rigorous government regulation (Miller and Michelson, 2012). A number of countries 
legalized the gambling industry for different political reasons, such as urban 
regeneration, tax revenue and tourism development (Austrin and West, 2005). Second, 
gambling may or may not be a legitimate form of activity (Reith, 2007). Gambling 
appears to be a socially constructed illegitimate form largely based on its historical 
background (Reith, 2007). As a result of economic, political, and cultural changes in 
western society, the evolution of gambling can be characterised as movement from an 
illegitimate form to a legitimated form of socially undesirable behaviour of recreation 
and consumption (Reith, 2007). Hence, interpretation of the legitimacy of gambling has 
changed over time. Legitimacy theory, thus, can provide a useful starting point to 
investigate CSR in the gambling industry (Chapter 2, Section 2.3).  
 
1.1.2 Gambling  
Gambling
1
 is said to have a long history
 
(Appendix 1) and is as old as the history of 
human beings. Gambling appears to link to different aspects of human nature, namely 
                                                     
1
 According to Blaszczynski, et al. (2011, p.7), gambling is generally defined as “a risk-taking activity 
that involves an agreement between two or more parties where something of value is wagered on an event 
of uncertain outcome and where chance determines the outcome of that event”.  
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faith
2
, ethic and rationality (Reith, 2007). In the historical context, gambling can serve 
as a form of recreation in different cultures
3
 (Culin, 1992 cited in Sauer, 2001); 
however, gambling became caught up in discourses on deviant behaviour related to 
alcoholism, addiction, and prostitution (Reith, 2007). In the mid-twentieth century, 
economic, social, political changes transformed Western societies and encouraged a 
paradigm shift on gambling (Reith, 2007). From the 1970s to 1980s, neo-liberal 
economic policies have encouraged the imposition of high taxes on gambling as 
alternative sources of revenue for governments and the political economy of gambling 
was increasingly deregulated, resulting in substantial expansion of commercial 
gambling as a global enterprise (Reith, 2007). 
 
In the twenty-first century, the gambling industry has become a profitable industry by 
                                                     
2
 Divination is the practice of employing an explanatory device so as to receive a message from the 
unknown (Bloch, 1951) or using supernatural or intuitive ways to tell the future, such as Greeks and 
Etruscans use entrails (liver) and Karydaomancers use coconut shells (Schwartz, 2006). In contrast, 
deep-rooted opposition to gambling originated in religion. Although there is a little discussion of 
gambling in the Bible, gambling is known to have been subject to civil punishment among Jews 
(McGowan, 1994 cited in Sauer, 2001). Additionally, the Puritans considered gambling to be evil and 
prohibited because it was against the teaching of God (Barker and Britz, 2000). All indulgence in pleasure 
is immoral which is more related to the religious asceticism (Collins, 2003). Thus, gambling as a way of 
life was perilous for the burgeoning Puritan community’s survival (Barker and Britz, 2000).  
3
 Several studies have investigated gambling preferences in nine ethics groups, for example the 
GAMECS Project in 1999. The GAMECS Project (1999) with 976 regular gamblers was a study to 
analyse gambling preferences in nine ethnic groups in Sydney, Australia. Arabic, Chinese, Vietnamese, 
and Greek participants present a lower rate to use gaming machines outside casinos than the general 
populace. Chinese, Croatian, Korean, Spanish, and Vietanamese prefer to go to the casino gambling, 
while Greek and Italian prefer playing cards. Hence, the preference of different forms of gambling varies 
across culture or national history. This prevalence could be linked to approval and familiarity of specific 
games and whose values and beliefs are passed down to next generations (Raylu and Oei, 2004). Several 
studies have compared Caucasian and Chinese gambling behaviour (Lesieur and Rosenthal, 1991; Raylu 
and Oei, 2004; Lau and Ranyard, 2005). The Chinese tend to exhibit higher rates towards gambling. 
Chinese culture has unique concepts of fate, chance, and luck, which are explained in terms of hidden 
gifts of destiny, power of number, and honouring of God (Papineau, 2005). Gambling culture has been a 
part of Chinese lifestyle, history, and tradition, and this culture has integrated into values and beliefs 
(Raylu and Oei, 2004). Yet, the results of several studies indicate that higher incidents of gambling are 
limited not only to Chinese, but also Jewish and “deviant” minority groups, such as the poor (Light, 
1977b), ethnic minorities (Light, 1977a), and indigenous people (Dickerson, et al., 1996; Zitzow, 1996; 
Volberg and Abbott, 1997; Wardman, et al., 2001; Raylu & Oei, 2004). Importantly, religious participation 
appears to moderate gambling participation to a certain degree (Ellison and Nybroten, 1999, Diaz, 2000; 
Brown, et al., 2003; Lam, 2006). Thus, religiosity might play a crucial role in discouraging people from 
engaging in gambling activities. 
20 
 
selling hope, excitement and entertainment to consumers (Reith, 2007). This industry 
can be regarded as a subset of the leisure sector, alongside cruises, holidays, sports, and 
theme parks (Christiansen, 1998). This rapid development reflects the new acceptability 
of this industry, which seeks to portray itself as normal business activities for free 
market, free choice and services for sale (Galvin, et al., 2004-5). The industry prefers 
the term “gaming” with its connotation of play and leisure, rather than “gambling” with 
its connotation of financial loss (Reith, 2007). The evolution of gambling is moving 
towards a legitimated form of recreation, entertainment, and consumption, rather than 
an illegitimate form associated with alcoholism, prostitution and drugs (Reith, 2007). 
Games of chance are not only a product of consumer culture, but also express the values 
of instant gratification, self-fulfilment, and conspicuous consumption (Reith, 2007). 
Despite its universality, the concept of gambling varies greatly in history, and its 
meanings vary according to different forms of gambling, people and society (McMillen, 
1996b, p. 6). 
 
The global gambling sector is typically viewed as part of the other services sector. This 
sector is positioned in the middle of the Fortune Global 500 list (KPMG, 2005). This 
globalization strongly affected the expansion of the gambling market (McMillen, 
1996a). Gambling takes different forms
4
. On the global level, the gambling sector had a 
total revenue of £354 billion in 2012 with a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 
                                                     
4
 According to MarketLine’s (2012a) report, the global casinos and gaming consists of different forms of 
betting and gambling. The broad spectrum of gambling can be classified into five major categories, each 
with its own characteristics. First, the casinos segment covers all gambling activities in casinos, for 
example card games, roulettes and slot machines; second, the lotteries segment encompasses all state, 
private, and charitable lotteries, including traditional draws, scratch card games and other similar products; 
third, the sports betting segment usually involves betting the outcome of such sporting games as horse 
races, football matches, and dog races and also pari-mutual operators; fourth, this segment involves bingo 
and slot machines located outside casinos; and fifth, the final segment refers to online gambling
4
 and 
gaming activities (MarketLine, 2012a). The Internet has had a significant growth rate over the last decade. 
Thus, online gambling has become as a popular form of entertainment in the gambling industry (Soriano, 
et al., 2012). In 2009, there were appropriately 2,500 online gambling websites owned by 600 
organisations (Remote Gambling Association, 2010). The complexity of Internet gambling cannot be 
underestimated, varies across country, jurisdiction and time (Cabot, 2006 and Rose and Owen, 2005 cited 
in Wood and Williams, 2007). A few of these companies were publicly listed on the stock exchange 
market, but most of them are privately owned (Wood and Williams, 2007). 
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3.8% (MarketLine, 2013a). This report shows the growing global gambling industry is 
significantly bigger than the shrinking global investment banking and brokerage sector 
(£45.9 billion), but smaller than the global oil and gas sector (£2,316.8 billion) and the 
metals and mining industry (£2,154.3billion) (MarketLine, 2012a; b; c; d). More 
pertinently, this global gambling sector grew moderately in 2011 when compared to the 
global oil and gas industry (5.7% and 25.1% respectively), but well when compared to 
the global investment banking and brokerage sector, which shrank by 11.7% 
(MarketLine, 2012 a; b; c; d). In particular, the Asia-Pacific and European gambling 
sectors are growing by 8.6% and 4.2% respectively (MarketLine, 2012a). Although 
there was a global economic downturn in 2008, the performance of the gambling sector 
is expected to have an anticipated growth rate of 6.1% from 2011 to 2016 (MarketLine, 
2012a). 
 
Notably, the gambling industry has been facing a number of opportunities and 
challenges. From an economic perspective, gambling may have an effect on economic 
development (Siegel and Anders, 1999). Various countries legalized gambling for profit 
in welfare regimes
5
 and for different reasons, such as public finance (Florida, US and 
Canada), economic development, (Lousisian, US and Macao) and suppressing illegal 
gambling (the UK and Canada) (Campbell and Smith, 1998; Chambers, 2011). 
Legalised gambling can be viewed as a major source of tax revenue in order to provide 
                                                     
5
 Chambers (2011) provides a general overview of gambling for profit in welfare regimes. These regimes 
can be classified into three groups: liberal regimes, social democratic regimes and conservative 
(corporatist) regimes. First, liberal federations, including United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, 
and United Kingdom, are highly decentralized and they tend to have the strongest tendency to allocate 
general revenue to states (Chambers, 2011). Due to the competitive deregulated market, the 
American-style casinos could allocate general gaming revenue to state coffers (Chambers, 2011). Second, 
social democratic states include Denmark, Finland, Sweden, and Norway (Chambers, 2011). Third, 
conservative (corporatist) regimes fall between social democratic and liberal states (Chambers, 2011). 
These European countries include Spain, Italy, Greece, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, Austria, France, 
and Portugal. Based on this classification, the Anglo states are more likely than the continental European 
countries to legalise gambling, while both corporatist and social democratic states adopt an interventionist 
approach, which means they have a stronger state intervention in the market (Chambers, 2011). These 
countries direct gambling revenue to social and cultural activities (Chambers, 2011). 
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not only public goods, for example education, pension and health care service 
(Christiansen, 1998; Blaszczynski, et al., 2004; Beem and Mikler, 2011), but also 
infrastructure, occupation and tourism (Christiansen, 1998; Felsenstein, et al., 1999; 
Korn and Shaffer, 1999; Collins and Lapsley, 2003). Yet, these benefits depend on the 
degree of the government’s political transparency, fairness and integrity (Cheng, 2009). 
From a liberal sociological perspective, gambling has a positive notion because it is 
viewed as a legitimate leisure activity that can enrich ordinary people’s lives (McMillen, 
1996b; Cheng, 2009). Goffman (1967) argues that gambling can provide players a way 
to show their character, such as in risk-taking, being bold and courageous. Gambling is 
regarded as maintaining a social structure due to the debilitating impact of modern work 
(Goldthorpe, et al., 1969; Parker, 1976 cited in McMillen, 1996b). Hence, gambling can 
be considered as a safety valve from which to escape the burden of work, a positive 
cohesive element and a mechanism to preserve social order (Herman, 1967 and 
Deverexu, 1968 cited in McMillen, 1996b; Aasved, 2003). 
 
In spite of the opportunities offered by the gambling industry, the gambling industry 
faces various challenges. Due to the dramatic growth of gambling and gambling 
operators’ aggressive marketing, this industry creates several socially undesirable 
externalities in the production of this revenue. Gambling may cause a psychological 
health crisis (Quinn, 2001). Problem gambling may have three notorious terms: 
“compulsive gambling6”, “problem gambling7” and “pathological gambling8” (Raylu 
and Oei, 2002, p.1010), which are distinct from social recreational gambling (McMillen, 
                                                     
6
 The term “compulsive” is usually employed by Gamblers Anonymous members (Raylu and Oei, 2002). 
Gambling induces compulsive behaviour in an exciting atmosphere to win more money (Lam, 2007). 
7
 “Problem gambling” has been widely used in the gambling academic literature. The term refers a wide 
range of difficulties with gambling and this term would be employed in a broader sense to include 
individuals who may have the experience gambling problems (Raylu and Oei, 2002).  
8
 Pathological gambling is a term employed by the American Psychiatric Association to recognise a 
gambling illness (Blaszczynski, et al., 2004) so this term “pathological” is usually used by clinicians 
(Raylu and Oei, 2002). Pathological gambling is characterised by out of control in gambling, the seeking 
of losses, deception, family disruption, financial bankruptcy and illegal behaviour (Volberg, 1994). 
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1996b). In particular, the issue of “problem gambling” has become more prominent 
during the past few decades (Hing, 2001). “Problem gamblers9” constitute roughly 2% 
of the general population (Blaszczynski, et al., 2011; LaPlante, et al., 2011), with a rate 
of around 0.9% in the UK (Wardle, et al., 2011) and 1.5% in Australia (Miller and 
Michelson, 2012), but with higher rates ranging from 2.5% to 4.0% in some 
jurisdictions in China (Loo, et al., 2008). In particular, the prevalence of problem in 
Macao (4.3% to 6.0%) from 2003 to 2007 is greater when compared to that in HK 
(4.5%) and Singapore (2.9%) in 2008 (Appendix 2).  
 
However, it can be argued that a small percentage of the population experiences 
gambling problem (Li, et al., 2011). Psychologists and psychiatrists assert that gamblers 
are unable to resist gambling because gamblers’ states of mind concerning impulse and 
sensation can be classified as “impulse control disorder” and “disorders in thinking” 
(Reith, 2007). As a result, gamblers will have an enhanced risk of suicide and family 
violence (McMillen, 1996b; Schalkwyk, et al., 2006), while problem gamblers can 
affect social relationships and the equilibrium of society (England and Albrechi, 1984; 
McMillen, 1996b; Korn and Shaffer, 1999). In particular, a single problem gambler 
negatively influences an average of 10 to 17 people, most commonly family, friends and 
employers (Shaffer and Korn, 2002).  
 
While some studies in social science have highlighted the link between criminal 
behaviour and illegal gambling (McMillen, 1996b), other studies have attempted to 
measure the social cost associated with gambling problem (Walker and Barnett, 1999; 
Grinols and Mustard, 2001; Henriksson, 2001). Grinols and Mustard (2001) assert that 
                                                     
9
 In this thesis, the term “problem gamblers” refer to people who have a gambling problem.  
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the social costs of gambling activity are 1.9 times higher than social benefits. The 
negative effects and related social costs of gambling can be classified into nine 
categories, namely crime, business and employment costs, bankruptcy, illness, suicide, 
social service costs, government direct regulatory costs, family costs and abused dollars 
(Grinols and Mustard, 2001). Walker and Barnett (1999) further show twelve alleged 
social costs, particularly, seven types of alleged social costs in the transfers or pecuniary 
externalities category (Table 1). However, Christiansen (1998) claims that the social 
costs and the social benefits tend to be hard, but not impossible, to quantify. This 
quantification attempts to provide a general indicator, but it does not appear to be a 
reliable indicator. Thus, the evidence can justify the claim that gambling is not a simply 
a form of entertainment; rather, it is detrimental to people’s spiritual welfare.  
 
Table 1: Alleged social costs of gambling 
Alleged Social Cost Economic 
Perspective 
(1)  Income lost from missed work;  
(2)  Costs borne by gambler’s decreased productivity on the job;  
(3)  Depression and physical illness related to stress;  
(4)  Increased suicide attempts 
Costs borne by 
gambler 
(5)  Bailout costs;  
(6)  Unrecovered loans to transfers or pecuniary pathological 
gamblers;  
(7)  Unpaid debts externalities and bankruptcies;  
(8)  Higher insurance premiums resulting from pathological 
gambler-caused fraud;  
(9)  Corruption of public officials;  
(10)  Strain on public services;  
(11)  Industry cannibalization 
Transfers or 
pecuniary 
externalities 
(12)  Divorces caused by gambling value judgment Value judgment 
Source: Walker and Barnett (1999) 
The opportunities and challenges of gambling are still being articulated nowadays, but 
are expressed in various ways. The evolution of arguments presents some reflections on 
the plural character of modern societies where people have different beliefs as a result 
of their differing value systems towards gambling (McMillen, 1996b). 
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1.1.3 CSR, Gambling and Externalities 
The combination of the nature of corporations, CSR, and gambling could be considered 
a complex and subtle issue. In fact, the gambling industry is similar to other industries, 
in that it seeks to make profit, build customer loyalty and increase market share (Quinn, 
2001). One negative impact of the gambling industry is individual and public health, as 
it becomes an “externalizing machine” (see Bakan, 2004). Banerjee (2008:55) argues “if 
a corporation had the legal right to externalize the social and environmental costs of its 
business activity with impunity, its responsibility to the larger community was less 
clear…” In order to have an overview of externalities caused by the gambling industry, 
these can be classified into two types: direct (positive and negative) and indirect 
externalities (moral behaviour) (Benston, 1982). In the gambling industry, direct 
externalities can have positive and negative effects (Grinols and Mustard, 2001). The 
positive effects include an increase in companies’ profit, taxes and employment benefits, 
while the negative effects and related social costs of gambling are many, as discussed in 
the previous section (see Table 1). 
 
In particular, the gambling industry attempts to highlight the positive externalities, 
rather than the negative ones; however, indirect externalities concern social 
responsibility reporting as a means of enhancing the moral “tone” of the community 
(Benston, 1982). McGowan (1997, p. 214) asserts that, “…gambling does not contribute 
to developing the ‘goodness’ or virtue of the individual … Gambling attacks the overall 
“moral” character of a society”. Thus, corporations in the gambling industry may 
embrace CSR as one of the solutions to tackle the criticism arising from direct and 
indirect negative externalities. The thesis sets out to explore whether the use of CSR is 
sincere in the gambling industry that capture the complex, dynamic, and complicated 
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business environment. This industry may be a reflection of other industries which may 
also employ CSR as a means of making profit as usual. 
 
As a result of the negative exteralities, gambling operators are often criticised for 
exploiting the general public (Hing and McMillen, 2002). Stakeholders impose pressure 
upon many gambling operators to apply more ethical concerns in the gambling business 
so as to avoid or mitigate possible gambling problems and harmful impacts (Hing, 
2001). This initiative is called “responsible gambling” (RG) (Blaszczynski, et al., 2004; 
2011). RG can be seen as a subset of CSR and further discussion will be examined in 
Chapter 7. 
 
Despite responsible gambling engagement by the gambling industry, the industry has 
also been facing an ongoing legitimacy threat; most particularly, gambling- and 
health-related issues (Section 1.1.2). The gambling industry can be expected to engage 
in efforts to identify with symbols of social legitimacy, for example CSD disclosures, 
CSR initiatives, and RG programmes (Reast, et al., 2012). This industry might seek the 
legitimacy implicit with adoption of CSR for various motivations, such as to ensure the 
industry’s two main objectives: continuity and creditability (Reast, et al., 2012). There 
has, however, been a lack of research examining organisational tactics or strategies to 
gain or seek legitimacy in the context of the gambling industry (Chapter 2, Section 
2.3.4). 
 
This thesis will argue that the international gambling industry could be expected to have 
a high volume of CSD and RG disclosure. However, the thesis does not find this to be 
the case. Rather, it shows that there are relatively low volumes of CSD and RG 
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disclosure in the international gambling industry and that this low volume of disclosure 
represents a proactive legitimising strategy. These findings are similar to those of the 
tobacco industry (Campbell, et al., 2003; Tilling and Tilt, 2010) and the mining industry 
(De Villiers and Van Staden, 2006); however, these findings are entirely different from 
the mainstream CSD studies on unforeseen crisis literature (Patten, 1992; 2002; Elsbach; 
1994; Chapter 4). 
 
In terms of the understanding of CSR prevalent in Macao’s gambling industry, the 
thesis’s case study, it is argued that there is a focus on positive social impacts, for 
example, community and employee welfare, and the industry’s positive impact on local 
economic development in order to obscure, it would seem, such negative impacts as 
gambling addiction and health-related issues (Chapter 5).  
 
In line with strategic legitimacy theory (Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975; Ashforth and Gibbs, 
1990; Lindblom, 1993; Suchman, 1995; O’Donovan, 2002; Chapter 2), the thesis holds 
that Macao’s gambling industry engages symbolically, rather than substantively, with 
CSR and RG in order to manage stakeholders’ perceptions in an attempt to gain 
different sources of legitimacy and in turn to enhance its economic interests, for 
example, renewing gambling licences, ensuring imported labour supply and accessing a 
steady stream of customers (Chapters 6 and 7).    
 
It is important to make explicit at an early stage my moral perceptions of what I term 
sincere and insincere CSR, not only since these are likely to shape my reaction to the 
data collected and inform my critical analysis of the data, but also because these 
perceptions motivate the thesis as a whole. I began my research with an under-theorised 
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sense of what a genuine commitment to normative claims by corporations might entail: 
for example, corporate philanthropy, employee welfare, and avoidance of social and 
environmental harm. Depending on the moral claims of a researcher, such a normative 
perspective might preclude gambling altogether, whether the activity takes place in a 
commercial or domestic setting, on the basis that, for example, it may harm gamblers 
and their families, and possibly the wider community. Alternatively, it could be argued 
that commercialised gambling is simply a leisure activity with few negative real world 
consequences.  
 
In terms of my own moral perspective, therefore, gambling should not be linked to a 
corporation’s single-minded pursuit of its economic interests when this action is pursued 
without any regard for its potential social and environmental costs to the wider 
community. Any claimed CSR in this case, in my view, would be insincere since it 
would only serve the goal of profit-maximisation.  
 
In contrast, I would term sincere CSR that which prioritises social (public) interests 
over the narrow interest of a company, such as economic growth, profit maximisation or 
wealth creation, which create socially and environmentally undesirable and negative 
externalities. Corporations should admit the social and environmental costs of their 
business operations. They should fully commit to socially responsible behaviour by 
protecting the local community and environment, rather than engaging symbolically 
with CSR to enhance their financial interests. 
 
CSR activities, practices, and discourses therefore become ‘insincere’ when they are 
used to hide or obscure immoral core business activities. The gambling industry, as 
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examined in this thesis, is similar to other industries with environmental, social and 
ethical issues, for example mining, armament, and biotech industries (Section 2.4.1). 
The issues of controversy vary greatly across time, culture, and social norms (Campbell, 
2007; Waller, et al, 2005; Jo and Na, 2012). To varying degrees, the research position is 
highly dependent upon the personal moral claims of a researcher, for example, “Does 
profit outweigh social costs?” “Is economic growth the first priority?” “Are financial 
interests more important than social interests?” The thesis is not intended to help 
profit-making organisations to develop strategic CSR by making profit at the expense of 
the public. The public, government, and academics should not blindly accept all CSR 
initiatives as sincere CSR. The thesis is intended to critically examine how organisations 
in the gambling industry obscure negative impacts, manage stakeholder perceptions and 
appear to place emphasis on protection in order to enhance their economic interests. 
 
As will become apparent in the thesis, I consider the use of insincere CSR somewhat 
surprising as a further moral assumption I make relates to the issue of protection of the 
customer by the gambling industry. These organisations should bear some responsibility 
for protecting the customer from the negative impacts of gambling-related activities, 
most particularly, addiction, for a number of reasons. Firstly, new gamblers are rarely 
aware of the risk of addiction, seeing gambling as a leisure pursuit. Secondly, gamblers 
are rarely aware of the likelihood that they will lose money. Notably, in Macao, the 
probability of winning is not made public by gambling organisations in the way that it is 
in UK, for example. Thirdly, these impacts are not experienced by the individual. Rather, 
they affect the individual’s family, friends, and the community. In other words, although 
the decision to gamble tends to be an individual one, the negative impacts of this 
decision are likely to affect a wider community. Finally, and possibly most importantly, 
the core aim of the industry, that is to encourage gambling, and as a consequence 
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gambling addiction among some gamblers, conflicts with the protection of public health. 
It is for these reasons, then, that I believe that gambling companies have a moral duty to 
protect their customers and it is this moral assumption that informs the critical lens I use 
to anlayse the impact of the gambling industry on Macao.   
 
1.2 My personal motivation 
This thesis has arisen from two main concerns that have driven my work and my study. 
These concerns have been from my time at university and work, and the period of social 
changes in Macao, 2004 (Appendix 1). 
 
In business school, I was taught about growth and profit maximisation in the economic 
courses I followed at the university and during my work experience in a chemical 
company. The case of Enron, the World.com and recent financial crisis revealed 
unethical business practices. What was wrong? Had I been taught to conduct business in 
an unethical way? CSR seemed to be one of the solutions to these crises so I started 
exploring CSR. After taking a Masters degree in International Business, my interest 
moved to CSR, rather than profit maximisation. This course taught us to challenge, 
confront and interrogate business and business practice. I found this course 
intellectually stimulating. I enjoyed studying CSR and optimistically viewed an 
organisation as having the potential to be powerful and capable of stifle change. 
 
Macao has experienced massive social change and rapid economic development over 
the past decade. Macao’s gross domestic product (GDP) per capital was £48,338 and 
Macao attracted over 28 million tourists in 2011, a number of 50 times greater than 
Macao’s population (Government of MSAR Statistics and Census Service, 2012a; 
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Appendix 2). This development caused a small town lifestyle with its mixed Chinese 
and Portuguese culture to be transformed into a diverse multicultural entertainment 
centre with and leisure activities. The number of casinos increased from 15 to 35 from 
2004 to 2013 (Appendix 2). Currently, Macao is one of Asia’s major gambling hubs 
(Ernst & Young, 2009). The gambling industry is the leading industry in Macao with 
over 60% of local residents working in this or related industries (Appendix 2). Most of 
my friends working in this industry started to change, it seemed to me, their ethical 
stance, morals and attitude to money, while my family members were affected 
negatively and positively by this industry. I slowly witnessed the substantial economic 
growth of Macao, which has turned into a “sin city”. 
 
The economic benefit sits uncomfortably with me and I have no idea why the local 
people praise this industry, when the community is full of hidden people who are 
negatively affected by this industry. What is going on? What does the gambling industry 
do to the community? When I was in Macao, I was not only questioning my moral 
stance, but also found this place was not suitable for living. Macao, as a small town, 
does not have enough capacity to absorb these negative social consequences. I have 
personally experienced more negative social impacts than economic benefits, for 
example gambling problem, gambling-related crime, and social disruption (Section 
1.1.2). 
 
These developments appeared to me to have a direct link to the CSR agenda. I started to 
think about gambling problems and health-related issues as a CSR issue, which raised a 
number of questions in my mind. “Was the gambling problem being addressed by 
means of CSR in the gambling industry? Was there a possibility that CSR might offer a 
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new agenda concerning gambling problems in this industry? If so, how could they 
address these externalities? If not, why not?” The aim of this thesis is to search for a 
discourse of organisational “externalities”. The challenge that I face, is that I am 
attempting to move a traditional thinking and simple understanding towards a more 
complex and subtle understanding of the industry. The objective of this thesis is to 
persuade locals, students and government officials to engage in a critical view of this 
industry and pay attention to the wider related social and environmental issues. Hence, I 
matched my personal concerns to my academic interests. These motivations reveal the 
origins of my PhD study. 
 
1.3 Contribution of the thesis  
This thesis is intended to make two main contributions to the CSR and legitimacy 
literature. First, the thesis is intended to respond to the calls from CSR scholars for 
much more critical examination of specific CSR practices (for example, Banerjee, 2007; 
Devinney, 2009). The complexity and subtlety of corporations’ motivation for CSR 
engagement needs to be examined. Relatively few studies have examined CSR in such 
controversial industries as tobacco (Pava and Krausz 1997; Palazzo and Richeter, 2005; 
Tilling and Tilt, 2010; Fooks, et al., 2013) and brewing (Quaak, et al., 2007). The 
gambling industry, a further example of a controversial industry, remains largely 
unexplored in the CSR literature. Gambling appears to be a source of tension and 
conflict between CSR and profit-making organisations in the gambling industry. The 
industry may provide a different context, setting, and background (Cai, et al., 2012; 
Soriano, et al., 2012) in order to understand how and why organisations in this industry 
employ CSR. With regard to the CSR literature, examining CSR in the gambling 
industry provides an opportunity to examine the subtle and complex relationship 
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between business and society. This thesis understands the gambling industry to be a 
novel setting for an investigation of CSR. The investigation of this industry may 
enhance and deepen scholarly understanding of the nature and development of CSR in 
this context.  
 
Second, some studies have examined CSR in the gambling industry without examining 
and questioning the construction of legitimacy in this industry (Hing, 2001; Jones, et al., 
2009; Lee and Park, 2009; Li, et al., 2011). This thesis is intended to contribute to the 
legitimacy theory literature by examining how organisations in controversial industries, 
particularly the gambling industry, appear to have a similar nature to the tobacco 
industry in seeking legitimacy (Pava and Krausz, 1997; Campbell, et al., 2003; 
Moerman and Der Laan, 2005; Palazzo and Richer, 2005; Tilling and Tilt, 2010; Fooks, 
et al., 2013). Relatively little prior CSR research relating to legitimacy has focused on 
organisations in the gambling industry. Yet, there are two recent studies (Miller and 
Michelson, 2012; Reast, et al., 2012) which have investigated legitimacy and CSR in 
this industry. This thesis attempts to show how organisations in the gambling industry in 
general and organisations in Macao’s gambling industry in particular seek legitimacy. 
The findings of this thesis may be similar to or different from those in other 
controversial and uncontroversial industries in the organisational legitimacy literature 
(Chapter 8). This industry presents a case that pushes the boundaries of this theory, 
which has received relatively little attention in the context of controversial industries.  
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1.4 Summary  
This chapter covers five sections, including an introduction, my personal motivations 
for conducting this research, and contributions to the thesis. The following diagram 
shows the structure of I have adopted.  
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Figure 1: The structure of this thesis 
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Chapter 2  
Literature review 
2.1   Introduction 
This chapter not only provides the literature review of this thesis, but also locates this 
thesis within the field. Despite the fact that organisations in controversial industries 
receive much higher scrutiny than those operating in uncontroversial industries (Reast, 
et al., 2012), there has been relatively little exploration, examination and investigation 
into managing organisational legitimacy, such as tactics, strategies and devices 
employed to seek, gain or maintain strategic legitimacy in the context of controversial 
industries in general and the gambling industry in particular.  
 
Studies of organisational legitimacy suggest potential actions for gaining, maintaining, 
and defending organisational legitimacy, which might suggest strategic initiatives for 
organisations seeking legitimacy in controversial industries (Reast, et al., 2012). A 
number of studies in organisational legitimacy have examined a different variety of 
legitimacy-seeking strategies and tactics including external endorsements (Galaskiewicz, 
1985), collaborations with third parties (Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990, Oliver, 1991) 
impression management and the use of different accounts (Elsbach, 1994). Reast, et al. 
(2012) suggest that some organisations endeavour to identify themselves with symbols 
or values that provide a greater foundation of social legitimacy (Dowling and Pfeffer, 
1975), for example through CSR-related initiatives, corporate social disclosures (CSD) 
and communications (Deegan, 2002). These legitimacy-seeking strategies and tactics 
can also be employed and applied in the context of the gambling industry.  
 
Against the background of research in legitimacy, reviewed in this chapter, this thesis 
makes a theoretical contribution by identifying and analysing the role of legitimising 
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strategies, namely CSD, CSR initiatives and one of the important mechanisms for the 
symbolic CSR - RG initiatives – as they are deployed in an effort to maintain legitimacy 
and to reduce to the gambling industry’s business operation. These three initiatives can 
be considered as symbolic management techniques (see Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990) to 
enhance the gambling industry’s economic interest. This thesis can contribute to 
strategic legitimacy literature by examining a novel case of how organisations in the 
gambling industry attempt to employ legitimacy-seeking strategies and their strategic 
focus on CSD, CSR, and RG without explicitly discussing gambling addiction and 
health-related issues.  
 
The chapter is divided into six sections. This section gives a brief introduction to the 
chapter. Section 2.2 provides a brief review of the Corporate Social Responsibility 
(CSR) literature followed by a general overview of Legitimacy Theory in Section 2.3. 
Section 2.4 presents CSR and legitimacy in the controversial industries, particular the 
gambling industry. Section 2.5 shows how CSR is applied in various countries. Finally, 
a concluding remark is made in section 2.6. 
 
2.2 Corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
2.2.1 CSR and the social responsibilities of business  
As a starting point, many academic, authorities, and institutions have defined CSR and 
the social responsibilities of business. Dahlsrud (2006), for example, compares and 
contrasts 37 definitions of CSR and identifies the most frequently used CSR definition 
as that suggested by The Commission of the European Communities. This (2001, p. 6) 
defines CSR as “A concept whereby companies integrate social and environmental 
concerns in the business operation and in their interactions with their stakeholders on 
37 
 
voluntary basis”. 
 
In the academic literature, CSR is a term that has been widely discussed and may be 
considered a far more contested concept than the Commission of the European 
Communities might suggest. Moreover, there has been extensive academic debate over 
the social responsibilities of business. Authors following Friedman (1970) emphasise 
the perspectives of shareholders, while for stakeholder theorists, the responsibilities of 
business are not limited to shareholders, but to a wider number of parties (Freeman, 
1984). Stakeholders are groups or individuals who may affect or be affected by 
corporate actions (Freeman, 1984). Stakeholders broadly include shareholders 
(Friedman, 1970), employees (Carroll, 1979, 1991; Maignan and Ralston, 2002; Yu, 
2009), customers (Valor, 2008), suppliers (Welford and Frost, 2006; Cheung, et al., 
2009), community (Carroll, 1979; 1991) and government (Moon and Vogel, 2008). 
Donaldson and Preseton (1995) further explain stakeholder theory in three aspects: 
descriptive
10
, instrumental,
11
 and normative
12
 stakeholder theory (Donaldson and 
Preston, 1995). However, corporations appear to place more emphasis on instrumental 
stakeholder theory rather than descriptive and normative stakeholder theory; good 
stakeholder management can lead to enhance corporate financial performance (Freeman, 
2010) and the stakeholder model has become a typical element of in management 
studies (Donaldson and Preston, 1995).  
 
The social responsibility of business links to a wider concept of corporate citizenship, 
                                                     
10
 The descriptive stakeholder theory describes and explains particular organizational behaviours and 
characteristics, such as the nature of a corporation (Donaldson and Preston, 1995, p. 70).  
11
 The instrumental stakeholder theory is used to identify the relationship between stakeholder 
management and traditional financial interest (Donaldson and Preston, 1995, p. 71). 
12
 The normative stakeholder theory is used to identify moral or philosophical guidelines for business 
operations (Donaldson and Preston, 1995, p. 71). 
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business ethics (Crane and Matten, 2007) and sustainability (Young and Tilley, 2006). 
Thus, CSR, in the loosest sense, seems to overlap with other concepts, lacks “a clear 
dominant paradigm” (Lockett, et al., 2006, p. 133). The concept of CSR is an essentially 
“contested concept” (Crane, et al., 2003 cited in Birch and Moon, 2004, p. 19).  
 
Furthermore, increasing awareness of the social responsibility of business is sometimes 
associated with the significant increase in the reporting of social and environmental 
policies, practices and performances generally known as “Corporate Social Disclosure 
(CSD)” or “Social and Environmental Accounting” (SEA). Gray, et al. (1996, p. 3) 
define this term as “… the process of communicating the social and environmental 
effects of organisations’ economic actions to particular interest groups within society 
and to society at large. As such it involves extending the accountability of organizations 
(particularly companies), beyond the traditional role of providing a financial account to 
the owners of capital, in particular shareholders”13. CSD is often perceived as a 
manifestation of CSR (Gray, et al., 1996). KPMG (2005) demonstrates that 50 percent 
of the largest global 250 companies in the world in 2005 used CSD to report on what 
might be thought as their claims of corporate responsibility activities. This figure 
increased significantly from 80 percent in 2008 to 95 percent in 2011 (KPMG, 2008; 
2011). Some companies report something which might be thought to be their claims of 
corporate social responsibility (CSR). There has been an increasing trend in CSD due to 
                                                     
13
 Hackston and Milne (1996, p. 78) provide a similar definition of CSD and define CSD as “the 
provision of financial and non-financial information relating to an organisation’s interaction with its 
physical and social environment”. CSD can be viewed as another term, which is called social accounting 
(Gray, et al., 1997). Gray, et al., (1996, p. 11) suggest that social accounting involves four forms of 
accounting: first, accounting for different things than conventional accounting, in other words accounting 
for things other than economic events; second, accounting in different media, as in not accounting in 
strictly financial terms; third, accounting to different individuals or groups, not just to providers of 
finance; and forth, accounting for different purposes, not just to enable decisions to make whose success 
is exclusively judged in financial or cash flow terms.    
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a number of common drivers, including managing legitimacy (Deegan, et al., 2002; 
Patten, 2002) and stakeholder demands (Islam and Deegan, 2010) (Chapter 4).  
 
2.2.2. CSR theories  
The purpose of this section is to review those theories of corporate responsibility, which 
are of particular relevance to the study of CSR in the gambling industry. In order to 
theorise this thesis, the present researcher will outline the main theories in the CSR 
literature and provide a justification of an appropriate theory for this thesis.  
 
There have been a number of studies attempting to classify CSR theory (see Garriga and 
Mele, 2004; Carroll, 2008; Basu and Palazzo, 2008); however, CSR theories are 
overlapping, interrelated and connected to each other. This section closely follows 
Garriga and Melé’s (2004, p. 52) study since these authors provide a general 
classification of CSR theories based on how each theory considers “the nature of the 
relationship between business and society”. Garriga and Melé (2004) suggest that 
current CSR theories can be broadly classified into four main categories: instrumental 
theories, integrative theories, ethical theories and political theories, which can be 
considered a general overview of CSR theories in the extant literature. 
 
The first group of CSR theories is instrumental theories, including shareholder value 
theory (Friedman, 1970), strategies for achieving competitive advantage (Porter and 
Kramer, 2002) and cost-related marketing (McWilliams and Siegel, 2001), which can be 
regarded as a strategic tool to achieve economic objectives and wealth creation. The 
instrumental theories can be generally regarded as achievement of economic 
performance and are widely used in Anglo-Saxon countries (Melé, 2008). Long-term 
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economic success can be achieved by considering shareholder interest and other 
stakeholders, such as government, communities and customers (Melé, 2008). This thesis 
does not primarily examine how gambling companies employ CSR to achieve financial 
objectives. Thus, instrumental theories will not be the main focus of this thesis. 
 
The second group of theories is integrative theories, including issue management (Sethi, 
1975), public responsibility (Preston and Post, 1981), stakeholder management 
(Freeman, 1984; Mitchell, et al., 1997) and corporate social performance (Carroll, 1979; 
Wood, 1991). These authors examine how corporations satisfy social demands and how 
corporations depend on society for their existence, survival, and growth. In particular, 
companies operating in other countries (Japan and Europe) are closer to the stakeholder 
mode (Melé, 2008) and provide a wide context to address wider responsibilities for 
stakeholders. Yet, the sole purpose of this thesis is not primarily to examine 
corporations in the gambling industry’s response to social issues, such as gambling 
problem, social disruptions and social impacts. Although this aspect can provide a 
helpful insight into these organisations, this aspect may not provide a framework to 
analyse the controversial industry. Give that this thesis aspires to a broader sense of the 
gambling industry. Integrative theories will be ruled out for its purpose. 
 
The third group of theories is ethical theories, which concentrate on ethical 
requirements that strengthen the relationship between corporations and society and are 
based on principles that relate to doing the right things to maintain a society (Garriga 
and Melé, 2004). These ethical theories include universal rights (Cassel, 2001), 
sustainable development (Gladwin and Kennelly, 1995) and the common good approach, 
which builds on intrinsic philosophical concepts, such as Aristotelian virtue ethics 
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(Maclntyre, 2002), Kantian duty ethics (Maclntyre, 2002), Catholic social thoughts 
(Carey, 2001), Buddhism (Marques, 2009), Confucianism (Wang and Juslin, 2009) and 
Kyosei (Kaku, 1997; Boardman and Kato, 2003). Ethical theories are not populated in a 
specific country. Ethical theories provide an underlying philosophical foundation upon 
which to view the concept of CSR; however, ethical theories tend to lack clarity and 
there is little scholarly consensus due to a lack of empirical support. Although ethical 
theories can be useful to give some insights into understanding whether or not the 
gambling industry is ethical or not, this controversial debate is not the main focus of this 
thesis, which focuses instead on the articulating of CSR by gambling companies. 
 
Even though the above three CSR theories can provide some helpful perspectives to this 
thesis, the present researcher has considered political theories to be more suitable for an 
examination of the gambling industry worldwide. Three major political theories can be 
loosely classified as corporate citizenship (Davis, 1973), integrative social contract 
theory (Donaldson and Dunfee, 1994, 1999) and corporate constitutionalism (Davis, 
1967). Political theories focus on the “interaction and connection between business and 
society and on the power and position of business and inherent” (Garriga and Melé, 
2004, p. 55). In addition, the broader political CSR literature has often addressed the 
relationship between government and business (Moon and Vogel, 2008).  
 
2.2.3  The business case  
CSR looks to have become a mainstream part of business activities and this is probably 
for a number of reasons. Corporations not only have a financial purpose, but also have 
additional purposes: social and environmental concerns of business (for example, 
Elkington, 1997). This view of the relationship between making profit and social and 
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environmental concerns is often known as “the business case” for CSR (Kurucz, et al. 
2008). Corporations can “do well by doing good”, which means that they can perform 
well in financial terms in business operations and can be responsible to creating a better 
society (Kurucz, et al., 2008). Thus, business practitioners often incorporate CSR in 
their business. This view is possibly a superficial view of the motivations for 
corporations’ CSR engagement.   
 
The business case for CSR is likely to provide a wide range of benefits for companies. It 
is often argued that organisations employing CSR can gain not only competitive 
advantage (McWilliams and Siegel, 2001; Porter and Kramer, 2002; Brammer and 
Millingon, 2005; Kurucz, et al., 2008), but can also enhance corporate image and 
reputation (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990; Turban and Greening, 1997; Brammer and 
Millington, 2005; Kurucz, et al., 2008; Jo and Na, 2012). CSR can be regarded as a 
strategic tool to change corporate image and re-construct corporate reputation in order 
to get the support of the community (Hertz, 2001; Klein, 2001; William, 2004). A 
number of studies have examined CSR in relation to employees and the results show 
that employing CSR can improve employee productivity (Brammer and Millington, 
2005; Lertzman and Vredenburg, 2005) and attract a quality labour force (Turban and 
Greening, 1997; Greening and Turban, 2000; Backhaus, et al., 2002) in order to reduce 
the turnover rate of employees (Hertz, 2001). In addition, several CSR studies have 
shown that CSR engagement can reduce costs (Smith, 2005; Kurucz, et al., 2008; 
Carroll and Shaband, 2010), risks (Cai, et al., 2012; Jo and Na, 2012), and have 
synergistic value creation (Kurucz, et al., 2008). 
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2.2.4 Critical perspectives of CSR  
However, CSR in “the business case” context tends to be limited to a “win-win” 
situation and “business as usual” with the assumption of making good business and 
improving shareholder value (Banerjee, 2008). Not all scholars agree with the business 
case.  
 
First of all, some scholars believe that the economic motivation is important. Friedman 
(1970) argues that a socially responsible corporation must maximise shareholder wealth. 
Sternberg (2000) extends Friedman’s (1970) argument by claiming that a corporation 
using its resources for non-financial purposes may be considered a form of “socialism” 
and is theft of the owner’s property. After all, corporations seem to have no legal 
requirement to serve the public interest (Crane and Matten, 2004; Banerjee, 2007). The 
development, promotion, and diffusion of CSR can be underpinned by an economic 
initiative, rather than an ethical one (Tilston, 2004). Henderson (2001) argues that 
corporate commitment to CSR is “deeply flawed” or “a mistaken view” which 
undermines the market economy. Long-term CSR engagement can be regarded as 
incompatible with economic objectives (Lertzman and Vredenburg, 2005). When there 
is an economic downturn, corporations may choose their survival over CSR engagement 
(Kapelus, 2002).  
 
The above discussion is based on the ideology of a free-market and capitalism. Provided 
that we accept “pristine capitalism”, the only social responsibility of a profit-making 
corporation is to seek profit (Gray, et al., 1996). Large, influential and powerful 
corporations, especially MNCs, tend not to be held responsible for their economic 
action and their behaviour can gradually affect society and the environment (Gray, et al., 
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1996). Gray and Milne (2004) go so far as to argue that the two famous scholars of 
capitalism, Karl Marx and Milton Friedman, surprisingly agreed on this notion; 
corporations cannot be socially responsible since the design of an organisation in 
contemporary capitalism follows a financial initiative. In addition, Carroll, et al. (2012, 
p. 8) claim that “corporate social responsibility asserts that capitalism is not perfect, but 
that the system can be perfected; capitalism has faults, but they can be addressed 
through other institutions (government) or through voluntary action by capitalists 
themselves”. In other words, corporations generally engage in CSR in order to pursue 
economic interest, without attempting to change the structure of the capitalism. 
 
Recent CSR studies have increasingly called for more reflexive and critical perspectives 
on CSR (Bondy, et al., 2012). The critical CSR literature has focused on three main 
issues. First, scholars challenged the universality of the CSR concept by showing how it 
is conceptualised differently in different countries (Blowfield and Frynas, 2005; Scherer, 
et al., 2009). According to Campbell (2007, p. 950) “…Socially responsible corporate 
behaviour may mean different things in different places to different people and at 
different time …” Matten and Moon (2008) have developed a theoretical analysis of 
national business systems to analyse CSR in national institutional contexts to address 
the questions of how and why CSR differs across country and to suggest an explanation 
of “implicit14” CSR (Section 2.5). Second, the critical CSR literature questions the role 
of business in society. Corporations increasingly take the role of government (Matten 
and Crane, 2005; Moon, et al., 2005) and this is known as “corporations as political 
actors” (Scherer and Palazzo, 2007). Third, the recent CSR studies have recognised that 
it is important to improve CSR research and its application in business (Bondy, et al., 
                                                     
14
 Implicit CSR refers to “values, norms and rules that result in requirement for corporations”, while 
explicit CSR refers to “voluntary corporate polices, programmes and strategies” (Matten and Moon, 2008, 
p. 410). 
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2012). In particular, Banerjee (2007, p. 167) and Devinney (2009, p. 54) both place 
emphasis on the importance of the need for a much more rigorous investigation of 
particular CSR practices, outcomes, and implications for society. Concentrating on CSR 
as a “good alone” (Devinney, 2009, p. 54) is a naïve thought. The complexity and 
subtlety of corporations’ reasons for engaging in CSR needs to be explored in reflexive 
mode.   
 
Corporations, especially MNCs, are becoming increasingly influential, powerful, and 
dominant in business and society. MNCs have the ability to choose their stakeholders 
(see, for example, Freeman, 1984; Donaldson and Preston, 1995). This selection is not 
directly related to the impact of their business operation, but is linked to the power, 
urgency, and legitimacy of the stakeholder claim (Mitchell, et al., 1997). MNCs are 
increasingly involved in providing public services, for example the development of 
national infrastructure, to ensure the access of MNCs to critical resources (Crane, et al., 
2008a). Therefore, MNCs are in an exclusive position to shape CSR in ways that are 
beneficial to them (Bondy, et al., 2012). CSR is possibly “windowing dressing” for 
irresponsible behaviour (Banerjee, 2008) or a “smokescreen” for deregulation (Hanlon, 
2008). Bondy, et al.’s (2012) study shows how the existence of CSR within MNCs 
represents a shift in the meaning of CSR away from stakeholders concerns, operational 
impacts and consideration of social and environmental issues and towards pursuing 
profit.  
 
The term, CSR, has thus been subjected to scrutiny and it would seem that corporations’ 
motivation for engaging in CSR remains questionable. Equally, CSR can be considered 
a shield, label, or cloak deployed by corporations to cover up their corporate 
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externalities. Corporations seem to employ this term in order to portray themselves as 
good businesses in order to create a stable, secure, and responsible business 
environment and thus in turn to ensure their survival, placate stakeholders and lobby 
government. In other words, CSR can be seen as an essential device for developing and 
maintaining organisational legitimacy.  
 
2.3 Legitimacy theory  
One of the main features of a controversial industry is that its products and services are 
contested. CSR in this controversial industry is likely to be questionable (Miller and 
Michelson, 2012). The level of cognitive beliefs about the product or service helps to 
constitute product acceptability and reconfigure a controversial industry’s legitimacy 
(Galvin, et al., 2004-05).  
 
In this thesis, it will be argued that the construction of legitimacy in the gambling 
industry can be subtle and complex due to both laws and societal norms. First, there is 
the dichotomy of free market-based regulation and gambling prohibition, “which does 
not seem to advance us very far as both positions in pure and simple form are rather 
marginal in mainstream debate” (Borrell, 2008, p. 267). From an industry viewpoint, 
some gambling regulation is appropriate because it can serve to increase and create 
lucrative businesses (Borrell, 2008). Much debate exists around which type of gambling 
activities should be legalised. However, according to Galvin, et al. (2004-05, p. 69), 
“The struggles over industry legitimacy are less about the activity of gambling per se, 
and much more about the authorised organisations and locations in which these 
activities take place”. Thus, it is subject to significant regulation and control by 
government (Miller and Michelson, 2012). Some countries, such as the US, the UK and 
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Australia, legalised the gambling industry for a number of political reasons, such as 
urban regeneration, tax revenue and tourism development (Austrin and West, 2005). In 
this vein, the legitimacy of the gambling industry can ensure the stability of businesses, 
markets and investors (Borrell, 2008). The gambling industry responds to any 
accusations by providing official arguments and legal justification for its actions (see 
also Spar and La Mure, 2003).  
 
Second, gambling tends to be socially constructed as illegitimate according to the 
historical background of gambling (Reith, 2007; Chapter 1). However, the evolution of 
gambling can be characterised as movement from an illegitimate form to a legitimated 
form of socially undesirable behaviour of recreation and consumption due to economic, 
political, and cultural changes in western society (Reith, 2007). Thus, the legitimacy of 
gambling is susceptible to re-interpretation and change over time (see Johnson and 
Holub, 2003). It is for these reasons that legitimacy theory can provide a useful starting 
point to examine CSR in the gambling industry.  
 
2.3.1   Definition of legitimacy 
Legitimacy has been widely discussed in institutional theory (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; 
Oliver, 1991; Suchman, 1995), resourse dependence theory (Pfeffer and Slancik, 1978), 
and organisational ecology (Singh, et al., 1986; Baum and Oliver, 1991). In defining 
legitimacy, it is an essential issue to consider various definitions and concentrate on 
what it means in terms of CSR. The concept of organisational legitimacy is derived 
from the work of Parsons (1960) which views legitimacy as congruence of organisation 
with social laws, norms and values; whereas, Weber’s (1978) writings discusses the 
importance of social practice which is related to “maxims” or rules and Weber also 
suggests legitimacy can be in conformity with both social norms and formal laws. 
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Relating to this thesis, an organisation will be considered legitimate if it represents 
social norms and values. Dowling and Pfeffer (1975) try to distinguish the difference 
between the laws and societal norms and values by stating that legitimacy is not entirely 
defined by what is legal or illegal, but a democratic law tends to correlate with societal 
norms and values. Suchman (1995, p. 574) provides a generic definition of legitimacy 
as “a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, 
proper or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs 
and definitions”. The most widely used definitions of organisational legitimacy focus 
the scope of actors’ behaviours concerning legitimacy assessment (Bitektine, 2011). 
Legitimacy could be understood as actors’ perceptions of the organisation, as a 
judgment regarding the organisation, or as the behavioural consequences of perception 
and judgment so as to reveal actors’ actions, particularly, acceptance and endorsement 
(Bitektine, 2011, p. 152), preserve “societal acceptance” (Weaver, et al., 1999) and lend 
credibility (Galvin, et al., 2004-5). The definition of legitimacy indicates that social 
actors grant or withhold legitimacy that shows a mechanism of “social control” (see 
Parson, 1951). Thus, social actors can encourage and promote structures and practices 
that they perceive as favourable for their organisation, their social group or even the 
whole society (Bitektine, 2011). 
 
2.3.2   Concept of legitimacy 
Aldrich and Fiol (1994) and Suchman (1995) deal with the conceptual dimensions of 
legitimacy. Aldrich and Fiol (1994, p. 648) identify two different legitimacies: cognitive 
and socio-political legitimacy. Cognitive legitimacy refers to a certain recognised 
organisational form and characteristics (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Barron, 1988; 
Suchman, 1995). These characteristics are generally identifiable organisational features, 
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such as structural, technical, or procedural characteristics, which “can be part of a 
cognitive legitimacy judgement inasmuch as they are used to classify the organisation as 
a member of a certain industry or class of organisations” (Bitektine, 2011, p. 158). 
Socio-political legitimacy, on the other hand, refers to whether certain organisational 
features, attributes, and outcomes of their activities against social norms, or their 
features are socially acceptable or unacceptable and which lead to organisations being 
sanctioned until they change their behaviour (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Aldrich and Fiol, 
1994; Suchman, 1995; Kostova and Zaheer, 1999). 
 
Suchman (1995) notes three theoretical aspects of legitimacy: first, legitimacy is 
“generalised” – “it represents an umbrella evaluation that, to some extent, transcends 
specific adverse acts or occurrences”; second, legitimacy is a “perception or assumption” 
– “it represents a reaction of observers to the organisation as they see it’; third, 
legitimacy is ‘socially constructed” – “it reflects a congruence between the behaviours 
of legitimated entity and the shared (or assumedly shared) beliefs of some social group” 
(Suchman, 1995, p. 574). It is important to note that organisations with questionable 
legitimacy tend to lack public support from the media (Marcus and Goodman, 1991) 
and would be viewed as less trustworthy (Suchman, 1995). It is important to note that 
organisations can lose their perceived legitimacy (Campbell, 2007). 
 
2.3.3   Types of organisational legitimacy 
Suchman (1995) distinguishes three types of organisational legitimacy: pragmatic 
legitimacy, moral legitimacy and cognitive legitimacy. Pragmatic legitimacy results 
from the calculations of self-interested individuals who are a part of the organisation’s 
immediate audiences, such as the key stakeholders or the public (Suchman, 1995). 
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Organisations offer something valuable and stakeholders are thereby getting something 
valuable in return (Reast, et al., 2012). Moral legitimacy refers to judgements on 
organisational activities which are the right thing to do within a set of accepted social 
values (Suchman, 1995, p. 579). Moral legitimacy reflects a normative evaluation of the 
organisational activities (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994). Cognitive legitimacy, finally, refers to 
“an organisation or mere acceptance of the organisation as necessary or inevitable based 
on taken-for-granted” assumptions (Suchman, 1995, p. 582). Cognitive legitimacy is 
different from pragmatic and moral legitimacies, as cognitive legitimacy does not 
involve an evaluation (Reast, et al., 2012). Seeking organisational legitimacy become 
more difficult as one moves from pragmatic to moral to cognitive (Suchman, 1995).  
 
2.3.4   Managing organisational legitimacy 
Some studies have examined how new organisations, entrepreneurs, multinational 
enterprises
15
 (MNEs) seek legitimacy (Baum and Oliver, 1991; Aldrich and Fiol, 1994; 
Kostova and Zaheer, 1999
16
; Zimmerman and Zeitz, 2002). Legitimacy can be 
considered a resource, which is essential for survival (Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975; 
Woodward, et al., 2001; O’Donovan, 2002), and is important to have the retention of 
corporations’ license to operate (Deegan, 2002). Ashforth and Gibbs (1990) suggest 
legitimation practices and Suchman (1995) further explores three distinct purposes of 
                                                     
15
 The multinational enterprise is an organisation that operates in more than two countries, while the 
MNE subunit is related to the shared polices, practices and strategies (Kostova and Zaheer, 1999). Thus, 
the legitimacy of the MNE subunit is the acceptance and by particular host country institutional 
environment (Kostova and Zaheer, 1999, p.65).  
16
 In particular, the MNEs, such as Nike, Shell, and BP, operate their subsidiaries in developing countries. 
Kostova and Zaheer (1999, p.68) suggest that MNEs often face two institutional environments: the 
internal environment of MNEs and the external host country environment. The first one refers to internal 
legitimacy, which is related to a unit adopting the organisational structures, policies, and practices 
institutionalized within the MNEs (Kostova and Zaheer, 1999). Internal legitimacy is vital for its survival 
of a subsidiary because of its dependence on the parent company for continuing access to resources, for 
example capital, knowledge and technology (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). The second one refers to the 
acceptance of an MNE subsidiary is affected by the host country environment and attitude toward foreign 
firm (Kostova and Zaheer, 1999). 
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legitimacy: gaining, maintain, and repairing legitimacy. The choice of legitimation 
tactics or techniques often depends on the aims of any organisational response 
(O’Donovan, 2002, p. 349). 
 
The first purpose of an organisation is to gain legitimacy. If large organisations move 
into a new area, they will face the challenge of gaining legitimacy (O’Donovan, 2002, p. 
349). This challenge can be seen as a “liability of newness” (Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990). 
In order to gain legitimacy, such organisations tend to take a proactive strategy to alter 
social values. They have advance knowledge of change, which could possibly threaten 
the organisations’ legitimacy; therefore, they can control the information and message 
before the issue becomes more public (O’Donovan, 2002). In other words, organisations 
wish to restrict the public’s knowledge of the negative information as long as they could 
(O’Donovan, 2002). 
 
Maintaining legitimacy can be generally considered easier than gaining or repairing 
legitimacy (Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990; O’Donovan, 2002). In maintaining legitimacy, 
the challenge of organisations is to identify the publics’ needs so that organisations need 
to observe, change, and protect past accomplishments (Suchman, 1995; O’Donovan, 
2002). Thus, organisations can be expected to change and control public’s perceptions 
(Sethi, 1978; Suchman, 1995; Deegan, 2007). According to O’Donovan (2002, p. 350), 
maintaining legitimacy has been classified into three different levels: first, if 
organisations are accepted as good corporate citizens and act responsibly, the public will 
have certain expectations concerning social and environmental activities; second, if 
organisations have the less “legitimacy”, the less they need to maintain; third, if 
organisations promote themselves as socially and environmentally responsible, they will 
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move one step ahead to fulfil what public would expect in order to maintain legitimacy. 
Repairing legitimacy has been related to different levels of crisis management (Elsbach 
and Sutton, 1992). Several CSD studies have generally examined how organisations 
adopted repairing legitimacy to respond to unforeseen crisis (Patten, 1992, 2002; 
Elsbach and Sutton, 1992; Elsbach, 1994; Deegan, et al., 2000). Repairing legitimacy is 
similar to gaining legitimacy; however, the main difference between the two is that 
repairing legitimacy appears to be involved in reactive strategies to unforeseen and 
immediate crises, whereas gaining legitimacy is proactive and not generally related to a 
crisis (O’Donovan, 2002). 
 
Organisational legitimacy suggests strategic initiatives for organisations seeking 
legitimacy in controversial industries (Reast, et al., 2012). In particular, companies in 
the tobacco industry are socially constructed an “illegitimate” (Campbell, et al., 2003). 
Thus, companies appear to adopt proactive strategies in gaining legitimacy, rather than 
to take reactive strategies to repair legitimacy to respond to an unforeseen crisis 
(O’Donovan, 2002). The tobacco industry in general has been facing ongoing threats to 
its legitimacy: smoking and health issues (Tilling and Tilt, 2010). The two important 
documents were the 1962 British Royal College of Physicians report and the 1964 
Surgeon-Generals Report (USA), which concluded that cigarette smoking is positively 
linked to lung cancer and other diseases associated with smoking (Gately, 2001 cited in 
Tilling and Tilt, 2010). Furthermore, Moerman and van der Laan (2005, p. 385) 
concluded that British American Tobacco (BAT) used social reporting as a 
“management strategy to forestall the introduction of more onerous regulation and to 
obfuscate or defect poor social performance.” Their results thus suggest a legitimacy 
motivation for social disclosure due to a consistent threat to their legitimacy (Moerman 
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and van der Laan (2005).  
 
In a similar vein, the gambling industry has also been facing ongoing legitimacy threats: 
especially those of gambling- and health-related issues. The health issues can be broadly 
divided into individual and public health levels. From individual health level, gambling 
problem can raise in psychological problems, including loss of self-esteem, depression 
and risk of suicide (Quinn, 2001). From public health level, gambling problem can 
influence social relationships, economic loss, and legal effects (England and Hlbrechi, 
1984; Korn and Shaffer, 1999; Li, et al., 2011). In general, “problem gamblers” 
constitute roughly 2% of the general population (Blaszczynski, et al., 2011; LaPlante, et 
al., 2011). This small percentage of the population which experiences gambling problem 
(Li, et al., 2011) may not realise their problem with gambling, and it is hard to control 
impulsive gambling and may even lead to involvement in socially destructive behaviour 
(from family violence to crime) (The Productivity Commission, 1999).   
 
The gambling industry can be expected to engage in efforts to identify with symbols of 
social legitimacy, for example CSD disclosures, CSR initiatives, and Responsible 
Gambling (RG) programmes (see Chapters 1 and 7) (Reast, et al., 2012). The industry 
might seek the legitimacy associated with CSR engagement for a number of reasons, for 
example to ensure the industry’s continuity and creditability (Reast, et al., 2012). 
Continuity can be achieved due to key stakeholders providing significant resources to 
industries that appear to be “desirable, proper and appropriate within some socially 
constructed systems of norms” (Suchman, 1995, p. 574), while creditability might 
enhance how individuals understand the industry’s trustworthiness (Miller and 
Michelson, 2012). A number of studies examine organisational tactics or strategies to 
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gain or seek legitimacy in a range of such industries as tobacco (Tilling and Tilt, 2010), 
brewing (Campbell, et al., 2003) and minerals (Deegan and Blomquist, 2006); however, 
relatively few studies have discussed gaining or seeking legitimacy in the gambling 
industry.  
 
2.3.5   Sources of legitimacy 
Organisations tend to look for different sources to legitimise their actions. These sources 
can be viewed as the audiences-based types of legitimacy (Bitektine, 2011). The 
audience can confer legitimacy on an organisation that can vary across industries 
(Bitektine, 2011). More importantly, some audiences are more important than others so 
that organisations can choose their strategy to decide which audiences that they should 
focus on (Oliver, 1991; Elsback and Sutton, 1992; Suchman, 1995; Clemens and Cook, 
1999). However, several studies have investigated external audiences, for example the 
media and professional associations, rather than internal audiences (see Pollock and 
Rindova, 2003). Deephouse and Suchman (2008) outline three major sources of 
legitimacy: authority, the media, and interorganisational relations. 
 
2.3.5.1   Authority 
The first source of legitimacy is related to authority. Meyer and Scott (1983, p. 200-201 
cited in Deephouse and Suchman, 2008) classify legitimacy sources into two main 
groups: the State and professionals. The first group is those who “have standing and 
license, derived from the organisation’s legitimating account of itself” (Deephouse and 
Suchman, 2008, p.55). This group tends to be a regulatory legitimacy, resulting from 
enforcement activities within the State. This group refers to an authority which 
establishes the regulations that control the way organisations should behave in a 
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particular field (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Singh et al., 1986; Baum and Oliver, 1991; 
Deephouse, 1996). In other words, this group can influence on performance and 
existence of industries and organisations, but is limited in institutional contexts 
(Bitektine, 2011). Operational measurements of legitimacy with this type include 
longitudinal data on the number of registered, licensed, or certified organisations 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Singh, et al., 1986; Baum and Oliver, 1991). Government 
generally determines the conditions for granting of licenses to operate gambling 
organisations, and similarly constrain the activities of these organisations in order to 
protect citizens’ rights (see Crane, et al., 2004). In the case of the gambling industry, 
governments establish the regulations that control organisations in the industry and 
which determine how they should behave. The second group is those who have 
collective authority, such as lawyers, accountants, and intellectuals (Meyer and Scott, 
1983). The gambling industry can be expected to be similar to other industries, for 
example the banking industry (Coupland, 2006), which suggests that CSR 
self-regulation through the legitimacy of the accounting professions, such as KPMG, 
which shows the role of accounting and auditing procedures.  
 
2.3.5.2   Media 
The second source of legitimacy is the media. Baum and Powell (1995) note that the 
media is one of the rich indicators of society-wide legitimacy. From 1990s, researchers 
in this area have been working on organisational legitimacy as reflected in 
communications through different forms of media (Deephouse and Suchman, 2008). 
Media reports have been generally employed as operationalisation of legitimacy 
(Elasback, 1994; Deephouse, 1996; Brown and Deegan, 1998; Pollock and Rindova, 
2003). Other studies used other forms of media, such as business articles (Abrahamson 
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and Fairchild, 1999), newspaper (Ryan and Barley 1994 cited in Deephouse and 
Suchman, 2008) and prestige media - The Wall Street Journal (Lamertz and Baum, 1998; 
Bansal and Clelland, 2004). More importantly, media reports can reflect and influence 
the opinion of the public (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990). Moreover, the media can act as 
“a monitoring service by reporting illegitimate activities” (Hybel, 1995, p. 244). In 
particular, the CSD literature has widely used media reports, such as annual reports 
(Patten, 1992; Gray, et al., 1996; Brown and Deegan, 1998; O’Donovan, 2002), 
standalone reports (Kolk, 2003), and internet website (Williams and Pei, 1999; 
Coupland, 2005; 2006; Aerts and Cormier, 2009) as communication strategies (Chapter 
3). Thus, we might expect that organisations in the gambling industry can employ CSD 
as a legitimising tool to offer a stronger base and a symbol of social legitimacy (Miller 
and Michelson, 2012; Reast, et al., 2012). 
 
2.3.5.3   Interorganisational relations 
The third source of legitimacy is derived from interorganisational relations. 
Organisations gain legitimacy as they are connected to other legitimate sources 
(Deephouse and Suchman, 2008) such as endorsements from political figures (Pfeffer 
and Salancik, 1978), board of directors (Singh, et al., 1986), industry leaders (Baum and 
Oliver, 1991), investors (Rao, et al., 2001; Certo, 2003) and advocacy groups (Rao, 
1998; Rao, et al., 2000). A good illustration of this is corporate donation, which can link 
to corporate managers and develop strategic alliance with prestigious partners; thus, this 
relationship can possibly be viewed as an important source of legitimacy (Galaskiewicz, 
1985; Deephouse and Suchman, 2008). 
 
In the case of the gambling industry, even if gambling companies engage in corporate 
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philanthropy, these organisations attempt to justify themselves to be a good citizen. For 
example, the gambling research conducted by one UK University, which is funded by 
one of the gambling companies - Gala Coral (Gala Coral, 2009a). Interorganisational 
relations can also be regarded as stakeholder collaboration, which can be viewed as a 
major pillar in establishing credibility (Palazzo and Richter, 2005). Sometimes, a third 
independent party is perceived by the community as a high value standard and this can 
be regarded as procedural legitimation (Richardson and Dowling, 1986). Another 
example is the oil industry, Shell Gas (LPG), justified its action by referring to the 
neutral experts – scientists who have done several independent studies (Basu and 
Palazzo, 2008). Such collaboration can provide a greater credibility for CSR 
programmes. Hence, credible personnel and experts also bolster organisational 
legitimacy so that such organisations can be viewed as prudent and rational (Elsbach 
and Sutton, 1992). This collaboration can result in increasing the credibility of the 
impression management tactics. 
 
2.3.6   Organisational legitimacy – strategic and institutional legitimacy 
Suchman (1995) suggests that there are two mainstreams of organisational legitimacies: 
strategic and institutional legitimacy. The strategic approach takes a micro level of 
analysis by referring to “a managerial perspective emphasises the ways in which 
organisations instrumentally manipulate and deploy evocative symbols in order to 
garner societal support” (Suchman, 1995, p. 572). This approach assumes that managers 
have a high degree of control over the legitimacy process (Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975; 
Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990; Lindblom, 1993). By contrast, institutional legitimacy takes 
a macro level of analysis. According to Suchman (1995, p.572) “adopts a more detached 
stance and emphasises the ways in which sector-wide structuration dynamics generate 
58 
 
cultural pressures that transcend any single organisation’s purposive control”. This 
approach tends to concentrate on how organisations adopt an institutional environment 
so as to manage legitimacy (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer and Rowan, 1991). 
This approach also describes organisational legitimacy as a continuous and unconscious 
adaption process in which corporations react to external expectations (Palazzo and 
Scherer, 2006). These two perspectives of organisational legitimacy, strategic and 
institutional legitimacy, which are interrelated, overlap and are interwoven, are both 
pertinent to this thesis. 
 
2.3.6.1   Strategic Legitimacy 
The “legitimacy gap” (Sethi, 1978) is used to describe the situation where there is a lack 
of correspondence between the actual or perceived behaviour of an organisation and 
with social values and norms. In the gambling industry, the issues of “problem gambling” 
have become more prominent during the past few decades (Hing, 2001). “Problem 
gamblers” constitute roughly 2% of the general population (Blaszczynski, et al., 2011; 
LaPlante, et al., 2011). In particular, a problem gambler negatively influences an 
average of 10 to 17 people, such as family, friends, and employers (Shaffer and Korn, 
2002). The social costs of gambling activity are 1.9 times higher than social benefits 
(Grinols and Mustard, 2001). Gambling has been linked to illegal activities including 
drugs, prostitution and crime (Collins, 2003; Reith, 2007; Chapter 1). As a result, the 
gambling industry has been facing an ongoing legitimacy threat: in the form of 
gambling addiction and health-related issues (Section 2.3.4). In this controversial 
industry, it is expected to have created the legitimacy gap. This provides a motivation 
for organisational legitimation.  
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To consider organisational strategies for maintaining or creating congruence of social 
value between organisations and society, two particular papers, Dowling and Pfeffer 
(1975) and Lindblom (1993), have been cited in the CSD literature. Dowling and 
Pfeffer (1975, p.127) outline three ways corporations face legitimacy threats.  
 
 the organisation can adapt its output, goals and methods of operation to conform to 
prevailing definitions of legitimacy 
 the organisation can attempt, through communication, to alter the definition of 
social legitimacy so that it conforms to the organisation’s present practices, output, 
and value;  
 the organisation can attempt, again through communication, to become identified 
with symbols, values, or institutions which have a strong base of social legitimacy. 
 
Consistent with Dowling and Pfeffer’s communication strategy, Lindblom (1993) states 
that legitimacy is a dynamic concept. Lindblom (1993) argues that a distinction needs to 
be considered between legitimacy and legitimation. The former is a status or condition, 
while the latter is the process of obtaining states or condition (Lindblom, 1993). When 
organisations face various legitimation threats, they will adopt four general legitimation 
strategies, which overlap with Dowling and Pfeffer’s (1975) work. 
 
 An attempt to educate its stakeholders about the organisation’s intentions to 
improve that performance; 
 An attempt to change the stakeholders’ perceptions of the event (but without 
changing its actual performance); 
 An attempt to distract (ie. manipulate) attention from the perceived problem areas 
(concentrate on some positive activity not necessarily related to the failure itself; 
 An attempt to change external expectations about its performance. 
 
In particular, Lindblom’s (1993) work focuses on both the proactive and reactive nature 
of legitimation strategies with symbolic actions in order to maintain organisational 
legitimacy. Legitimacy theory can be applied in the gambling industry, which can take 
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certain actions if the revelations about harm associated with gambling can create a 
significant legitimacy gap. This gap may well provide an important motivation for 
organisational legitimation within the gambling industry. The gap can probably be 
reduced through CSD, CSR initiatives and RG programmes. Legitimacy theory has not 
only been described as a positive theory, seeking to explain or predict particular 
managerial activities and certain actions, but has also been described as a system-based 
theory (Deegan, 2007). The purpose of legitimacy theory is viewed by Dowling and 
Pfeffer (1975) and Lindblom (1993) as shifting public opinion and convincing public 
audiences that the organisation is legitimate (Neu, et al., 1998; O’Dwyer, 2002). 
However, these strategies have used in CSD empirical studies, which in turn limits 
legitimacy to a superficial level of examining a set of strategies, rather than to have a 
deeper level of discussing or an investigating of the concept of legitimacy itself. Thus, 
legitimacy theory is generally considered to be underdeveloped (Deegan, 2002) and 
needs further development (Neu, et al., 1998; Deegan, 2007). 
 
In recent years, gambling companies have been criticised because of the harms 
associated with gambling; however, gamblers are deemed to make their own choice to 
gamble. Gambling companies can provide information which is about the attributes and 
contributions of organisations to offset the negative impact to society. Therefore, 
gambling companies tend to highlight their strengths, such as taxation, donation, and 
RG engagement, while neglecting information that will have unfavourable implications, 
such as news concerning gambling addiction, social disruption and illegal activities 
(money-laundering, kidnapping, and corruption). As a result, gambling companies 
attempt to produce such information to distract the attention of the public in order to 
change the values of society towards gambling (see Lindblom’s third point, 1993). 
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Nevertheless, if a company’s major product is perceived and socially structured 
illegitimate, for example the tobacco companies, “legitimacy can never be attained in 
the eyes of some constituencies and here the objective cannot be restore something 
which it never had” (Campbell, et al., 2003, p. 560). O’Donovan (2002) suggests that 
the lower the perceived legitimacy of the organisation, the less likely it was to bother 
providing CSD disclosure. Another explanation could be that such companies are 
socially constructed as illegitimate and so social disclosure would have “no effective 
value” (Campbell, et al., 2003). Thus, such companies are more likely to make low or 
no social disclosures so stakeholders are slowly being neglected (Campbell, et al., 2003). 
Tilling and Tilt (2010) and De Villiers and van Staden (2006) found that reducing 
disclosure can be viewed as a legitimising strategy in the tobacco industry in Australia, 
and the mining industry in South Africa. Importantly, little unfavourable information is 
disclosed, supporting Owen and O’Dwyer’s (2008) view that voluntary social disclosure 
appears to illustrate favourable managerial accounts of positive information. 
Organisations repairing or maintaining legitimacy might view disclosure completely 
different from those organisations building or establishing legitimacy (Campbell, et al., 
2003). Organisations attempting to build legitimacy might feel that the costs of 
disclosures are higher than the benefits, and thus adopting the best strategy is simply to 
remain silent (Campbell, et al., 2003). 
 
It is worth noting that the particular CSR process adopted differs from one organisation 
to another, or from one industry to another. However, strategic legitimacy can be 
changed to analyse another industry or the gambling industry in a different context.  
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2.3.6.2   Substantive and symbolic legitimacy 
Both Dowling and Pfeffer (1975) and Lindblom (1993) have the common theme of 
symbolic action and Ashforth and Gibbs (1990) further explores this aspect as two 
legitimacy approaches: substantive and symbolic management techniques. 
 
Substantive management techniques refer to “material change in organisational goals, 
structures, and processes or socially institutionalized practices” (Ashforth and Gibbs, 
1990, p. 178). Substantive management techniques include role performance, coercive 
isomorphism (conform to the values, norms and expectations of constituents) 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Section 2.3.6.3), altering resource dependencies and 
altering socio-instituted practices, all of which techniques involve a real change in the 
behaviour of the corporation (Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990, p. 178). In contrast, symbolic 
management techniques refer to techniques with which organisations will portray or 
symbolically manage themselves in order to “appear consistent with social values and 
expectations and transforms the meaning of acts” (Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990, p. 180). 
Symbolic management techniques comprise espousing socially acceptable goals, denial 
and concealment, redefining means and ends, offering accounts, offering apologies and 
ceremonial conformity. According to Ashforth and Gibbs (1990), organisations 
necessarily employ either substantive or symbolic management techniques or both.  
 
2.3.6.3   Institutional legitimacy 
Institutional legitimacy, in contrast, can consider broader contexts in the constitution of 
the organisation. Meyer and Rowan (1977) suggest that rational myths are regarded as 
prescriptions of proper behaviour, and organisations become isomorphic with their 
institutional environment to gain legitimacy with different types of stakeholders. 
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Legitimacy can be achieved by conforming to institutionalised structures and practices 
(Meyer and Rowan, 1977).  
 
This is regarded as “a set of constitutive beliefs” (Suchman, 1995, p. 576). The most 
cited work for institutional legitimacy is DiMaggio and Powell (1983), which suggest 
three main processes: coercive isomorphism, mimetic processes and normative 
pressures. These three pressures can increase homogeneity of practices concerning 
different institutions (Scott, 2001 cited in Bondy, et al., 2012). 
 
Coercive isomorphism
17
 refers to organisational behaviour which may be controlled by 
institutional pressure rather than by managers that produce an “iron cage” (DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1983). However, these pressures may be complex, pervasive, and powerful 
and explain why and how organisations should exist and behave (Milne and Pattern, 
2002). Coercive isomorphism includes both formal and informal rules to enforce 
organisations. Formal rules are regarded as hard law and forms of regulative pressures 
from governmental regulation (Scherer and Palazzo, 2011). Informal rules are viewed as 
“soft law 18 ” with voluntary actions and self-regulation of companies without a 
governmental power (Moon, et al., 2011). Self-regulation can be viewed as the “new 
institutionalism” in CSR which is codified rules, norms and regulations assigned 
legitimacy to new management practices (Matten and Moon, 2008; Moon, et al., 2011). 
The new institution can be divided into four main types (Table 2). 
 
 
                                                     
17
 Coercive isomorphism refers to organisations to become similar “not through adaptation to an external 
or technically demanding environment or through weeding out of technical and social misfits, but through 
adaptation to a socially constructed environment” (Boxenbaum and Jonsson, 2008, p. 80). 
18
 Soft law means “their effectiveness depends on the extent to which the inherent norms are understood 
and spread among business” (Moon, et al., 2011).  
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Table 2: Institutions for global CSR 
 
     Responsible business institutions (examples) 
Responsible global business 
institutions within companies 
 The Nestlé Business Principles  
 Unilever’s Sustainable Agriculture Guidelines 
 
Responsible global business 
institutions among 
companies 
 International business associations (e.g. the 
World Business Council for Sustainable 
Development, International Business Leaders’ 
Forum)  
 Sector-based associations (e.g. the Electronics 
Industry Citizenship Coalition, the Equator 
Principles {finance})  
 Issue- based associations (e.g. Business 
Coalition on HIV Aids)  
 Region-based associations (e.g. CSR Europe, 
European Alliance on CSR) 
 
Multi-stakeholder 
institutions involving 
responsible global business 
 
 
 Global Reporting Initiative Kimberly Process 
Investment screens and indexes (e.g. FTSE 4 
Good)  
 Sector-specific institutions (e.g. Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative) 
Certification systems (e.g. Forestry 
Certification System, Marine Stewardship 
Council) 
International government-led 
institutions for responsible 
business 
 OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises UN Global Compact International 
Standards Organisation 
Source: Based on Moon, et al. (2010) 
 
The first type of new institution refers to CSR institutions within companies, which 
means that MNCs have increasingly become responsible for their supply chains (Moon, 
et al., 2011). Organisations endeavour not only to employ CSR expertise, but also to 
develop CSR policies, procedures, and reports (Moon, et al., 2011). One of the 
examples in this classification is that in business principles, the Nestlé claims to have 
similar environmental, health and safety standards among their subsidiaries as in 
Switzerland; however, there remains scepticism about whether society can depend on 
intra-company institutions to carry out this business principle (Moon, et al., 2011).   
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The second type is CSR institutions among companies, which refers to organisations 
which collaborate with each other to develop institutions that provide fundamental CSR 
principles and assist individual companies to achieve these requirements (Moon, et al., 
2011). The World Business Council for Sustainable Development consists of more than 
200 CEOs from 35 countries across 20 sectors and this institution are involved in policy 
debates, enhances the business case for sustainable development and develops projects 
in emerging markets (Moon, et al., 2011). Further examples of institutions have a 
sectoral, issue and regional basis (Table 2) and these institutions are self-governing with 
collective motivations (Moon, et al., 2011).  
 
The third type is multi-stakeholder CSR institutions, which refers to numerous 
multi-stakeholder institutions which seek to develop responsible business standards 
(Moon, et al., 2011). The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), an example, consists of 
representatives of accounting, business, society, and government, and this initiative 
encourages sustainability development reporting practices and enhances transparency 
(Moon, et al., 2011). The FTSE4Good, a further example, addresses responsible 
business behaviour at the international level and organisations tend to be explicitly 
engage in using these indicators with investors (Moon, et al., 2011). The Marine 
Stewardship Council developed by Unliver and the World Wildlife Council deal with 
the depletion of fish stocks (Moon, et al., 2011).  
 
In the case of the gambling industry, at the industry level, RG initiatives were developed 
and initiated using industry-based voluntary codes of practice due to government and 
public pressures (Blaszczynski, et al., 2011). Nevertheless, the mandatory and voluntary 
RG initiatives vary greatly across countries (Chapter 7; Appendix 3). These 
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organisations in the gambling industry can be also expected to follow industry-based 
RG initiatives and legislative requirement. However, RG does not have one established 
standard, and thus RG tends not to have international organisations to establish 
legislative requirement (Chapter 7).   
 
The final type is international governmental organisations that combine their power, 
business partners and other organisations to establish CSR institutions (Moon, et al., 
2011). The UN Global Compact (UNGC) provides a framework of ten principles 
concerning human rights, the environment, and anti-corruption and consists of over 
4,000 companies with business associations, nongovernmental organisations (NGOs), 
trade unions and academic institutions (Moon, et al., 2011). However, the UNGC lacks 
real practices and 400 signatories were removed from the list due to inadequate 
reporting (Moon, et al., 2011).  
 
Organisations can encounter institutional pressure from international governmental 
organisations and comply with certain standards, such as ISO 9001, ISO 14001
19
 and 
ISO 26000
20
 (CSR). Organisations in the gambling industry can be expected to follow 
the lead of other industries and adopt these standards. However, organisations may 
employ either substantive or symbolic management techniques or the mixture of the two 
as means of legitimation; however, any attempts at legitimation seem to form part of a 
“myth system” that is loosely or completely decoupled (Milne and Patten, 2002). Taking 
managing environmental issues as an example, corporations may provide accounts of a 
                                                     
19
 The International Organisation for Standards (ISO) issued ISO 14001, which stands for an 
international environmental management standard. It is common practice for environmentally sensitive 
organisations to comply this standard (International Organisation for Standardisation, 2010). 
20
 According to International Organisation for Standardisation (2010, p.4) defines ISO 26000 as “an ISO 
International Standard giving guidance on SR. It is intended for use by organisations of all types, in both 
public and private sectors, in developed and developing countries, as well as in economies in transition. It 
will assist them in their efforts to operate in the socially responsible manner that society increasingly 
demands. ISO 26000 contains voluntary guidance, not requirements, and therefore is not for use as a 
certification standard like ISO 9001:2008 and ISO 14001:2004.” 
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wide range of institutionalised practices, such as ISO 14000, environmental audits and 
committees, in order to manage and reduce environmental pollution (Milne and Patten, 
2002). Yet, such environmental initiatives actually do little to engender a real or 
material change to the “real work” of the organisations (see Jackall, 1998 and Bowles, 
1991). Milne and Patten (2002) suggest that whether organisations employ pure 
symbolic or substantive management techniques, these forms of organisational 
legitimations may do little to change significantly organisational behaviours.   
 
The OECD also developed a number of standards in relations to responsible business at 
the international level; however, these standards are heavily dependent on national 
governments for jurisdiction (Moon, et al., 2011). At national level, CSR is 
comparatively government driven, reflecting European Commission Initiatives and 
national government within European countries (Albareda, et al., 2006; Gond, et al., 
2011). Regional and local governments, for example, have developed CSR polices in 
European countries, such as German province of North Rhine-Westphalia, the UK local 
government (Matten and Moon, 2008) and the French government (Igalens and Nioche, 
1997 cited in Gond, et al., 2011). However, CSR at the national level is implemented 
across national government systems (Gond, et al., 2011). Gond, et al. (2011, p. 646) 
distinguishes five distinct modes of CSR-government configurations: (1) CSR as 
self-government; (2) CSR as facilitated by government; (3) CSR as partnership with 
government; (4) CSR as mandated by government; (5) CSR as a form of government. 
 
Mimetic pressures arise mainly from uncertainties in the business environment, such as 
changes in consumer preferences, absence of government regulation or negative 
publicity (Bondy, et al., 2012). Organisations tend to imitate peers that are perceived as 
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influential or successful (Haveman, 1993) and sometimes managers tend to consider 
practices from industry peers, such as business reengineering and total quality 
management, as “best practices” (Matten and Moon, 2008). MNCs not only join 
business coalitions for CSR to sign up to new principles, codes and standards, such as 
the UK Business in the Community and CSR Europe, but also subscribe to CSR training 
programmes, for example the UK CSR academy, so as to learn CSR practices (Matten 
and Moon, 2008). Another example of mimetic processes is CSR reports, in which 
MNCs received guidance or information from CSR organisations (Matten and Moon, 
2008). Bondy, et al.’s (2012) study shows that MNCs in the UK indicated strong 
mimetic isomorphic pressure to show some form of CSR engagement due to the 
competition between them. A unit operated in a host country, a further example, 
adopting the organisational structures, policies, and practices from the parent company, 
which is known as internal legitimacy (Kostova and Zaheer, 1999). This view can be 
associated with the resource dependency theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), which 
suggests that a subsidiary’s survival is highly dependent on the parent company for 
continuing access to critical resources, particularly CSR and RG knowledge. There is an 
increasing trend towards CSR practices or reports in developed countries so that the 
gambling industry is expected to mimic this process so as to learn and develop CSR 
practices in general and RG practices in particular.   
 
Normative pressures refer to what is generally considered a proper moral duty 
(Suchman, 1995). Such pressures are often related to an external source, for example, 
education and professional authorities which directly or indirectly, set standards for 
legitimate organisational practices (Matten and Moon, 2008). More importantly, 
professional power is generally assigned by the state (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). 
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Such authorities can standardise the “skills and cognitive base” for members of 
education and professional authorities in order to create the “legitimacy for their 
occupational autonomy” (Bondy, et al., 2012, p. 283). Thus, university and professional 
training authorities are important centres for the development of organisational norms 
for managers and their staff (DiMaggio and Power, 1983). There are signals from the 
organisational environment that adoption of a certain practice or structure is a proper 
action (Boxenbaum and Jonsson, 2008). This can influence professionals in 
organisations, which are likely to adopt similar practices and structures (Galaskiewicz 
and Burt, 1991). Bondy, et al.’s (2012) empirical study shows that MNCs did not find 
normative isomorphic pressure as a significant driver in the UK context.  
 
Boxenbaum and Jonsson (2008) suggest that these three pressures stem from an 
organisation field which can be classified into two main pressures: regulative pressure 
from the state (coercive isomorphism) and peer pressure (mimetic and normative 
pressure). Similarly, Strang and Soule (1998) suggest that these three pressures can be 
divided into external diffusion (pressure from the State and peers), while internal 
diffusion (pressure from professional information networks). 
 
In the organisational legitimacy literature, organisational response to institutional 
pressures can be divided into two approaches: the agentic approach and the non-agentic 
approach (Boxenbaum and Jonsson, 2008). The former refers to organisations as active 
agents that can have different responses to institutional pressures (Ingram and Clay, 
2000). Oliver (1991) suggests that how organisations can deal with institutional pressure 
of five strategic responses: acquiescence (conformity), compromise (decoupling
21
), 
                                                     
21 According to Boxenbaum and Jonsson (2008, p. 81), decoupling means “organisations abide only superficially by 
institutional pressure and adopt new structures without necessarily implementing the related practices.” That means 
decoupling can be inconsistent with the practice and transform the practice which is beneficial to organisations.  
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avoidance, defiance, and manipulation. Organisational capacity and ability to comply, 
resist and manipulate pressures can be predicted based on these five institutional factors. 
Oliver’s (1991) work has initiated a number of empirical studies in this area (see Ingram 
and Simon, 1995; Goodrick and Salancik, 1996). The latter refers to institutions as 
social fact that organisations can internalise institutional pressures to a great extent 
(Dacin, 1997; D’ Aunno, et al., 2000; Beck and Walgenbach, 2005). This adoption of a 
structure and practices are perceived as self-evident and are related to translation and 
edition (Boxenbaum and Jonsson, 2008). 
 
The limitation of institutional legitimacy needs to be considered. DiMaggio and 
Powell’s (1983) theoretical framework is ambiguous, thus leading empirical researchers 
to develop their own methods (Oliver, 1988). Isomorphic pressure has been found in 
relation to competitive pressure, space and time (Dacin 1997; Ruef and Scott, 1998). 
According to Mizruchi and Fein (1999), mimetic pressure has received the most 
attention among the three isomorphic pressures. Mimetic pressure is more widely 
employed than coercive and normative pressures in North American social sciences, 
while coercive and normative pressures are widely employed in other particular 
institutional literature, for example the European institutional school (Mizruchi and Fein, 
1999). Furthermore, mimetic pressure is easier to examine with quantitative methods, 
while coercive and normative pressures are more difficult to collect the data and show 
in quantitative studies (Mizruchi and Fein, 1999). DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) paper 
tends to ignore the connection between institutional processes and elite interests 
(Tolbert and Zucker, 1983). The political consequences of institutional process can be 
widely lost in organisation theory (see Stern and Barley, 1996). 
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2.4 CSR and legitimacy in the controversial industries 
2.4.1 Defining controversial industry  
Controversial, contentious or sin industries have been defined as those which are often 
associated with “products, services or concepts that for reasons of delicacy, decency, 
morality, or even fear, elicit reactions of distaste, disgust, offence or outrage when 
mentioned or when openly presented” (Wilson and West, 1981, p. 92). In other words, 
certain products, services, and concepts are categorised as controversies when they 
create dissensus among members of society at a particular point of time (Miller and 
Michelson, 2012). Controversial industries are generally characterised by social taboos, 
moral debates and political pressures, which include not only sinful industries, for 
example tobacco, alcohol, gambling, and pornography, but also industries in relation to 
emerging environmental, social or ethical issues, such as weapons, nuclear, and biotech 
(Cai, et al., 2012). However, the precise classification of controversial industries can 
vary by time (Campbell, 2007), by culture (Waller, et al, 2005) and by the degree of 
unethical violation of social norms (Jo and Na, 2012).  
 
There is an on-going discussion between proponents and opponents of CSR in 
controversial industry sectors (Cai, et al., 2012). Proponents suggest that controversial 
industries have legitimate right to develop CSR engagement due to two main reasons: (1) 
CSR is an important mechanism to enhance corporate reputation; (2) top management is 
free to select which strategy to operate their business (Cai, et al., 2012, p. 468). By 
contrast, opponents argue that governments should “denormalize” activities which 
controversial industries describe as “socially responsible” (Cai, et al., 2012, p. 468). 
Opponents further argue that CSR engagement developed by organisations in the 
controversial industry is not entirely trustworthy due to that fact that these organisations’ 
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beliefs stem “from deeply rooted distrust from the past” (Jo and Na, 2012, p. 442).  
 
A number of studies have examined CSR in controversial industries. Several studies 
have examined addictive industries such as tobacco (Pava and Krausz, 1997; Palazzo 
and Richter, 2005), brewing (Quaak, et al., 2007), and gambling (Hing, 2001). In 
particular, Palazzo and Richter (2005) argue that even though the tobacco industry has 
begun to engage in CSR, CSR engagement may be a smoke curtain and hide the fact 
that their business hurts billions of people every year. Other CSR studies have 
investigated other contentious industries. Byrne’s (2010) study shows that the 
corporations can influence the US government’s military policy. Banerjee and 
Bonnefous (2011) find that the French Nuclear Industry employed different strategies to 
manage different stakeholders in order to enhance its economic growth strategy. Other 
“sinful” industries, for example pornography, are normally regarded as immoral and 
incompatible with CSR (Davidson, 1996).  
 
According to CSR literature on these controversial industries, although organisations of 
this type claim to engage in CSR, they operate under the structure of capitalism 
and actually tend to use CSR to continue their business-as-usual practices. CSR 
engagement and sustainable development are reframed to enhance their business as 
usual context and continue to legitimate themselves as legal entities. The question of 
whether organisations in controversial industries can be socially responsible and how 
and why how these organisations gain or seek legitimacy through CSR engagement 
remains in an infant stage in the CSR literature.  
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2.4.2 CSR and legitimacy  
Over the past decade, some studies of CSR in the gambling industry have tended to 
focus on such developed countries as Australia (Hing, 2001; Miller and Michelson, 
2012), the UK (Jones, et al., 2009; Soriano, et al., 2012), and the US (Lee and Park, 
2009; Cai, et al., 2012; Jo and Na, 2012). However, relatively few studies have 
examined CSR in the gambling industry in developing countries with some notable 
exceptions, for example China’s sports lottery industry (Li, et al., 2011). The social 
consequences of gambling can be harmful and thus gambling operators adopt ethical 
concerns in the gambling business, which is called “responsible gambling” (RG) 
initiatives (Hing, 2001; Blaszczynski, et al., 2004; 2011; Chapters 1 and 7). In addition, 
a number of RG studies have been widely conducted in such developed countries as the 
US (LaPlante, et al., 2011), Canada (Giroux et al., 2008) and Australia (Breen, et al., 
2005; Hing and Nuske, 2011a); however, a few studies have concentrated on RG in 
developing countries, such as South Africa (Tyawa, 2012) and Macao (Vong, 2010).  
 
Although some CSR studies have attempted to compare the gambling industry with 
other controversial industries concerning financial performance, firm value and firm 
risk (Lee and Park, 2009; Cai, et al., 2012; Jo and Na, 2012), most of these studies have 
examined at only one country and lack an international comparative dimension. Some 
studies have only investigated a single dimension, such as the relationship between 
consumers perceptive of gambling and CSR (Li, et al., 2011; Soriano, et al., 2012). 
Additionally, some RG studies have conducted in different forms of gambling and can 
be classified into two main groups: in casinos (Hing, 2001; 2005; Breen, et al., 2005; 
Giroux, et al., 2008; LaPlante, et al., 2011; Reast, et al., 2012), and in non-casinos 
studies, including online gambling, electronic gambling machine and video lottery 
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(Smeaton and Griffiths, 2004; Nisbet, 2005; Cloutier, et al., 2010; Monaghan and 
Blaszczynski, 2010; Miller and Michelson, 2012; Soriano, et al., 2012). These studies 
have focused on internal employees’ perspectives. It would have been more persuasive 
if these studies had widened their scope to include wider stakeholders of the industry. 
 
Legitimacy theory is also applied in CSR literature. Corporate legitimacy has been 
described as the “yardstick” for the CSR discussion because CSR can be used to 
legitimise a corporation’s activities and increase corporate acceptance (Palazzo and 
Richter, 2005). Pava and Krausz (1997) suggest four distinct criteria for evaluating the 
legitimacy of CSR: local knowledge, level of responsibility, sharing consensus and 
relationship to financial performance.  
 
Furthermore, a number of CSR studies have applied legitimacy theory to the study of a 
range of such controversial industries as oil (Coupland, 2005; Branco and Rodrigues, 
2006), tobacco (Pava and Krausz, 1997; Palazzo and Richer, 2005; Tilling and Tilt, 
2010; Fooks, et al., 2013) and brewing (Campbell, et al., 2003).  
 
As mentioned earlier, CSR has been linked to a significant increase in the reporting of 
social and environmental policies and practices. In particular, a few prior CSD studies 
have applied legitimacy theory in the context of the tobacco industry. Campbell, et al., 
(2003) investigate a longitudinal period of voluntary social disclosures in the annual 
reports of companies in tobacco, brewing and retailing industries in the UK and their 
results conclude that the volume of social disclosure vary across sectors. When 
corporations are faced with a threat, they increase the volume of social disclosure as a 
legitimising strategy; however, British American Tobacco (BAT)’s social disclosure 
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declined over time, and the results do not support the traditional view (Campbell, et al., 
2003). Their study is limited to only the UK tobacco company. It would be more 
persuasive if their study with a large sample may get some overview of average 
behaviour. Moerman and Der Laan (2005) examine the BAT’s 2001/2002 Social Report 
and their results suggest that managing the perceptions of society through social 
reporting seems to forestall the introduction of more stringent regulation, privileging 
certain issues and deflecting poor social performance. This view is in line with 
legitimacy theory as suggested by Dowling and Pfeffer (1975) and Lindblom (1993). 
However, this study is limited to a single report and other supporting documents in one 
year and lacks an in-depth investigation with key stakeholders. Tilling and Tilt (2010) 
provide a longitudinal study (1955-1999) of CSD in the annual reports of the 
Australian-based tobacco company (Rothmans Ltd). Their results suggest that the 
voluntary CSD may have been provided with a view to counteracting the negative 
information to the organisational legitimacy of the smoking and health debate (Tilling 
and Tilt, 2010). Their findings support the traditional view that when corporations face a 
threat, they engage in legitimising strategies, for example increasing the volume of 
disclosure in their qualitative analysis; however, the quantitative analysis did not 
support the traditional view and prior empirical studies (Tilling and Tilt, 2010). Yet, the 
authors examine a single company in one industry and present a case from limited 
stakeholders.  
 
What remains unknown is how organisations in controversial industries, particularly the 
gambling industry, which tends to have a similar nature to the tobacco industry and the 
brewing industry, seeks legitimacy. Relatively little prior CSR research relating to 
legitimacy has concentrated on the gambling industry. A few studies have focused on 
76 
 
CSR (and RG) in the gambling industry without discussing the construction of 
legitimacy in this context (Hing, 2001; Jones, et al., 2009; Li, et al., 2011).  
 
Gambling can be regarded as a form of entertainment, leisure activity or recreation, but 
it can equally be linked to alcoholism, prostitution and drugs. Given the gap between 
these two views, it is not surprising that there is a lack of consensus around CSR and 
legitimacy in the gambling industry. The level of cognitive beliefs about the product or 
service helps to constitute the product acceptability and reconfigure the industry’s 
legitimacy (Galvin, et al., 2004-05). In this thesis, it will be argued that the construction 
of legitimacy by the gambling industry can be a subtle and complex process in the 
gambling industry due to laws and societal norms (Section 2.3). 
 
Two recent studies (Miller and Michelson, 2012; Reast, et al., 2012) have attempted to 
provide a better understanding of legitimacy and CSR in the gambling industry. This is 
because study of the gambling industry has the potential to provide a deep insight into 
the relationship between CSR and organisational legitimacy in the controversial 
industries. Miller and Michelson (2012) show the difficulty in establishing legitimacy in 
relation to CSR in the electronic gaming machine sector in Australia. The authors 
examine two state-funded studies for developing policies in Australia for developing 
gambling policy; however, the limited documents restricted their investigation of CSR 
in the gambling industry (Miller and Michelson, 2012). Reast, et al.’s (2012) study 
examines various strategies employed by the UK gambling industry to seek 
organisational legitimacy, with a case study of the failure of a regional supercasino 
project. Their results suggest various strategies are available to gambling companies 
seeking organisational legitimacy in the highly complex industry. However, the extent 
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of organisational legitimacy is likely to differ or simply vary across organisations, 
industries and countries (culture) (Reast, et al., 2012). Therefore, the legitimacy-seeking 
strategies of organisations in the gambling industry in other contexts (countries) could 
provide a useful starting point to explore, examine, and investigate the problems of 
legitimacy.  
 
2.5 CSR and Culture  
Section 2.4 examined the legitimacy-seeking strategies of organisations in the gambling 
industry and show they can manifest themselves differently across country (culture). 
This section provides this perspective in the context of CSR. There is no particular CSR 
template for international corporations due to various cultures (Birch and Moon, 2004). 
Several studies have widely examined CSR in developed regions, such as the US, 
Europe and North America, over the past five decades (Maignan and Ralston, 2002; 
Matten and Moon, 2004; 2008; Carroll, 2008), while other studies have been conducted 
in developing regions, such as Asia, Africa and Lain American (Crane and Moon, 2007; 
Visser, 2008). Matten and Moon (2008) have developed a theoretical analysis of 
national business systems to analyse CSR in national institutional contexts to address 
the questions of how and why CSR differs across country and to suggest an explanation 
of “implicit” and “explicit” CSR. Due to globalisation and free trade, these changes may 
thus increase MNCs’ explicit CSR in the developing regions, for example in Asia, 
where there are weak institutions or poor governance (Matten and Moon, 2008).  
 
Some studies have examined CSR in Asian countries in order to enhance the 
understanding of CSR. Welford (2004) conducted a comparative study of CSR between 
Europe and Asia using a survey and found that CSR policies in Asian companies lag 
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behind European countries. CSR has been prevalent over the last two decades in Asia as 
Asian companies become increasingly exposed to a global capital market and 
“Americanisation” of business practices (Matton and Moon, 2004; 2008). Chapple and 
Moon (2005) undertook a study in seven Asian countries by analysing corporate 
websites. The results show that MNCs are more likely to adopt CSR than those 
operating in their home countries but that the profile of their CSR is likely to reflect the 
country of operation, rather than the country of origin (Chapple and Moon, 2005). 
Wang and Juslin (2009) argue that the CSR concept does not fit into the Chinese 
context. The authors suggest a new definition of CSR called “the Chinese Harmony 
approach”, which draws on Confucianism22 (interpersonal harmony) and Taosim23 are 
needed (harmony with nature) to provide a better insight into CSR. Xu and Yang (2010) 
undertook a survey comparing CSR in China with that in Western countries to develop 
a conceptual dimension of CSR. The result shows that the western CSR dimensions are 
similar to China’s CSR dimensions, including economic responsibility, legal 
responsibility, environmental protection, customer orientation, employee and charity; 
however, the result also unveils some Chinese dimensions of CSR, such as social 
stability, good faith, and employment (Xu and Yang, 2010).  
 
Regarding employment, CSR policies in Asian countries in the form of corporate 
welfare schemes are often associated with employees’ interest (Gond, et al., 2011), such 
as work-life balance (Welford, 2004), health and safety and employee education in 
developing countries which governments are unable to protect such right (Crane, et al., 
                                                     
22
 Wang and Juslin (2009, p. 441) states that Confucian harmony relies on four main principles: the 
stability of society based on the five cardinal relationship, the family as a core unit of society, reciprocal 
virtuous behaviour and self-cultivation. 
23
 According to Wang and Juslin (2009, p. 445) explain Taoism as “pursues the harmonious complexity 
of natural ecosystems, believes that the relationship between man and nature is reciprocal and retributive, 
and they are exploiting each other as well.” 
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2004). Thus, corporations operated in Asian countries increasingly share the 
responsibilities of the local government (Moon, et al., 2011). This can enhance the 
relationship between organisations and community in developing countries so 
corporations can be viewed as a good employer (Schmitt, 2010).  
 
2.6 Concluding remark on literature  
In conclusion, prior CSR and legitimacy literature have not had an extended focus on 
the gambling industry (Section 2.4). With its novel focus, this thesis not only enhances 
the understanding of CSR in the gambling industry, but should also provide a general 
overview of this industry. This thesis attempts to investigate three main research 
questions: [1] to what extent does the gambling industry disclose CSR-related data? [2] 
how is CSR understood in the gambling industry? and [3] why does the gambling 
industry engage in CSR? The first research question is a preliminary global 
investigation of the gambling industry. As can be seen in Section 2.4 in this chapter, the 
CSR literature the gambling industry remains largely unexplored. Prior literature has 
given little guidance on the issue of legitimacy and CSR. The first question seeks to 
provide a foundation to understand this industry with a general overview, similarities 
and differences in the industry. The context provided by this first question then lays the 
groundwork to ask more pressing questions and so the second and third questions 
attempt to provide an in-depth investigation of the gambling industry.  
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Chapter 3  
Research Design 
3.1 Introduction  
As outlined in Chapter 1, the purpose of this thesis is to explore the understandings of 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) within the gambling industry in order to further 
the understanding of CSR. According to the literature review (Chapter 2), the issue of 
CSR in the gambling industry remains largely unexplored (see, for example, Hing, 2001; 
Jones, et al., 2009; Li, et al., 2011). Furthermore, there is relatively little exploration and 
guidance on the issue of legitimacy and CSR in the gambling industry (see, for example, 
Miller and Michelson, 2012; Reast, et al., 2012). One might have thought, an industry 
with such a conflicted reputation would have found CSR an essential component in its 
strategic posturing (see, for example, Reast, et al., 2012). In particular, the Responsible 
Gambling (RG) initiative, as discussed in Chapter 1, would seem to manifest CSR 
engagement of organisations in the gambling industry.  
 
The relatively unclear picture of CSR and legitimacy in the gambling industry has 
shaped the research strategy of this thesis, which is to examine three research questions: 
(1) To what extent does the gambling industry disclose CSR-related data? (2) How is 
CSR understood in the gambling industry? (3) Why does the gambling industry engage 
in CSR? (Chapter 2). The three main research questions require both a global 
investigation and an in-depth investigation in a particular context. There are few studies 
in relation to a global survey which might provide an initial exploration of international 
gambling companies’ engagement with CSR as a whole. This method may answer the 
first research question. However, such a survey (Section 3.2) will be superficial and 
help little with the more pressing second and three questions of this thesis. These two 
research questions need an in-depth investigation.   
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The research design of the thesis employs mixed methods: context analysis to provide 
an exploratory investigation and a focused, in-depth investigation to seek motivations 
and explanations. Each choice in different step is made at each stage.  
 
This chapter is split into two research methods: content analysis and semi-structured 
interviews. Each section shows the justification, potential limitations, and process of 
conducting each method.   
 
3.2  Content Analysis  
3.2.1 Justification of content analysis  
Chapter 1 outlined a general overview of the gambling industry. The concept of 
gambling varies greatly in history, and its meanings are largely based on a complex 
range of different forms of gambling, the society within which gambling takes place, 
and the changing nature of the gambling industry. However, the literature has provided 
little guidance and exploration of the industry on a global level or how the industry is 
organised into global initiatives and postures on CSR or RG. 
 
To overcome this problem, the obvious choice of method would be either some form of 
international survey or some examination of public documents produced by gambling 
companies. A survey might be useful; however, it would probably not be productive in 
terms of access, returns, or analysis. The more obvious approach is widely adopted in 
the CSR and CSD literature as illustrated in Chapters 2 and 4 and is to investigate 
public documents from organisations in the gambling industry. 
 
Content analysis is an initial research method used as an exploratory technique within 
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the gambling companies. This thesis will analyse the information for constructs and to 
what extent the gambling industry discloses CSR-related data (Chapter 4). This method 
can be employed to examine past data (Easterby-Smith, et al., 2008) and can enable the 
researcher to analyse CSR-related data by examining organisational documents, such as 
annual reports, stand-alone reports, and corporate websites. Such a method allows one 
to discern the importance or salience of CSR-related data in this industry as some 
companies tend to report something, which might be thought to be their claims of CSR.  
 
Berelson (1952, p. 18) defines content analysis as “a research technique for the 
objective, systematic and quantitative description of the manifest content of 
communication”. In addition, Holsti (1969, p. 14) refers to this method as 
“characteristics of message”. Hence, this method could get superficial indicators of 
content (Bryman and Bell, 2007). There are, however, a number of advantages of using 
content analysis (Bryman and Bell, 2011). First, this method is transparent since the 
coding decision rules and coding procedures can be clearly shown to ensure the 
possibility of result replications; second, content analysis is regarded as an unobtrusive 
method, which does not involve any participants; third, this method is highly flexible 
and can be applied to a variety of different media (Bryman and Bell, 2011).. 
 
Content analysis can be considered a quantitative and qualitative method (Unerman, 
2002 cited in Belal, 2008). Quantitative content analysis measures volume of disclosure 
which infers the importance of the text (Gray, et al., 1995a; b; Krippendorff, 1980; 
2012), while qualitative content analysis attempts to concentrate on the meaning and 
implication of the context of disclosure (Bennington, 1999 cited in Belal, 2008). In this 
thesis, quantitative content analysis was selected to enable an initial exploration in the 
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gambling companies in six countries, in order to gain a general overview in this industry. 
Such analysis can draw inferences concerning the importance, rather than the meaning 
of the context of disclosures. 
 
3.2.2 Potential limitation of content analysis 
According to Bryman and Bell (2007), content analysis has three major limitations: (1) 
the problem of getting documents of authenticity, credibility, and representation; (2) 
possible errors when devising a coding manual; (3) it is hard to answer “why” questions 
through content analysis. Additionally, Abbott and Monsen (1979, p. 506) state, that 
content analysis has two possible types of errors: (1) the formulation of categories does 
not completely cover all the issues in the annual reports; (2) inaccuracy in coding the 
raw data within the categories. Errors will also inevitably arise from the rounding of 
measurements with a different variety of fonts, printing designs and graphic styles (Gray, 
et al., 1995b).  
 
More importantly, this method involves a considerable element of “subjectivity” with 
the same documents meaning different things to other users (Tilt, 1998). In order to 
minimise this inevitable subjectivity, a pilot study was conducted by the researcher 
before the formal study was carried out (Section 3.2.3.5.1) and the researcher discussed 
the coding schedule with her supervisor before the pilot study. The classification 
scheme is designed to be reliable, consistent, and robust so that different people coding 
the same text can get the similar results (Weber, 1990). The researcher coded the text at 
different times and invited four colleagues from the research department to code the 
same text so as to modify the coding schedule, to increase intra-coder and inter-coder 
reliability and to limit inconsistency (Section 3.2.3.3; Milne and Adler, 1999). 
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Although content analysis can generate a general picture and identify some patterns and 
trends in the gambling industry, it can lack close examination and neglect some 
important messages. Consequently, multiple sources of data will be employed for 
triangulation
24
. More than one method can be employed in development of research, 
which leads to a greater confidence in findings (Webb, Campbell, Schwartz and 
Sechrest, 1996 cited in Bryman and Bell, 2007) and enhances validity of the thesis (see 
Stebbins, 2007). The collected views will offer an indication of underlying situation 
(Easterby-Smith, et al., 2008, p. 63). Therefore, this thesis employs qualitative methods 
in order to answer the “how” and “why” questions. 
 
3.2.3 Content analysis  
This section outlines the process of conducting content analysis as the first research 
method in the thesis. Section 3.2.3 is divided into five parts: introduction to content 
analysis method, defining the units of analysis, objectivity, systematic and reliability, 
sample for the gambling industry, and collection or recording data of the sampled 
gambling companies. 
 
3.2.3.1 Introduction to content analysis method 
Content analysis has been widely employed in Corporate Social Disclsoure (CSD) and 
Social Environmental Accounting (SEA) literature. The main purpose of this part of the 
thesis is to provide an overview of CSD in the global gambling industry in six countries. 
In order to do so, this thesis provides a description of Corporate Social Responsibility 
(CSR) through content analysis of the annual reports to determine the volumes of 
                                                     
24
 Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill (2009, p.614) define triangulation as “The use of two or more 
independent sources of data or data collection methods within one study in order to help ensure that the 
data are telling you what you think they are telling you”. 
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disclosures. In CSD research, what an organisation says on a particular subject, can be 
regarded as an indication of the importance that the reporting organisation attaches to 
this subject (Krippendorff, 1980; Deegan and Rankin, 1996; Neu, et al., 1998), such as 
social and environmental issues (Chapter 4). 
 
This thesis employed a conventional content analysis which has a different variety of 
comparable findings in the literature. This method is largely based on an established 
research instrument developed at The Centre for Social and Environmental Accounting 
Research (CSEAR) at the University of St Andrews (see Gray, et al. 1995a; b). The 
reason for the choice of this research instrument was mainly the comprehensive 
coverage of its development at the CSEAR in the UK context. However, this thesis 
investigates the gambling industry in both developed and developing countries. Thus, 
some adjustments have been made to account for cultural difference and the gambling 
industry.  
 
The following section will outline a number of different stages
25
 and different choices 
in order to show how the research instrument was developed and to justify the choice 
made at each stage. 
 
3.2.3.2 Defining the units of analysis 
Krippendorf (1980) identifies three types of unit of analysis in content analysis: 
sampling units, recording units, and measuring units. 
 
                                                     
25
 These stages are based on the work of Gray, et al. (1995b) and are also influenced by Hackston and 
Milne (1996), Welford (2004), Williams and Pei (1999), The Global Report Initiative’s (GRI) 
Sustainability Guidelines (2002) and Corporate Social Responsibility in Asia (2009) (see Appendix 7). 
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3.2.3.2.1 Sampling units – corporate annual reports  
A number of CSD studies have widely used annual reports as the sampling units
26
. 
Content analysis enables the researcher to analyse CSD by examining organisational 
documents, such as annual reports, so as to discern the importance or salience of CSR in 
an industry. This is because some companies appear to report some information, which 
might be thought to be their claims of social responsibility.  
 
Although annual reports can be recognised as important media, Zéghal and Ahmed 
(1990) argue other forms of media, such as company brochures, advertisements and 
press notices, provide richer sources of information. It is impossible to ensure 
completeness of the public corporate documents (Unerman, 2000). In the gambling 
industry, all corporate documents, for example press releases, employee magazines or 
brochures in various countries cannot be easily accessed. Crucially, the alterative 
mediums of disclosure, for example stand-alone reports
27
, integrated reports
28
 and 
corporate websites are not employed in this thesis. The shortage
29
 of stand-alone 
reports and no integrated reports were found in the gambling industry. In addition, 
corporate websites can be treated as a public document and as a form of communication 
(Coupland, 2005); however, the content in corporate websites were changed over time. 
Thus, the websites were employed for any updated CSR-related information. In order to 
have a systematic and a complete data set, annual reports were selected as the sample 
units.  
 
                                                     
26
 See Abbott and Monsen, 1979; Wiseman, 1982; Guthrie and Mathews, 1985; Guthrie and Parker, 1989; 
Zéghal and Ahmed, 1990; Gray, et al., 1995a; Hackston and Milne, 1996; Deegan and Rankin, 1997; 
Adams, et al., 1998; Islam and Deegan, 2008; Cho, et al., 2010. 
27
 Standalone reports are individual reports; however, these reports are usually issued together with 
annual reports. Such reports provide a detailed information of social and environmental issues.  
28
 Recently, corporations have tended to issue a single integrated report which includes economic, social 
and environmental performance. 
29
 Of the 28 sampled gambling companies, 13 companies have standalone reports. 
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There are a number of reasons for choosing annual reports, rather than other forms of 
media in this thesis. First, annual reports tend to have a higher degree of credibility than 
other types of reports and are the most important information provided to shareholders 
and stakeholders (Tilt, 1994; Deegan and Rankin, 1997; Buhr, 1998; Neu, et al., 1998). 
Second, a regularly produced annual report is not only a legal document, but also a way 
of communication and social construction (Hines, 1988; Neimark, 1992). Such 
materials cannot only offer valuable background information about the company, but 
can also provide a partial insight into past managerial decisions and a timeline of 
organisational change (Bryman and Bell, 2007). The public cannot observe most 
organisational activities. As a result, they rely on words and numbers, such as annual 
reports or financial statements, as imperfect proxies for these activities (Gjesdal, 1981 
cited in Neu, et al., 1998). Third, annual reports can be considered a statutory form of 
reporting that incorporates mandatory and voluntary disclosure (Hackston and Milne, 
1996; Wilmshurst and Frost, 2000). Fourth, annual reports are more easily accessible 
via corporate website than other corporate reports (Adams and Harte, 1998; Wilmshurst 
and Frost, 2000). Nevertheless, the exclusive use of annual reports can have some 
drawbacks. Selecting annual reports tends not to give a full picture of CSR policies 
among these companies (Roberts, 1992) or superficial disclosure (Gray and Bebbington, 
2001). Additionally, the primary focus of the annual report is to communicate the 
economic function of a corporation and other functions will be reported in separate 
reports (Gray, 2001). 
 
3.2.3.2.2 Recording Units – Categories of CSR Context Units 
Content analysis requires an accurate and exclusive category of CSD. The process of 
category usually involves creating a set of different main categories and sub-categories. 
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Recording units are used to help the examination of each annual report (Unerman, 2000). 
This section explains how the process of recording units was identified and can be 
divided into three parts: categories, sub-categories, and a pilot study. 
 
The first part explains how these categories were identified. In this thesis, eight 
categories
30
 have been formulated to account for the main themes of CSD. The 
identification of the categories was classified into two main groups: the categories based 
on those established categories (CSEAR, 2011; Gray, et al., 1995b) and other new 
categories emerged from the literature. 
 
The second part explains how the sub-categories were adjusted and refined to fit in this 
thesis. A further concern with the categories derived in Gray, et al. (1995a; b) is 
concerned with a specific industry. Little exploration of CSD practices in the gambling 
industry has been examined. Jones, et al.’s (2009) study provides valuable information 
to examine CSR in the UK context by using online reporting. The following section 
concerning whether the instrument could be applied in this thesis.  
 
                                                     
30
 The first group of “categories” was based on categories developed at the Centre for Social and 
Environmental Accounting Research (CSEAR) at the University of St Andrews (see Gray, et al., 1995a; 
b). There were seven main categories. The first four main categories are environment, community, 
consumer and employee’ These four major categories have been widely employed in the Social and 
Environmental literature (Gray, et al., 1995a; Hackston and Milne, 1996; Williams and Pei, 1999). In 
addition, “director” and “corporate governance” were added in the recent development in the UK (see 
CSEAR, 2011). The last category was called ‘general other’ in order to capture any issues not covered by 
the first six main categories (Gray, et al., 1995a). The second group of “categories” was based on the 
current Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) literature. “Economic” was added as an eighth main 
category for two reasons. First, the CSR literature suggests that ‘economic’ plays an important part in 
local community. Corporations tend to justify their actions through their tangible economic contributions 
to their communities, for example, providing jobs, employing local people, and contributing tax (Basu 
and Palazzo, 2008). Second, this thesis investigates the gambling industry in both developed and 
developing countries. The “economic” category appeared was in the Global Report Initiative’s (GRI) 
Sustainability Guidelines (2002) and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in Asia (2009). This 
“Economic” dimension is likely to grow in the literature on CSR in developing countries (Visser, 2008). 
This category can be regarded as an important element in this thesis.   
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The sub-categories have been added according to cultural difference and the context of 
the gambling industry. The above categories were subdivided into sub-categories so as 
to capture CSD. Their research instrument is designed within a western context; 
however, raises the question of its application within a non-western context (Hackston 
and Milne, 1996; Williams and Pei, 1999). Those two studies chose to adopt Gray, et 
al.’s (1995b) instrument to both western and non-western context as was done for this 
thesis. The sub-categories were largely based on the work of Gray, et al. (1995b) and 
largely framed by Hackston and Milne (1996), Williams and Pei (1999), The Global 
Report Initiative’s (GRI)31 Sustainability Guidelines (2002), Welford (2004), and CSR 
in Asia (2009). These concerns were the applicability of this Western research 
instrument that can be applied to developed and developing countries and different 
contexts (the gambling industry). These studies and reports investigated CSD in 
different countries and conducted comparative studies (Appendix 7). 
 
The third part explains how a pilot study was conducted in order to test the 
appropriateness of categories or sub-categories in this thesis. In order to determine 
whether the instrument needed adapting, and the extent to which it needed adapting, a 
pilot study was carried out. In order to finalise these categories and decision rules, a 
pilot study was conducted in July and August 2010. Annual reports were downloaded 
from the corporate websites and the literature was reviewed. A sample of the 2007 
annual reports was read to have a rough idea and a sense of the major themes in this 
industry. The purpose of this pilot study was to test whether or not the western 
established research instrument developed by Gray, et al. (1995b) was appropriate for a 
                                                     
31
 Global corporations are more likely to follow the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) in their reports 
GRI encourages corporations to report particularly on transparency and sustainable development and 
consists of individuals, accounting representatives, corporations and society and governmental 
organisations (Moon, et al., 2011, p.217). 
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comparative study of the gambling industry in both western and non-western contexts. 
 
The result of this pilot study suggested that Gray, et al.’s (1995b) categories were 
largely suitable for this thesis. Categories were applicable to the gambling industry, 
because nearly all CSD categories were covered in the annual reports of the sampled 
gambling companies. At sub-category level, the instrument was shown to be less 
appropriate. There were two apparent differences in the sub-categories in relation to the 
gambling industry and the emerging CSD research. First, the sub-category of 
responsible gambling (Chapter 1) disclosure was added in the consumer category as the 
high frequency mentioned in the sampled annual reports. Second, the sub-category of 
stakeholder engagement disclosure was added in the community category. This theme 
emerged from the KPMG reports (2005; 2008). As well as adding sub-categories to the 
instrument, the preliminary findings of the pilot study supported deleting certain 
sub-categories. Some adjustments were made to the sub-categories
32
 (Appendix 7).  
 
3.2.3.2.3 Units of analysis – measuring volume of CSR 
This section will discuss how the choice of the enumeration was made in order to 
capture the CSD-related data. Gray, et al. (1995a) state that there are two general ways 
to identify the measurement: the number of CSD or the amount of disclosure. The 
authors claim that the second one can provide a richer data set than the first one. The 
enumeration units often include words (Deegan and Gordon, 1996; Deegan and Rankin, 
1996; Wilmshurt and Frost, 2000), sentences (Hackston and Milne, 1996, Buhr, 1998; 
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 For example, the employee category previously included “South Africa”. South Africa represented any 
statement of compliance with code and/ or submission to The Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) 
and any information or reference to employment in South Africa other than as part of economic/review or 
employment data (Gray, et al., 1995b). This sub-category was not applicable to the western countries and 
the gambling industry and thus this sub-category was not included in the decision rules. A full coding 
schedule of categories and sub-categories is presented in Appendix 7. 
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Patten and Crampton, 2004) and pages (Guthrie and Parker, 1990, Gray, et al., 1995b 
and Unerman, 2000), the frequency of disclosure (Cowen, et al., 1987) or high/low 
disclosure rating (Patten, 1991). In general, the three common units of analysis for 
quantifying disclosures are words
33
, sentences
34
 and pages
35
. This thesis chose the 
proportions of page as units of analysis for a number of reasons
36
. First, the gambling 
companies tend to use non-narrative disclosures, such as photographs, charts, and 
figures. Second, a further research method used in this thesis is in-depth interviews, the 
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 Words are easily categorised and scanned in the databases. Quantification in terms of words can be 
recorded in detail (Deegan and Gordon, 1996). Yet, the coding of words as a unit of measurement is 
difficult as interpretation of individual words out of context or words without a sentence is problematic 
because it is difficult to check the specific meaning or no meaning (Milne and Adler, 1999; Unerman, 
2000). 
34
 Sentences are used to convey meaning (Hackston and Milne, 1996). Milne and Adler (1999) argue that 
sentences are far more reliable than words and pages as a measure of volume of disclosure. Whole 
sentences can be counted with more accuracy than words (Hackston and Milne, 1996; Tsang, 1998) and 
the use of sentences can overcome the misinterpretation of individual words and this also provides the 
means of determining any variations in disclosure practices (Holland and Foo, 2003). Milne and Adler 
(1999) claim that a careful reading of annual reports actually reveals that sentences form the foundation 
of coding decisions. In addition, discerning the meaning of individual words is problematic (Hackston 
and Milne, 1996). However, the use of sentences will only capture narrative disclosures (Unerman, 2000), 
and measuring sentences, words, or text units fails to capture differences of font size, choice and boldness 
(Beattie, et al., 2004). 
35
 Pages can not only overcome grammatical differences, but also cover the non-narrative disclosure, for 
example photographs, charts and graphs, while words or sentences will ignore any non-narrative 
disclosures (Unerman, 2000). Measuring proportion of pages will therefore provide potentially powerful, 
immediate, and effective methods of communication (Beattie and Jones, 1992; 1994; Graves, et al., 1996; 
Preston, et al, 1996). In addition, Unerman (2000) argues that non-narrative disclosures, such as 
photographs, sometimes more powerful than narrative disclosures as stakeholders may not have time to 
read all the details in annual reports. Textual images together with words can come to signify 
organisational actions (Tinker, 1991). However, the use of page size also has some difficulties for 
measuring font size, column sizes, pages sizes, margins, and graphics and the use of a grid presents 
problems of comparability (Ng, 1995 cited in Hackston & Milne, 1996; Wilmshurst and Frost, 2000). 
More importantly, boldness and colour in both non-narrative and narrative disclosures cannot be captured 
(Beattie and Thomson, 2007). Although Milne and Adler (1999) demonstrated that counts of sentences 
give similar results to proportions of pages, the volume of pages seems to be the best method employed in 
this thesis 
36
 More importantly, the location of data within corporate annual reports was not recorded in this thesis 
because Gray, et al. (1995b) could not find a persuasive reason to look at certain locations in the corporate 
annual reports that may be preferred (see also Unerman, 2000). However, in some Intellectual Capital’s 
studies, Beattie and Thomson (2007) suggest that the location of disclosure of the corporate annual report 
may be formative with regard to the important information, reader attention and auditor confirmation. 
Various sub-categories found in the same location may be useful to investigating the relationship (Beattie 
and Thomson, 2007). This could be problematic if repeated and similar information might be legitimately 
expected to appear in different sections of the corporate annual reports (Gray, et al., 1997). Thus, the 
location of data will not consider in this thesis. This thesis employs content analysis to capture CSD 
within the annual reports so that there is no distinction between various locations of CSD underlying in 
each annual reports. 
92 
 
transcripts of which were closely examined (text including sentences) in order to 
provide a deeper understanding of CSR in the gambling industry. Third, this thesis did 
not employ any software to search for key words and sentence to categorise them. 
 
Content analysis tends to give a subjective assessment of the quality. Types of CSD 
followed the general guidelines of the research instrument. Moreover, the subjective 
assessment can also be reflected in the coding process and the other researchers’ 
feedback. However, the key assumption of content analysis studies is that quantifying of 
disclosures within a category signifies the importance of the category (Krippendorff, 
1980; Gray, et al., 1995a; Deegan and Rankin, 1996, Neu, et al., 1998; Unerman, 2000). 
Milne and Adler (1999) state that the coded output from inexperienced coders with little 
or no prior training can be relied upon for aggregate total disclosure analysis. 
 
Considering pages as the measurement units, there is a possibility that some information 
may be lost. Therefore, the CSEAR research instrument tends to provide some attempt 
to access the quality and the type of CSD. The information disclosed in the annual 
reports will provide the quality of the statement referred to three types of news: neutral, 
good or bad news, while the statements made in the annual reports were classified into 
three types: monetary quantitative, other quantitative or declarative (see Gray, et al., 
1995b; CSEAR 2011). Consideration was given to whether the data disclosed was 
auditable or not so as to distinguish between the data which was simply assertive and 
data which could be verified by a third party (CSEAR, 2011). This classification or 
categorisation of news would be a subjective assessment of the quality and the type of 
CSD using the general guidance provided on these judgments (Appendix 11). 
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3.2.3.3 Objective, systematic and reliable 
Krippendorff (1980) indicates that the data are objective, systematic, and reliable. The 
following paragraph will discuss these three issues in detail. 
 
The first issue is the objectivity of the data. In content analysis, a clear definition is 
deemed an important part. This involves the need for an objective definition of CSD and 
identification of a set of sub-categories. These categories would enable independent 
researchers to identity what is CSD and what is not CSD. In spite of achieving 
objectivity, the categories chosen are unavoidably subjective. Although the requirement 
in content analysis is objectivity, decisions made in the process of coding content are 
inherently subjective in nature.  
 
The second issue is related to systematic which refers to the recording process. Each 
annual report was examined according to the decision rules. When a particular text was 
identified and was labelled as a particular category, a template was used to measure the 
volume of disclosure in each annual report. This category was classified according to 
whether the text was monetary quantitative, other monetary or declarative. All the 
information was recorded in one data entry form. This recoding process was repeated 
for every selected text. After examining each annual report, the total volume of 
disclosure in a sub-category was added together and was recorded under the 
sub-category heading. Then, the total of each category was calculated by adding all the 
sub-category. Finally, each sampled annual report was recorded. This recoding 
procedure was repeated again when examining another annual report. 
 
The third issue is related to reliability of the data. Employing content analysis to 
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examine CSD, there are two reliability issues: the coding instrument and consistent 
coding decisions (Milne and Adler, 1999). This thesis attempted to examine these two 
reliability issues. First, the coding instrument needs to be reliable with well-established 
decision rules and disclosure categories, which was based on the established research 
instrument developed at the CSEAR and the extant CSD literature (Chapter 4). An 
essential step of piloting the decision rules was tested before the formal study. Second, 
consistent coding decisions need to be shown through the employing of different coders, 
different time periods and any inconsistencies need to be discussed. The thesis involved 
one primary researcher, but four volunteers were also involved (two were PhD students, 
while two were taught-graduate students
37
). In order to be replicable and test the coding 
schedule, the primary researcher gave the coding schedule to other researchers and 
taught them how to code a set of the annual reports. The primary researcher coded at 
three different times and showed consistent results over time which is called 
“intra-coder reliability”, while the findings of the primary researcher were checked and 
discussed with four coders to ensure “inter-coder reliability” (See Milne and Adler, 
1999). However, a comparison of the results found that two of coders had in a high level 
of agreement, while two of them did not. If there were any inconsistencies, the 
researcher would discuss with other coders to reduce the level of discrepancy, refined 
the decision rules and disclosure categories. Importantly, shared meanings and the 
process of collecting data was able to be replicated by other researchers. 
 
3.2.3.4 Sample for the gambling industry 
In order to get a representative picture of the gambling industry, the selected sample 
                                                     
37
 All of them were studying in the School of Management at the University of St Andrews. Each of them 
analysed ten reports for each region. All of them used the same recording instructions and grid to record 
the annual reports in the gambling industry. 
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contained data from six countries, three years, 28 companies, and 82 annual reports. The 
selection of annual reports in these six countries was three financial from 2007 to 2009. 
The choice of the period was determined by the data collection period (from 2010) 
when the latest available annual reports were for 2009. The sample was divided into two 
parts: the selection of countries and the selection of gambling companies (Appendix 6). 
 
3.2.3.4.1 The selection of countries 
There is relatively limited information available concerning the global gambling 
industry. Thus, the selection of countries in the sample was largely based on 
MarketLine’s reports, Ernst & Young’s (2009) report, and the CSR literature. This 
study’s sample was limited by two factors: lack of full data access to all countries and 
language limitations. 
 
Table 3: Global casinos & gaming sector geography segmentation: total revenue in 
US$ billion 
Geography  Total revenue 
2011 
Percentage Total revenue 
2012 
Percentage 
Asia-Pacific  186.8 44.4% 222.2 48.7% 
America 128.0 30.4% 98.4 21.6% 
Europe 103.5 24.6% 97.7 21.4% 
Middle East  2.8 0.7% 2.7 0.6% 
Rest of world  -- -- 37.8 8.3% 
Total 421.1  100% 456  100% 
Source: Global Casinos and Gaming, MarketLine (2012a, 2013a) 
 
According to MarketLine’s reports (2012a, 2013a; Table 3), the global casinos and 
gaming sectors are broadly divided into five geographical regions: Asia-Pacific, 
America
38
, Europe, Middle East & Africa, and rest of the world. Asia-Pacific regions, 
                                                     
38
 The global gaming market for America refers to North America and South America, while Europe 
refers to Western Europe and Eastern Europe.  
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America and Europe account for 48.7%, 21.6%, and 21.4% of the global casinos and 
gaming sector value respectively (MarketLine, 2013a).   
 
Table 4: China’s casinos & gaming sector geography segmentation: total revenue 
in US$ billion 
Asia-Pacific Total revenue 
2011 
Percentage Total revenue 
2012 
Percentage 
China  82.6 44.2% 115.6 51.6% 
Japan  52.4 28.1% 53.9 24.3% 
Australia  21.3 11.4% 21.3 9.8% 
South Korea  12.0 6.5% 12.3 5.5% 
India  -- -- 5.7 3.0% 
Rest of Asia-Pacific  18.4 9.9% 19.6 5.8% 
Total  186.7  100% 222 100% 
Source: Casinos and Gaming in China, MarketLine (2012g, 2013c) 
 
The casinos and gaming sectors in the Asia-Pacific region mainly include China, Japan, 
Australia, South Korea, India and the rest of Asia-Pacific region (MarketLine, 2013c; f; 
Table 4). China, Japan and Australia account for 51.6%, 24.3% and 9.8% of the 
Asian-Pacific casinos and gaming sector value respectively. Most forms of gambling in 
China are banned; however, gambling activities and lotteries are permitted significantly 
in Macao and Hong Kong (MarketLine, 2013c). Therefore, Macao and Hong Kong 
were selected in the sample. However, Japan was not included in the sample due to data 
access limitations as only financial reports and no annual reports are available online
39
. 
Australia is positioned third in the Asia-Pacific region, and thus Australia is selected for 
the sample due to limited information on South Korea and India largely based on 
MarketLine’s and Ernst and Young’s reports (2009).  
                                                     
39
 According to MarketLine’s (2013f) report, Maruhan Corporation is the leading gaming company in 
Japan. Only financial reports, rather than annual reports are available on the corporate website.  
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Table 5: Casinos & gaming sector geography segmentation in America: total 
revenue in US$ billion 
Geography Total revenue 
2011 
Percentage Total revenue 
2012 
Percentage 
USA 93.7 73.2% 98.4 73.7% 
Canada  17.6 13.7% 17.8 13.3% 
Mexico  3.2 2.5% 3.4 2.6% 
Rest of American
40
  13.5 10.5% 13.9 10.4% 
Total 128 100% 133.5 100% 
Source: Casinos and Gaming in the US, MarketLine (2012f, 2013b) 
 
Within the global casinos and gaming sectors (MarketLine, 2013a; Table 3), the 
American sector is ranked second. The US gaming sector dominates in the American 
regions, followed by Canada and Mexico (MarketLine, 2013b; Table 5). Thus, the US 
gaming sector was chosen for the study, because of its size, and data access limitations 
for Canada and Mexico. There was a difficulty in gaining access to the 
government-owned Canadian gambling companies’ annual reports at the initial stage in 
2009 and also many leading companies, for example Gamehost Inc., only publish 
incomplete annual reports. There was limited information on the Mexican gambling 
industry available in MarketLine’s and Ernst and Young’ reports (2009).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
40
 North America comprises the United States, Canada and Mexico, while South America comprises 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Venezuela (MarketLine, 2013a). The information of the United 
States and Canada is available in MarketLine’s reports, while Mexico and other countries in South 
America are not considered due to the limited information available in both MarketLine’s and Ernst and 
Young’ reports (2009).  
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Table 6: United Kingdom casinos & gaming sector geography segmentation: total 
revenue in US$ billion 
Geography Western 
Europe 
Total revenue 
2011 
Percentage Total revenue 
2012 
Percentage 
Italy 25.1 24.3% 21.3 21.8% 
Germany 15.6 15.1% 15.2 15.6% 
the United Kingdom 14.3 13.8% 14.5 14.8% 
France 12.4 11.9% 12.1 12.4% 
Spain 11.8 11.4% 11.0 11.2% 
Rest of Europe 24.3 23.4% 23.7 24.2% 
Total  103.5 100% 97.8 100% 
Source: Casinos and gaming in the United Kingdom, MarketLine (2012h, 2013h) 
 
Within the global casinos and gaming sectors (MarketLine, 2013a; Table 3), the 
European sector is positioned third. The Western European
41
 gaming sector mainly 
includes Italy, Germany, the UK, France, Spain, and Rest of Europe (MarketLine, 2013g; 
Table 6). Italy, Germany, and the UK account for 21.8%, 15.6%, and 14.8% of the 
Western European casinos and gaming sector value respectively (MarketLine, 2013g). 
The UK was chosen in the sample due to data access limitations on other European 
countries. Italy
42
, Germany
43
, Spain,
44
 and France
45
 were not included in the sample as 
the corporate documents were not in English.  
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 Eastern Europe comprises the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Russia and Ukraine. 
However, it is limited information available in MarketLine’s, and Ernst and Young’s (2009) reports.  
42
 According to MarketLine’s (2013e) and Ernst and Young’s reports (2009), there are five major gaming 
operators in Italy. However, the corporate website of Snai and Lottomatica are not in English, while only 
Sisal’s annual reports in 2011 and 2012 are available online.  
43
 Oddest is part of the German state-operated Lotte and Toto Block (DLTB) and it is an effective 
monopoly (MarketLine, 2013g). The corporate website is not in English and it is difficult to access the 
corporate documents, for example annual reports, financial reports or stand-alone reports.    
44
 There are three major gaming operators in Italy: The CIRSA Gaming Corporation, Codere S.A and 
Gala Coral Group Limited (MarketLine, 2013e). The CIRSA Gaming Corporation has limited access to 
annual reports from 2010 or before on their corporate website, while the corporate website of CODERE 
S.A. is not in English. Gala Coral Group Limited is based in the UK, but the group operates in Europe 
and Italy (MarketLine, 2013e).  
45
 The leading gambling operators in France are La Francaise Des Jeux, Groupe Partouche SA and Pari 
Mutuel Urbain (MarketLine, 2013d); however, it is difficult to gain access to their information due to 
language limitation. None of these organisations’ websites is in English.  
99 
 
Middle East-Africa (MEA) comprises Egypt, Israel, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, 
and United Arab Emirates. There is limited information available for MarketLine’s 
reports in the MEA gambling market. According to Ernst and Young’s (2009) report, 
there are 45 casinos in South Africa, 25 casinos in Egypt, four casinos in Israel and two 
casinos in Nigeria. There is limited information related to Saudi Arabia, the United Arab 
Emirates, Egypt, Israel, and Nigeria. Thus, South Africa was selected in the sample.  
 
With a number of selection criteria, the selected countries in this thesis are Macao and 
Hong Kong, Australia, the US, the UK and South Africa. This method can be seen as a 
technique to explore and develop a theory, particularly legitimacy theory (Chapter 4). 
Eisenhardt’s (1991) multiple case studies method, through the analysis of a wide range 
of cases, rather than a single case, allows for the generation of a general construct 
because this method enables replication and extension of a single case study and it has 
methodological rigor. The comparative multiple–case logic of replication will permit the 
researcher to extend theoretical insights (Eisenhardt, 1991). 
 
3.2.3.4.2 The selection of gambling companies 
After six countries were selected, gambling companies needed to be selected for each of 
these countries. The main criterion for including a company within a sample was its size 
as shown by its market capitalisation. However, the sample of some countries, such as 
South Africa, Macao, and Hong Kong, were collected in a slightly different process, 
unlike the US and the UK. The sample was difficult to access from South Africa (three  
companies). Zeng (2010) notes that seven (now six)
46
 gambling companies in South 
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 The gambling market share of South Africa’s gambling industry are Sun International (39.4%), 
Peermont Global (21.2%), Tsogo Sun Gaming (15.2%), Gold Reef City (12.1%), Monte Casinos (6.1%), 
London Club (3.0%) and Desert Palace (3.0%) (Zeng, 2010). However, Gold Reef City merged with 
Tsogo Sun Gaming in 2010, therefore there are six gambling companies in South Africa. The last three 
gambling companies’ websites were not available online.  
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Africa. The researcher tried an initial online search for South African gambling 
companies; however, only three of these gambling companies had corporate websites. 
The other three gambling companies without corporate websites has a market of less 
than one percent. In Macao, there are only six gambling operators; hence, all companies 
were selected. Finally, the Hong Kong sample is quite inadequate and actually only one 
gambling company
47
. As a result, there are 28 gambling companies in the sample (Table 
7). 
 
Table 7: The selection of gambling companies according to its size, market 
capitalisation 
Country UK US Australia South 
Africa 
Macao Hong 
Kong 
No. of company 6 6 6 3 6 1 
 
3.2.3.5 Collection/ recording data from the gambling companies 
After collecting the annual reports of the sampled gambling companies (Section 3.2.3.4), 
a pilot study was carried out to test the research instrument. 
 
3.2.3.5.1 Pilot Study 
This thesis involved 82 annual reports
48
 in the final sample. In the initial stage of 
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 In Hong Kong, the Hong Kong Jockey Club operates a different gambling business model as a 
non-profit organisation. Interestingly, other gambling companies, for example, Neptune Group Ltd, 
AMAX holdings and Paradise Entertainment Ltd, which are all listed on the Hong Kong stock exchange. 
These three companies are actually regarded as “junket operators”. These companies operated “VIP 
Gaming Rooms” in Macao’s Casino Operators. The relationship between Macao’s Casino Operators and 
junket operators are in Joint Venture. Macao’s Casinos Operators only have the obligation to increase the 
number of gaming tables or to apply new projects with the government of Macao’s approval (The 
Independent, 2012). In other words, junket operators do not have such right and are regarded as “business 
partners” (See the Independent, 2012) .  
48
 The selection of annual reports in six countries was drawn from three financial year end from 2007 to 
2009. Thus, 84 reports should been included in the final sample. However, in Macao sample, SJM only 
listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange in 2007 and their first annual report was published in 2008. In 
addition, one of the Australian companies published their 2007 annual report in PowerPoint format rather 
than a standard format, so it is difficult to measure in PowerPoint form.  
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content analysis, 21 annual reports were a part of the pilot study (from 2010/7 to 
2010/9). Milne and Adler (1999) suggest that a period of training with at least 20 
reports will be necessary for the less experienced coders before the coded output can be 
relied upon. This is an important step for the present researcher to familiarise 
themselves them with the research instrument and to refine the coding schedule prior to 
conducting the formal study. A number of these selected companies formed part of the 
final sample. In the pilot study, any issues related to coding with the decision rules and 
any problems using the grid measure were noted. These issues were discussed by the 
researcher with her supervisors before measuring the final sample. Another step was to 
test the research instrument and to clarify the decision rules so as to refine the decision 
rules before proceeding the formal study (Section 3.2.3.3). 
 
3.2.3.5.2 Recoding Process 
After conducting a pilot study, the actual recording process began (from 2010/11 to 
2011/3). During the recoding process, each annual report was examined when referring 
to the decision rules (Gray, et al., 1995b; CSEAR, 2011; Appendix 7 and 8). A template 
was divided into one hundredths of a page (with 25 rows of equal height and four 
columns) and it was used to measure each annual report (Gray, et al., 1995b; CSEAR, 
2011; Appendix 10). Amount of disclosure was measured by the number of cells taken 
up by a disclosure, including blank parts of a page, as a part of communication (See 
Gray, et al., 1995b).  
 
This type of measurement gives a general reading of the text in the annual reports; 
however, this does not address the implicit meaning behind the text. When the particular 
text was identified and was labelled as a particular category, this category was classified 
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according to the quality of the statement (Appendix 11). The data for each annual report 
was recorded in one data entry form (Appendix 12) together with background 
information
49
. This recording procedure was repeated for every selected text. When 
there was more than one incidence for a specific category, the total volume of disclosure 
in a sub-category was added together and was recorded under the sub-category heading. 
Then, the totals for each category was calculated by adding together the relevant total of 
sub-category. Finally, each sampled annual report was recorded and these numbers were 
added up in order to calculate the volume of disclosure.  
 
3.2.3.5.3 Final sample of annual reports in the gambling industry 
The annual reports in the final sample were read three times so as to ensure the 
completeness of the recording process. The texts in the annual reports were coded and 
the results were consistent at different times. The differences, missing items, and errors 
discovered in the second or third rounds were corrected. These differences did not make 
a significant difference in relation to the aggregated volume of disclosure, which 
signified the importance of disclosure. In doing so, different coders were encouraged to 
make their understanding of their category more accurate. The shared meanings of the 
categories were important in the recording process. 
 
The amount of disclosure for each annual report was recorded, using a standard A4 page 
of a grid (Gray, et al., 1995b; Appendix 10). Selection of each report was classified into 
                                                     
49
 In the process of collecting data, background information on the gambling companies often plays an 
important part in examining content analysis at a later stage. Background information was collected in 
order to examine the relationships between the volume of CSD and corporate characteristics as suggested 
by the CSD literature. Corporate size of the sampled gambling companies from the year ended 2007 to 
2009 was collected in terms of market capitalisation, total assets, total sales, and number of employees. 
Moreover, the types of business of the sample was also collected because these companies are operating 
not only in gambling industry, but also in other such industries as hotel, construction, and entertainment. 
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each category and was firstly recorded manually on a coding sheet (CSEAR, 2011 and 
Appendix 12). This coding sheet was to record the volume of disclosure and to make 
some notes in a memo column. All the coding sheets were kept for rechecking at a later 
stage. The volume of disclosure was recorded in different categories and sub-categories. 
The total amount of each category was calculated for each annual report. 
 
Next, all the annual reports were coded and recorded on a coding sheet, a detailed 
checking process was undertaken to ensure the correctness of each entry before 
transferring all the data on the coding sheet to a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet. Any errors 
were immediately corrected. After that, all the data in the Microsoft file could be 
analysed and presented as descriptive statistics. This then allows the generation of 
figures and patterns in CSD in the gambling industry (Chapter 4). 
 
3.3  Semi-structured interviews  
3.3.1 Justification for semi-structured interviews 
As shown in a literature review (Chapter 2), relatively few studies have examined CSR 
in the gambling industry. These studies have attempted to compare the gambling 
industry with other controversial industries in relation to financial performance, firm 
value and risk (Lee and Park, 2009; Cai, et al., 2012; Jo and Na, 2012), while other 
studies have examined the relationship between consumers and CSR (Li, et al., 2011; 
Soriano, et al., 2012). However, these studies would be more persuasive if they had 
widened their scope to include stakeholders, which are or can be affected by the 
gambling industry, and vice versa.  
 
In order to overcome this problem, the possible choices of approach would be 
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ethnographic approaches, natural language approaches, and interview methods. 
Ethnography was initially considered for the purposes of the current study. Despite its 
considerable advantages, but this method subsequently ruled out. Although this 
approach would have provided the researcher with both considerable insights into how 
gambling companies understand CSR and with an insider perspective of reality, gaining 
full access to the gambling companies would have been a very difficult, perhaps even 
dangerous, and a time-consuming process. Thus, the method proved impracticable given 
the time constraints involved. 
 
The choice of the natural language method might be appropriate because it enables the 
discovery of views, perceptions and opinions (Easterby-Smith, et al., 2008). Two types 
of the natural language methods, discourse analysis
50
 and interviews, are employed in 
this thesis in order to answer the “how” question from different perspectives. The term 
discourse involves thoughts, language, and written text which refer to a specific subject 
and the practices, structures, standards, and norms inherent in institutional and social 
spheres (Foucault 1973 and 1977 cited in Livesey and Kearins, 2002). Discourse 
analysis can explore how language and text construct, reproduce and change the social 
world (Phillips and Hardy, 2002 quoted in Saunders, et al., 2009). Such analysis enables 
the close reading of the content and language of corporate annual reports in order to 
construct the meaning of CSR in the gambling industry. This analysis can reveal the 
hidden motivations behind the text or explore the fundamental aims of a discourse (Lee 
and Ling, 2008). However, discourse analysis was initially considered. Despite its 
potential benefits, this method ruled out for this thesis. Discourse analysis has been 
criticised for being too narrow and insensitive to the context or too broad to be 
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 Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill (2009, p.502) define as “Discourse analysis is a general term that 
covers an extremely wide variety of approaches to the analysis of language in its own right and is 
concerned with how and why individuals’ language is used by individuals in specific social contexts”. 
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meaningful (Alvesson and Karreman, 2000; Bryman and Bell, 2007). This method can 
be criticised for distorting or oversimplifying a complex reality and giving it instead as 
“a relatively sanitised picture of business-society relations” (Spence, 2007, p. 874).  
 
The more obvious approach that is widely adopted in the CSR and CSD studies, and 
that is to provide an in-depth understanding of organisations in the gambling industry is 
by way of interviews. Interviews are intended to answer how and why questions. The 
researcher is interested in “how” people understand and perceive CSR in the gambling 
industry and “why” the gambling industry engages in CSR. It is better for the researcher 
to gain a general understanding of the gambling companies’ CSR engagements and 
social reporting practices before proceeding to carrying out fieldwork, through such 
method as interviews. Interviews can capture the meaning and interpretation of such 
phenomena related to the interviewees’ world (Kavle, 1996 cited in Easterby-Smith, et 
al., 2008). Such a method concentrates on understanding an interviewees’ own 
experiences by collecting in-depth data to develop stories and accounts in order to 
understand social phenomena (Rubin and Rubin, 1995). 
 
Interviews can be conducted in formal or informal ways and can be classified into three 
types, namely, highly structured interviews, semi-structured interviews, and 
unstructured interviews (Easterby-Smith, et al., 2008). Highly structured interviews tend 
to be used for market research (large-scale surveys), whereas unstructured interviews 
tend to be used for ethnography purposes (Easterby-Smith, et al., 2008). Unstructured 
interviews and semi-structured interviews are two major types of interviews when 
conducting qualitative research (Bryman and Bell, 2007). The purpose of the thesis 
involves neither market research nor ethnography; thus, semi-structured interviews, 
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which lie in between highly structured interviews and unstructured interviews, will be 
employed. Semi-structured interviews represent exploratory discussions that can help 
the researcher to understand interviewees’ responses to the “what”, “how” and “why” 
questions (Bryman and Bell, 2007). Such interviews offer the researcher an opportunity 
to investigate interviewees’ answers and allow participants to elucidate or construct 
their own replies (Saunders, et al., 2009). The process of semi-structured interviews is 
flexible and the emphasis is to show how interviewees frame and understand issues and 
what they view as important in explaining events, patterns and forms of behaviour 
(Bryman and Bell, 2011). The design of questions tends to be “open” in semi-structured 
interviews when the research is an exploratory study seeking to discover the thoughts 
which are uppermost in interviewees’ mind (Saunders, et al., 2009). 
 
3.3.2 Potential limitation of semi-structured interviews 
Although this method will give a rich and in-depth insight into employees working in 
Macao’s gambling industry, a number of limitations will be considered. First, 
interviewees are invited to participate in a free and open conversation, so they will 
express answers in their own language and deliver more detailed responses (Bryman 
and Bell, 2007; Eriksson and Kovalainen, 2008). In the analysis, the researcher is aware 
that personal bias can distort perception and interpretation of phenomena (see Stebbins, 
2007). However, the researcher will look for evidence that contradicts the findings 
during the process of analysis to attempt to present a fair view of the gambling industry. 
Second, most interviewees will not have English as their first language so the researcher 
will let them respond in their first language, Cantonese, and translate raw information 
into English when making notes. There is, however, a limitation, as differences between 
the two languages, especially in terms of word meaning, may lead to some distortion of 
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the information (Bryman and Bell, 2007). In order to minimise this discrepancy, the 
translated quote will be discussed and proofread by an English teacher. Third, writing 
down the notes from each interview may also cause bias (Hair, et al., 2003). In order to 
overcome these limitations, the researcher endeavours to minimise any discrepancies 
and discuss the transcripts with peers as well as provide all interviews’ notes if they are 
needed. Fourth, the selected sample is only in Macao, which have limited samples, and 
thus it is not be possible to get wider opinions (Hair, et al., 2003). Fifth, even though 
collecting qualitative information is not intrinsically unreliable and invalid, it depends 
on how the data is analysed (Lee and Lings, 2008). 
 
3.3.3 In-depth semi-structured interviews 
Semi-structured interviews were used to answer the second and the third research 
questions, which are qualitative in nature: How is CSR understood in the gambling 
industry? and Why does the gambling industry engage in CSR? Given time constraints 
and limitations, the researcher is unable to interview every single company from each of  
the selected countries. Thus, this thesis is mainly focused on Macao
51
, which has been 
selected to conduct the interviews for four main reasons. First, Macao provides 
explanations as its gross gambling revenue in 2012, of US$38 billion, has outstripped 
six times that of the Las Vegas Strip as the world’s largest gambling market (Eadington 
and Siu, 2007; The Economist, 2013). Second, Macao’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
for the second quarter of 2013 is 10.2%, which is mainly from gaming services 
(Government of MSAR Statistics and Census Service, 2013). Third, Macao’s gambling 
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 Macao has not been investigated in relation to CSR or more generally. The choice of the case depends 
on the amount of new information to be learned from incremental cases (Eisenhardt, 1991, p.622) and the 
variation between cases (Flyvbjerg, 2006). Flyvbjerg (2006) also points out that the typical or average 
cases might not provide the richest information; instead, atypical case(s) might reveal more information 
since they involve more actors and mechanisms in a particular situation. 
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industry is the leading industry in Macao with over 60% of local residents working in 
this industry or related industries and with a gaming tax of 35 percent and 4 percent of 
its gross gaming revenue to the government for other social and cultural activities 
(Macao Government Information Bureau, 2010; Appendix 2). Forth, the researcher not 
only has greater access to Macao’s gambling companies compared to those other 
countries, but is also capable of understanding and explaining the social setting; 
enabling how to communicate with readers and to generate theory within the context 
(Dyer and Wilkins, 1991).  
 
The objective of this thesis is to examine perceptions and motivations for CSR in 
Macao’s gambling industry. In order to pursue this objective, semi-structured interviews 
were chosen to collect data from internal and external stakeholders. Importantly, the 
whole process of conducting interviews with both groups was similar. Some aspects, 
however, were slightly different, particularly sampling decisions, contacting 
interviewees, data collection and interview questions. The following section outlines the 
process of conducting semi-structured interviews and is divided into seven parts: 
reliability and validity in qualitative research, sampling decision, contacting 
interviewees, data collection, interview questions, interview profile and data analysis. 
 
3.3.3.1 Reliability and validity in qualitative research 
Guba and Lincoln (1994) suggest two primary criteria for assessing a qualitative study: 
trustworthiness and authenticity. Trustworthiness consists of four criteria: credibility, 
transferability, dependability, and conformability. 
 
The first criterion of trustworthiness is credibility. The credibility of findings in the 
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thesis entails ensure the thesis was carried out according to good practice (an ethical 
application form from the School of Management, see Appendix 13) and submitting 
findings to the participants for confirmation and approval (Bryman and Bell, 2007; 
Trochim and Donnnelly, 2007). The second criterion is transferability, in which findings 
can be “generalized or transferred to other contexts or settings” (Trochim and Donnelly, 
2007, p149). However, the findings in this thesis appear to have contextual uniqueness 
and cannot necessarily be transferred to other controversial industries. Additionally, 
transferability can be achieved to some extent through the process of conducting 
interviews and analysing the data so that other researchers can follow and replicate. The 
third one is dependability, which ensures a complete record of all the research process 
(Bryman and Bell, 2007; Trochim and Donnelly, 2007). The researcher kept an 
extensive and detailed record of the process, including selection of interviewees, 
interview questions and data analysis for other researchers to follow and replicate. The 
last one is confirmability, which refers to whether the findings could be “confirmed or 
correlated by others” (Trochim and Donnelly, 2007, p. 149). Yet, it would be impossible 
to have the interviews conducted two researchers in an identical manner. In order to 
overcome this problem, the present researcher has shown to “have acted in good faith” 
and “has not allowed personal values or theoretical inclinations to sway the conduct of 
the thesis and findings deriving from it” (Bryman and Bell, 2007, p. 414). In addition to 
trustworthiness, Guba and Lincoln (1994) propose “fairness” as a criterion of 
authenticity. In order to do so, this thesis represents different perceptions and viewpoints 
of internal stakeholders working in the gambling industry as well as other salient 
stakeholders (Section 3.3.3.2). 
 
3.3.3.2 Sampling decision 
In selecting the interviewees in Macao’s gambling industry, this process involves 
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internal and external stakeholders. However, the process of sampling was slightly 
different between the two groups. 
 
For the selection internal stakeholder interviewees, the objective was to cover a wide 
range of employees in Macao’s gambling industry for two primary reasons. Firstly, the 
researcher conducted pilot interviews
52
 in Macao during the summer of 2010. The 
result suggested that not all gambling companies had a CSR department, which can be 
positioned and linked in various departments (Footnote 52). Thus, the researcher 
decided to interview employees in different departments and at different levels. 
Secondly, even though senior managers are likely to possess overall knowledge of a 
company including CSR strategic aspects (O’ Dowyer, 2002; Belal and Owen, 2007), all 
employees in a company may encounter CSR issues at some stage in their careers. In 
order to obtain a complete picture of CSR practice within a company, it was important 
to select interviewees from different levels within that company. 
 
On the other hand, by selecting external stakeholders, the objective was to cover the 
related stakeholders
53
. This step is designed to deepen the insight and “complete the 
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 The pilot interviews involved four interviews with employees in Macao’s gambling companies and one 
interview with a CSR director in one of the UK’s gambling companies (from 2010/7 to 2010/10). After 
the pilot study, three important issues are valuable to prepare for the formal interviews. First, prior to 
commencing the fieldwork, these questions were piloted in five interviews and were subsequently refined. 
The interview questions were divided into two sections. The first section is to prepare for those 
interviewees who have heard of CSR; whereas the second section is for those interviewees who have 
never heard CSR and the questions are designed for more open and directed them to answer the main 
research questions in relation to CSR. Second, the researcher found that there are no CSR departments in 
any gambling companies in Macao. These companies have some departments which deal with CSR issues, 
but they sometimes are under Human Resource Departments, Communication Departments or Public 
Relations Department. Therefore, this finding assisted the researcher to decide the selection of 
interviewees in formal interviews. Third, the researcher is a lack of experience in interviewing 
participants. Prior to commencing the interviews, the researchers practiced the interview skills with other 
PhD students who are familiar with the fieldwork.   
53
 Fifth, suppliers were not included amongst stakeholders in this thesis because only one interviewee 
recognised this group of stakeholders from which it can be inferred that suppliers appeared not to be 
salient stakeholders in the gambling industry. 
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picture already obtained and to enrich the information on the first group”, i.e. the 
internal stakeholder interview (Boeije, 2002, p. 399). The selection of these external 
interviewees was based on internal stakeholder interviewees’ responses and a number of 
reasons. First, the government of Macao and academics played leading roles in CSR and 
RG in Macao’s gambling industry. Second, problem gambling counsellors and gamblers 
tended to be salient stakeholders in the industry. Third, journalists appeared to represent 
the opinions of the local community so as to provide a more comprehensive view to the 
industry. Fourth, some interviewees suggested that labour unions tended to have a close 
relationship with the industry that supplied the trained frontline employees to the 
industry. The final sample can be seen in Tables 8 and 9.  
 
3.3.3.3 Contacting the interviewees 
An important step was to contact stakeholders for interviewees. However, this process 
was slightly different between the two groups. 
 
Internal stakeholder interviewees who worked at different levels in the six gambling 
companies were chosen via two methods: personal contact and a snowball sampling 
technique. Firstly, initial contact with the interviewees was made through an email 
which outlined this research and attached five broad research questions (Appendix 14). 
This enabled each interviewee to consider this thesis and to seek clarification, if needed. 
80 emails were sent, and 14 favourable responses were received. The researcher 
contacted the potential interviewees by phone in January 2011 in Macao. Secondly, the 
drawing of a random sample to ensure a representative sample was clearly impossible. 
Therefore, the practical mode of finding suitable interviewees who were relevant to this 
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thesis was through the snowball sampling technique
54
 (Bryman and Bell, 2007). By 
establishing contacts with other potential interviewees, 30 interviews were finalised. 
 
A similar approach was adopted when contacting external stakeholder interviewees. 
They were chosen via three methods: sending an official letter, personal contact and 
snowball sampling technique. Firstly, initial contact with the interviewees was made in 
Macao through an official letter which includes five broad research questions 
(Appendix 15). Official letters were sent to 30 different potential interviewees, followed 
by email and by phone. Finally, 20 favourable responses were received. Secondly, to 
ensure equal representation from a random sample was very difficult as it was infeasible 
to contact all external stakeholders in Macao. Thirdly, the practical approach of finding 
appropriate interviewees was through personal contact and the snowball sampling 
technique. In the end, 19 interviews were finalised. 
 
3.3.3.4 Data collection - procedures of interviews 
This section provides detailed information on the initial stage of the interviews. This 
procedure was similar for internal and external stakeholders. Before starting the 
interviews, the researcher explained the nature of the research to each interviewee. The 
guarantee of anonymity and confidentially was outlined in the information sheet and 
that the interviewees’ names and organisations would not be disclosed. All information 
was clarified at the beginning of each interview in order to get open responses to the 
questions. The researcher was not looking for right or wrong answers, but was seeking 
to find out the interviewee’s opinions. The questions were more open-ended to invite 
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 The snowball technique is not drawn from a random sample. The researcher will not know the exact 
population which the sample would have to be drawn. Such approach can be achieved through the only 
feasible person from who can access the sample of the population (Bryman and Bell, 2007).   
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them to participate in a conversation (Bryman and Bell, 2011). They were not assumed 
to have professional knowledge. This arrangement was to maximise the likelihood of 
interviewees providing truthful responses during the interview. 
 
At the beginning of each interview, the interviewees were asked if it was possible to 
record the conversation during the interview. The purpose of making a digital record of 
each interview was to enhance the accuracy of the data collection
55
. If the interviewees 
wanted to stop the tape recording at the beginning
56
 or during the interview, the 
researcher would do so. If they wanted to receive a transcript in order to retain or check 
it, they could ask the researcher to send a copy to them, which happened in one case. 
Finally, five of the 49 interviewees did not agree to be digital recorded. 
 
After explaining the outline of the research, the researcher asked each interviewee 
whether or not they needed any further information. More than half of them took this 
chance to seek more clarification. Then, the researcher tried to answer the interviewees’ 
questions and to remove their anxiety. This approach led to a more relaxed atmosphere 
in the course of the interview and developed the rapport and trust between the 
interviewer and the interviewee. Most interviewees were willing to provide further 
information to the researcher if needed after the interviews. 
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 During the course of recorded interviews, written notes were taken so as to identify key concepts and 
interesting points, which the researcher returned to analyse at a later stage. Moreover, the researcher used 
the notes to identify conflicting information, which she then clarified. More importantly, during each 
interview, notes were written the relationship between the researcher and the interviewee, the level of 
rapport, the reaction to the questions and the researcher’s initial impression. 
56
 In the case of the interviews in which interviewees did not wish to be tape-recorded, those notes were 
written up immediately after the interviews to avoid missing major themes, points and phrases. In 
addition, observations were written down in the notes, which helped to examine, comprehend, and 
enhance the accuracy of the interview at a later stage of analysis. 
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Interviews were held at different locations for the convenience of the interviewees. Of 
the 49 interviewees, 27 were interviewed at their workplace in Macao, while the 
remaining 17 interviewees were interviewed at a quiet coffee shop of their convenience. 
Three interviewees, who were gamblers, were interviewed at the gambling treatment 
centres. If there was a noise that made the audio-recorded speech inaudible, the 
researcher put the audio-recorder as close to the interviewees as possible. The 
interviews lasted between 30 minutes and two hours, depending on the interviewees’ 
schedule, degree of knowledge, and willingness to share the information. 
 
3.3.3.5 Interview questions 
The questions were open-ended (including the questions in the interview guideline
57
) 
and were shaped by the CSR literature (Chapter 2), the pilot content analysis, and the 
pilot interviews. The design of the questions was open to discussion and to avoid 
dichotomous questions which led to direct answers, for example yes or no answer. The 
questions were clear to ensure each interviewee understood and was able to answer the 
questions. In addition, the researcher had a detailed discussion with other PhD peers 
who were familiar with this research method. 
 
The researcher thus designed two sets of questions based on the pilot interview
58
 for 
internal stakeholder interviewees: Case 1 - those who recognised the term CSR, and 
Case 2 - those who did not recognise the term CSR (Appendix 14). The interviews 
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 The interview guideline (see Appendix 14 and 15) was prepared before the interviews and allowed the 
researcher to explore and probe further issues that emerge perspectives relating to particular questions 
which helped the researcher to understand this topic better. The interview guideline may act as a general 
template, these questions cannot be restricted the researcher’s openness to new or emerging themes 
during the interview (O’Dwyer, 2004). The same questions were asked in each interview, but the 
sequence of the questions varied across interviews.  
58
 The findings of the pilot interview undertook between July and August in 2010 suggests that one of the 
interviewees did not recognise the term CSR. 
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ranged from 40 to 120 minutes to explore the five broad areas. These five questions tend 
to be open, general, and simple. This would help to draw the interviewees’ opinions and 
perception concerning certain business practices, routines and ethics that can reveal the 
extent of CSR. If the researcher deemed that the interviewee recognised CSR during the 
interviews, she would lead them to answer Case 1 questions. 
 
After the data collection in internal stakeholders, 25 interviews were undertaken 
between January and February in 2011 in Macao. The researcher started to transcribe 
and make a summary of all the interviews. Certain key stakeholders emerged from the 
interviews and the content analysis. It was important to know how these stakeholders 
view CSR in Macao’s gambling industry. After reviewing the transcripts, annual reports 
and the literature review, salient stakeholders were identified (Table 8). Thus, the 
researcher would adopt the similar approach undertook in internal stakeholders and two 
sets of questions for external stakeholder interviewees: Case 3 - those who recognised 
the term CSR, and Case 4 those who did not recognised the term CSR (Appendix 15). 
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3.3.3.6 Interview profile 
Table 8: Profile of internal stakeholders in Macao’s gambling industry 
Company Job Title Level 
Company A Director
59
, Communications Senior management 
(Western company) Director, Human Resources Senior management 
 
President, Education Dept.  Middle management 
 
Clerk, Account Receivable, Accounting Dept. Non-management 
 
Officer, Security Dept. Non-management 
   
Company B Casino Accountant, Casino Finance Junior management 
(Western company) Supervisor*, VIP room Junior management 
 
Officer, Public and Communication Dept. Non-management 
 
Coordinator, Convention & Exhibition, Sales Dept. Non-management 
 
Telephone Marketer, Casino Marketing Non-management 
   Company C Chief Executive Officer Senior management 
(Western company) Vice President, Human Resource Dept. Senior management 
 
Marketing Executive, International Marketing, Casino Middle management 
 
Coordinator, Promotion and Events, Casino Marketing, 
Business Dept. 
Non-management 
   Company D Executive Vice President, Chief HR/ CSR Officer Senior management 
(Western company) Senior Manager, Casino Promotions and Events Middle management 
 Manager, Finance Planning Analyst, Finance Dept. Middle management 
 Supervisor, Public Administration Junior management 
 Technical Analyst, Information Technology Dept. Non-management 
 Cleaner Non-management 
   Company E  Assistant Director, Employee Training Dept. Senior management 
(Chinese company) Director, Casino Operations Senior management 
 Supervisor, Employee Relation of Human Resource Dept. Junior management 
 Inspector*, Table Gaming Non-management 
 Supervisor*, Table Gaming Non-management 
   
Company F  Director, Security Department Senior management 
(Chinese company) Assistant Manager, Public Relations Dept. Middle management 
 Assistant Manager, Public Administration Middle management 
 
Assistant Operation Manager*, Table Gaming, Casino 
Operation 
Middle management 
 Supervisor, Account Receivable, Finance Dept. Junior management 
Total  30 
Notes: (*) refers to frontline employees who work in table gaming in casinos 
Department= Dept.  
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 Two directors were interviewed together when this interview was arranged by Company A’s Human 
Resource Department.  
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Table 8 shows that internal stakeholder interviewees worked at various levels in six 
gambling companies in Macao. All interviewees were interviewed during two periods: 
January to February 2011 and June to August 2011. 30 interviewees
60
 were named 
according to their company, job title and level of position, for example Manager, 
Company A, was the code for a manager who worked in Education Department in 
Company A (Table 8). This arrangement can help readers to know which quotes
61
 come 
from and understand their position to answer the interviewees’ questions. This is an 
important step for examining the data in more depth. 
 
Regarding the company, one of the Macao gambling companies had a monopoly from 
1960 to 2001 (Appendix 2). This company has continued to dominate Macao’s 
gambling industry since 2001. Another Chinese gambling company was from Hong 
Kong. The other four international gambling companies were mainly from the US and 
Australia. In particular, the sample of internal stakeholders could be classified into four 
main groups: senior, middle, junior, and non-management levels, so as to concentrate on 
the perspectives of all interviewees at different levels regarding CSR. This step of 
comparison is between interviews within the same group, which means interviewees 
share the same concept (Boeije, 2002). 
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 All interviewees were Macao citizens, with the exception of one British and one Australian. Ten 
interviewees were from two Chinese companies in Macao, and twenty interviewees were from four 
international gambling companies. 
61
 More pertinently, many (but not all) of the selected quotations were translated from Cantonese into 
English. The researcher doubled checked with her English teacher to ensure the quotations were written 
with similar meaning in order to convey or express the interviewees’ ideas or actual meanings. 
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Table 9: Profile of external stakeholders (ES) at Macao’s gambling industry 
Type of Organisation Code Job Title 
Government 
Department 
Regulator 1 Director, Gaming Regulatory Authority 
 
Regulator 2 Inspector, Gaming Regulatory Authority 
 
Regulator 3 
Supervisor, Problem Gambling Prevention and 
Treatment Centre 
 
  
Academic Institution Academic 1 
Director, Institute for the Study of Commercial 
Gaming and Associate Professor, Gambling 
studies 
 
Academic 2 Associate Professor, Business Economics, 
 
Academic 3 
Associate Professor, School of Public 
Administration/ Social Work Programme, 
 
Academic 4 
Associate Professor, Department of 
Communication 
 
  
Problem Gambling 
Counselling Centre 
Counsellor 1 
Supervisor, Problem Gambling Counselling 
Centre A 
 
Counsellor 2 
Assistant Unit In-Charge, Problem Gambling 
Counselling Centre B 
 
Counsellor 3 
Director, Problem Gambling Counselling 
Centre C 
 
Counsellor 4 
Executive, Problem Gambling Counselling 
Centre D 
 
  
Individual Gambler* Gambler 1 Hotel Technician, Casino A 
 
Gambler 2 Dealer, Table Gaming, Casino B 
 
Gambler 3 Officer, Security Department, Casino C 
 
  
Journalism Journalist 1 Reporter, Bilingual Newspaper A 
 
Journalist 2 Director, Bilingual Newspaper A 
 
Journalist 3 Assistant Chief Editor, (Local) Newspaper B 
 
Journalist 4 Executive, Newspaper C 
 
  
Labour Union Labour Unionist 1 
Director, Macao Gaming Industry Labourers 
Association 
Total 19 19 
Notes: Gamblers (*) refer to local citizens who worked in the gambling companies and 
gambled in their pleasure time. One of the interviewees worked as a frontline employee. 
There is some grey area of identification between gamblers and employees. 
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Macao’s gambling industry can have different salient stakeholders62 who can affect or 
be affected by the industry. Table 9 shows the second group of interviewees. These 
interviewees were named according to their type of organisation, an interviewee code 
and job title. The classification is slightly different from the first group because 
interviewees worked in different types of organisations, rather than a single type. Thus, 
the interviewees were given a particular code for convenience, for example Government 
Official 1, was the code for a director in Gaming Regulatory Body (Table 9). This step 
can make a comparison between the interviews with other group (Boeije, 2002). All 19 
interviewees were interviewed from June 2011 to August 2011, and were Macao 
citizens, with the exception of one German and one Portuguese. 
 
3.3.3.7  Data analysis 
In this thesis, computer aided qualitative data analysis software (CAQDAS)
63
 was 
employed. The researcher dealt with a large data set, 49 interviews, and was 
inexperienced with managing qualitative data. This software offered a number of 
benefits concerning analytical procedures (Saunders, et al., 2009). It can organise the 
data systematically, increase transparency, and enhance continuity. The researcher could 
access and learn
64
 one software of CAQDAS, namely Nvivo, in the School of 
Management
65
 in 2011.  
 
                                                     
62
 Every corporation interacts positively or negatively with stakeholders (Carroll, et al., 2012). The most 
normal stakeholders generally include owners, employees, suppliers, customers, local community, and 
government. 
63
 There are a range of CSQDAS developers, such as ATLAS. Ti, HyperRESEARCH, MAXqda2, NVivo 
and QSR N6 (Saunders, et al., 2009, p. 516). 
64
 Moreover, the researcher took a course of using Nvivo 8 in the first year of her PhD. After collecting 
all the interviews, the researcher asked colleagues in the School of Management and Phycology, who had 
the practical experience of using this software. 
65
 This software is also available at some departments, for example Psychology, Management, or 
Geography. 
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The principles of using CAQDAS, (for example Nvivo 8) can help when examining 
qualitative data with regard to managing a project, organizing data, structuring work, 
keeping close to data, exploring the data, coding and retrieving, searching and 
interrogating, and writing memos (Saunders, et al., 2009, p. 515). However, Nvivo is 
merely a tool for assisting interview analysis. This software cannot do critical thinking 
and cannot formulate conclusions; thus, the researcher will need to interpret the data 
(O’Dwyer, 2004). 
 
The analytical process was driven by the data. The transcripts were read several times 
and the primary themes were developed. Subsequently, the transcripts were all imported 
to Nvivo 8 and all the files saved in an external hard disk. Thus, all documents were 
built up in an “electronic filing cabinet” in order to enhance deeper analysis (Fisher, 
2010). Reading and analysing the transcripts were mainly driven by the research 
questions. The procedure was inductive with different themes outside the interviews 
that were derived from the notes (O’Dwyer, 2003). There were three distinct phases in 
the interview data analysis: data reduction, data display and data interpretation (Miles 
and Huberman, 1994; O’Dwyer, 2004), which is explained in the following section. 
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Figure 2: Process of interview data analysis (Adapted from O'Dwyer, 2004) 
 
3.3.3.7.1 Data Reduction 
The 49 interviews were transcribed
66
. Each transcript was double checked with the 
digital recorder to ensure accuracy. Any errors were immediately corrected. All the 
transcripts were read together with the interview notes
67
 taken during the interviews, 
reflections after the interview, and any observations written, so as to assist transcript 
analysis.  
 
Numerous sources for data collection, such as the interview guideline, the digital record 
interview and rough diagrams, were gathered to assist in transcript analysis. The process 
of data reduction was conducted in four months (from October 2011 to January 2012) 
and was divided into four stages (Figure 2). 
                                                     
66
 Since 49 interviews were conducted, all internal and external stakeholder interviewees were Macao 
citizens with six exceptions, one British, one Australian, one Japanese, one German, one Portuguese and 
one local citizens who like to speak in English. Therefore, 43 interviews were conducted in Cantonese, 
while six interviews were conducted in English.   
67
 Moreover, the interview notes were written in a note form to remind companies’ policies, perspectives 
and opinions within an organisation (Bryman and Bell, 2007). 
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In the first phrase, the initial process was started to provide a general overview of the 
interviewees’ notes. A summary was made after each interview. All the themes or 
perhaps keywords used by the interviewees were identified and written down on a 
separate sheet of paper before transferring to Nvivo. This step was important to generate 
the key themes that helped to interpret and theorised the findings at the later stage. 
 
In the second phrase, the interviews were listened to again, the transcripts were read and 
the open codes were developed according to the CSR literature (Chapter 2; O’Dwyer, 
2004). Open coding
68
 is the part of qualitative analysis regarding identifying, 
categorising, and describing the situation found in the transcripts and these labels refer 
to the nouns or verbs of a conceptual world (Fisher, 2010). This analytic process can 
help to identify general categories. Initially, any open codes were made and were 
highlighted in yellow beside the interview transcripts. As a result, more than 100 open 
codes were made at the initial stage and were transferred to Nvivo 8. The codes 
themselves do not cause the problem. Yet, too many open codes led to a focus on small 
codes, rather than big codes. 
 
In the third phrase, the interviews were listened to again, the transcripts were reviewed 
in more depth and key themes were developed from the data. Focusing on big codes 
were mainly described the central issue and was framed according to the theory 
(Chapter 2). The big codes were also referred to in the open code done in the second 
phrase. The purpose was to integrate the open codes into the big codes. Subsequently, 
big codes for each interview were developed systemically, which can be a number and 
the letter of alphabet, to identify the key themes. A number of open codes were grouped 
                                                     
68
 Computer aided qualitative data analysis software (CAQDAS), for example, Nvivo 8 offers allocation 
of concept of “free nodes” which are standalone’ nodes with no connection with other nodes and with no 
hierarchical structure (Fisher, 2010). 
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under the certain theme – “CSR/concept”, for example CSR/ECO69 (Figure 3). After 
identifying primary themes, sub-themes and new themes, some patterns emerged to 
make sense of the data. A reflection period was needed and a discussion was made with 
her supervisors. 
 
Figure 3: Examples of code development 
 
The fourth phrase was the second ‘reflection’ period (See O’Dwyer, 2004). The 
researcher reread the transcripts to check if any new themes emerged. Primary themes 
and sub-themes were renamed after deep thinking and questioning. This step was 
introduced to search for the ‘big picture’ and for analytic themes (See O’Dwyer, 2004). 
Sometimes, some themes tended to conflict with other themes between internal and 
external stakeholders and these conflicting themes derived from the findings in the 
earlier stages of analysis (See O’Dywer, 2004). The preceding analysis led to have 
limited explanations; hence, the researcher started to question the data, to seek 
assumptions behind the quotes, and to challenge the initial analysis. 
                                                     
69
 CSR/ECO meant “the concept of Corporate Social Responsibility in relation to economic 
development”, CSR/RG meant “the concept of Corporate Social Responsibility in relation to Responsible 
Gambling”, and CSR/CUL meant the concept of Corporate Social Responsibility in relation to cultural 
perspective. 
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3.3.3.7.2 Data Displays 
Producing data displays is an important step. Data can be shown in a number of ways; 
however, this process involves selection or data reduction (Fisher, 2010). Data display is 
an essential part of qualitative analysis that involves systematic development, and 
coherent explanation of interview findings (O’Dwyer, 2004). This thesis used a 
mind-map to illustrate the findings. Interviewees were divided into internal and external 
stakeholders and were spilt according to roles of people in organisations and types of 
companies. 
 
3.3.3.7.3 Data Interpretation 
The process of data interpretation can be divided into three main stages. First, revisit 
transcripts, mind maps, and literature were an initial process. A descriptive 
representation of the interview findings was based on the primary theme (O’Dwyer, 
2004). These provide the big picture of current themes from the data so as to give some 
sense of richness and complexity (See O’Dwyer, 2004). An initial story emerging from 
the data was drawn from the main themes and sub-themes. 
 
Second, an initial thick description (O’Dwyer, 2004) was written with data sets and 
notes. Employing the main themes or sub-themes of the interview findings led to a 
limited explanation and a loose framework. An iterative process can have a reflection, a 
clarification and a challenge to the previous findings. The initial thick description
70
 
drew some new insights, new interpretations and alternative explanations (O’Dwyer, 
2004). The researcher became aware of more conflicts, contradictions, and paradoxes 
from the findings. This process can question the initial analysis and interpretation of the 
                                                     
70
 Thick description means “rich accounts of the details of a culture” (Geertz, 1973 cited in Bryman and 
Bell, 2007, p.413) and Guba and Lincoln (1994) contend that a thick description provides other 
researchers with a database for ascertain about the level of transferability of findings to another context.  
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data. 
 
Third, a more interpretive narrative (Llewellyn, 1999) or a big picture representing the 
interview findings was carefully crafted around the key themes (O’Dwyer, 2004). 
Finally, a narrative concentrating on an analytical theme helped to develop a story by 
using legitimacy theory (Chapter 2) that could make some sense of the data (O’Dwyer, 
2004). This step could make a connection between the literature and the big codes or 
themes (Chapter 3). This step can help seek assumptions and challenge the analysis. 
 
With these two approaches, each finding in Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7 could be regarded as 
a stepping-stone to build up a small story and to develop a big story in Chapter 8. 
Therefore, each finding chapter included extensive description, linking to the literature 
(Chapter 2) and the theory (Chapter 2). However, the process of coding text into chunk 
and put the text out of the context into groups of related fragments that can 
decontextualize the data and lose the social setting (Bryman and Bell, 2011). 
 
3.4 Summary 
This chapter has described the research design of the thesis: content analysis and 
semi-structured interviews. Each method covers method selection, potential limitation 
and a detailed description of how each method is shown a detailed description and 
process. In Chapter 4, content analysis findings are presented, followed by the 
semi-structured interview findings in Chapters 5, 6, and 7. 
126 
 
Chapter 4 
Corporate Social Disclosure Practice in the gambling industry 
4.1 Introduction 
CSR has been associated with a significant increase in the reporting of social and 
environmental policies, practices, and performance. This is generally known as 
“Corporate Social Disclosure (CSD)”. The quantity and quality of corporate disclosure 
has become increasingly questionable as evidence. The KPMG (2011) reports, for 
example, shows that there is an increasing trend to corporate disclosure in a number of 
countries (34) and sectors (16).  
 
A number of the CSD studies have examined how the nature of a particular industry 
may affect the level of CSD. Companies in high profile industries
71
, for example the 
automobile, airline and oil industries, are more likely to have higher levels of CSD than 
those in low-profile industries, such as food, hotel, and services (Roberts, 1992; 
Newson and Deegan, 2002). Companies with higher sensitivity to environmental issues 
appear to provide more environmental disclosure than those with lower sensitivity 
(Cowen, et al., 1987; Patten, 1991, 1992, 2002; Hackston and Milne, 1996; Cho and 
Patten, 2007; Aerts and Cormier, 2009). Companies with a “higher public” profile – the 
most vulnerable to change in social opinion – tend to undertake community disclosure 
and these types of companies are likely to relate to consumers and the general public 
(Campbell, et al., 2006). According to Hackston and Milne (1996, p. 81), 
“consumer-oriented industries companies can be expected to exhibit greater concern 
with demonstrating their social responsibility to community”. This type of social 
                                                     
71
 According to Roberts (1992, p. 605), high profile industries refer to “industries with consumer 
visibility, a high level of political risk, and concentrated, intense competition”. 
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disclosure is often voluntary in nature. For the higher profile companies, for example 
retailers, brewers and petrochemicals, the findings have shown that community 
disclosure is a higher priority than other types of disclosure in annual reports of lower 
profile companies, for example chemicals, intermediates and aggregates (Campbell, et 
al., 2006). 
 
Some CSD studies have investigated controversial industries, for example the tobacco 
industry (Campbell, et al., 2003; Moerman and Der Laan, 2005; Tilling and Tilt, 2010), 
and the brewing industry (Campbell, et al., 2006). The gambling industry, a further 
example of a contentious industry, remains largely unexplored in the CSD literature, and 
most of the CSD studies do not address the gambling industry specifically.  
 
Since the gambling industry creates several socially undesirable externalities in the 
production of its revenue, problem gamblers have become more prominent over the past 
few decades (Hing, 2001). Companies in the gambling industry with high community 
visibility are associated with consumers and the public (Campbell, et al., 2006).  
 
According to legitimacy theory (Chapter 2), the gambling industry has been facing an 
ongoing threat to its legitimacy: gambling addiction and health-related issues. The 
legitimacy threat can create a significant legitimacy gap (Sethi, 1978), which provides 
an important motivation for organisational legitimation within the gambling industry 
(Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975; Lindblom, 1993). Thus, the gambling industry might 
engage in efforts to reduce this gap through identifying some symbols of social 
legitimacy, particularly CSD (Chapter 2). This approach can be regarded as strategic 
legitimacy (Suchman, 1995), which assumes that managers have a high degree of 
128 
 
control over the legitimacy process (Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975; Ashforth and Gibbs, 
1990; Lindblom, 1993). Organisations in the gambling industry are expected to deploy 
legitimating disclosure more strongly (see Campbell, et al., 2003), particularly RG 
disclosure (gambling addiction and health-related issues) to reduce the legitimacy gap. 
In contrast, institutional legitimacy tends to concentrate on how organisations adopt an 
institutional environment to manage legitimacy (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer 
and Rowan, 1991). DiMaggio and Powell (1983) suggest that there are three main 
process used to maintain institutional legitimacy: “coercive isomorphism”, “mimetic 
processes” and “normative pressures”. Based on the legitimacy literature (Chapter 2), 
organisations in the gambling industry are expected to be shaped by or to conform to the 
institutional environment.  
 
Prior CSD literature provided a little guidance in the area of CSD and the gambling 
industry as discussed above. Thus, content analysis (Chapters 3) was employed to 
provide an initial exploration of the social and environmental reporting practices of the 
gambling industry and its engagement with Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in 
order to answer the first quantitative research question of the thesis. RQ1: To what 
extent does the gambling industry disclose Corporate Social Responsibility 
(CSR)-related data? This question attempts to explore what organisations in the 
gambling industry report to the public, and what they do not report. This chapter will 
examine CSD and related data in the annual reports across six countries, including the 
UK, the US, Australia, South Africa, Macao and Hong Kong, over three years from 
2007 to 2009. The selected sample comprises data from 28 companies and 82 annual 
reports (Chapters 3).  
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There are four main findings in this chapter. First, not surprisingly, disclosure is mostly 
dominated by mandated employee and director disclosure. Second, the RG disclosure, 
concerning customer protection cannot be regarded as an important issue in the annual 
reports. It could be argued that the gambling industry attempts to remain silent 
concerning gambling addiction and health-related issues. The gambling industry appears 
not to develop some symbols, for example CSD and also RG disclosure, to maintain 
social legitimacy. Third, there is a no relationship between corporate size and the 
volume of disclosure. These findings indicate that organisations in the gambling 
industry tend to operate on a national, rather than international level since these 
organisations appear to make references to national, rather than international, reporting 
practices and authorities. Fourth, this industry appears to lack an international gambling 
association which might develop an international standard of RG codes and practices. 
These findings indicate that the gambling industry is unlikely to have institutional 
pressure from global and industry levels. 
 
This chapter reports on the preliminary content analysis findings of CSD in the 
gambling industry. The chapter is divided into seven sections. The first section reports 
the introduction of the chapter. Section 4.2 provides the overall volume of total CSD, 
followed by an overview of the main trends in volume of CSD over the three year 
across six countries in Section 4.3. Section 4.4 shows the total CSD across six countries 
in comparison with the recent international evidence and the volume of disclosure in the 
gambling industry represented by the countries. Section 4.5 presents thematic analysis 
across six countries, which can be divided into mandatory and voluntary CSD with a 
detailed analysis on each theme. Section 4.6 shows the relationship between corporate 
size and CSD, and finally a concluding remark is in the last Section 4.7. 
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4.2 Overall volume of total corporate social disclosure (CSD) 
In order to capture gambling companies’ engagement with CSR, CSD within corporate 
annual reports will be examined in detail. CSD has been divided into eight categories 
(Appendix 8), which have resulted in an uneven distribution of CSD across the six 
countries. In Table 10, the average volume of total CSD over the three year was 12.71 
pages of the annual reports. The highest volume of disclosure is related to director with 
3.71 pages due to the mandatory disclosure in annual reports. Other types of disclosure 
indicate a very low priority given to responsible gambling (0.22 pages), economic (0.15 
pages), and consumer (0.06 pages) disclosures. The volume of responsible gambling 
disclosure is roughly a seventeenth of the volume of director disclosure, while the 
volume of economic disclosure and consumer disclosure are approximately a 
twenty-fifth and a sixtieth of the volume of director disclosure respectively. The 
maximum volume of disclosure is undertaken in 2009 at 27.18 pages of the corporate 
annual report relating to community at Hong Kong.  
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Table 10: Average volume of CSD from 2007-2009 across 6 countries (Descriptive 
statistics) 
 
2007 2008 2009 
Mean 
(07-09) 
Max 
(07-09) 
Min 
(07-09) 
Median 
(07-09) 
Disclosure  
No 
Disclosure 
Total CSR 11.97 11.28 14.88 12.71 33.12 5.29 12.63 82 (100%) 0% 
Voluntary 
CSD 
5.79 4.34 7.65 5.92 31.74 1.03 2.77 82 (100%) 0% 
Mandatory 
CSD 
6.18 6.94 7.23 6.78 10.58 0.94 7.49 82 (100%) 0% 
Economic 0.10  0.17  0.19  0.15  0.49  0.01  0.08  40/82 (49%) 42/82 (51%) 
Environment 0.67  0.42  0.59  0.56  2.35  0.08  0.37  59/82 (72%) 23/82 (28%) 
Consumers 0.05  0.05  0.09  0.06  0.15  0.00  0.04  24/82 (30%) 58/82 (70%) 
Responsible 
Gambling 
0.22 0.18 0.28 0.22 0.76 0.00 0.17 
36/82(44%) 46/82 (56%) 
Community 3.45  2.41  5.22  3.69  27.18  0.00  1.02  55/82 (67%) 27/82 (33%) 
Employees 3.89  3.30  3.58  3.59  7.97  0.87  3.34  82/82 (100%) 0/82 (0%) 
Directors 3.15  4.13  3.90  3.71  7.30  0.08  4.67  76/82 (93%) 7/82 (7%) 
Corporate 
Governance 
0.20  0.37  0.56  0.38  1.10  0.00  0.35  
66/82 (80%) 16/82 (20%) 
Others 0.24  0.25  0.47  0.32  2.27  0.00  0.30  47/82 (57%) 35/82 (43%) 
Note: The figures in % indicate the percentage of companies in the sample disclosing in the 
relevant category. 
Note: Max, Min, Median are from the year 2007- 2009 
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Table 11: Number of disclosing in 6 countries 
2007-2009 US UK Australia South Africa Macao Hong Kong 
Number of 
Disclosure 
Total CSD 
(Voluntary   
Mandatory) 
18  18 17 9  17 3  82  
Economic 5/40 (13%) 10/40 (25%) 4/40 (10%) 8/40 (20%) 10/40 (25%) 3/40 (8%) 40/82 (49%) 
Environment 13/59 (22%) 12/59 (20%) 13/59 (22%) 7/59 (12%) 11/59 (19%) 3/59 (5%) 59/82 (72%) 
Consumers 3/24 (13%) 8/24 (33%) 4/24 (17%) 4/24(17%) 3/24 (13%) 2/24 (8%) 24/82 (30%) 
Responsible Gambling 1/36 (3%) 14/36 (39%) 9/36 (25%) 9/36(25%) 3/36 (8%) 0/36 (0%) 36/82 (44%) 
Community 4/55 (7%) 16/55(29%) 11/55 (20%) 9/55(16%) 12/55 (22%) 3/55(5%) 55/82 (67%) 
Employees 18/82(22%) 18/82 (22%) 17/82 (20%) 9/82(11%) 17/82(20%) 3/82 (4%) 82/82 (100%) 
Directors 16/76(21%) 18/76(24%) 17/76 (22%) 8/76 (11%) 14/76 (18%) 3/76 (4%) 76/82 (93%) 
Corporate Governance 14/66 (21%) 16/66 (24%) 14/66 (21%) 6/66 (9%) 16/66 (24%) 0/66 (0%) 66/82 (80%) 
Others 1/47 (2%) 14/47 (30%) 11/47 (23%) 9/47 (19%) 9/47 (19%) 3/47 (6%) 47/82 (57%) 
Notes: % are represented in bracket 
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4.3 Trends in total CSD 
Figure 4: Average volume of total, voluntary and mandatory CSD across 6 
countries 
 
Figure 4 shows that average volume of total, voluntary, and mandatory CSD across six 
countries. There has been a gradual increase in the volume of total disclosure, voluntary 
and mandatory disclosures from year 2007 to 2009. The average volume of total CSD 
remains relatively constant during 2007 and 2008, but it rises sharply in 2009 (Figure 4). 
From 2007 to 2009, the average volume of mandatory disclosure increases steadily. In 
2007, particularly, the average volume of voluntary disclosure is slightly higher than the 
mandatory disclosure in 2007; however, it goes to opposite direction in 2007 onwards. 
The average volume of voluntary disclosure increases slightly between 2008 and 2009. 
This decrease corresponds with the sharp increase in the volume of mandatory 
disclosure. Perhaps, a financial crisis started at 2007; therefore, gambling companies 
tended to have less resources to engage in CSR activities so as to decline slightly in 
their voluntary disclosure between 2007 and 2008.  
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4.4 Total CSD across 6 countries 
4.4.1 International comparison of CSD in the gambling industry 
Figure 5: International comparison of disclosure in the gambling industry 
 
Figure 5 illustrates the international comparisons of disclosure within the gambling 
industry. The relative volumes of disclosure from the UK and Australia are similar and 
leading in the sample because the UK and Australia generally require for greater 
accountability, transparency, and a strong demand from different stakeholders, such as 
consumers, employees and shareholders (KPMG 2008; 2011
72
). Surprisingly, the 
volume of disclosure from the US appears to be low and even lower than the volume of 
disclosure from South Africa. The findings of the KPMG International Report of CSD 
are based on all sectors at national level. The sampled companies in the US represent 
only the gambling industry rather than all sectors. Therefore, the findings indicate that 
the volume of disclosure in the US gambling industry cannot be expected to follow the 
national reporting practices. Interestingly, it is unanticipated to see an increasing trend 
of disclosure in Macao and Hong Kong and there is no explanation for this 
phenomenon.  
                                                     
72
 The previous studies refer to the KPMG’s survey (2005, 2008 and 2011), which concentrated on 
standalone report; however, these reports include some general data concerning CSR reporting, including 
annual reports. In these reports, the gambling industry is classified as the “other service” sector, which 
13% of the sampled companies in large global companies (G250) (KPMG, 2008). 
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4.4.2 International comparison of average yearly levels of disclosure 
Figure 6: Average pages of disclosure per year per company across 6 countries 
 
Figure 6 shows the average volume of disclosure per year per reporting company across 
six countries over the three years
73
. The total volume of CSD disclosure can be divided 
into total, mandatory, and voluntary disclosures. It is helpful to discuss the difference 
between these two disclosures. The average volume of total mandatory disclosure is 
6.78 pages higher than the average volume of total voluntary CSD with 5.94 pages 
across the US, the UK, Australia, Macao, and South Africa (Table 10). Mandatory 
disclosure is consistently higher than voluntary disclosure for the sample. In contrast to 
voluntary disclosure, the average volume of voluntary disclosure from Hong Kong is 
                                                     
73
 Prior CSD studies have concentrated on international comparative studies (Guthrie and Parker, 1990; 
Adams, et al., 1998; Adams and Kuasirkun, 2000; Buhr and Freedman, 2001; Holland and Foo, 2003; Van 
Der Lann Smith, et al., 2005). A number of CSD studies have predominantly investigated on developed 
countries. The empirical works on CSD have focused on developed countries, for example the US, the 
UK, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and European countries (Wiseman, 1982; Guthrie and Parker, 1989; 
Harte and Owen, 1991; Patten, 1991; Roberts, 1992; Adams, et al, 1995; Gray, et al., 1995a; Deegan and 
Gordon, 1996; Hackston and Milne, 1996, Adams and Kuasirkun, 2000; Buhr & Freedman, 2001; Cho, et 
al., 2010), while there has been increasing number of studies on developing countries, for example South 
Africa (Savage, 1994; De Villiers and Charl, 1999; Van Staden, 2000; Mitchell and Hill, 2009), 
Bangladesh (Belal, 2001, 2008; Belal and Owen, 2007), Uganda (Kisenyi and Graym, 1998), Nigeria 
(Disu and Gray, 1998), and Ghana (Rahaman, 2000), Turkey (Nuhoglu, 2003). Other CSD studies have 
examined in Asian countries, such as Japan (Lodhia, 2000), Malaysia (Teoh and Thong, 1984; Jamil and 
Mohamed, 2002), Singapore (Tsang, 1998), Hong Kong (Lynn, 1992; Gao, et al., 2005), Thailand 
(Kuasirikun and Shere, 2004) and China (Kolk, et al., 2010). 
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higher than those reported by the UK, the US, Australia, South Africa and Macao. In 
particular, Hong Kong is also the highest in the sample in terms of voluntary disclosure. 
Apparently, Hong Kong disclosed the most information on CSD on average due to the 
highest volume community disclosure levels in 2007, 2008 and 2009 (Appendix 16). 
The phenomenon for this is not obvious, but it may have something to do with the 
sample and the types of organisations. The collected sample comes from one gambling 
company
74
 in Hong Kong a result the sample may be considered unrepresented, but it 
can be argued that this finding can influence how to analyse the data. In addition, the 
gambling company in Hong Kong is a non-profit organisation, which is different from 
those profit-making gambling companies in the sampled countries.  
4.5 Themes analysis across 6 countries 
Figure 7: Topics of disclosure - an international comparison (Excluding Hong 
Kong - Community) 
 
Apart from the volume of disclosure being generally very low, a number of interesting 
disclosures are obvious in Figure 7 (Table 11; Appendix 16). The figure provides a 
general overview of “themes” across six countries.  
                                                     
74
 The Hong Kong Jockey Club is representative in Hong Kong 
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First, both employee disclosure and director disclosure dominated the annual reports. 
This shows the importance of mandatory disclosure. These findings are consistent with 
those of the previous CSD studies (Gray, et al., 1995a; Parker, 2008/09). Second, the 
CSD tends to be very low in general; however, Hong Kong has the highest volume of 
community disclosure with a maximum of 17.4 pages between 2007 and 2009 
(Appendix 16). This phenomenon is due to the distorting information influence of only 
one sample in Hong Kong and this company being a non-profit-making organisation 
which is different from those in the sample. Third, the environmental disclosure from 
South Africa and Hong Kong are higher than the sample from the UK, the US, and 
Australia. Surprisingly, these findings are not in line with those of prior studies (KPMG, 
2005; 2008). This is due to the limited sample in South Africa and Hong Kong. Fourth, 
economic disclosure from Macao, South Africa and Hong Kong are relatively higher 
than the samples from the UK, the US and Australia. If a country is heavily dependent 
on the gambling industry, this industry plays a significant role in economic development 
in this country. Finally, one unique theme to this industry is called Responsible 
Gambling (RG). RG disclosure is very disappointing with a low volume of disclosure in 
general. The sample from Hong Kong offers no disclosure, and the sample from the 
USA and Macao merely none as well. 
 
4.5.1 Average volume of mandatory CSD across 6 countries: A general outline 
This section will be divided into two disclosures: (1) mandatory (Section 4.5.1) and (2) 
voluntary (Section 4.5.2) across six countries. This classification can show legislative 
disclosure (minimum disclosure) and voluntary disclosure beyond minimum 
requirement (see Adams, et al., 1995; Gray, et al., 1995a). However, other scholars did 
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not divide disclosure into mandatory and voluntary disclosure (Patten, 1991; Hackston 
and Milne, 1996). Patten (1991) argues that a distinction between mandatory and 
voluntary is not helpful for because the level of mandatory is so low. The distinction 
between the two disclosures can arguably be seen as how corporations follow the 
minimum disclosure requirement. Each following section will highlight different 
categories and will be discussed in detail. 
 
Figure 8: Corporate social disclosure - mandatory and voluntary disclosure 
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Figure 9: Average volume of mandatory CSD across 6 countries from 2007-2009 
 
Figure 9 breaks the mandatory CSD per country into five main themes. Mandated 
disclosure concerning directors and employees dominate with 2.25 pages and 3.72 
pages respectively. While other disclosure, including corporate governance, mandatory 
environment and mandatory community, are varied. 
 
4.5.1.1 Director disclosure 
Figure 9 shows that director disclosure is the highest volume of mandatory disclosure. 
These findings are consistent with those of previous CSD studies, which suggest that 
the volume of director disclosure tends to be high (see Parker, 2008/2009). The findings 
show 93 % (from 82 annual reports) of all gambling companies to disclose information 
concerning director over the three-year period (Tables 10 and 11). The UK, Australia, 
South Africa and Macao are similar in that these countries require mandatory disclosure 
concerning directors’ information, for example directors’ emoluments, remuneration and 
short-term benefits. The following text is one of the examples.  
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Other Directorships 
“Christchurch Casinos Limited, in which SKYCITY has a 45.7% interest, paid 
director’s fees of $40,000 each for A B Ryan and N B Morrison. These directors’ 
fees were paid to SKYCITY and were not received personally by either Messrs 
Ryan or Morrison. Queenstown Casinos Limited, in which SKYCITY has a 60% 
interest, paid director’s fees of $7,500 each for A B Ryan and N B Morrison. These 
directors’ fees were paid to SKYCITY and were not received personally by either 
Messrs Ryan or Morrison.” 
(Australia, Skycity, 2009:60) 
4.5.1.2 Mandatory employee disclosure 
Table 11 shows that 100% of all the sampled companies disclose information 
concerning employee. Employee disclosure can be divided into mandatory disclosure 
and voluntary disclosure (Figures 9 and 10). This section focuses on mandatory 
employee disclosure, while voluntary employee disclosure will be discussed in Section 
4.5.3.2. In mandatory employee disclosure, the gambling companies complied with 
minimal mandated legislation in most countries. This type of disclosure can be viewed 
as a statutory item in the published annual report and accounts of larger organisations 
(Day and Woodward, 2004). Employee disclosure is driven by the mandatory disclosure, 
which is not surprising or inconsistent with those findings of prior studies (Guthrie and 
Parker, 1990; Roberts, 1992; Adams, et al., 1995; Gray, et al., 1995a; Hackston and 
Milne, 1996; Adams, et al., 1998; Parker, 2008/2009).  
 
The sampled countries have legislation requiring disclosure in relation to 
employee-related information. In particular, the UK reports the highest volume of 
employee disclosure. The UK has legislation to disclose information concerning 
employees, for example the Companies Act 2006 in relation to Employee Data, 
Employee Pension, Employee Share Ownership, and the Health and Safety at Work Act 
1974 and the Employment Act 1982 concerning Employee Disability (Appendix 9). The 
141 
 
following text is one of the examples of employee pension.  
 
Pensions and other post-employment benefits 
 The defined benefit pension fund holds assets separately from the Group. The 
pension cost relating to this fund is assessed in accordance with the advice of 
independent qualified actuaries using the projected unit credit method. 
 Any past service cost is recognised immediately to the extent that the benefits 
have already vested and otherwise is amortised on a straight line basis over the 
average period until the benefits vest. The retirement benefit asset recognised in 
the balance sheet represents the fair value of scheme assets less the value of the 
defined benefit obligations as adjusted for unrecognised past service cost. 
 (UK, Ladbrokes, 2009:67) 
 
Interestingly, Macao and South Africa are similar to developed countries, including the 
US, the UK and Australia. South Africa, in particular, has legislation requiring the 
disclosure of information concerning employees, such as the Occupational Health and 
Safety Act (OSHACT) 1996, the Employment Equity Act, the Promotion of Equality 
and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 2000, the Protected Disclosures Act 2000, 
the Labour Relations Act and the South African Companies Act (Employee Pension) 
(Appendix 9). These findings are in line with those of previous studies (Roberts 1990 
cited in Adams, et al., 1998, p. 3). Gold Reef provides one of the examples.  
 
   Health and Safety 
 Employees are equipped to address health and safety through training in fire 
fighting, first aid and evacuation procedures. As a result of the training courses 
and the safety and control measures put in place during the year, only minor 
incidents were reported by all the casinos.  
 All the established casinos conduct regular health and safety risk assessments 
,for instance Gold Reef City Casino conducted a safety, health and 
environmental risk assessment during the year in conjunction with Marsh 
International as part of a business continuity planning process.  
(South Africa, Gold Reef, 2007:19) 
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Similarly, mandatory employee disclosure in the US and Australia are similar to that in 
Macao and South Africa with 3.01 pages in employee information. However, in Hong 
Kong, the findings reflect that there is a deficiency in compliance with regulatory 
requirement in mandatory employee disclosure. The reason for this may be due to fact 
that the Hong Kong Jockey Club, a non-profit organisation, may present different 
disclosure requirements than that of profit-making gambling organisations. 
 
4.5.1.3 Corporate governance disclosure 
The volume of corporate governance disclosure averages 0.38 pages across six countries 
except in Hong Kong. Roughly 80 % (82 annual reports) of all gambling companies 
disclose this type of information over the three-year period (Tables 10 and 11). The 
average disclosure was 0.38 of a page with a maximum of 1.10 pages (Table 10). In 
Figure 9, Australia, Macao, and South Africa are similar in that they indicate greater 
compliance than the US and the UK regarding legislative requirement in corporate 
governance. However, in their annual reports, the sample in Hong Kong is a non-profit 
organisation, which may not need to disclose only general information in terms of 
corporate governance. The following text is from the annual report of William Hill PLC.  
 
Compliance with the Combined Code 
“During the year, the Company has been in full compliance with the June 2008 
issue of the Combined Code on Corporate Governance (the ‘Code’), published by 
the Financial Reporting Council and available on its website www.frc.org.uk.” 
(UK, William Hill PLC, 2009:59) 
4.5.1.4 Mandatory environmental disclosure 
The sampled gambling companies in the US and Australia disclosed mandatory 
environmental information in annual reports. These findings are consistent with those of 
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Welford’s (2004) study, according to which companies in developed countries, 
particularly the US and Australia, pay more attention to environmental issues and 
establish environmental regulations than less-developed countries, such as Macao and 
South Africa. Additionally, these findings are in line with those of Holland and Foo 
(2003) who found that the US often discloses environmental information due to 
mandatory reporting. The US has worked to constrain its application in international 
environmental disclosure (Kerr, et al., 2009). The feasibility-based standards found in 
the US environmental law, for example the Clean Air Act and the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). The US corporations embraced these 
environmental laws, which reflect the core elements of the precautionary principle (Kerr, 
et al., 2009, p. 384). The Superfund clean-up process of the Environmental Protection 
Act
75
 is structurally designed to implement the precautionary principle (Kerr, et al., 
2009, p. 384). Here is one of the examples.  
 
We are subject to environmental laws and potential exposure to environmental 
liabilities. 
“We also are subject to laws and regulations that impose liability and clean-up 
responsibility for releases of hazardous substances into the environment. … The 
presence of contamination, or failure to remediate it properly, may adversely 
affect our ability to sell or rent property. The Bullwhackers properties are located 
within the geographic footprint of the Clear Creek/Central City Superfund Site, 
a large area of historic mining activity which is the subject of state and federal 
clean-up actions. Although we have not been named a potentially responsible 
party for this Superfund Site, it is possible that as a result of our ownership and 
operation of these properties (on which mining may have occurred in the past), 
we may incur costs related to this matter in the future.” 
(US, Penn National Gaming, 2009:20: emphasis added) 
                                                     
75
 “Structural incentives within the Superfund process seem to encourage [the] EPA to require more 
protective approaches: it is the PRPs [potentially responsible parties] that are supposed to pay, and the 
public generally chooses to err on the side of safety” (Kerr, et al., 2009, p. 384).  
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4.5.1.5 Mandatory community disclosure 
Community disclosure is generally voluntary in nature; however, South African 
gambling companies disclosed mandatory community information. All of companies in 
South Africa disclose community information (Table 11). The findings highlight that 
South Africa introduced a novel regulation framework, which is intended to promote 
community investment by the corporate sector within black communities (Kerr, et al., 
2009, p. 513). This regulation refers to the Broad-Based Black Economic Empower Act 
in 2003 (the BBBEE Act)
76
, where all states and public entities must take into account 
codes of good practice. This Act requires companies to either have black ownership or 
have a partnership with black owned businesses (De Villier and Staden, 2006, p. 770). 
 
    BEE - Company ownership 
“As a black owned and controlled company we are committed to our national 
objective to transform the workplace to reflect the demographics of South Africa. 
Seven of our eleven directors are black, and two are women. The group has 
adopted a five-year transformation plan that will result in the company achieving 
a Level Two BBBEE contributor status. To achieve this the company has 
designed intereventions in discrete categories that includes developing a pipeline 
of black talent, procuring from black owned businesses, developing and mentoring 
new black owned enterprises and sustaining a coherent social investment 
programme.” 
(South Africa, Peermont Hotels Casinos Hotels, 2009:20: emphasis added) 
 
All in all, the total volume of CSD can be divided into mandatory and voluntary 
disclosures. The findings show that total mandatory disclosure was higher than total 
voluntary disclosure. The CSD disclosure is mostly dominated by mandated disclosure 
                                                     
76
 The Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (BBBEE) act when: (a) determining qualification 
criteria for the issuing of licenses and concessions …; (b) developing and implementing a preferential 
procurement policy; c) Developing criteria for entering into partnerships with the private sector; d) 
developing criteria for entering into partnerships with the private sector (Kerr, et al., 2009, p. 513). 
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in relation to directors, employees, and corporate governance. Importantly, mandated 
environmental disclosure is commonly disclosed by American and Australian gambling 
companies, while mandated community disclosure is only disclosed by South African 
gambling companies.  
 
4.5.2 Average Volume of Voluntary CSD across 6 countries: A General Outline 
Figure 10: Average volume of voluntary CSD across 6 countries from 2007- 2009 
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Figure 11: Average volume of voluntary CSD across six countries (Excluding Hong 
Kong - community) 
 
 
Figure 10 breaks the voluntary CSD per country into seven themes. Voluntary disclosure 
is dominated by community and voluntary employee disclosure. The community 
disclosure is dominated by disclosure from one company for Hong Kong, while the 
voluntary employee disclosure is led by disclosure from three companies for South 
Africa. Furthermore, environmental disclosure is dominated by South Africa, and 
followed by Hong Kong. Surprisingly, the volume of environmental disclosure in South 
Africa and Hong Kong appears to be higher than the UK and Australia. However, the 
US shows the lowest volume of environmental disclosure. More pertinently, the average 
volume of consumer disclosure in the UK, Australia and South Africa tends to be 
relatively low, while the average volume consumer disclosure in the US, Macao and 
Hong Kong is close to zero. 
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4.5.3 Illustration and description of categories of voluntary CSD across 6 countries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.5.3.1 Social disclosure 
This section is mainly focused on voluntary social disclosure, which includes disclosure 
concerning voluntary employee, community, consumer, and responsible gambling. The 
following section will examine each types of voluntary social disclosure in detail and 
provide appropriate illustrations and descriptions. Voluntary other disclosure, including 
environment- and economic-related disclosure will be discussed in Sections 4.5.3.5 and 
4.5.3.6. 
 
 Social Disclosure:   
 Voluntary 
Employee 
 Community 
 Consumer 
 Responsible 
Gambling  
Other Disclosure:  
 Economic 
 Environment 
Voluntary CSD 
Figure 12: Voluntary CSD of social disclosure and other disclosure 
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Figure 13: Average volume of voluntary social CSD across 6 countries (consumers, 
responsible gambling, community and voluntary employee disclosure) 
 
Figure 13 shows that the gambling companies making social disclosures, including 
consumers, responsible gambling, community and voluntary employee disclosure, from 
2007 to 2009 are relatively low ranging from 0.06 pages to 3.69 pages (Table 10). A 
number of CSD studies have widely investiaged environmental disclosure (Ingram and 
Frazier, 1980; Wiseman, 1982; Patter, 1992; 1995; Deegan and Gorden, 1996; Deegan 
and Rankin, 1996; Freedman and Jaggi, 1998; Buhr and Freedman, 2001; Holland and 
Foo, 2003; Cho and Pattern, 2007; Cho, et al., 2010). Some studies have examined 
social disclosure (Belkaoui and Karpik, 1989; Campbell, 2000; Campbell, et al., 2006). 
However, there have not been many studies that consider one unique dimension of 
social disclosure in the gambling industry – responsible gambling. 
 
Before examining the relationship between RG and each country, this section will 
examine three social disclosures: voluntary employee, community and consumer. First, 
voluntary employee disclosure seems to be the highest of the social disclosure. The 
most common disclosure in the voluntary employee disclosure included Employee 
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Pensions, Shares Employees, and Employee Others. These findings are in line with 
those of previous studies in developed countries (Guthrie and Parker, 1990; Roberts, 
1992; Adams, et al., 1995; Gray, et al., 1995a; Hackston and Milne, 1996; Adams, et al., 
1998; Parker, 2008/2009) and Asian countries (Andrews, et al., 1989; Tsang, 1998; 
Jamil, et al., 2002; Newson and Deegan, 2002; Kuasirikun and Sherer, 2004; Gao, 2005), 
which suggest that corporations generally provide social disclosure, particular on 
employee-related information. Second, community disclosure is lower than voluntary 
employee disclosure, ranging from 0.11 pages to 1.89 pages; however, community 
disclosure in Hong Kong is the highest of the sample. These findings are consistent with 
those of Gao (2005) who found that the highest volume of disclosure is community 
disclsoure in Hong Kong. The most common disclosure in this category included 
community involvement and charitable donations. Third, responsible gambling 
disclosure, a sub-category of consumer disclosure, is a relatively low volume of 
disclosure ranging from 0.02 pages to 0.1 pages. Further explanation will be given in 
Section 4.5.3.4. 
 
4.5.3.2 Voluntary employee disclosure  
This section focuses on voluntary employee disclosure. The predominance of voluntary 
employee disclosure is evident, with three gambling companies in South Africa 
undertaking the highest volumes of this type of disclosure, followed by the UK, the US 
and Australia (Figure 13). The UK has legislation to disclose employee information, for 
example Employee Data, Employee Pension and Employee Disability (Section 4.5.1.2). 
However, not all the sample countries have reporting requirements to disclose mandated 
employee disclosure. The common types of mandatory employee disclosure are those 
related to Employee Pension and Employee Share Ownership (Appendix 9). In 
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particular, the US, Australia, Hong Kong and Macao, do not have reporting 
requirements to disclose mandating employee disclosure, for example Employee Data, 
Employee Disability, Employee Health and Safety (Appendix 9). As a result, for those 
countries, employee information, for example Employee Equal Opportunity and 
Employee Others, is categorised as voluntary employee disclosure. The following text is 
one of the examples of Employee Others.  
 
Many companies in Hong Kong have been forced to lay off staff and often, 
part-timers have been the first to go – but the Club has given a commitment not to 
make layoffs unless absolutely necessary, aware that the stable and reliable 
income its racing and betting operations provide means so much to so many people 
in Hong Kong from all walks of life. 
                            (Hong Kong, the Hong Kong Jockey Club, 2008:20) 
4.5.3.3 Community disclosure 
Figure 14: Average volume of voluntary social CSD across six countries 
(consumers, responsible gambling and community) 
 
Figure 14 shows the average volume of social disclosure in terms of three categories. 
The company in Hong Kong undertook the highest average volume of community 
disclosure with a maximum of 17.4 pages; however, caution should be exercised 
interpreting this data (Section 4.4.2).  
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“Some HK$13 billion a year from the Club’s racing, football and Mark Six 
operations goes to Government as duties or taxes – a major contributor to public 
spending. Another HK$1 billion-plus is set aside annually from the Club’s surplus 
for charitable and community projects, benefiting tens of thousands more local 
citizens from all walks of life.” 
(Hong Kong, the Hong Kong Jockey Club, 2008:18) 
 
In contrast, the UK, the US, Australia and Macao, have far a much lower volume of 
disclosure on average 1 page. The disclosure tends to take the form of descriptive and 
monetary statements. In these countries, community disclosure is often in voluntary, 
rather than mandatory disclosure in annual reports. These findings are not in line with 
those of previous studies, which found that community disclosure is a higher priority 
than other types of disclosures in the annual reports of the “higher” profile companies 
(such as retailers, brewers, petrochemicals), which interact directly with consumers than 
in their annual reports of “lower” profile companies (for example chemicals, 
intermediates and aggregates) (Campbell, 2000; Campbell, et al., 2006). Surprisingly, 
the US has a relatively low volume of community disclosure since most of the annual 
reports in the US sample were in 10-K form, which had special disclosure requirements 
at the New York Stock Exchange. 
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4.5.3.4 Consumer (responsible gambling) disclosure 
Figure 15: Average volume of consumer and RG disclosure across 6 countries 
 
Figure 15 shows the average volume of RG disclosure compared to consumer disclosure. 
After reviewing the RG literature (Chapter 2), conducting a preliminary study of content 
analysis and conducting a pilot interview in 2009 (Chapter 3), this category appears to 
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(gamblers) and public protection from gambling-related adverse effects; therefore, this 
category was included as a sub-category of consumer disclosure (Chapter 3). This 
category is highlighted in the literature to show how the gambling companies have a 
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reduce this gap through deploying CSD more strongly (see Campbell, et al., 2003). 
These organisations can be expected to disclose high volume of RG disclosure in 
relation to customers. Table 11 shows that 44% and 30% of the sample disclose 
responsible gambling and consumer-related information. Surprisingly, the results show 
that the volume of RG disclosure is the second lowest with below 0.22 pages, followed 
closely by consumer disclosure with average 0.06 pages (Figure 14). At a national level, 
gambling companies in Australia, South Africa, and the UK have the volume of RG 
disclosure with 0.50 pages, 0.44 pages and 0.33 pages respectively. In contrast, the US 
and Macao shows almost nothing with 0.02 and 0.04 pages. Interestingly, the sample of 
one Hong Kong company shows no disclosure and the reason could be explained that 
there is only one sample from Hong Kong, and this company is a non-profit 
organisation. 
 
This section attempts to explain a possible reason of relative low volume of RG 
disclosure. This industry tends to disclose RG information in relation to voluntary 
employee disclosure and community disclosure, rather than customer disclosure. 
Interestingly, RG disclosure appears to concentrate on employee training programmes in 
identifying high risk behaviours on site and educating employees to have RG awareness. 
Such disclsoures are predominately declarative and are classified as “Employee Others”, 
rather than under “Consumer” disclsoure. The tone and orientation of RG disclsoure 
accorded closely with Lindblom’s (1993) third legtimation strategy. Gambling 
companies appear to distract attention away from the customer protection towards 
employee protection with satisfactory performance within RG. 
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   Responsible Gaming 
 We promote responsible gaming to the public and staff members via the 
following channels: Placed new Responsible Gaming materials including 
brochures and posters, at the main entrances and back-of-house areas… to alert 
both the public and our staff members of the importance of responsible gaming. 
 Established Macau’s first and only Responsible Gaming Support and 
Counselling Hotline to provide employees with twenty-four hours, seven days a 
week telephone counselling, individual face-to-face counselling and online 
counselling are also provided as needed. 
 Established guidelines for staff members to take online and classroom 
trainings so that they are aware of the risks associated with problem gambling 
 Established procedures for all staff members to take a Mandatory Responsible 
Gaming Education and yearly Responsible Gaming training refresher courses. 
 Established procedures for staff members to provide self-exclusion services to 
our patrons if needed. 
(Macao, Galaxy 2009:28: Emphasis added) 
 
The findings indicate that the volume of RG disclosure appears to be relatively low. 
This implies that RG is thought not to be an main issue. In particular, RG is typcially 
designed to promote consumer protection (Blaszczynski, et al., 2004; 2011). Yet, RG 
disclosure in gambling companies’ annual reports tend to report information concerning 
employee training programmes, mandatory or volunatry codes of RG practices and 
gambling regulation, rather than customer protection. 
 
The volume of RG disclosure ranges between relatively low and nothing. These 
findings are in line with CSD studies in the controversial industries, particularly in the 
tobacco industry in the UK and Australia (Campbell, et al., 2003; Tilling and Tilt, 2010) 
and in the mining industry in South Africa (De Villiers and van Staden, 2006), which 
found that reducing disclosure can be viewed as a legitimising strategy. These findings 
are consistent with O’Donovan (2002) who found that the lower the perceived 
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legitimacy of the organisation, the less likely it was to bother providing CSD disclosure. 
The finding suggests that gambling companies are socially constructed as illegitimate so 
that social disclosure would be of “no effective value” (Campbell, et al., 2003). Indeed, 
these findings for organisations in the gambling industry building or establishing 
legitimacy are totally different from those organisations repairing or maintaining 
legitimacy, particularly, previous CSD studies on unforeseen crisis or unexpected 
disasters, such as the oil spills (Patten, 1992; 2002; Elsbach and Sutton, 1992; Elsbach, 
1994; Deegan, et al., 2000). 
 
Organisations attempting to build legitimacy might feel that the costs of disclosures are 
higher than the benefits (Campbell, et al., 2003). Therefore, the best strategy for 
organisations in the gambling industry appear to be to remain silent. Thus, they would 
wish to restrict the public’s knowledge of gambling- and health-related issues as long as 
they could (O’Donovan, 2002). Such companies seem to make low or no social 
disclosures so stakeholders are being slowly neglected by such social disclosure, 
particularly the gambling addiction and health-related issues (see Campbell, et al., 2003). 
Thus, low or no RG disclosure in the gambling industry could be viewed as a proactive 
strategy (O’Donovan, 2002). Importantly, these findings are in line with Owen and 
O’Dwyer (2008) who found that voluntary social disclosure appears to report 
favourable managerial accounts of positive information, rather than negative 
information (see Solomon and Lewis, 2002). However, it remains questionable on 
whether or not these organisations can truly embrace transparency. Transparency 
concerning this sensitive area remains unsatisfactory and invisible based on the findings 
in this section. 
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4.5.3.5 Voluntary other disclosure 
This section is mainly focused on voluntary other disclosure regarding 
environment-related and economic disclosure. 
 
4.5.3.6 Environmental disclosure 
Table 11 shows 72% of the environmental information disclosed by the sampled 
companies general statements, rather than of detailed discussion of special issues, such 
as climate change
77
 and carbon footprint disclosure
78
 (KMPG, 2005, 2008). 
 
“Central to our understanding of good corporate citizenship is our commitment to 
sustainable development. Apart from the implementation of internationally 
recognised environmental management systems, the group actively participates in 
the Heritage environmental rating programme which commits us to high and 
demand standards in respect of responsible tourism and business practices”. 
(South Africa, Sun International Limited, 2010:28, 29: emphasis added) 
 
“The Group participates in the Federal Government’s Energy Efficiency 
Opportunities initiative and in December 2008 published its initial report 
regarding opportunities that have been identified to reduce energy consumption. … 
The Group has also registered for the Federal Government’s National 
Greenhouse Energy Reporting System. Tabcorp is required to submit details of its 
energy consumption and emissions by 31 October 2009”. 
(Australia, Tabcorp, 2009: 9: emphasis added) 
 
Organisations in the gambling industry tend not to focus on environmental disclosure 
and can be regarded as the environmentally less sensitive industry. These findings are 
                                                     
77
 According to KPMG (2008, p.49), climate change has emerged as one of the most important issues in 
Corporate Social Responsibility and has posed potential risks to companies around the world, including 
physical, regulatory, litigation, or reputational. Of G250, 57% address the business risk of climate change 
in their reports; however, 68% of the N100 do not address this issue (KPMG, 2008, p. 49).  
78
 Carbon footprint reporting is not very common in the industry; however, companies are starting to take 
opportunities and risks in relation to climate change seriously (KPMG, 2008).  
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consistent with those of prior studies (KMPG, 2005; 2008). The gambling industry can 
be classified under the sector of “other services”79 as a rough indicator to compare its 
CSD level with other sectors. Of the “other services” sector in G250, 31% address the 
business risk to the environment, for example climate change, but CSD level of “other 
services” sector is not as high as the top three sectors, including mining, utilities and 
metals (KMPG, 2005) (Appendix 17). The trend is similar for the N100 in the “other 
services” sector, which shows a relatively low percentage addressing the climate change 
issue (KMPG, 2005). These findings imply that this sector is lagging behind other 
sectors in its disclosure about climate change issues.  
 
In addition, these findings are in line with those of CSD studies in the area of 
environmental sensitivity
80
 according to which the gambling industry can be classified 
as the environmentally less sensitive industry (Adams, et al., 1998), rather than the 
environmentally sensitive industry, such as, the chemical, metals, and mining industries 
(Cho, et al., 2010). Other CSD studies have divided the sectors into two main groups: 
high profile companies
81
 and low profile
82
 companies (Patten, 1992; Roberts, 1992; 
Hackston and Milne, 1996; Newson and Deegan, 2002). In general, high profile 
companies are more likely to have higher levels of CSD than low profile companies. 
The nature of the gambling industry appears to cause the environmental issue to become 
less important. 
                                                     
79
 The “Other services” sector comprises computer services and software, diversified outsourcing 
services, entertainment, health care, hotel, casinos, resorts, mail, package and freight delivery (KPMG, 
2005 and Appendix 17). The “Other services” sector can provide a rough indicator of the situation of the 
gambling industry so as to compare its CSD level with other sectors.  
80
 Environmental sensitivity has been considered a key factor in determining the level or amount of CSD 
(Harte and Owen, 1991; Deegan and Gordon, 1996). A number of CSD studies in the United States, 
Europe and Australia (Cowen, et al, 1987; Patten, 1991, 1992, 2002; Hackston and Milne, 1996; Cho and 
Patten, 2007; Aerts and Cormier, 2009) suggest that companies with higher sensitivity on the natural and 
environmental issue appear to make more environmental disclosures than those with lower sensitivity. 
81
 Companies in high profile industries, for example, the automobile, airline, oil industry, raw material 
extraction, chemical, wood, paper and forestry (Roberts, 1992; Newson and Deegan, 2002). 
82
 Low-profile industries, including the food, health and personal products, hotel, household products, 
services, health care, computers and electronic industries (Roberts, 1992; Newson and Deegan, 2002). 
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In particular, since Macao and Hong Kong also have similar political and economic 
backgrounds, the volume of environmental disclosure in the sample of Macao and Hong 
Kong is relatively low with an average 1.3 pages. These findings are consistent with 
those of previous studies, which indicate that the level of environmental disclosure is 
relatively low in Asian countries, such as Singapore (Newson and Deegan, 2002), 
Malaysia (Jamil, et al., 2002) and Hong Kong (Jaggi and Zhao, 1996; Gao, 2005). In 
particular, both Jaggi and Zhao’s (1996) and Gao’s (2005) studies suggest that 
companies in Hong Kong disclosed little environmental information in the 1990s and 
companies tend to disclose in brief, descriptive and narrative statements.  
 
4.5.3.7  Economic disclosure 
Figure 16: Average volume of economic disclosure across 6 countries from 2007- 
2009 
 
Although economic disclosure accounts for 49% of all the sample (Table 11), this type 
of disclosure appears to be the third lowest volume of disclosure among nine categories 
(Section 4.5). These findings are in line with those of the KPMG (2005) report, which 
found that only a minority of companies in G250 discuss the economic impact of their 
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business operations as it is not easy to measure the social gains of economic activity.  
 
Economic disclosure can be viewed as fundamental information in the annual reports. 
Nearly all gambling companies provide basic “economic performance” information, 
such as profits, revenue and sales, as well as the amount of tax paid to the government, 
in their annual reports. These findings are consistent with those of the KPMG (2005) 
report, which found that 77%
83
 of G250 companies provide such information. Yet, 45% 
of gambling companies reported economic disclosure
84
, which comprised economic 
performance beyond taxation
85
, market presence,
86
 and indirect economic impact
87
, in 
their reports (Section 4.1). Examining the economic disclosure in detail, indirect 
economic impact shows 45% in economic disclosure that gambling companies draw 
particular attention to the economic impact of their operation on the local community. 
These findings are similar to those of the KPMG (2005) survey. 
 
At national level, South African gambling companies show the highest volume of 
indirect economic impact disclosure and provide the information about infrastructure 
investment to the local community, while Australian gambling companies pay little 
attention to indirect economic impact. These findings are in line with those of the CSR 
literature, which report that companies are likely to claim economic contribution to 
developing countries (Visser, 2008; CSR in Asia, 2009). 
                                                     
83
 of G250 companies, 61% provide basic information on their economic performance, such as profits 
and sales in their Corporate Responsibility Reports and 16% of G250 companies provide information 
about tax issues, such as tax payment. 6 % of the companies receive little attention in economic issues 
concerning fair trade and fair competition (KPMG, 2005).  
84
 The decision rule of economic disclosure is broadly followed by the Global Reporting Initiative’s (GRI) 
Sustainability Guidelines (GRI, 2002).  
85
 Economic performance refers to significant financial assistance from government (GRI, 2002). 
86
 Market presence refers to procedures for local hiring and proportion of senior management hired from 
the local community at locations of significant operation (GRI, 2002). 
87
 Indirect economic impact refers to development and impact of infrastructure investments and services 
provided, provided primarily for public benefit through commercial, in-kind, or pro bono engagement, 
understanding and describing significant indirect economic impacts (GRI, 2002). 
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“The resort has significantly acted a catalyst for other major new investment in 
public and private infrastructure in the area and has been responsible for a wide 
variety of new hotels and lodges, new retail, public utility spending and 
investments by tourism operators”. 
 
(South Africa, Sun International Limited, 2008:19: emphasis added) 
 
The second highest volume of the economic disclosure is “market presence” with 29%. 
At a national level, Macao shows the highest volume of disclosure in market presence, 
and economic disclosure typically focuses on hiring the local people and recruiting a 
proportion of senior managers from the local community. 
 
“Our deep local knowledge and experience are vital resources as we strive to expand 
and further develop our operations. In doing so, we will continue to promote the 
sustainable prosperity of Macau, the home of over 90% of our employees.” 
 
(Macao, SJM Holdings Limited 2009:6: emphasis added) 
 
The last category is economic performance beyond taxation, which shows 25% in 
economic disclosure. At a national level, the UK gambling companies are the highest in 
this category, followed closely by Macao and Hong Kong. 
 
“The Group has invested a large amount of time and money in pursuing a number 
of fiscal neutrality claims. In simple terms, EU VAT principles require that similar 
services are taxed in the same way. A major case in the European Court of Justice 
(Linneweber) was a key precedent for the gambling industry and is the basis for a 
number of claims being made.” 
 
(UK, The Rank Group PLC 2008:30) 
 
Since the gambling industry can be regarded as a socially sensitive industry, the industry 
tends to focus on social disclosures including voluntary employee, community, 
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consumer and RG, rather than non-social disclosure, including environmental and 
economic-related information. However, reporting on information concerning gambling 
addiction and health-related issues seems to be absent in this industry.  
4.6 Corporate size and volume of corporate social disclosure (CSD) 
The CSD literature suggests that corporate size is generally recognised as an important 
factor affecting the level of CSD and as an essential explanatory variable (Cowen, et al., 
1987; Roberts, 1992; Patten, 1991, 1992, 2002; Gray, et al., 1995a; Deegan and Gordon, 
1996; Hackston and Milne, 1996; Adams, et al., 1998; Cormier and Magnan, 2003; Cho, 
et al., 2010). This means larger companies tend to disclose more social and 
environmental information than smaller companies (Andrew, et al., 1989; Williams, 
1999; Gao, 2005). Additionally, the CSD literature undertaken in Asia-Pacific nations
88
 
suggests the same result. However, some CSD studies have shown the inverse 
relationship between corporate size and volume of disclosure and no size effect in the 
US sample (Roberts, 1992), in the Hong Kong sample (Lynn, 1992) and in the US and 
Belgium sample (Bouten, et al., 2012). This section is to find out whether this 
relationship also holds for the gambling industry. 
 
Corporate size has been measured by different factors in previous studies, including 
market capitalisation, (Guthrie and Parker, 1990; Hackston and Milne, 1996; Newson 
and Deegan, 2002), number of employees (Abbott and Monsen, 1979), turnover (Gao, 
2005; Deegan and Gordon, 1996; Adams, et al., 1998) and total assets (Trotman and 
Bradley, 1981; Brammer and Pavelin, 2004; Cho, et al., 2010). Market capitalisation is 
chosen to analyse corporate size because of the higher chances of getting English 
                                                     
88
 Asia-Pacific region refers to Australia, Singapore, Hong Kong, Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, and 
Malaysia  
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language annual reports from the publicly listed companies (Adams, et al., 1998) and a 
consistency with prior CSD studies of international comparison (Guthrie and Parker, 
1990; Hackston and Milne, 1996). Market capitalisation was collected from Thomson 
Reuters DataStream.  
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Table 12: National comparison between corporate size and volume of disclosure 
Enterprise 
Market 
Capitalisation
89
 
BPN 
(million
90
) 
2007-2009 
Rank 
Total 
average 
disclosure 
2007-2009 
(pages) 
Rank 
Total 
average 
mandatory  
disclosure    
2007- 2009 
(pages) 
Rank 
Total 
average 
voluntary 
disclosure         
2007-2009 
(pages) 
Rank 
     Sands 11,182,220 1 6.15 22 4.37 19 1.91 18 
Harrah        
Harrah 
9,375,997 2 8.34 14 6.61 11 0.64 26 
MGM 6,380,557 3 6.33 21 2.53 22 2.91 10 
Wynn 5,806,120 4 4.05 27 1.73 25 2.67 12 
Station 3,072,920 5 6.57 20 5.15 16 4.76 5 
 Crown 2,948,320 6 13.24 8 8.41 10 2.35 15 
Tabcorp 2,577,887 7 7.32 17 6.27 12 2.87 11 
Aristocrat 2,060,715 8 10.81 13 5.03 17 0.11 28 
Tatts 1,757,970 9 12.11 9 11.23 6 1.86 19 
Penn 1,591,467 10 4.69 26 5.01 18 0.55 27 
William Hills  1,460,527 11 18.72 5 13.63 4 3.8 6 
   Ladbroke 1,233,000 12 18.97 4 16.88 2 2.18 17 
Galaxy 1,137,210 13 15.22 7 11.93 5 3.32 9 
Boyd 933,260 14 4.75 25 2.03 24 0.85 24 
  Sun  
International 
875,520 15 23.26 2 14.68 3 15.72 2 
SkyCity 797,450 16 11.66 10 2.98 21 14.55 3 
SJM 792,267 17 6.84 19 3.08 20 0.92 23 
Melco 592,117 18 25.36 1 18.17 1 3.37 8 
Ameristar 562,467 19 3.59 28 2.48 23 1.21 22 
Gold Reef 486,400 20 17.96 6 10.61 7 5.59 4 
Pinnacle 462,820 21 7.04 18 5.69 15 2.23 16 
The Rank 417,733 22 11.64 11 8.53 9 2.45 14 
Peermont  145,657 23 5.42 23 1.13 27 3.71 7 
Ainsworth 20,590 24 10.81 12 9.68 8 1.25 21 
Gala Coral             ---            
-    
25 8.18 15 6.15 13 2.61 13 
The Tote            ---                         
-    
26 8.05 16 6.13 14 1.8 20 
Camelot             ---                        
-    
27 4.79 24 0.49 28 0.75 25 
 Jocky Club            ---                        
-    
28 21.5 3 1.39 26 20.48 1 
                                                     
89
 Each country group represents the US, the UK, Australia, Macao, South Africa, and Hong Kong. 
Market capitalisation provides an alternative measure to other such measures of size as number of 
employees, turnover, and total assets. The purpose of the correlated coefficients test between the other 
size measures is to check whether they are different from each other. All these alterative measures are 
highly and positively correlated with market capitalisation. Among the sample of the US companies, 
market capitalisation has a strong positive correlation with other measures of size, for example number of 
employees, turnover, and total assets with correlation coefficients of 97%, 96%, and 97% respectively. In 
the sample of the UK companies, market capitalisation has a positive correlation with others with 
correlation coefficients of 0.46%, 0.97% and 0.95% respectively. In the sample of the Australian 
companies, market capitalisation has a positive correlation with others with correlation coefficients of 
0.67%, 0.65%, and 0.81%. In the sample of the Macao companies, market capitalisation has a positive 
correlation with others with correlation coefficient of 0.42%, 0.62%, and 0.64%. In the sample of the 
South African companies, market capitalisation has a positive correlation with others with 0.99 %, 0.99%, 
and 0.99%.  
90
 Since the sample includes six countries, the currency is standardised in Pound Sterling. The currencies 
are counted into Pound Sterling to make the companies comparable.  
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Table 12 shows the relationship between corporate size and volume of CSD in gambling 
companies in six countries. Market capitalisation across the gambling companies varies 
greatly from £11,182,220 million to £20,590 million based on market capitalisation 
from 2007 to 2009 (see Footnote 89). Further analysis is needed; thus, the total average 
disclosure can be divided into total average mandatory disclosure and total average 
voluntary disclosure. Each market captialisation column and the three types of 
disclosure columns are associated with rank columns. The results show that there is no 
clear relationship between corporate size and volume of CSD (including total average 
disclosure, total average mandatory disclosure, and total average voluntary disclosure). 
For example, Sands Corp in Macao ranks first in market capitalisation; however, this 
company ranks 22
nd
 in total average disclosure, 19
th
 in total average mandatory 
disclosure and 18
th
 in total average voluntary respectively. Another example is Boyd 
Gaming Corporation in the US. The result shows that this company ranks 14
th
 in market 
capitalisation; however, this company ranks 25th in total average disclosure, 24
th
 in total 
average mandatory disclosure and 24
th
 in total average voluntary disclosure. Ainsworth 
Game Technology ranks 24
th
 in market capitalisation. Yet, this company ranks 12
th
 in 
total average disclosure, 8
th 
in total average mandatory disclosure and 21
st
 in total 
average voluntary. The findings of all sampled gambling companies are inconsistent 
with those of prior studies (Andrews, et al., 1989; Williams, 1999; Gao, 2005), which 
found that larger gambling companies generally appear to disclose more CSD than 
smaller gambling companies.  
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Table 13: Kendall and Spearman rank correlation coefficient for all companies over 3 
years (2007- 2009) 
2007 Kendall Spearman 
  size 
Total 
average 
disclosure  
Total 
average 
mandatory 
Total 
average 
voluntary size 
Total 
average 
disclosure  
Total 
average 
mandatory 
Total 
average 
voluntary 
size 1       1       
                  
Total average 
disclosure -0.219 1     -0.3325 1     
  1       0.1409       
                  
Total average 
mandatory -0.1905 0.7619* 1   -0.2597 0.8247* 1   
  1 0     0.2555 0     
                  
Total average 
voluntary -0.1619 0.4476 0.2095 1 -0.2364 0.6169* 0.3273 1 
  1 0.0299 1   0.3023 0.0029 0.1476   
2008 Kendall Spearman 
  size 
Total 
average 
disclosure  
Total 
average 
mandatory 
Total 
average 
voluntary size 
Total 
average 
disclosure  
Total 
average 
mandatory 
Total 
average 
voluntary 
size 1       1       
                  
Total average 
disclosure -0.1542 1     -0.2302 1     
  1       0.2906       
                  
Total average 
mandatory -0.1542 0.8419* 1   -0.2342 0.9625* 1   
  1 0     0.2821 0     
                  
Total average 
voluntary -0.0711 0.4427 0.3004 0.996 -0.1048 0.6093* 0.4255 1 
  1 0.0202 0.2852   0.6343 0.002 0.0429   
2009 Kendall Spearman 
  size 
Total 
average 
disclosure  
Total 
average 
mandatory 
Total 
average 
voluntary size 
Total 
average 
disclosure  
Total 
average 
mandatory 
Total 
average 
voluntary 
size 1       1       
                  
Total average 
disclosure -0.2029 1     -0.3096 1     
  1       0.141       
                  
Total average 
mandatory -0.1957 0.8333* 1   -0.2774 0.9478* 1   
  1 0     0.1894 0     
                  
Total average 
voluntary -0.087 0.3478 0.1812 1 -0.1304 0.5139 0.28 1 
  1 0.1107 1   0.5435 0.0102 0.1851   
* Significant level at 1% level.              
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Table 13 provides a simple Spearman and Kandall rank correlation coefficients for all 
the sampled gambling companies by year (from 2007 to 2009). The result in Table 13 is 
consistent with the result as shown in Table 12. All rank correlation coefficients 
between corporate size and different measures of CSD are not significantly different 
from zero. These findings indicate that there is no relationship between corporate size 
and volume of disclosure (including total average disclosure, total average mandatory 
disclosure, and total average voluntary disclosure). Total average mandatory disclosure 
and total average voluntary disclosure are positively correlated with total volume of 
total disclosure, but total average mandatory disclosure is not correlated with total 
average voluntary disclosure.  
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Table 14: Kendall and Spearman rank correlation coefficient for each country 
group over 3 years (2007- 2009) 
US Kendall Spearman 
 
size 
Total 
average 
disclosure 
Total 
average 
mandatory 
Total 
average 
voluntary 
size 
Total 
average 
disclosure 
Total 
average 
mandatory 
Total 
average 
voluntary 
size 1 
   
1 
   
Total average 
disclosure 
0.1961 0.9935 
  
0.2426 1 
  
 
1 
   
0.332 
   
Total average 
mandatory 
0.4118 0.7059* 1 
 
0.5645 0.8653* 1 
 
 
0.1131 0.0003 
  
0.0147 0 
  
Total average 
voluntary 
-0.2484 0.3725 0.1176 0.9935 -0.3872 0.4726 0.1724 1 
 
0.9646 0.2019 1 
 
0.1124 0.0476 0.4939 
 
UK Kendall Spearman 
 
size 
Total 
average 
disclosure 
Total 
average 
mandatory 
Total 
average 
voluntary 
size 
Total 
average 
disclosure 
Total 
average 
mandatory 
Total 
average 
voluntary 
size 0.9167 
   
1 
   
Total average 
disclosure 
0.1944 1 
  
0.4238 1 
  
 
1 
   
0.2557 
   
Total average 
mandatory 
0.3611 0.6667 1 
 
0.5764 0.8333* 1 
 
 
1 0.0989 
  
0.1043 0.0053 
  
Total average 
voluntary 
-0.1389 0.1667 -0.1667 1 -0.1865 0.2333 -0.1333 1 
 
1 1 1 
 
0.631 0.5457 0.7324 
 
Australia Kendall Spearman 
 
size 
Total 
average 
disclosure 
Total 
average 
mandatory 
Total 
average 
voluntary 
size 
Total 
average 
disclosure 
Total 
average 
mandatory 
Total 
average 
voluntary 
size 1 
   
1 
   
Total average 
disclosure 
-0.0441 1 
  
0 1 
  
 
1 
   
1 
   
Total average 
mandatory 
-0.0735 0.6176* 1 
 
-0.098 0.6495* 1 
 
 
1 0.0038 
  
0.7082 0.0048 
  
Total average 
voluntary 
0.25 0.4118 0.0294 1 0.3775 0.5539 0.076 1 
 
1 0.1409 1 
 
0.1353 0.021 0.7719 
 
Macao Kendall Spearman 
 
size 
Total 
average 
disclosure 
Total 
average 
mandatory 
Total 
average 
voluntary 
size 
Total 
average 
disclosure 
Total 
average 
mandatory 
Total 
average 
voluntary 
size 1 
   
1 
   
Total average 
disclosure 
-0.6324* 1 
  
-0.8162* 1 
  
 
0.0028 
   
0.0001 
   
Total average 
mandatory 
-0.5294 0.8676* 1 
 
-0.7181* 0.9559* 1 
 
 
0.0207 0 
  
0.0012 0 
  
Total average 
voluntary 
-0.6471* 0.5735* 0.4412 1 -0.7941* 0.7475* 0.5686 1 
 
0.002 0.0091 0.0905 
 
0.0001 0.0006 0.0172 
 
South Africa Kendall Spearman 
 
size 
Total 
average 
disclosure 
Total 
average 
mandatory 
Total 
average 
voluntary 
size 
Total 
average 
disclosure 
Total 
average 
mandatory 
Total 
average 
voluntary 
size 1 
   
1 
   
Total average 
disclosure 
0.3333 1 
  
0.4286 1 
  
 
1 
   
0.3374 
   
Total average 
mandatory 
0.3333 1 1 
 
0.4286 1.0000* 1 
 
 
1 0.016 
  
0.3374 0 
  
Total average 
voluntary 
0.2381 0.3333 0.3333 1 0.2857 0.5 0.5 1 
 
1 1 1 
 
0.5345 0.2532 0.2532 
 
168 
 
Table 14 provides a simple Spearman and Kandall rank correlation coefficients for each 
country group (including the US, the UK, Australia, Macao, and South Africa) from 
2007 to 2009; however, Hong Kong is removed from the analysis because there is only 
one company in Hong Kong. Overall, the results show that there is no direct 
relationship between corporate size and the three types of disclosure. The results for 
each country group are similar to those for all gambling companies (Tables 12 and 13). 
However, there is some evidence showing a significant relationship between corporate 
size and the three types of disclosure. First, the sample in Macao shows a significant 
negative correlation between corporate size and the volume of disclosure regardless of 
its nature (i.e. mandatory or voluntary). The findings show inconsistencies with those of 
prior studies (Andrews, et al., 1989; Williams, 1999; Gao, 2005), which found that the 
larger gambling companies generally appear to disclose more CSD than smaller 
gambling companies. In Macao, smaller gambling companies appear to disclose more 
CSD than larger gambling companies.  
 
Two possible explanations can be offered for this phenomenon. First, in the Macao 
sample, since Wynn Resort, Limited, Las Vegas Sands Corp., and MGM Mirage are 
originally from the USA, the annual reports from the parent companies (the country of 
origin), rather than the subsidiary companies in Macao, were examined. Second, for 
Macao’s gambling market, both Wynn Macao Ltd. and Sands China Ltd91 published 
their annual reports for the year-end 31 December 2009, while MGM China Holdings 
Ltd published annual reports for December 31, 2011 (Wynn Macao Ltd., 2010; Sands 
China Ltd., 2010; MGM China Holdings Ltd, 2012). The researcher started to collect all 
                                                     
91
 Wynn Macao, Ltd., Sands China Ltd., and MGM China Holdings Ltd. were also traded on the 
mainboard of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange in 9 September, 2009, 30 November, 2009 and 3 June, 
2011 respectively (The Hong Kong Stock Exchange, 2012a; 2012b; 2012c). These three gambling 
companies are also a subsidiary of NASDAQ listed Wynn Resorts, Limited, Las Vegas Sands Corp., and 
MGM Mirage. 
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the annual reports at the end of 2009 and examined at the beginning of 2010. It was not 
possible to obtain a subsidiary annual report for the whole period from 2009 to 2011. 
Wynn Macao Ltd and Sand China Ltd. Limited, for example, did not publish first a 
subsidiary annual report until 2009 and MGM China Holdings Ltd did not publish their 
subsidiary annual report until 2011. Therefore, the annual reports from parent 
companies were chosen in this thesis. 
 
Second, the US sampled companies show positive and significant correlation between 
corporate size and total average mandatory disclosure. Total average mandatory 
disclosure is part of the total average disclosure. Total mandatory disclosure is higher 
than the voluntary disclosure as shown in Figure 6. The reason for this is not obvious, 
but it might relate to national reporting practices. Perhaps, the US companies appear to 
follow the US reporting legislation by different authorities, such as the Financial 
Accounting Standard Board (FASB) and the United States Securities Exchange 
Commission (SEC). The larger US gambling companies generally appear to disclose 
more mandatory disclosure in relation to information concerning employees, directors 
and environment than smaller gambling companies.  
 
Overall, these findings in Tables 12, 13 and 14 are largely not in line with those of 
mainstream CSD studies, which found a positive relationship between corporate size 
and volume of disclosure (Andrews, et al., 1989; Williams, 1999; Gao, 2005). The 
findings of this thesis are consistent with the findings of no size effect in the US and 
Belgium sample (Bouten, et al., 2012), in US sample (Roberts, 1992) and in Hong Kong 
(Lynn, 1992). Perhaps, such large variations indicate that especially the larger firms are 
not only operating in the gambling industry but also in other related industries, such as 
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the hotel industry. These findings suggest that organisations in the gambling industry 
tend to operate on a national, rather than an international level. This raises the question 
of the local orientation in their disclosure.  
 
There are two particular aspects to support this argument. First, the gambling industry 
appears to employ local, rather than international, reporting practices as a point of 
reference in their annual reports. The findings suggest that the gambling companies tend 
to follow local or national reporting standards, for example The Companies Act 2006 
(the UK), The Corporations Act 2001 (Australia) and The King III Code on Corporate 
Governance 2008 (South Africa). Nevertheless, the gambling industry did not generally 
apply any global reporting standards, codes, and guidelines, such as SA 8000, AA 1000 
guideline
92
 and the GRI Sustainability Guidelines. Yet, some of the gambling 
companies followed certain international reporting standards, such as ISO 9001, ISO 
14001, and ISO 26000. 
 
Second, the gambling companies tend to make references to national, rather than 
international authorities. In this sample, the UK gambling companies tended to make 
references to national authorities, such as the Gambling Commission, the British 
Gambling Prevalence Survey and the Association of British Bookmakers in their annual 
reports. Australian gambling companies appeared to make references to national bodies, 
such as The Australia Gaming Council, the Australasian Casino, and the Victorian 
Responsible Gambling Ministerial Advisory Council. 
 
                                                     
92
 The AA1000 guidelines from AccountAbility provides guidance on how to establish a systematic 
stakeholder engagement process that generates the indicators, targets and reporting systems needed to 
ensure its effectiveness in impacting on decisions, activities and overall organisational performance 
(KPMG, 2005, p. 43). 
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At industry level, there is the absence of an international gambling association or 
authority which might develop an international standard of RG codes, practices and 
guidelines so that the gambling industry can follow RG. This phenomenon is not clear, 
but it might be something to do with the inadequate industry reporting requirements 
(Blaszczynski, et al., 2011). On account of the unexpected weak pressure from 
international organisations, there was insufficient pressure to regulate this industry. 
Indeed, the gambling industry is entirely not in line with other industries. The Australian 
mineral industry, for example, has some guidelines for Sustainable Development 
(KPMG, 2005). The tobacco industry has international standards
93
 of The Framework 
Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) developed by the World Health Organisation 
(Moerman and Van Der Laan, 2005). Hence, the selected gambling companies in this 
thesis obviously do not follow any international standard of RG practices, but national, 
industry-based standards of RG practices. Each company seems to apply the mandatory 
or voluntary codes of RG practices proposed by the host country, such as the UK, 
Australia, and South Africa.  
 
4.7 Concluding remarks 
This chapter provides a preliminary international exploration of gambling companies’ 
CSD across six countries. The findings show that CSD provided by all the sampled 
gambling companies appears to be relatively low. There are four key findings in this 
chapter. First, not surprisingly, disclosures are mostly dominated by mandated 
disclosure in relation to employees and directors. These findings are in line with those 
of prior CSD studies. Second, the role of RG disclosure, concerning customer protection, 
                                                     
93
 The Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) is an international standards on issues, for 
example, tobacco production, advertising, marketing and prevention of smuggling (Moerman and Van 
Der Laan, 2005).   
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cannot be viewed as a major issue in the annual reports. However, the findings show 
that with no and low RG disclosure a lack of in the sensitive information can be viewed 
as a proactive legitimising strategy. Arguably, the gambling industry attempts to remain 
silent concerning gambling addiction and health-related issues. Thus, the gambling 
industry appears not to develop some symbols, namely CSD and RG disclosure to 
maintain social legitimacy. Third, there is no relationship between corporate size and the 
volume of disclosure. These findings suggest that the gambling industry tends to operate 
on a national, rather than international level since the sampled gambling companies 
seem to make references to national, rather than international, reporting practices and 
authorities. Fourth, this industry appears to lack an international gambling association 
which might develop an international standard of RG codes and practices; and thus the 
gambling industry in other country can follow RG standards, codes and practices. There 
is a lack of mimetic process of RG disclosure as there are no international organisations 
or associations to regulate this industry. These findings imply that the industry is 
unlikely to have institutional pressure from global and industry levels. 
 
With a range of sampled countries, particularly, the role of RG is unique in this thesis. 
RG disclosure in the US and Macao shows almost nothing with 0.02 pages and 0.04 
pages respectively (Section 4.5.3.4). In particular, only one out of 18 annual reports in 
the US disclosed RG information, while 3 out of 17 annual reports in Macao disclosed 
RG information. However, Macao’s gambling industry is a unique place for further 
investigation for a number of reasons. First, Macao’s gross gambling revenue has six 
times outstripped that of Las Vegas as the world’s largest gambling market (Eadington 
and Siu, 2007; The Economist, 2013). Second, the government of Macao, the whole 
economy and the vast majority of residents are heavily dependent on this industry. Third, 
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the government of Macao started to introduce RG polices in 2009. Chapters 5, 6 and 7 
provide an analysis of semi-structured interview findings in the case of Macao’s 
gambling industry in order to further investigate CSR. 
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Chapter 5 
Exploring Internal and External Stakeholders’ Perspective of  
Corporate Social Responsibility 
5.1  Introduction 
This chapter builds on the content analysis findings of Chapter 4 to develop a deeper 
understanding of how the concept of CSR is being developed in the gambling industry. 
Though the concept of CSR varies across country, industry and time, there are few 
previous studies concerning CSR and legitimacy in the gambling industry (Chapter 2). 
Semi-structured interviews (Chapters 3) were employed to provide an in-depth 
investigation to seek more explanations by asking the second research question: How is 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) understood in the gambling industry? This 
research question is qualitative in nature and uses interviews with 30 internal 
stakeholders and 19 external stakeholders to explore Macao’s gambling industry.  
 
Interviewees were initially asked if they recognised the term CSR. Both internal and 
external stakeholders’ recognition of CSR appeared to be high. Of the 30 internal 
stakeholders, 25 interviewees recognised this term; whereas, of 19 external stakeholders, 
15 interviewees recognised CSR. In general, a number of interviewees tended to find it 
difficult to expand and elaborate on how Macao’s gambling industry has CSR and any 
responsibilities in any great depth. Some interviewees were very general in their 
responses as if they had shared everything they knew on the topic and their experience. 
However, the researcher believed that some interviewees refused to speak openly 
because they were worried about adverse effects on their company or their work. Some 
of them had been previously interviewed and what they expressed in the interviews was 
slightly different from what was written in the previous media reports.    
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In stark contrast, however, of 30 internal stakeholders, five failed to recognise this term 
and tended to refer to employee benefits or welfare as “social responsibilities”. These 
interviewees were unsure if their company operated CSR programmes. Similarly, of 19 
external stakeholders, four interviewees, three of whom were gamblers, failed to 
recognise this term. The gamblers appeared to find it difficult to expand on the topic and 
limited their comments to RG and employee benefits. They believed that this industry 
tended not to be considered socially responsible. 
 
There was a fairly strong sense that internal and external stakeholders recognised that 
the gambling industry has a broad range of stakeholders. However, the findings in this 
chapter suggest that Macao’s gambling industry appears to prioritise social concerns, 
and these are limited to corporate philanthropy, employee welfare, and economic 
development, rather than gambling- and health-related issues.  
 
This chapter is divided into five sections. The first of which introduces the chapter. The 
second section focus on proactive social concerns, including community, employees, 
and economic development, were the gambling industry primary responsibility. The 
third section discusses how most interviewees tended to emphasise and elaborate on 
Responsible Gambling (RG) and they attached importance to employees, rather than 
customers, which can be viewed as an avoidance approach by deflecting attention from 
the perceived problem. The fourth section explores the limited influences of culture on 
CSR, environmental responsibilities and other responsibilities. Finally, a concluding 
remark is made at the end of this chapter. 
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5.2.  Proactive social concerns as a shield 
Although the concept of CSR have been widely debated and contested (Chapter 2), it is 
possible to identify the broad parameters of the CSR debate in Macao’s gambling 
industry. This industry could be viewed as a socially sensitive industry so it tended to 
improve social aspects in order to operate unhindered. One executive vice president 
believed that CSR addressed the “social issues” in any country, but “social issues” were 
clearly visible in Macao. 
 
“Everybody has a different [CSR] definition. I define it, as you know to address 
the social issue of their country in which you operate and how the company has 
a proactive solution. … Is it a women issue, a gaming issue, or a youth issue? 
The issue is related to the industry”. (Executive Vice President, Company D) 
 
5.2.1. Community 
The most commonly identified responsibility in Macao’s gambling industry was social 
responsibilities towards the local community. The vast majority of internal stakeholders 
working in all positions in both Chinese and international gambling companies and 
most external stakeholders referred to this concept. CSR in Macao’s gambling industry 
is widely understood in the narrow sense of social responsibilities, for example 
corporate donations, sponsorships and employee volunteering, which could all be 
regarded as types of corporate philanthropy. 
 
“The Macao gambling industry pays attention to charitable donations, 
sponsorships, contribution to society and educational support.” (Assistant 
Operation Manager, Company F) 
 
“They [The gambling companies] have donated money or set up certain training 
programmes. By having some kind of volunteers work [,] [employees] visit the 
handicapped and … invite some elderly to come free dinner party.” (Journalist 2) 
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Additionally, a director and some managers working in the international gambling 
companies suggested that the fulfilment of social responsibilities could address 
emerging local social issues, namely human trafficking and a policy of employment of 
previously unemployed people. These issues were viewed as benefiting both the 
gambling industry and the community, thereby highlighting the complementary 
relationship between business and society. This was limited to a win-win scenario 
(Chapter 2). 
 
“We will not accept and not participate in prostitution. But, I know prostitution in 
this building. .... I want to create a resource and a structure where a security and 
safety mechanism that we can engage with girls who find the courage to break that 
cycle and actually get help.” (CEO, Company C) 
 
“Those people are long term unemployed… We put them through intensive training 
programmes. … That to me is a very good ethical way. We are not just recruiting. 
We brought them up to work for us.” (Manager, Company A) 
 
Yet, a manager was sceptical about the social responsibilities concerning corporate 
donations. He argued that the gambling industry’s long-term fulfilment of CSR was not 
compatible with economic self-interest. 
 
“We are lacking the ideas how to do CSR. We just give money or sponsor 
activities. … the CSR we do is very short term. There is no long-term project to do 
CSR. … Because they are too busy making money …” (Manager, Company D) 
 
In a similar manner, some external stakeholders expressed the view that Macao’s 
gambling industry appeared to use a small amount of money to attach importance to the 
unprivileged groups, rather than gamblers (customers). 
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“In terms of social responsibility, they are keener on being seen as a helper of the 
community in general, [but it is] not necessarily gamblers. … Many of them give to 
the charity rather than to the casinos.” (Journalist 4) 
 
“The gambling companies won’t organise a party in a high-class restaurant for the 
elderly. … Honestly, the underprivileged groups don’t care. They sponsor a small 
amount of money for every activity.” (Counsellor 1 – Translation) 
 
It was striking that a quarter of the internal stakeholders working at all levels recognised 
a “social conflict” between the nature of gambling and CSR engagement. Conflicts may 
arise where the internal stakeholders feel that the anticipated benefits from CSR 
engagement do not match the risks associated with the gambling industry’s negative 
externalities, notably gambling addiction and health-related issues. A manager believed 
that CSR was not able to cover or resolve negative social impacts on the Macao 
community. 
 
“You take a few steps from CSR and gambling. … If you are spoiling people’s lives, 
people are in addiction. You know whatever CSR you do. It is not able to offset the 
damage of the society, right?” (Manager, Company A) 
 
Historically, gambling has been linked to illegal activities, including drugs, prostitution 
and crime (Collins, 2003; Reith, 2007; Chapter 1). The gambling industry could be 
viewed as a community-sensitive industry, as it tends to improve social aspects in order 
to operate unhindered. Thus, CSR in this industry is widely understood to focus 
exclusively on social matters, such as the philanthropic contributions to the local 
community. These findings are consistent with the views of Carroll (1979, 1991), Porter 
and Kramer (2002) and Brammer and Millington (2005). CSR in this context may 
enhance the complementary relationship between the gambling industry and the local 
community, but it was limited to a win-win scenario (Banerjee, 2008). However, 
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corporate donations to and sponsorships of local communities or charities may be 
controversial since a large amount of companies’ gambling revenues can come from 
gamblers. In particular, “Very Important Person” (VIP) rooms account for over 60% of 
the gaming revenue of Macao’s gambling industry, while the mass market accounts for 
over 50% of the gaming profits (The Economist, 2013). Responsibility towards the 
community enacted through philanthropic effects is likely to gain acceptance and 
support from the community (Weaver, et al., 1999). These findings are in line with those 
of Palazzo and Richter (2005) for the tobacco industry. This may affect how the local 
community viewed the gambling industry. Thus, the findings could be evidence of 
Macao’s gambling industry using a legitimising strategy, which is consistent with 
Lindblom’s (1993) point two. It is a possibility that this industry might dictate the level 
of CSR. It is fair to suggest that such a proactive approach could enhance its 
business-as-usual scenario and deflect attention away from its irresponsible behaviour. 
 
5.2.2  Employees 
The second theme in relation to the prevalence of CSR in Macao’s gambling industry 
was responsibilities owed to employees. This concept was identified by most of the 
internal stakeholders, who worked at different levels in both the Chinese and the 
international gambling companies and by external stakeholders. These findings are 
consistent with the concept of CSR in relation to employees (Maignan and Ralston, 
2002). CSR in the form of corporate welfare schemes is linked to employees’ interest 
and benefits (Gond, et al., 2011), for example work-life balance (Welford, 2004), health 
and safety and education in the developing countries, where governments are unable to 
protect such right (Crane, et al., 2004). Since the vast majority of Macao residents work 
in this industry, responsibilities towards employees and their interest became an 
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essential part of this industry, which in turn showed the local community another way to 
care. A counsellor noted:  
 
“The gambling companies have a lot of employees who are local citizens in Macao. 
Sometimes, they organise social activities for employees and employees’ families as 
another way to give back to the community.” (Counsellor 1, Translation) 
 
The interviewees referred to responsibilities towards employees, including employee 
training, employee social activities, and employee benefits when they discussed CSR. A 
government official gave a detailed example of responsibilities owed to employees. 
 
“From employees’ perspectives, the gambling industry has responsibilities to their 
employees, for example employee training, employee benefit, employee equality, 
employees’ family, employees’ health, compensation for over time (OT), health and 
safety and working environment.” (Government official 2, Translation) 
 
Additionally, an academic elaborated on this concept in more depth, specifically on 
development of employee whistle-blower protection as employee welfare. 
 
“Some of Macao’s gambling companies have compliant mechanisms so that 
employees have an opportunity to complain. In 1990s, these companies did not 
provide a whistleblowing scheme so employees couldn’t complain.” (Academic 3, 
Translation) 
 
Concerning employee welfare, work-life balance, and whistle-blower protection, the 
gambling industry seems to increasingly share the roles and responsibilities of the 
government of Macao concerning employees (see Moon, et al., 2011). Such treatment of 
employees was seen as directly enlightening self-interest. A manager explained the 
motivation for investing in human resources. 
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“The government keeps telling us or the community. We have to develop human 
resources [employees and young people]. Not just for the small and medium-sized 
[enterprises] as well as the cash cow of the gambling operators because this 
benefits for us in the long-term.” (Manager, Company F) 
 
Indeed, it was striking that the gambling industry failed to consider “employee health 
risks”, including public health problems, individual health problems and individual 
psychological problems. These issues introduce the question of the extent to which this 
industry has seriously engaged in responsibilities towards employees. These findings 
are inconsistent with those of Crane, et al. (2004) for the metal industry in Germany, 
which shows that there is a very strong legal position for workers and trade unions.  
 
Firstly, frontline employees, particularly dealers working on a rota, would lead to public 
health, and family problems, although they have employee health insurance, social 
activities, and employee benefits. This issue was raised by some internal stakeholders 
working at non-management level and some external stakeholders. 
 
“The casinos are open 24 hours a day. Employees working on a rota can affect 
employee health. This industry should take responsibility. It is a serious problem in 
the long-term.” (Coordinator, Company B, Translation) 
 
“Dealers work at the weekend. They have a rest on days off. If they have children, 
the maid takes care of their children, who meet the maid rather than their parent. 
This affects public health.” (Technical Analyst, Company D, Translation) 
 
“Dealers can earn a stable income, but they work on a rota. They may have a bad 
relationship with their wife and their children. … Sometimes, when they go home at 
night, all family members are asleep.” (Gambler 3, Translation) 
 
Second, frontline employees’ (dealers’) passive smoking in the casinos was viewed as an 
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employee health problem. This was recognised by several internal and external 
stakeholders. 
 
“Many customers are allowed to smoke in the casinos. It is not good for frontline 
employee health.” (Coordinator, Company B, Translation) 
 
“In VIP rooms and mass markets, many customers can smoke … Smoking may 
affect employees’ health and they may get lung or nose cancer and high blood 
pressure.” (Labour unionist 1, Translation) 
 
A journalist emphasised a lack of smoking enforcement and absence of monitoring by the 
government of Macao. 
 
“When the government established smoking laws, casinos were exempted. We have 
been waiting for 3 years for non-smoking areas ... Dealers are affected the most. 
The casinos fail to provide a healthy working environment for employees.” 
(Journalist 1, Translation) 
 
Third, employee psychological problems were an important issue. Frontline employees, 
particularly dealers, were under a great deal of pressure to work on the casino gaming 
floor due to unhappy customers and gambling addiction. Several internal and external 
stakeholders suggested that the gambling companies should provide more counselling 
services for frontline employees. 
 
“The gambling companies should provide stress management. Employees are under 
a great deal of pressure. If customers lose money, they blame employees who 
become unhappy.” (Counsellor 4, Translation) 
 
“They can do better in CSR, for example the counselling services for employees. … 
The first priority is for employees because they are working in this industry.” 
(Director, Company F, Translation) 
 
183 
 
“I know many dealers who are addicted to gambling. They work at gaming 
tables and watch customers win so easily. Not only customers are addicted to 
gambling, but also employees.” (Casino Accountant, Company B, Translation). 
A counsellor gave an example of how one of the gambling companies took care of their 
employees and family members by organizing an “Employee Assistance Campaign”, 
which provides a counselling hotline, consultation and workshops for their employees 
so that they had a healthy and balanced lifestyle to perform at their best for the 
company. 
 
“This company invited us to offer counselling services. Normally, we have referrals 
and find the clients, but the response rate is very low. This company is very happy to 
know employees’ problems. … This is the first time that they collaborate with social 
services.” (Counsellor 2- Translation) 
 
CSR in this industry is widely understood as responsibilities owed to employees. This 
industry increasingly shares the roles and responsibilities of the government of Macao 
concerning local employees. These findings are similar to those of Moon, et al.’s (2011) 
views. Such treatment of employees suggests a complementary relationship between the 
gambling industry and the local employees. These findings are consistent with 
Lindblom’s (1993) point two. This legitimising initiative may provide the industry with 
a high level of employee loyalty, public’s trust and local support for two reasons. First, 
the vast majority of local residents work in this industry, rather than non-gambling 
industries due to high salary incentives (Appendix 2). Second, the industry increased the 
number of job opportunities in Macao, which eased local employment pressure in the 
early years. These findings are in line with those of Schmitt (2010), who found that the 
key to enhance the relationship between organisations and community in developing 
countries is just to be good employers.  
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However, it is fair to suggest that this industry highlighted the importance of employee 
responsibility without concerning potential employee health risk issues. This industry 
seemed not to be required to tackle employee health risks and employee problem 
gambling as mentioned above. These issues were absence from the discourse of senior 
management interviewees. This introduces a question of why the international gambling 
companies failed to aware employee health-related issues, particular they had gained 
experience operating in their home countries. This industry appears to exclude its social 
impacts on employee and public health-related issues. Since over 60% of Macao’s 
employees work in posts directly in relation to gambling services (Wu and Wang, 2008; 
Wan, 2009), employees can be viewed as key stakeholders in Macao’s gambling 
industry. If this industry fails to manage the employee health risk in its employees’ eyes, 
this failure may pose a threat to the industry gaining acceptance and support from 
Macao’s local citizens. This support of the local community can be considered as an 
importance source of legitimacy (see Chapter 6 – Section 6.4.4).  
 
5.2.3  Economic development   
The third common CSR concept in Macao’s gambling industry was economic 
responsibilities. Half of the internal stakeholders worked at senior management level in 
both the Chinese and the international gambling companies, and external stakeholders 
who spanned all roles, held a similar view that the gambling industry made significant 
tangible economic contributions to Macao society in terms of taxation, job creation and 
infrastructure. These findings are similar to those of Christiansen (1998), Korn and 
Shaffer (1999) and Felsenstein, et al. (1999), who found that legalised gambling, can be 
regarded as a major source of tax revenue to provide economic development. In 
particular, a CEO and a manager tended to make it clear that economic growth and 
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contribution were seen as the necessary precursors for the achievement of CSR. 
 
“Six large companies in Macao control … influence the economic activities in 
Macao. … So, we are in Macao clearly demonstrating the economic growth.” 
(CEO, Company C) 
 
“We are the gambling operators and people have more job opportunity. Over the 
past ten years, we have increased the standard of living and salaries. People can 
how afford to buy a house.” (Manager, Company F) 
 
Importantly, internal stakeholders working at all levels recognised that there will always 
be a gambling industry in Macao, since the government and the whole economy were 
heavily dependent on this industry. Since this industry is one of the most highly taxed 
industries in Macao (up to 40%) (see Appendix 2), this industry provides revenue from 
gambling tax for the government of Macao, and income for local employees, civil 
servants and residents.  
 
“Macao depends on this industry and we pay to all the civil servants. We 
contribute 40% of our gambling revenue to the government. A lot of local people 
depend on us. … The whole economy depends on us.” (Manager, Company D) 
 
“If Macao doesn’t have the gambling industry, we can’t find jobs.” (Cleaner, 
Company D, Transaction) 
 
Crucially, several external stakeholders noted that the Macao society relied heavily on 
this industry is gambling tax to support local infrastructure and job creation. These 
developments would have been unthinkable without this industry. 
 
“They make profit from the gamblers who lose their money. They create jobs and 
entertainment. They create wealth to the community as a whole and are creating a 
lot of tax. … Another point is that it is very labour intensive. … I don't know where 
these people would work if we didn't have casinos.” (Journalist 2) 
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“The gambling industry also provides a fund for the society to develop technology 
and tourism in order to improve infrastructure.” (Government official 2) 
 
The level of dependency may address the question of the extent to which this industry 
has the close relationship between the government of Macao and the Chinese 
government. 
 
“Before the handover to Mainland China, Macao had been a gambling place for a 
few hundred years. Macao could not survive without this industry. The central 
government [Mainland China] permitted Macao’s gambling industry to continue 
after the handover to China.” (Director, Company F, Translation) 
 
Conversely, a supervisor at junior management level explicitly questioned the extent to 
which the government of Macao made wise use of the gambling taxation and delivered 
the contribution of taxation effectively needed by the community. Thus, the importance 
of economic contribution remains questionable. 
 
“The government received the gambling tax from the gambling industry, but failed 
to make use of this taxation to balance the social impacts made by this industry. 
Can the taxation cover the social costs?” (Supervisor, Company E, Translation) 
 
Economic contribution is an important issue and cannot be ignored in the CSR debate. 
The industry plays a significant economic role in the local community, as the majority 
of local residents, the government and the economy are heavily dependent on this 
industry. These findings are consistent with the CSR literature, which was on the 
significant role of economic responsibilities in local community (Carroll, 1979; 1991; 
Wood. 1991) and appears to be more explicit in developing countries than developed 
countries (Visser, 2008; CSR in Asia, 2009). Both internal and external stakeholders 
deemed the gambling industry’s existence to be inevitable. The industry has made a 
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direct economic impact on Macao. Thus, it is fair to suggest that economic contribution 
was the most powerful justification made by the industry. Such economic contribution 
could enhance the complementary relationship between the industry and the local 
community.  
 
These findings are consistent with Lindblom’s (1993) point three. These findings 
suggest that this industry appears to employ a legitimising strategy and tends to draw 
attention to its strengths, such as taxation, job creation, and infrastructure, while it 
seems to neglect information concerning unfavourable implications of its activities, for 
example personal, social and health disruption (see McMillen, 1996b). An alternative 
explanation could be in line with Campbell, et al.’s (2003) study, who found that the 
tobacco industry seems to be socially constructed as illegitimate. As a result, such an 
industry tends to disseminate little or no information to stakeholders who may slowly 
neglect important issues and may focus on unrelated issues (Campbell, et al, 2003). 
Thus, the industry appears to operate a business as usual scenario and continue to 
exploit the local community. 
 
5.3 Avoidance perspective 
5.3.1  Responsible gambling (RG) as a distraction 
The third common issue arising from the interviewees was Responsible Gambling (RG), 
which is consistent with the CSR literature on consumers’ perspective and incorporates 
the concept of “consumer protection”94 (see also Chapter 7), but this can be viewed as a 
distinctive issue in the gambling industry. More than half of the internal stakeholders 
                                                     
94
 Consumers being defined to include customers or gamblers as well as the concept of public protection, 
education and awareness (Blaszczynski, et al., 2004; 2011). 
188 
 
working at all levels in both Chinese and international gambling companies referred to 
RG, while half of external stakeholders referred to the same concept
95
. Most internal 
stakeholders appeared to place much emphasis on supporting employees and relatively 
little emphasis on supporting customers or gamblers. This view was in contrast to 
external stakeholders who tended to prioritise the support of customers or gamblers over 
employees. There is a detailed analysis of the topic of RG in Chapter 7. 
 
First and foremost, the necessity for “Employee education, awareness and assistance 
programmes” appeared to be highlighted as important in Macao’s gambling industry. 
These employee programmes were mentioned by half of the internal stakeholders 
working at all levels and one third of the external stakeholders. This programme was 
designed for all the employees, who worked both on the casino floor and at the back 
office. This programme has also been implemented in several casinos in Canada, the 
United States and Europe (Giroux, et al., 2008). As a manager for a Chinese gambling 
company and a director of an international company put it: 
 
“We develop RG posters, cards and mandatory training programmes for all our 
team members, including employees who don’t work on the frontline. You can detect 
someone who is at risk and help them.”  (Manager, Company F, Translation)  
 
“Last year, our company devoted itself to promoting RG, for example sharing 
activities with frontline employees and back office employees. … All employees are 
seen as our big family. We organised some games to promote the concept of “RG” 
                                                     
95
 These findings are similar to those of Macao RG survey, which found that the public awareness level 
of the term “Responsible Gambling” was slightly increased from 16.7% (pre-event) to 23.7% (post-event) 
in 2010 (The Institute for the Study of Commercial Gaming, University of Macao, 2010a). More 
importantly, gambling operators provide RG training to their casino employees’ and support “Responsible 
Gambling Awareness Week” (RGAW) and it was expected that casinos had a higher level of awareness of 
RG than Macao residents. However, casino employees’ and gamblers’ understanding of RG was not 
significantly improved before and after the RGAW. Visiting gamblers’ understanding of this term was 
even lower than that of casino employees’ and Macao-based gamblers’ (The Institute for the Study of 
Commercial Gaming, University of Macao, 2010a) 
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and how to face challenges and problems.” (Director, Company A, Translation) 
 
An officer and a gambler revealed that the RG training programme could help them to 
understand the risk of gambling, the notion of chance and randomness
96
 and the 
availability of resources. Yet, it is possible to suggest that the gambling industry seemed 
to be reluctant to disclose these potential risks inherent in the games to customers. 
 
“A problem gambler will affect his/her family members. Gambling is a form of 
entertainment. But, our company always has the house advantage. We taught 
employees about the concept of money.” (Officer, Company B) 
 
“We attended an orientation programme … The probability of customers winning is 
generally 25%, whereas the probability of gambling companies winning is 75%. In 
other words, customers will lose. … They have formulas. The longer customers play, 
the more gambling tax customers pay (5%).” (Gambler 3, Translation) 
 
Although the gambling industry usually provides employee education and awareness 
programmes, two academics were sceptical about RG programmes, which were “very 
short and simple” and “hard to implement”. Gambling operators could contribute 
money to help problem gamblers, rather than training their employees. 
 
“RG is a good idea, but it’s hard to implement. How to train employees to check, 
approach and help problem gamblers … if you gamble too long, you should take a 
rest. Where do they put the posters? Restroom? Gambling tables?” (Academic 2) 
 
“RG is a lip service. The government of Macao requires gambling operators to 
train their employees about RG. Do they train all employees or some? New 
employees know RG, but they forget in the second year. … Gambling operators can 
contribute money to help problem gamblers. But, they don’t.” (Academic 3, 
Translation) 
                                                     
96
 These findings were similar to those conducted by Ladouceur, et al. (2004) for video lottery retailers 
and Giroux, et al. (2008) for three casinos in Quebec, Canada.    
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More importantly, “Customer awareness, assistance, and voluntary self-exclusion 
programmes” appeared to be another important element in the RG programme. A third 
of internal stakeholders working at all levels and a quarter of the external stakeholders 
tended to be committed to taking some measures to protect customers. RG engagement 
concerning customers enabled the gambling industry to point to the evidence of their 
doing something with regard to RG when not necessarily having to do anything 
substantive (see Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990). 
 
“Our company has a responsibility towards customers. We operate in this direction. 
We make profit, but we care about this issue. We don’t want our customers to have 
any bad gambling behaviour.” (Vice President, Company C, Translation) 
 
“The most important thing was RG and we provide free [hotline] services … for 
the people [customers] who have gambling problems.” (Manager, Company D) 
 
“If customers cannot control themselves, they ask a social service organisation to 
put them on a voluntary self-exclusion programme for 6 months or 1 year. If they 
can control themselves, they can withdraw the application. … It works for people 
who volunteer, but not for others.” (Supervisor, Company D, Translation) 
 
RG in Macao’s gambling industry was widely recognised; however, interviewees did 
not understand this term sufficiently to find it useful. Having this code of RG practice 
could arguably be seen as a symbolic commitment to improving customer protection in 
order to fulfil social demands (see Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990). The target audience of 
the RG programme is directed to customers and public (Blaszczynski, et al., 2011). 
However, the findings suggest that the gambling industry can be seen to be involved in 
the responsibility of RG discourse concerning employee and customer protection, while 
doing so has little real effect on its business operation to customers. It is apparent from 
the above quotes that the industry was limited in scope because it concentrated on RG 
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concerning employees, rather than the importance of assisting and protecting customers. 
These findings suggest that this industry actually employed a symbolic legitimising 
strategy. This is consistent with Lindblom’s (1993) point three; i.e. seek to manipulate 
perception by deflecting attention from customer protection to employee protection. It 
could be argued that RG can be viewed as potentially quite harmful to certain 
stakeholders if the gambling industry’s adoption of RG fails to act in the interests of 
consumers (gamblers). Thus, RG could possibly be viewed as window dressing for the 
industry’s irresponsible behaviour. 
 
5.3.2  Reducing gambling problem as long-term business development 
The concept of sustainable development is widespread in western countries (Lertzman 
and Vredenburg, 2005; Young and Tilley, 2006); however, this concept was less 
prevalent in Macao’s gambling industry. A few directors recognised it, but they failed to 
give much in-depth discussion of sustainable development and elaborated no further 
than merely recognising long-term business development in terms of enlightened 
self-interest. 
 
“We are looking for sustainable development. We don’t want to make profit for just 
ten years and leave Macao. ... We consider developing a business foundation and 
positively consider the gambling problems in the early days, but we won’t wait 
until it happens.” (Director, Company A, Translation) 
 
By contrast, an academic and a counsellor expressed their belief in a slightly different 
way by referring to the idea of balance. If the gambling companies had a negative 
impact on the society, the society would be worse off. In other words, they could 
balance social interests in order to achieve sustainable development in Macao by 
reducing the number of problem gamblers. This priority can be viewed as a social 
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aspect of sustainable development. 
 
“… in order to have sustainable growth, [the company] makes sure that we can 
maintain the top leaders who pay attention to the long-term growth and balance of 
social interests from time to time.” (Academic 2) 
 
“CSR not only makes a profit, but also achieves sustainable development. This is 
reducing the harm associated with gambling problem from not making profit. … 
The gambling industry affects 6.8% of the Macao population. If the gambling 
companies donate money, is it enough to cover the social cost of a society of which 
6.8% problem gamblers?” (Counsellor 3, Translation) 
 
Interestingly, another academic held a completely different view of the concept of 
sustainable development as social welfare development. He expressed his belief in the 
Catholic religion and made the connection between the Bible’s concepts and corporate 
donations as a metaphor. 
 
“Charity should go beyond the idea of donation. Charity should teach people how, 
when and where to catch fish [living] and maintain sustainable development. 
Catching all the fish means no fish to eat. … What kinds of nets are used to catch 
what kind of fish.” (Academic 3, Translation) 
 
The concept of sustainable development was likely to be understood differently by 
directors, academics, and problem gambling counsellors. The awareness and the degree 
of understanding of this concept varied. This introduces the question of why internal 
stakeholders recognised economic elements of sustainable development, while external 
stakeholders recognised social elements of sustainable development. According to the 
literature (Chapter 2), it was a realistic assumption that the directors viewed sustainable 
development as compatible with economic objective. This industry presented how it 
engaged in the discourse of long-term business development. Yet, social elements of 
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sustainable development have not translated into any practical business elements. This 
industry could be viewed as a socially sensitive industry and thus the social concerns 
appeared to be the primary issue of social aspects of sustainable development, 
particularly reducing the number of problem gamblers in Macao, rather than 
environmental aspects. This phenomenon could be explained by two major reasons. 
First, this may be due to the liberalisation of Macao’s gambling industry and the local 
citizens concern with the social stability, process and impact of Macao (Appendix 2). 
Second, the concept of sustainable development in relation to the environment tends to 
be less important, and a weak environmental enforcement (Appendix 2) may well 
account for why the concept of sustainable development tends not to be widespread in 
Macao. 
 
5.4  Limited perspective on environment and other responsibilities 
5.4.1  Little Chinese cultural influence on CSR 
A Chinese cultural influence on CSR was less prevalent in Macao’s gambling industry. 
This industry seemed to cover similar sets of CSR themes to those companies which 
operated in developed countries. Surprisingly, the findings did not support the view that 
Chinese cultural traits (eastern culture) are prevalent in Macao (see Wang and Juslin, 
2009; Xu and Yang, 2010). A reason for this may be that Macao was a Portuguese 
Colony, which seems to have been “westernised” over 400 years ago (Appendix 2). 
Another reason for this is the rapid development of this industry over the past decade; as 
international gambling companies have introduced a western management style. Even 
though Chinese cultural traits are not prevalent in Macao, a fifth of internal and external  
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stakeholders referred to two typical Chinese CSR concepts – the Confucian harmony97 
concept of reciprocity
98
 and of family, and the Buddhist ethical concept of “Karma”. 
Both concepts remain important and have had a profound influence on Chinese culture, 
even in Macao (Macao Government Information Bureau, 2010). 
 
“Taking from society and giving money back to society”, which refers to one of the 
Confucian harmony concepts – reciprocity – was the most common quote from both 
internal and external stakeholders. This concept explains that this industry could operate 
in a reciprocal way by returning wealth to society. Several internal stakeholders working 
in management referred to this concept. A vice president suggested that harmony was an 
important concept of operating their businesses in Macao. 
  
“We are talking about “Taking from society and giving money back to society”. … 
When our company makes so much money, by all means, our company shares with 
the community. … Our company makes use of our resources and expertise to give 
back to the community.” (Vice President, Company C, Translation) 
 
In contrast, several external stakeholders characterised the gambling industry’s policy as 
a “Hit and Run” policy, as one interviewee called it. In particular, the international 
gambling companies in Macao make a profit which goes back to their home country 
without returning wealth to society. For example, a director from the labour union noted 
that: 
 
                                                     
97
 The notion of harmony that was propounded by one of the most famous Chinese philosophers, 
Confucius (551- 479 BC) (See Wang and Juslin, 2009). 
98
 According to Wang and Juslin (2009), Confucian harmony relies on four main principles: the stability 
of society based on the five cardinal relationships, the family as a core unit of society, reciprocal virtuous 
behaviour and self-cultivation. Reciprocity is referred to the third principle of the Confucian harmony 
concept. Confusianism believes that if people attempt to treat others virtuously, others will treat the same 
virtuous behaviour (Wang and Juslin, 2009). In other words, if companies apply the reciprocity, the 
Confucian harmony concept, companies will operate in a reciprocal way by returning some wealth to 
society (Wang and Juslin, 2009, p. 443).  
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“ “Taking from society and giving money back to society”. They just earn the 
money and then “Hit and Run”. The gambling industry should give something 
back to the Macao community.” (Labour union 1, Translation) 
 
The gambling industry seemed to project an image to the public that they earned money 
without investing in the local community. In other words, a sense of belonging could be 
regarded as an important value for operating a gambling business in Macao and 
reinvesting money back to the society as a means of achieving the important value. A 
similar view was expressed by a journalist and a counsellor: 
 
“The western gambling companies said that it’s not true that they promote their 
image among the community, but local people believe that actually Americans are 
making and taking the money away without investing here.” (Journalist 4) 
 
“The gambling companies make profits and then go. They can go, but it is not for 
sustainable development. They don’t have a sense of belongin. … It is against the 
doctrine of CSR.” (Counsellor 3, Translation) 
 
Another Chinese CSR concept was the Confucian harmony concept of family
99
. The 
gambling companies attempt to form a family atmosphere amongst their employees. 
This concept could be applied particularly to develop the employment relationship, thus 
enhancing the complementary relationship between the company and employees. For 
example, a counsellor explained that: 
 
“One of the considerations is culture, including religious background. The Chinese 
have the Confucian virtue. … for example, Xiao 100  (Filial Piety), Yi 101 
                                                     
99
 According to Wang and Juslin (2009, p. 442), “Confucianism views the family as the natural habitat of 
humans, the most desirable environment for mutual support and personal growth and as the 
building-block for society’s structure and function (Moise, 1986 cited in Wang and Juslin, 2009). 
Confucius believed that a good family relationship is the key to harmonious society, in that if people 
could learn to perform their familial roles properly, they would in turn be able to carry out their roles in 
society and government properly (Confucius, Analects 1, p. 2 and 4, p. 20)”. 
100
 Xiao  –  “Xiao is being obedient” (Confucius, Analects: 2.5 cited by Wang and Juslin, 2009) and 
Xiao means Filial Piety denotes the respect and obedience that a child should show to his parents (Wang 
and Juslin, 2009, p. 444)  
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(Righteousness) and the concept of family. These concepts are not strong in the 
western culture. … The Chinese emphasise the concept of family. If the gambling 
companies provide a job opportunity for employees, their employees will remain 
loyal to their company.” (Counsellor 3, Translation) 
 
Another typical Chinese CSR concept was the Buddhist concept of “Karma102”, which 
is a principle of “cause and effect”, developed by Buddhism. However, this concept was 
not widespread in Macao. A telephone marketer expressed her belief: 
“Some Chinese companies used blood-soaked cotton wool collected from hospitals, 
[rather than clean and unused cotton] to make clothes [due to the hygiene 
problem]. No one wants to work in these companies … At the ethical level, no one 
wants to do bad things. According to the Chinese ethical concept, the principle of 
causality is called ‘Karma’. [People’s present experience is largely based on 
previous actions, while future experience depends on what people do at the present 
time (See Marques, 2009)].” (Telephone Marketer, Company B, Translation) 
 
According to the the CSR literature (see Wang and Juslin, 2009; Xu and Yang, 2010), 
Macao’s gambling industry was assumed to have some Chinese cultural traits. 
Additionally, Macao's traditional religions, including “Confucianism” and “Buddhism”, 
have profoundly influenced local residents based on Macao’s historical context (Macao 
Government Information Bureau, 2010; Appendix 2). Unexpectedly, these findings 
suggest that the two Chinese cultural traits were not widely recognised in Macao. Due 
to migration of Catholicism and Protestantism in the early 20th century to Macao 
(Macao Government Information Bureau, 2010; Appendix 2), this infusion of different 
religions could dilute or weaken its eastern culture. More pertinently, in relation to the 
one of the Confucian harmony concepts – “reciprocity” – these findings suggest that 
                                                                                                                                                           
101
 Yi - righteousness simply means what is ethically best to do in a certain context, or the performance of 
duties regardless of their outcome (Dolor, 2001 cited by Wang and Juslin, 2009, p. 444). 
102
 Bercholz and Kohn (1993, p. 318) cited in Marques (2009) explain karma as follows: “According to 
the doctrine of cause and effect, our present experience is a product of previous actions and volitions, and 
future conditions depend on what we do in the present.” 
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Macao’s gambling industry could operate not merely on the exchange of money, but in a 
reciprocal way by returning some wealth to society. However, the international 
gambling companies seemed to show no sense of belonging, which means that 
companies make profit without investing in Macao. In particular, the public’s view of 
international companies in the gambling industry’s lack of reciprocity may pose a threat 
to the industry gaining legitimacy and may make it difficult for the industry to gain 
different sources of legitimacy, for example the local community (Weaver, et al., 1999), 
the government of Macao (Crane, et al., 2004) and the Chinese government (Baum and 
Oliver, 1991; Deephouse, 1996) (Chapters 6 and 7). 
 
5.4.2  Environmental responsibility 
The concept of environment is widely discussed in the developed countries (Matten and 
Moon, 2008) and there has been an increase in environmental consciousness in Asian 
countries (Williams, 2011). However, this phenomenon seems to be less prevalent in 
Macao’s gambling industry. Importantly, this industry tended to have less obvious 
impacts on the environment than other such “environmental sensitive industries” as oil, 
mining and chemical (Cho, et al., 2010). The gambling industry could be arguably 
viewed as a “socially sensitive industry”. Several internal stakeholders working at 
non-management level and to a greater extent to the international gambling companies 
recognised environmental responsibilities. More importantly, environmental 
responsibilities were a relatively new concept in the Chinese gambling companies in 
Macao. However, a supervisor also expressed this concept merely in terms of 
enlightened self-interest.  
“Our company is not familiar with environmental responsibilities. Our company is 
not necessarily to establish a new department to do this thing [environment]. … 
When they want to increase profit and reduce expenditure, they consider recycling 
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paper as environmental protection.” (Supervisor, Company E, Translation) 
 
Contrary to the predominant viewpoints, environmental responsibility was merely a cost 
saving tool (Chapter 6). Yet, it is relatively difficult to sustain the exclusion of 
environmental impact from the CSR debate. Several internal and external stakeholders 
explicitly criticised that this industry, which operated on 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, 
365 days a year (a 24/7/365 basis) and played a dominant role in Macao’s economy, 
might have potential environmental impacts on Macao by highlighting electronic waste, 
light pollution, and air pollution. In particular, the quality of air has deteriorated over the 
past ten years (To, et al., 2011). The academics seemed to show more critical 
perspectives on environmental impact than other internal and external stakeholders. 
 
“The life cycle of slot machines is very short and varies from 1 to 7 years. This is 
electronic waste. How do they dispose of them? … The government doesn’t have a 
strong guideline to regulate this.” (Academic 1, Translation) 
 
“We have light pollution because of too many casinos and lights. … The gambling 
companies switch off the lights for an hour in Energy Saving Week or World 
Environmental Day. This is a symbolic gesture.” (Academic 3, Translation) 
 
“The gambling companies have too many shuttle buses at the ferry pie, the airport 
and the gateway to China. … Their shuttle buses occupy Macao’s main roads, but 
they don’t deal with this problem.” (Academic 4, Translation) 
 
“Both light pollution and air pollution exist in this industry. It is open 24 hours a 
day and uses light, air conditioning or heating systems which waste a lot of natural 
resources.” (Coordinator, Company B, Translation) 
 
Both internal and external stakeholders discussed environment perspectives in general 
and presented a narrow understanding of environmental responsibilities, merely 
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environmental protection in terms of saving cost. Doing so, the findings present how 
well the gambling industry enables the responsibility of environment. This industry was 
limited to a win-win scenario in scope because it focused on environmental 
management. It may be inappropriate to suggest that this industry was concerned with 
environmental responsibility. The gambling industry, which is similar to the tobacco 
industry (Tilling and Tilt, 2010), has been facing the ongoing threat to its legitimacy: 
gambling addiction and health-related issues (Chapter 2). Thus, this industry could 
arguably be viewed as a socially sensitive industry (see Cho, et al., 2010), which tended 
to have more obvious impacts on society, rather than on the environment. However, this 
industry operates on 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, 365 days a year (a 24/7/365 basis) 
and uses significant amounts of electricity for lighting, heating and power in casinos, 
hotels and shopping malls, and thus the consumption of electricity increased twofold 
between 2000 and 2010 (To, et al., 2011). It was apparent from above quotes that 
several internal and external interviewees highlighted this industry might have potential 
environmental impacts on Macao, for example electronic waste, light pollution and air 
pollution. These impacts could not be underestimated. 
In general, the concept of environment was not widely seen in Macao’s gambling 
industry. This phenomenon could be explained by three major reasons. First, this 
industry has undergone a rapid development over the last decade. In particular, social 
problems, notably gambling problem, tend to associate with this industry during the 
process of transition from a monopoly gambling market to a competitive gambling 
market (Appendix 2). Second, weak environmental enforcement in the industry may 
well account for why there is weak sensitivity regarding the “environment” in Macao. 
Third, Macao has a limited space of 29.9 km
2
, with a very high population density and 
with a relatively high number of 35 gambling companies (Appendix 2). Thus, there are 
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not many green spaces in Macao, which has a total green area of 7,703,995 sq meters; a 
per capital green area of 14.2 sq. meters (Appendix 2). 
 
5.4.3  Other responsibilities 
More importantly, the concepts of stakeholders, legal and shareholders have been 
widely discussed in the CSR literature. Surprisingly, the findings suggest that these 
three concepts were not prevalent in Macao’s gambling industry. A few managers, 
academics and journalists tended to have a general discussion on these three concepts. 
 
First, the concept of stakeholders (Freeman, 1984; Donaldson and Preston, 1995; 
Mitchell, et al., 1997) tended to be understood by senior managers and academics; 
however, this concept was still far from being widely understood by other interviewees 
in Macao. Additionally, this phenomenon could be explained by the fact that a majority 
of internal and external stakeholders implicitly mentioned some of stakeholders, such as 
community, employees and customers. It is not necessary to mention the concept of 
stakeholders. Alternative explanation could be drawn from the unusual findings in this 
thesis, which found that the industry seems to lack stakeholder pressures, from NGOs 
(gambling counselling service organisations), media (journalists) and problem gamblers 
and their family members. Without such stakeholder pressures could not profoundly 
influence the industry to engage in voluntary CSR and RG standards. 
 
Professional gambling counselling service organisations
103
 could be regarded as 
stakeholders who can affect, or be affected by the gambling industry. However, it is 
                                                     
103
 Professional gambling counselling service organisations can be divided into three types of 
organisations according to their provider: the government of Macao, non-profit organisations, and one of 
the gambling operators. 
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evident that these organisations seem not to have a strong demand for Macao’s 
gambling industry. Although these organisations occasionally generate concerns for 
problem gamblers, this industry tends not to regard them as bringing major pressure for 
greater social concerns. The reason for this is not apparent, but it may have something 
to do with political issues. In particular, non-profit gambling counselling service 
organisations are indirectly funded by Macao’s gambling industry due to the gambling 
tax (Appendix 2). The government, the gambling industry and gambling counselling 
service organisations tend to be interlinked with each other. Macao’s gambling industry 
seems to have developed an interorganisational relation with these organisations 
(Deephouse and Suchman, 2008), which can help the industry in distancing itself from 
criticism and provide a justification as a good citizen. Yet, non-profit organisations 
found it difficult to collaborate with the industry to provide counselling services for 
their customers (gamblers) according to the interviews. Aggressive demand for 
collaboration and support in problem gamblers seem to pose a threat to gaining funding 
for these professional gambling counselling service organisations. 
 
Macao’s gambling industry seems not to be affected by the media as suggested by the 
literature (see Islam and Deegan, 2010). The local media appears to report 
gambling-related financial news, past community achievements and regulatory 
procedures, rather than community resistance and antigambling advocacy (see 
Humphreys, 2010). Although the negative social impacts are reported in the local 
community, the industry seems not to be affected by the negative information. The 
reason for this is not clear, but it may perhaps have something to do with the nature of 
the industry and also some political issues. The gambling industry has been facing an 
ongoing threat to its legitimacy, notably in the form of gambling addiction and 
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health-related issues (Chapter 2). The public may generally perceive the gambling 
industry’s major product in a negative light. However, this industry, particularly 
international gambling companies, tends to have the experience to manage the 
legitimacy gap in developed countries. In addition, the main source of the media’s 
income, particularly advertisement, is largely from Macao’s gambling industry. 
 
Problem gamblers and their family members seem to be the most vulnerable and 
marginalised. They seem to have no power and no voice to fight against Macao’s 
gambling industry. The reason for this phenomenon looks increasingly obvious, and it 
may have something to do with economic issues. The vast majority of local residents 
are heavily dependent on this industry since most of them work in it, and other 
gambling-related industries. They tend to prioritise the economic benefits brought by 
the industry over its social costs. On the other hand, the industry seems to be successful 
in engendering a positive view among the local community by providing job 
opportunities, building infrastructure and taxation, rather than concentrating on 
gambling addiction and health-related issues. Representatives of the industry rarely use 
the term “problem gamblers”, but “customers” in the interviews. Yet, the industry seems 
to shield its role in producing corporate externalities and promote an ethical stance. 
 
Second, surprisingly, the concept of legal responsibility (Carroll, 1979; 1991; Moon and 
Vogel, 2008) was not prevalent in Macao’s gambling industry. Few internal stakeholders 
explicitly recognised this concept. It was unusual that the internal stakeholders did not 
feel the obligation to comply with any legislation. Nevertheless, this concept may 
intertwine, overlap, and interlink with other CSR concepts, including employment 
practice and the obligation of pay taxes as discussed in this chapter. These concepts 
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could be viewed as “implicit CSR”, which is not considered a deliberate, voluntary, and 
strategic decision, but could appear in a form of norms and rules (Matten and Moon, 
2008). Additionally, the international gambling companies operate in Macao, which is a 
so-called developing country, where there is a weak institution, a weak enforcement and 
poor governance (see Matten and Moon, 2008). In other words, Macao’s gambling 
industry is effectively in a position to take advantage of Macao’s less regulated 
gambling industry for gambling business operations and to move its investment to a 
place where local laws are suitable for this industry. These findings imply that there was 
weak institutional pressure from the external environment at regional level, notably the 
government of Macao, on CSR engagement. These findings are not similar to those of 
previous CSR studies in developed countries (Chapter 2), which found that local 
governments have developed CSR polices in European countries, such as the UK, 
France and Germany (Matten and Moon, 2008; Igalens and Nioche, 1997 cited in Gond, 
et al., 2011). However, these findings are in line with those of CSR studies in East Asia 
(Gond, et al., 2011), which found that the government tends to rely on self-government 
CSR, rather than a partnership with government or mandated by government. The 
findings suggest that organisation in Macao’s gambling industry can possibly fall into 
CSR as self-government category, rather than other relationship types, as described in 
Gond, et al.’s (2011) study. The government of Macao seems to have a little interference 
in CSR in Macao’s gambling industry; however, CSR in this context is a typical case of 
CSR beyond legal requirement (see Gond, et al., 2011). From a theoretical perspective, 
organisations in Macao’s gambling industry are not fully shaped to the institutional 
environment at regional level. These findings are not consistent with the institutional 
legitimacy literature in Chapter 2. 
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Third, unexpectedly, there was a little discussion or elaboration on responsibilities 
towards shareholders (Friedman, 1970) both within Macao’s gambling companies and 
in the international gambling companies operating in their home countries. A possible 
explanation of this phenomenon could be drawn from the legitimacy theory (Chapter 2). 
Macao’s gambling industry employs a set of legitimising strategies, particularly CSR 
and RG, to manage different stakeholders’ perceptions (Lindblom, 1993) so as to reduce 
the legitimacy gap and gain different sources of legitimacy to ensure its survival. It is 
possible to suggest a sophisticated view of the absence of shareholders that this industry 
attempted to manage different stakeholders in order to enhance economic self-interest 
and ultimately benefit shareholders value in the long term. This will be discussed in 
Chapters 6 and 7. 
 
5.5 Concluding remarks 
Both internal and external stakeholders identified different concepts of CSR. It 
comprised a set of programmes incorporating corporate philanthropy, employee welfare, 
economic development and a specific industry-wide initiative known as RG. 
Organisations in the gambling industry endeavour to communicate their responsibility 
by obscuring certain features of their work when emphasising others. Thus, they shield 
their role in producing corporate externalities and promoting an ethical stance. From the 
above discussion, three main areas needed to be further investigated and analysed. 
 
First, organisations in Macao’s gambling industry appear to highlight proactive social 
concerns, including community involvement, employee welfare, and economic 
development. These views are similar to those of Gond, et al. (2011) for the 
nineteenth-century US and Western Europe. The reason for this is obvious and it may 
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have something to do with political issues. A majority of residents, the government, and 
the economy have been heavily dependent on the gambling industry. These 
organisations seem to pursue the control of social issues so as to shield its irresponsible 
behaviour. More importantly, these organisations appear to either omit or exclude their 
corporate externalities from their discourse. CSR programmes can be viewed from a 
purely strategic viewpoint. These proactive social concerns could be viewed as a means 
of managing stakeholders’ by showing their good deeds the industry has done for the 
community (Lindblom, 1993). Such engagement could possibly enhance the gambling 
industry’s relationship with society. This will be discussed in Chapter 6. 
 
Second, both internal and external stakeholders appear to emphasise and elaborate on 
RG in interview questions. The target audience of the RG programme are customers and 
the public (Blaszczynski. et al., 2011). However, the findings suggest that the internal 
stakeholders tended to place emphasis on the importance of employee, rather than 
customers responsibilities, while the external stakeholders viewed that reducing the 
number of problem gamblers could be possibly viewed as sustainable development in 
Macao. Having RG polices can arguably be viewed as the gambling companies’ 
symbolic commitment to improving customer protection or public health so as to fulfil 
social demands and expectations (Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990). Yet, this industry 
employed RG as a means of deflecting attention from customer protection to employ 
protection (Lindblom, 1993). RG tends to have no real meaning in practice; however, 
RG remains symbolically important. RG will be investigated in more depth in Chapter 
7. 
 
Third, the concepts of stakeholders appeared to be less prevalent in Macao’s gambling 
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industry. There is a little evidence to suggest that this industry not only received strong 
pressure from external stakeholders, particularly gambling counselling service 
organisations, journalists, and problem gamblers and their family members, but also 
little pressure from institutional environment, notably the government of Macao. In 
other words, this industry seems to have its own way to operate and does not receive 
any pressure from the external environment. From a theoretical perspective, 
organisations in Macao’s gambling industry are not entirely conformed to the 
institutional environment at regional level. These findings are not similar to the 
institutional legitimacy literature (Chapter 2). This aspect will be investigated in 
Chapter 8. 
 
The next chapter (Chapter 6) will discuss the internal and external stakeholders’ 
perspectives on the implementation of CSR in Macao’s gambling industry. Chapter 6 
covers three rationales for CSR engagement: business case adoption strategies, 
stakeholder management, and source of legitimacy. 
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Chapter 6  
Motivation for Engaging Corporate Social Responsibility in  
Macao’s Gambling Industry 
6.1  Introduction 
Chapter 6 builds on the interview findings of Chapter 5 to provide a deeper insight into 
Macao’s gambling industry’s motivation for engaging in CSR. A few CSR studies have 
examined the tension between CSR and profit-making organisations in the gambling 
industry, which is a further example of a controversial industry (Chapter 2). This thesis 
may enhance and deepen understanding of CSR in the gambling industry. 
Semi-structured interviews (Chapter 3) were employed to investigate the third research 
question: Why does the gambling industry engage in Corporate Social Responsibility? 
This research question is qualitative in nature and explored through interviews with 30 
internal stakeholders and 19 external stakeholders of Macao’s gambling industry. 
 
There are three main findings in this chapter. First, organisations in Macao’s gambling 
industry employ CSR as a part of the business case, emphasising promotion of 
corporate image and reputation, gaining competitive advantages and saving cost. These 
findings are in line with prior CSR literature, which advocates CSR as a win-win 
scenario (Chapter 2). Second, this industry employs CSR as a means of managing 
stakeholders by changing their perception, educating them and distracting their attention 
from perceived problems (Lindblom, 1993). Third, they also wish to appear “legitimate” 
to two important audiences: internal audiences (the parent company) and external 
audiences (the public, the government of Macao and the Chinese government). Each 
group can provide certain forms of political and social support to the industry through 
granting greater access to critical resources, including knowledge, acceptance, gambling 
licenses, labour, land, and customers to enhance their self-interest and survival. 
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The chapter is divided into five sections: having outlined an introduction in the first 
section; second, the business case adaptation strategies will be analysed; third, 
stakeholder management will be investigated; fourth, different sources of legitimacy 
will be examined; and a summary is made at the end of the chapter. 
 
6.2   Business Case adoption strategies 
There are a number of international and domestic gambling companies in Macao’s 
gambling industry. Despite the differences between international and domestic gambling 
companies, the findings suggest that organisations in Macao’s gambling industry 
employ CSR as a part of the business case. These findings are consistent with previous 
CSR literature (Chapter 2), which focuses on how corporations can do well by 
performing well in financial terms as a business operation and seem to be engaging with 
responsibility to create a better society at the same time (Kurucz, et al., 2008). This 
assumption of CSR is limited to a win-win situation (Banerjee, 2008). There are three 
main findings concerning the business case of CSR, namely rebuilding corporate image 
and reputation, gaining competitive advantage by attracting local talent and cost 
reduction. 
 
6.2.1 Rebuilding corporate image and reputation 
The rationale for CSR engagement seemed likely to promote a corporate image and 
reputation to become a better industry. These findings are generally consistent with 
those of the business case in CSR literature, which suggests that organisations 
employing CSR can enhance corporate image and reputation (Fombrun and Shanley, 
1990; Turban and Greening, 1997; Brammer and Millington, 2005; Kurucz, et al., 2008; 
Jo and Na, 2012). Historically, gambling has been associated with illegal activities 
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including drugs, prostitution and crime (Collins, 2003; Reith, 2003; Chapter 1). CSR 
engagement could be used to sanitise these illegal activities and may rebuild the 
corporate image that the gambling companies could be viewed as normal business to 
operate in Macao. This was recognised by half of both the internal and external 
stakeholders. This view was widely expressed by the internal stakeholders working at 
all levels at both international and Chinese gambling companies and to a lesser extent 
by those working at junior management levels. 
 
“Let society know that many people are prejudiced. … Being selfish, CSR can 
improve our corporate image. When we were young, casinos were like a dirty place. 
Customers taking gamble with their lives. We don’t want to give this image to the 
general public.” (Vice President, Company C, Translation) 
 
“I believe that CSR is an intangible asset which is a tool to build up a corporate 
imagein the long term.” (Supervisor, Company E, Translation) 
 
“Every gambling company makes a contribution to society. They have this social 
status and keep their reputation. … so everyone pays more attention to these 
companies.” (Telephone Marketer, Company B, Translation) 
 
“Our company needs to attract large corporations’ attention. If such big business 
partners have a good impression of us, they pay more attention to our company.” 
(Officer, Company A, Translation) 
This view was not limited to internal stakeholders. More than half of the external 
stakeholders held a slightly different view. This view was expressed to a greater extent 
in academia and journalism. They asserted that CSR, particularly corporate donation 
seemed to be an easy way to rebuild positive corporate images and develop good public 
relations in order to gain trust and support from the community. 
 
“One gambling company donated 1 billion dollars to our university in instalments, 
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while another company also donated 30 million dollars to us. … I think what that 
they are doing to make a good of themselves and a good public relations exercise.” 
(Academic 4, Translation) 
 
“They don't donate money just because they are very nice people. … They do it 
 because it is good for their image. … From a more cynical view, it is some kind of 
PRs [public relations] or a marketing tool …” (Journalist 2) 
 
As can be seen from the above quotes, CSR engagement could enhance corporate image. 
In some respects, one journalist held a critical view that companies often laid off 
employees during the financial crisis; however, Macao’s gambling industry seemed to 
continue to employ their employees in the difficult time with reduced wages, reduced 
working hours and an unpaid leave scheme (Vong, 2010). In other words, this industry 
appears to take the role of government to provide employee job security. CSR in this 
form can be viewed as a means of gaining trust and winning support from employees 
and the community, thereby promoting public relations. 
 
“During the [financial] crisis in 2009, organisations fired employees. … The 
gambling companies took this opportunity to improve their image, you know, to 
organise the activities for employees so that they can strengthen their presence in 
Macao.” (Journalist 4) 
 
The findings suggest that this industry could take a proactive stance towards CSR 
engagement so as to promote a corporate image, which can sanitise its reputation by 
obscuring the uncovered and illegal activities, thus rebuilding, restoring, reconstructing 
its corporate image to win trust, support and espousal from employees and the 
community. This view is similar to that of Hertz (2001) and Klein (2001). Furthermore, 
these findings are in line with those of Cai, et al. (2012) and Jo and Na’s study (2012), 
which found that CSR engagement of controversial industry can reduce its risk, and 
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therefore, enhance corporate image and corporate reputation. The gambling industry 
endeavours to alter the perception of its image, appearance, and identity (Dowling and 
Pfeffer, 1975; Suchman, 1995). These findings are similar to those of Palazzo and 
Richter (2005) for the tobacco industry. The gambling industry could be viewed the 
other normal industries that operate in a business as usual context. 
 
6.2.2 Competitive advantage by attracting local talents 
CSR engagement was viewed as a means of gaining competitive advantage of attracting 
local employees to work in gambling companies over other gambling competitors and 
such other industries as banking, retailing or construction. Since there has been a rapid 
development of Macao’s gambling industry over the past decade, organisations in the 
industry had a high demand for a labour in both gambling and non-gambling areas 
(Appendix 2). However, the supply of local labour did not meet the demand of the 
industry. Due to the shortage of local labour in Macao, CSR can be considered as a 
tactically means of attracting local employees to work in the gambling industry. This 
view was expressed by less than a quarter of the internal stakeholders working at senior 
and middle management levels in Chinese and international gambling companies. 
 
“I think that our company attaches importance to CSR because of the labour 
shortage in Macao. If we don’t do CSR to establish a good image, it may affect our 
human resource competitiveness.” (Director, Company F, Translation) 
“If our company has a good image, I think that we can get more resources. It is 
easier for employees to apply to us. I don’t believe that anyone wants to work in an 
inhumane place with no CSR practices.” (Supervisor, Company E, Translation) 
Macao’s gambling industry experienced dramatic growth over the past decade, thereby 
offering various job opportunities and providing employee benefits (Chapter 5). The 
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industry seems to endeavour to reduce this legitimacy gap to develop a symbol of social 
legitimacy, particularly CSR initiatives (Chapter 2), in order to gain more resources, 
such as local talents. 
 
“We like to think we are the best employer in Macao. Part of that is our brand and 
how we can attract people. We can pay high salaries and some of our competitors 
have employees who are happy to join us.” (Manager, Company A) 
 
These findings indicate that CSR engagement in Macao’s gambling industry about 
attempting to gain competitive advantage over other gambling companies and other 
industries by attracting local talent. These findings are similar to prior CSR literature, 
which claims that CSR can offer a competitive advantage in attracting local labour force 
(Turban and Greening, 1997; Greening and Turban, 2000; Backhaus, et al., 2002; Porter 
and Kramer, 2002). The industry endeavours to alter the perception of its image, 
appearance and identity (Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975, Suchman, 1995; Palazzo and 
Richter, 2005) to reduce the legitimacy gap in order to gain more resources, particular 
local talent. However, in this context, CSR is limited to a win-win situation by creating 
good gambling business and benefiting shareholders in the long term (Chapter 2). The 
underlying purpose of CSR engagement was often viewed as enlightened self-interest in 
order to reduce the turnover rate of employees for its internal performance (See Hertz, 
2001). CSR engagement can be seen as a part of the business case. 
 
6.2.3  Cost reduction  
Environmental concerns (Chapter 5), could be seen as a potential benefit on the 
economic success of Macao’s gambling industry and enlighten its self-interest. In 
particular, cost reduction can be achieved through CSR activities directed at the 
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environment (Carroll and Shabana, 2010). Several internal stakeholders were likely to 
show these responsibilities merely environmental protection in terms of reducing energy 
in order to save cost. 
“Environmental responsibilities are things like reducing water usage, electricity 
usage and waste, for example changing to environmental shower heads and bed 
sheets. … Environmental protection is cost saving and we get environmental 
accreditation from the government every year.” (Officer, Company B) 
 
“They spend a lot of money on using this new environmental technology to reduce 
energy cost. Some gambling companies apply western environmental technology to 
Macao.” (Technical Analyst, Company D, Translation) 
 
“When they want to increase profit and reduce expenditure, they consider recycling 
paper as environmental protection.” (Supervisor, Company E, Translation) 
 
These findings indicate that CSR engagement in Macao’s gambling industry is an 
attempt to reduce costs. These findings are similar to the views of Kurucz, et al. (2008) 
(Chapter 2). Yet, this CSR engagement can enhance long-term shareholder value 
through reducing cost (Smith, 2005). Cost reduction arguments for CSR have been 
generally accepted among managers (Carroll and Shabana, 2010). Macao’s gambling 
industry appear appears to a win-win scenario by perform finally in business operation 
and can have responsibility to environment (Kurucz, et al. 2008; Chapter 2). The 
purpose of CSR engagement was often viewed as enlightened self-interest to reduce 
cost to these organisations, which built a business case for CSR. 
 
6.2.4.  Self-interested rationales 
The underlying motivation for CSR engagement was often seen as self-interest 
rationales. This view was commonly expressed by one third of the internal stakeholders 
working at all levels in both international and Chinese gambling companies. This 
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assumption of self-interest leads to a free rider scenario where the gambling industry 
will not usually take on CSR unless it meets its profitability criteria (Banerjee, 2008). In 
particular, helping the community, providing employee training and sponsoring 
employee education led to the industry having economic benefits in both the short and 
the long-term. CSR was seen as a means of increasing corporate benefits rather than, 
seeking to advance the interest of the community and employees. Two managers 
expressed this from the industry’s viewpoint. 
 
“CSR is a good business decision because it helps the branding and the community 
in the eyes of the government. … We would get something back immediately. … 
CSR has to be purely altruistic.” (Manager, Company A) 
 
“The government keeps telling us or the community. We have to develop human 
resources [young employees]. Not just for the small and medium-sized [enterprises] 
as well as cash cow of the gambling operators because it is the long term that 
benefits us.” (Manager, Company F) 
 
The industry engaged in CSR according to their financial ability. However, when there 
was a serious economic downturn, they would choose business survival over continuing 
to engage in CSR. These findings are in line with those of Kapelus (2002) for the 
mining industry. This raises the notion of capitalism. CSR asserts that capitalism is not 
perfect (Carroll, et al., 2012). In other words, this industry engaged in CSR and pursued 
economic self-interest without changing the structure of a market economy (see Carroll, 
et al., 2012). A CEO and a casino accountant in the international gambling companies 
emphasised this viewpoint. 
 
“When the company’s survival comes into question, they will always pick survival 
over ethical actions. There is a limit. There is a potentially limiting factor of the 
capital system that currently exists.” (CEO, Company C) 
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“We won’t engage in CSR which conflicts with our self-interest. … But, if the 
gambling companies are in a bad economic situation, they fire people. They do less 
charity work and they engage in CSR according to their financial ability and they 
won’t keep doing CSR.” (Casino Accountant, Company B, Translation) 
 
A more complete view on CSR as enlightened self-interest was recognised by a third of 
the external stakeholders, particularly those who were gamblers, journalists and a labour 
unionist. Since Macao’s gambling industry is a profit-making business, rather than a 
non-profit one, such as the Hong Kong Jockey Club (Chapter 4). The industry seemed 
to calculate potential business benefits that it gained from CSR before it actually 
engages in CSR. A director in a labour union and a gambler explained their viewpoints. 
 
“If they open a Sanatorium or a nursery school, can they make money? They think 
that they can’t make profit from these activities. Businessmen calculate everything 
and calculate every single return.” (Labour Union 1, Translation) 
 
“The gambling companies want customers to lose … [I know] because I used to 
work in casinos. … They say they want to stop gambling problem and promote RG, 
but they don’t think so. …. Macao’s gambling industry is a profit-making business. 
It is different from the Hong Kong Jockey Club.” (Gambler 2, Translation) 
 
The findings in the previous three sections concerning business case of CSR are limited 
to a win-win situation (Chapter 2). However, these findings indicate that CSR can be 
viewed as a means of enhancing profitability, which is consistent with the views of 
Friedman’s (1970). Since Macao’s gambling industry is a profit making business, rather 
than a non-profit one or stated-owned business, corporations in this industry fall under 
the institution of capitalism (see Carroll, et al., 2012). On the other hand, a non-profit 
one or state owned business appeared to operate the interest of the public, rather than 
the interest of shareholders. Undoubtedly, Macao’s gambling industry has increasingly 
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contributed economic development in the local community (Chapter 5); however, their 
motivation for engaging in CSR remains questionable. No matter how this industry 
employed CSR, the underlying purpose of CSR engagement was often seen as 
enlightened self-interest in both short-term and long-term. These findings are consistent 
with Karl Marx and Milton Friedman, who claim that the design of an organisation in 
contemporary capitalism follows a financial initiative (Gray and Milne, 2004). This 
phenomenon was more explicit when this industry encountered an economic downturn 
as it ensures business survival, rather than CSR engagement. 
 
6.3  Stakeholder Management 
There remained some scepticism about whether or not the industry was truly engaging 
in CSR. This section examines how this industry employed CSR as a means of 
achieving strategic legitimacy, thus engaging symbolically, rather than substantively in 
CSR initiatives. The industry employs a set of legitimising strategies to manage 
stakeholders’ perception by changing their perception, by educating them and by 
distracting their attention from perceived problems. These interpretations are mainly 
based on Lindblom’s (1993) framework, which provides a useful analytical lens to 
examine the data. 
 
6.3.1.  Changing stakeholders’ perception by balancing negative social impact 
First, Macao’s gambling industry appeared to employ CSR as a means of changing 
stakeholders’ perceptions by employing symbolic CSR initiatives of social legitimacy. 
The construction of the gambling industry is so contested for two main reasons: (1) the 
industry may or may not be a legalised and (2) gambling may or may not be a 
legitimated form of activity (Reith, 2007; Chapter 2). Historically, this industry has been 
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associated with illegal activities, namely drugs (Chapter 1). Thus, Macao’s gambling 
industry employed CSR as a means of changing stakeholders’ perception by balancing 
the perceived negative social impact of gambling on society against a positive 
engagement in CSR in Macao. A supervisor and a manager noted that the nature of the 
gambling industry was seen as having a negative impact on society so that CSR could 
be employed as a means of countering the public negative perception of the industry. 
 
“The gambling industry has a negative image. Our company knows this point so 
they make donations to balance this negative image.” (Supervisor, Company D) 
 
“The nature of business will always be attacked. [No] matter how much we 
contribute … because of its negative noise, we have to do a lot better to protect the 
branding and image.” (Manager, Company F) 
 
Similarly, this view of employing CSR to balance the perceived negative image of the 
industry to a positive CSR engagement was supported by half of the external 
stakeholders. Apart from the government officials and a director of labour union, those 
interviewees shared a similar view with the notion of balancing between corporate 
survival and social impacts, thus enhancing corporate self-interest. 
 
“If individuals gamble heavily, they lose money, and then may have family abuse, 
child abuse and crime. … CSR is especially important to balance the company’s 
return and the social conflict.” (Academics 2) 
 
“Ideally, they will make sure that they don’t have problem gamblers. You know 
flooding into their casinos. They donate a lot of their [the company’s] money to 
charity … and they give back as much as possible to society.” (Journalist 2) 
 
“If they don’t have CSR, they can’t survive in the long term. They may use society’s 
resource. … The gambling companies need to balance their future development 
and the social interest.” (Counsellor 1, Translation) 
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“One of the gambling owners held a superstitious belief. He makes so much profit 
from gamblers and then donates to charities because his two sons died in a car 
accident. He wants to balance it by donating his money.’ (Gambler 3, Translation) 
 
These findings indicate that by legitimising CSR through communication, Macao’s 
gambling industry could reach strategic objectives by creating a more positive image of 
the industry than the perceived negative image of the industry. The positive and 
extensive CSR engagement, particularly community involvements, employee welfare 
and economic development, can profoundly influence the public’s perception and social 
value (Chapter 5). These findings are consistent with Lindblom’s (1993) point two. This 
positive image may convince the public that they are “not all that bad”. These findings 
are similar to those of Campbell, et al. (2003) for the tobacco industry. However, the 
gambling industry is not required to tackle social issues, thus this was not framed in the 
discussion about CSR. It seems that the social impacts of gambling- and health-related 
issues are removed from the gambling industry discourse. It is relatively difficult to 
sustain the exclusion of social impacts from CSR debate. These CSR engagement can 
be regarded as a symbolic, rather than substantive, management technique (Ashforth 
and Gibbs, 1990). More importantly, the industry seemed to employ CSR to signify 
falsely that the industry’s performance has already changed; however, CSR engagement 
could possibly reduce the legitimacy gap. This strategic approach can be seen as a 
proactive strategy by the industry so that the industry attempted to get the positive 
image across in order to put its own interpretation on CSR (see O’Donovan, 2002). 
 
6.3.2   Educating stakeholders about its intentions to improve its social 
performance 
Second, Macao’s gambling industry attempted to educate stakeholders’ perception 
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through employing symbolic CSR initiatives of social legitimacy. The industry appears 
to employ CSR to educate its stakeholders about its intentions to improve its 
performance. These findings are in line with the views of Lindblom’s (1993) point one. 
This industry employed various forms of media, such as newspapers, videos and TV 
shows, as a source of organisational legitimacy to educate, influence and shape the 
opinion of their employees and the public, in order to reiterate past CSR achievements, 
namely community involvements in Macao. These findings are consistent with the 
views of Deephouse and Suchman (2008), who suggest that organisations seek different 
sources of organisational legitimacy. This was recognised by some of the internal 
stakeholders working at middle management level. Two supervisors working at junior 
management level in the international gambling companies noted: 
 
“If we donate money, we take a photo and put it in the newspaper. … We have a 
video in the staff rooms or offices which shows what we have donated for charity 
during the year.” (Supervisor, Company D) 
 
“When we take a ferry from Macao to Hong Kong, we can watch their CSR 
activities on the TV in the ferry all the time. … The video shows the elderly having 
a buffet in a restaurant or kids making Easter eggs … We realised that our 
company did CSR activities.” (Supervisor, Company B, Translation) 
 
More importantly, a manager in marketing and a senior manager in the public relations 
department provided some examples of how their company educated the general public 
and employees about gambling as a choice, as a form of entertainment and as a leisure 
environment in Macao’s gambling industry. 
 
“When we educate people about gambling, you know gambling is a choice. You 
know it is not something wrong. … We are taught not to label the gamblers as 
doing bad things.” (Manager, Company F) 
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“Our company can be regarded as socially responsible. … My boss taught us that 
gambling is an entertainment which is different from the early days. … We hope to 
provide a leisure environment for customers in the mass market. ... Do you want 
your customers to lose all their money? At least, my boss didn’t teach me.” (Senior 
Manager, Company D, Translation) 
 
These findings suggest that Macao’s gambling industry employs different forms of 
media as a source of organisational legitimacy in attempt to educate, influence and 
shape the opinions of their employees and the general public by reiterating past CSR 
achievements, and educated stakeholders that gambling is as a legitimated form of 
activity (see Reith, 2007). These findings are consistent with the views of Lindblom’s 
(1993) point one. The local community should judge this industry by its current positive 
and negative contributions to the community. However, past CSR achievements are 
subject to scrutiny. This industry appears to concentrate on corporate philanthropy, 
rather than gambling addiction and health-related issues. This strategic focus on 
corporate philanthropy can be regarded as symbolic, rather than a substantive, 
management technique (Ashforth and Gibb, 1990). The legitimising strategies could 
reflect or portray the industry as having transformed itself, which may actually move the 
industry towards an actual change as a reformed industry; however, this legitimising 
strategy can be seen as forestalling any real changes in corporate behaviour. These 
findings are consistent with those of Deegan and Blomquist (2006) for the Australian 
minerals industry. The strategic legitimacy could benefit the interests of the owners of 
the gambling industry, rather than the consumers in order to sustain corporate operations. 
In other words, it could be argued that CSR could be regarded as potentially quite 
harmful to certain stakeholders if the industry’s adoption of CSR could fail to act in the 
interests of consumers (gamblers), within society. 
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6.3.3.  Distracting attention from perceived problems 
Finally, Macao’s gambling industry employed CSR as a means of distracting the 
public’s attention away from perceived negative impact of the industry towards positive 
impact of the industry on local community, while drawing attention to the positive 
impact of the industry, thus in turn changing the public’s attitude to the industry, and 
giving the public a more positive impression. These findings are in line with the views 
of Lindblom’s (1993) point three. The findings suggest that the industry seems to 
highlight its strengths, particularly the positive value of social engagement, rather than 
the negative phenomenon in relation to gambling- and health-related issues. This view 
was supported by some of the internal stakeholders working at middle management and 
non-management levels and one external stakeholder. 
 
“The gambling business has a perceived negative image … You can’t eliminate that 
and teach people how to think about it, but you can change people’s perceptions … 
to move the focus away from gaming. … We want to change our image and to align 
ourselves with tourism, leisure, and recreation.” (Manager, Company F) 
 
“The gambling industry is generally perceived to have a negative image because of 
problem gamblers. … Thus, the industry attaches importance to CSR and tries to 
persuade people to think positively.” (Coordinator, Company C, Translation) 
 
“One way of changing this image is to promote CSR events which helped to 
improve its [the industry’s] image so the community perceived them as benefactors 
of the community.” (Journalist 4) 
 
More pertinently, this industry appears to be secretive and sensitive regarding the 
confidential information of “junket operators”104 and “VIP high rollers105”. Over 70% 
                                                     
104
 Junket operators signed Joint-Venture contracts with Macao gambling operators which hold 
concessionaries and sub-concessionaires to operate “VIP Gaming Rooms” in their casinos (also see 
Footnote 47).  
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of Macao’s gambling revenues come from VIP rooms (Eadington and Siu, 2007). Of 
great concern were the responses from five external stakeholders concerning the 
industry’s lack of transparency in regard to junket operators, big customers and illegal 
employment policy. The industry seemed to have difficulty in gaining legitimacy on the 
basis of the integrity and transparency of its operations (Soriano, et al., 2012). 
 
“From a low transparency industry to some transparency, CSR is improving. [But] 
it is still below what is acceptable. … Especially, junket operators … and some of 
the big customers gamble in gambling rooms. [This information] was not disclosed 
to the license holders.” (Academics 2, Translation) 
 
“[The gambling companies] are listed on the stock exchange which requires 
certain transparency. But, they tend to be secretive and sensitive to, especially, 
high rollers and big gamblers. … they are bonded by some of the secrecy rules. … 
Some aspects are quite confidential.” (Journalist 2) 
 
Even more compelling was the infringement of the employment policy provided by 
some of the gambling companies. A gambler revealed the ways in which the 
employment policy is broken. 
 
“Some managers want to make a fortune. For example, if our company hired 
imported labour, mainly from mainland China. Their salaries are MOP$9,000, but 
they actually receive MOP$7,000 or less. … They need to pay a fee to an agent and 
other fees to managers and supervisors.” (Gambler 4, Translation)  
 
These findings imply that Macao’s gambling industry shifted their attention from 
assisting problem gamblers to community involvement (Chapter 5). These findings are 
consistent with the views of Lindblom’s (1993) point three. These findings are also 
                                                                                                                                                           
105
 The junket operators often offer credit to VIP high-rollers from mainland China according to the value 
of their fixed assets (The Independent, 2012). If VIP high-rollers lose money in any casino in Macao, the 
junket operators have their own special ways, for example custody, to collect debts from VIP high-rollers 
(The Independent, 2012). 
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similar to those of Hing and McMillen (2002) for the Australian gambling industry. The 
negative impacts of the industry seem to be unrepresented in the interviews. This raises 
the questions of why internal stakeholders were silent on gambling addiction and 
health-related issues, while external stakeholders recognised all these negative impacts, 
for example gambling addiction, junket operators, and illegal employment policies. Not 
mentioning the negative effects of the industry can be regarded as on avoidance 
approach, which implies the management style of the industry tends to be secret or 
sensitive (see O’Donovan, 2002). Thus, the concept and construct of CSR could not 
possibly be regarded as a true representation of the gambling industry. These findings 
are consistent with those of Palazzo and Richter (2005) for the tobacco industry. These 
are not necessarily false, but could be misleading (Lindblom, 1993). This strategic focus 
on CSR without explicitly dealing with gambling- and health-related issues can be 
regarded as a symbolic, rather than substantive, management technique (Ashforth and 
Gibbs, 1990). The industry attempted to bolster its position as a legitimate organisation 
without really changing of its operations. Otherwise, making industry-sensitive 
information public can pose a threat the gambling industry to legitimising its actions. 
These findings are similar to those of De Villiers and Van Staden (2006) for the mining 
industry in South Africa. 
 
6.4  Sources of legitimacy 
This section concentrates on how Macao’s gambling industry can be said to employ 
CSR as a means of gaining different sources of legitimacy so as to ensure its survival. 
They attempted to appear “legitimate” to two important audiences: internal audiences 
and external audiences. The internal audiences are the parent companies, while the 
external audiences can be divided into three groups, namely the public, the government 
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of Macao, and the Chinese Central Government (mainland China). Each group provides 
certain forms of political and social support through a better access to critical resources 
without which the gambling companies would not be so profitable. The following 
sections will discuss four aspects of organisational legitimacy through the lens of the 
legitimacy theory (Chapter 2). 
 
6.4.1.  Internal legitimacy from the parent company 
Macao’s gambling industry is mixed with international and domestic gambling 
companies. Those international companies are Multiple National Enterprises (MNEs), 
originating from the USA and Australia (Appendix 2), which seems to share CSR 
polices, practices and strategies from the parent companies. Thus, the legitimacy of the 
MNE subunit is the acceptance and the host country institutional environment (Kostova 
and Zaher, 1999, p. 65). Kostova and Zaheer (1999, p. 68) suggest that MNEs often face 
two institutional environments: “the internal environment of MNEs” and “the external 
host country environment”. However, the findings show that the internal pressure from 
parent company corporate culture are more significant than the external pressure from 
the government of Macao. 
 
The influence of parent company corporate culture in motivating CSR seemed to be a 
reason to engage in CSR of the subsidiary operated in Macao. This corporate culture 
can be regarded as an example of internal legitimacy, which refers to a unit adopting the 
organisational structures, policies and practices institutionalized within the MNEs 
(Kostova and Zaheer, 1999). This is essential for a subsidiary’s survival because of its 
dependence on the parent company for continuing access to resources, such as capital, 
knowledge and technology (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). This dependency was recognised 
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by more than a third of the internal stakeholders working at senior, middle and 
non-management levels at the international gambling companies and to a lesser extent 
in the Chinese gambling companies. In most cases, the subsidiaries of international 
gambling companies were according to parent companies’ CSR and RG polices, 
practices and guidelines. Two internal stakeholders believed that CSR of Macao’s 
subsidiary was profoundly influenced by parent company corporate culture. 
 
“Actually, we have implemented many diversity programmes in the US and attach 
importance to the community. The CEO in Macao also pays attention to the 
contribution to the society. On the first day, our company came here. We have 
many social activities that can help the society or our employees.” (Vice President, 
Company C, Translation) 
 
“The main reason is our company is from the US. In the US, our company is 
engaged in CSR.  So, they introduce this corporate culture to Macao and still 
have this CSR department.” (Coordinator, Company B, Translation) 
 
“I think that our company is from the US. … In the US, the parent company has 
RG polices … because American gambling companies encourage RG.” (Telephone 
Marketer, Company B, Translation)  
 
The international gambling companies seemed to follow largely the parent company 
standards or the Western standards (see Moon, 2002; Welford, 2004) and to transplant 
their CSR philosophy to the Macao context in which they operate their businesses 
(Kostova, 1997). However, in MNEs, internal legitimacy requirements can vary 
depending on each host country. One officer working at non-management level argued 
that the corporate culture relating to CSR in a subsidiary company in Macao was often 
not exactly the same as the US parent company’s. 
 
“We follow CSR from the parent company. When I first worked in this department, 
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staffs have been doing CSR for one year. We have engaged for a long time with our 
own standards, but it is not exactly the same as the parent company. Some western 
CSR can’t be implemented in Macao.” (Officer, Company B, Translation) 
 
More importantly, several academics, journalists, and counsellors questioned whether or 
not their parent companies could transfer their full CSR philosophy to their Macao 
subsidiaries. It is fair to suggest that there is inadequate community and government 
audit on CSR in Macao’s gambling industry. These views are similar to those of Vong’s 
(2010) study. However, the findings for Macao are entirely different from those of 
developed countries, such as Australia (The Productivity Commission, 1999), the US 
and the UK (see Smith, 2009), on providing a national review of the gambling industry. 
It seemed necessary to have an independent third party to provide an objective report to 
monitor, verify and evaluate CSR standards in Macao’s gambling industry. 
 
“The gambling industry is very good at CSR and it is better than other 
industries. … we can’t use local [low] standards to judge. … Macao doesn’t have 
any power to evaluate these companies. … Are they reaching the global standard 
or are they worse than the US? We don’t know.” (Journalist 3, Translation) 
 
“There are some international labelling activities. If they don’t have CSR, the 
international organisations boycott this company. We are in line with them and 
social service organisations to monitor this industry at a global level.” (Counsellor 
3, Translation) 
 
These findings show that international organisations operating in Macao appear to 
engage in efforts to reduce the legitimacy gap and to identify some symbols of social 
legitimacy, particularly by using CSR and RG philosophies from the parent company to 
continue access to resources, for example CSR and RG knowledge. These findings are 
in line with the idea of Kostova and Zaheer (1999), who suggest that internal legitimacy 
is important for a subsidiary in order to be able to depend on the parent company for 
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continuing access to resources, for example knowledge (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). 
Hence, the industry could possibly improve its survival chances and reduce the chance 
of opposition (see Bitektine, 2011).  
 
6.4.2   External legitimacy from the public 
External audiences can be divided into three main groups. First, the findings indicate 
that Macao’s gambling industry employed CSR as a means of gaining acceptance and 
support from the general public, thereby emphasising the complementary relationship 
between corporations and the community. Thus, the support of the local community can 
be viewed as an important source of legitimacy. This industry seemed to take a 
proactive CSR strategy, which can be regarded as preventing the public’s resistance to 
its dominance in Macao in order to increase the likelihood of acceptability or possibly 
reduced chances of opposition (Weaver, et al., 1999). These findings are consistent with 
those of Palazzo and Richter (2005) for the tobacco industry. This view was expressed 
by some of the internal stakeholders mostly working at middle and senior management 
levels in international gambling companies, and to a lesser extent by those who working 
in the Chinese gambling companies. 
 
“There is no telling the community how good I am. What I am demonstrating is 
engaging with the community.” (CEO, Company C) 
 
“Having a good relationship with the community is good for their businesses. Then, 
I think where we talk about education and labour pool. You know it is such a small 
labour pool in a small resort. We can improve anything. It will help us eventually.” 
(Manager, Company A) 
 
“I mean renewing [gambling] licenses. The gambling companies need to get 
Macao people to support because Macao people have [the right] to say indirectly 
how the government gives us [the gambling companies] to continue to operate the 
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gambling licenses.” (Manager, Company D) 
 
“First, minimising the harm (I think). I mean if the gambling industry is a new 
industry, we want the community to accept our company. So, we can’t harm the 
local residents.” (Officer, Company B, Translation) 
 
By contrast, some of the external stakeholders, two journalists, held a slightly different 
view on gaining acceptance and support from the general public. They suggested that 
Macao’s gambling industry attempts to promote itself as a normal industry and to 
portray itself as being a benefactor in Macao in order to enhance corporate acceptance 
or possibly reduce the chances of opposition. 
 
“They may be tempted to use [CSR] to promote themselves as a normal industry.” 
(Journalist 2) 
 
“Chinese [gambling companies] are now portraying themselves as benefactors in 
that sense. You know to promote the idea that they are involved in the 
community. … I have been talking to these PR [Public Relations] people. They all 
want to see themselves as community helpers and that they help their community. 
That is the general idea of all the casinos at this point.” (Journalists 4) 
 
Since the gambling companies operated in Macao in 2004, they will face the task of 
gaining legitimacy, which is termed the “liability of newness” (Ashforth and Gibbs, 
1990). The internal stakeholders tend to build a good relationship with the community 
and to demonstrate its CSR engagement to stakeholders through the good deeds that this 
industry has done for the local community, while two journalists highlighted that the 
motivation for engaging in CSR was to promote itself as a normal industry and a 
benefactor in Macao. The industry promotes CSR as favourable for its organisations, 
salient stakeholders and the society. It introduces the question of why the gambling 
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industry employs CSR. If this industry has a bad relationship with the public, this 
industry causes harm to the local community, which leads to the no longer trusting them. 
Such CSR engagement can be viewed as a window dressing for corporate externalities, 
with the intention to distort its inherent problems, notably in the form of gambling- and 
health-related issues. These findings are similar to those of Palazzo and Richter (2005) 
for the tobacco industry. Hence, the local community can possibly provide societal 
support in order to enlighten self-interest through a granting access to important 
resources, such as gambling licenses and employees. 
 
6.4.3   External legitimacy from the government of Macao 
Maintaining a good relationship with the government of Macao seemed to be an 
important source of legitimacy for the industry. The government of Macao could be 
regarded as an authority which establishes the regulations that control the way Macao’s 
gambling industry should behave (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Singh, et al., 1986; Baum 
and Oliver, 1991; Deephouse, 1996). More pertinently, the government can determine 
the conditions for the social licenses and constrain the industry’s activities to ensure to 
protect citizens’ rights (see Crane, et al., 2004). This industry has invested time and 
money in CSR, which might influence political decision-making. This was recognised 
by a quarter of the internal stakeholders working at all levels and an elaboration came 
from the international gambling companies. In particular, two managers and a journalist 
expressed the view that maintaining a good relationship with the government of Macao 
was viewed important in order to gain support from the government to ensure its 
survival and to gain supply of critical resources, namely increasing the imported labour 
quota, granting land for expansion and renewing gambling licenses in 2020 and 2022. 
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“… driven by the need to build up a good relationship with the government. … 
Keep the government happy. … If the government does not care about how much 
money we spend and how much we put into it. … If there is no sense in what we are 
doing, we have a bad relationship with the government.” (Manager, Company A) 
 
“Now, all of them have to do it [CSR] because we are competing with each other. 
We all want the government of Macao to help, like labour issues or getting a new 
place to develop in the Cotai area. … If they don’t engage in [CSR], when the time 
is to renew [their] licenses … If any conflict happens, the government may not help 
them because they perform badly [in CSR].” (Manager, Company D) 
 
“I think that they [the gambling companies] are very keen to have a good 
relationship with the government because obviously they want the government to 
renew their license and they want to expand their operation … they need more 
workers. … the government authorizes the quota for more workers.” (Journalist 4) 
 
With regard to labour issue, some internal stakeholders discussed the importance of 
gaining more resources by importing foreign labour, rather than local labour to ensure 
their existence and survival. The government of Macao regulates the amount of labour 
imported for the gambling industry in order to ensure the balance of the local job market. 
The gambling industry tended to justify for a shortage of English-speaking employees 
and experienced gambling employees. In Macao, nearly 30% of non-resident workers 
have been worked in middle or senior levels in the gambling and hospitality sectors 
(Appendix 2). Yet, the findings suggest that language differences could create 
communication problems, particularly misunderstandings between local employees and 
foreign supervisors. These findings are in line with those of Wan’s (2009) study. A 
director and a journalist highlighted the inequality issue of the local employees, who 
can’t speak English. These employees tended to work in the low-level jobs, due to 
Macao historical background and its previous economy structure. 
 
“The senior managers are from Hong Kong, Australia, America and they can 
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speak English. … We studied Portuguese before, but we speak Cantonese in our 
daily lives. We don’t speak English. … Many local residents can’t speak English so 
they can only work in low level jobs.” (Director, Company F, Translation) 
 
“A few hundred thousand people work in low level jobs. … But, many 50-year-old 
locals are still unemployed and they previously worked in a manufacturing industry. 
The gambling industry doesn’t need their skills and that leads to causing structural 
unemployment and having many social conflicts.” (Journalist 1, Translation) 
 
However, a manager asserted that local employees were lacking English speaking skills 
and knowledge of gambling management. This would affect the quality of its services. 
 
“They [the government of Macao] restrict [gambling] company quotes of foreign 
employees. There is a problem. A shortage of labour will affect the quality of our 
services. We don’t want to spend money on hiring these people [local citizens] 
because they lack skills.” (Manager, Company D) 
 
In comparison, a labour unionist revealed that a CEO in one of the gambling companies 
was a member of legislative assembly to encourage the government of Macao to employ 
more imported labour, rather than local labour. This perspective was from management 
level, rather than from non-management level. This industry could possibly use its 
political power to lobby the government to reduce the regulation on imported labour in 
order to obtain more resources. 
 
“The management always wants to hire imported labour. We disagree because the 
gambling industry doesn’t demand high qualifications and only needs junior or 
secondary education level. Many local people fulfil this requirement and salaries 
are higher than those in other industries. … Why doesn’t the industry hire local 
employees? The locals only work in low level jobs.” (Labour Union 1, Translation) 
 
In addition, some internal stakeholders revealed that it was expatriate, rather than local 
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employees that tended to get promotion opportunities to middle and upper management 
levels. Managerial vacancies are often filled by those who can communicate with 
foreign managers. These findings are consistent with those of Wan’s (2009) study, 
which found that the reward and promotion system are thought to be poor and unfair for 
employees in Macao’s gambling industry. This phenomena shows a conflict between 
CSR engagement in terms of job creation (Chapter 5 - Section 5.2.3) and provision of 
low-level jobs. If this industry fails to manage the employee inequality issue in its 
employees’ eyes, this issue may therefore pose a threat to the industry gaining an 
important source of imported labour from the government of Macao. 
 
“Local residents only work at low-levels, but the gambling industry fails to localise 
the jobs. … They don’t give local employees a chance to gain more promotions.” 
(Director, Company F, Translation) 
 
“A few local residents get promotion and work at management level. The gambling 
industry usually hires employees from Hong Kong and Malaysia. But, they don’t 
know how long they wait to get promotion. … Local residents don’t have the 
expertise in casino management.” (Technical Analyst, Company D, Translation) 
 
The government of Macao could be seen as an authority which establishes the gambling 
regulations that control the way Macao’s gambling industry should behave in Macao 
(Chapter 2). Organisations in Macao’s gambling industry attempted to build a good 
relationship with the government to gain an important source of legitimacy (Deephouse 
and Suchman, 2008) to ensure the supply of resources in order to ensure their survival. 
This industry with CSR can be considered being more legitimate partners for 
governments in the developing countries, such as Macao. The government can be 
viewed as an implicit institutional shareholder. This industry instrumentally manipulates 
CSR in order to gain political support to enlighten self-interest through a better access 
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to three main critical resources: imported labour, land and gambling licenses. First, they 
need to maintain a good relationship with the government as they attempted to gain 
more resources, particularly imported foreign labour (with English-speaking and 
experienced gambling employees), rather than local employees, who found it difficult to 
get promotions. The government controls the quota for imported labour in the gambling 
industry. Second, this industry seems to pursue CSR strategies as a means of winning 
the trust of the government of Macao so that this industry could grant more land to 
expand its gambling business operation in Macao. Third, this industry also employed 
CSR as a means of preparing to renew gambling licenses for its continued existence in 
2020 and 2022. This industry could conform to organisational legitimacy for the 
retention for its license to operate (see Deegan, 2002).  
 
6.4.4  External legitimacy from the Chinese central government 
Maintaining a good relationship with the Chinese Central government (mainland China) 
can be considered an important source of legitimacy. This was recognised by some of 
the external stakeholders. Historically, the government of Macao has had a close 
relationship with the Chinese government (Appendix 2). The Chinese government could 
be viewed as another authority, which establishes the regulation that allows the 
legalisation of Macao’s gambling industry (Appendix 2), and indirectly controls the way 
this industry should behave in Macao (see Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Singh, et al., 
1986; Baum and Oliver, 1991; Deephouse, 1996). One gambler asserted that the 
gambling industry heavily depends on policies set out by the Chinese government. 
Since nearly 90% of visitors come from mainland China (Appendix 2), maintaining a 
good relationship with the Chinese government could be viewed as gaining access to 
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critical resources (visitors) from mainland China through the “Free Travel Scheme106” 
policy to ensure the industry’s continued survival in Macao. 
 
“Some gambling companies made donations for natural disasters to Mainland 
China. The industry all depends on mainland China. … If the Chinese Central 
government cancelled the Free Travel Scheme Visas to Macao, they would lose 
major income.” (Gambler 2, Translation) 
 
An academic expressed the belief that Macao was a place to invest due to its economic 
structure. The international gambling companies appeared to build up a good 
relationship with the Chinese Central government in Macao in order to develop a 
gateway to invest in mainland China. 
 
“The foreign companies win the trust of the Chinese Central government 
(mainland China). Macao is their first place to invest. If they operate very well, 
they can invest in mainland China easily.” (Academic 3, Translation) 
 
The Chinese government could be regarded as another important authority. Thus, the 
gambling industry employed CSR to maintain a good relationship with the Chinese 
government in order to gain legitimacy to ensure its supply of critical resources, 
particularly Chinese visitors (customers), to improve the likelihood of survival. These 
findings are in line with Deephouse and Suchman’s (2008) view, which suggest that the 
authority can be viewed as a major source of legitimacy (Chapter 2). Without a base of 
these important customers, neither gaming income nor profits are possible. More 
pertinently, Macao is the only place in mainland China where it is legal to gamble in 
                                                     
106
 Macao’s gambling industry has launched a decisive policy called the “Free Travel Scheme” (FTS) to 
permit Chinese visitors to come to Macao since 2003 (Gu and Tam, 2011) (see Appendix 2). This scheme 
allows mainland residents to visit Macao and Hong Kong on an individual basis rather than a tour group 
basis (Vong, 2010).  
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casinos (Vong, 2004; BBC, 2009; MarketLine, 2013c), while in mainland China it is 
limited in a form of a national lottery (Appendix 2). In addition, Chinese people appear 
to show higher participation rates towards gambling than the Caucasians mainly due to 
the Chinese culture, historical background and tradition (Raylu and Oei, 2004; Lau and 
Ranyard, 2005; Papineau, 2005; Chapter 1).  
 
6.5 Concluding remarks 
Organisations in Macao’s gambling industry have been facing an ongoing threat to its 
legitimacy as the negatively perceived links between gambling addiction and 
health-related issues are established (Chapter 2). These organisations may endeavour to 
minimise the legitimacy gap through identifying CSR as a symbol to enhance social 
legitimacy. 
 
According to findings (Chapter 6), these organisations employ CSR as a part of the 
business case, namely to improve corporate image and reputation, gaining competitive 
advantage, and cost reduction. These findings are consistent with the previous CSR 
literature, which advocates CSR as a win-win scenario (Chapter 2). However, these 
organisations’ motivation for CSR engagement was often viewed as self-interest 
rationales. It is suspected to blur their agenda of a business-as-usual. The industry will 
not often engage in CSR unless it meets its profitability criteria (Banerjee, 2008).  
 
The motivation for CSR engagement remains questionable that whether or not 
organisations in the gambling industry are entirely engaging in CSR. However, these 
organisations seem to engage “symbolically”, rather than “substantively” in CSR 
initiatives. The findings indicate that these organisations could employ CSR to achieve 
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legitimacy by managing stakeholders in three main aspects: first, changing stakeholders’ 
perception by balancing the perceived negative social impact of the industry against a 
positive CSR engagement in Macao; second, educating, influencing and shaping 
stakeholders’ perception through reiterating past CSR achievement by different forms of 
media; and third, distracting the public’s attention away from the perceived negative 
impact of the industry towards a positive impact of the industry on the local community, 
while drawing attention to the positive impact of the industry. This thus in turn changes 
the public’s attitude towards the industry, giving the public a far more positive 
impression. These examinations are based upon three aspects of Lindblom’s framework 
(1993). These findings are in line with those of the legitimacy theory (Chapter 2). 
Macao’s gambling industry instrumentalise, manipulates and deploys symbolic CSR, 
rather than involving real change in organisational practices concerning gambling- and 
health-related issues (Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990). These strategies would appear to have 
succeeded, at least to the extent that Macao’s gambling industry is not highly regulated, 
scrutinised or evaluated by the government of Macao, and thus the industry continues to 
survive. These findings pose a challenge to the extant institutional legitimacy literature 
at regional level (Chapter 2). 
 
More importantly, organisations in the gambling industry wish to appear “legitimate” to 
two major audiences. First, internal audiences are the parent company. Second, external 
audiences are mainly from the local community, the government of Macao and the 
Chinese government. Each audience can provide certain forms of political and societal 
support in order to enhance economic interests through a better access to critical 
resources, namely CSR knowledge from parent company, public acceptance, gambling 
licenses, imported labour, land, and customers. The industry can seek legitimacy with 
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CSR engagement that could improve the likelihood of its survival and continuity (see 
Reast, et al., 2012).  
 
Chapter 7 reports the semi-structured interview findings based on the emerging themes, 
RG, a subset of CSR, while discussing the concept of CSR in Chapter 5 – Section 5.3.1 
examines how Macao’s gambling industry attempts to minimise the legitimacy gap 
through employing RG programmes as a symbol of social legitimacy. It covers six main 
sections, including background of RG, introduction of the chapter, discussion of RG, 
RG as a symbolic commitment, sources of legitimacy and a concluding remark. 
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Chapter 7 
Motivation for Engaging in Responsible Gambling in Macao’s Gambling Industry 
 
7.1 Introduction of this chapter 
Chapter 7 lends further weight to the argument from Chapter 6. This chapter examines 
interview findings in relation to Responsible Gambling (RG), a subset of CSR, which is 
consistent with the CSR literature concerning consumers’ perspectives (Section 7.2.1). 
Several RG studies have examined and been limited to employees’ perspectives 
(Chapter 2). The thesis attempts to explore a wider stakeholder perspective on RG. 
Additionally, the vast majority of the interviewees tended to emphasise and elaborate on 
this topic in most of the interviews (Chapter 5). Hence, RG appeared to be a substantial 
concept in Macao’s gambling industry so RG will be investigated in more depth in the 
chapter. Semi-structured interviews (Chapter 3) were used in this thesis to examine the 
third research question. Why does the gambling industry engage in Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) (and Responsible Gambling)? This question is qualitative in 
nature and was explored in the interviews with 30 internal stakeholders and 19 external 
stakeholders of Macao’s gambling industry.  
 
The findings in this chapter concentrate on the motivation for Macao’s gambling 
industry’s RG engagement. There are three main findings in this chapter. First, the 
concept of RG seems to be obscure, but organisations in Macao’s gambling industry 
take advantage of RG ambiguity for their own interest. Thus, RG could be viewed as a 
sustainable development tool to enlighten self-interest as the industry wishes its 
customers to play a number of games, rather than one game. This view introduces the 
question of why internal stakeholders working at senior management level and a leading 
239 
 
RG academic recognised no apparent conflict between the pursuit of economic interest 
and the promotion of RG amongst the public, while external stakeholders tended to 
recognise this conflict. These findings are in line with prior CSR (RG) literature, which 
advocates CSR (RG) as an economic initiative, rather than an ethical one (Chapter 2). 
Second, this industry employs RG as a means of managing stakeholders by changing 
their perception: this is achieved by highlighting the individual responsibility, educating 
them about its intention to improve social performance, and distracting their attention 
from gambling problems to customer protection to employee protection. RG, in this 
context, is actually to promote the interest of the industry, rather than the interest of 
customers. RG has no real meaning in practice; however, RG remains symbolically 
important. Third, they appear legitimate to the major external audiences, namely the 
University of Macao, the public, the government of Macao and the Chinese government. 
Each group can provide certain forms of political and social support through granting 
greater access to critical resources, namely creditability, acceptance, gambling licenses, 
labour, land and customers, to ensure the industry’s survival. 
 
The chapter is divided into six sections. After an introduction, the second section 
outlines a general background of RG. The third section examines the concept of RG. 
The fourth section investigates how organisations in Macao’s gambling industry employ 
RG as a symbolic commitment to managing stakeholders and follow by how these 
organisations seek different sources of legitimacy. Finally, a concluding remark is made 
at the end of the chapter. 
 
7.2 Background of Responsible Gambling (RG) 
Gambling operators may be criticised for exploiting the general public (Hing and 
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McMillen, 2002) because the social consequences of gambling, such as gambling 
addiction, health-related issues and social disruption can be harmful (Chapter 1). 
Furthermore, stakeholders tend to put pressure on gambling operators to apply ethical 
concerns in order to avoid possible gambling problems (Hing, 2001). Consequently, 
CSR in the gambling industry has gradually received more attention from gambling 
providers, the public, regulators, and researchers. Gambling operators, thus, adopt some 
“responsible gambling” (RG) initiatives (Hing and McMillen, 2002) and comply with a 
variety of socially-responsible practices, for example providing counsel to problem 
gamblers by implementing precautionary and curative approaches (Miers, 2008). They 
can thus be considered to behave in a socially responsible manner (Lee and Park, 2009). 
RG can be viewed as a subset of CSR and as an important concept in the gambling 
industry. RG has been widely discussed in psychology, medicine and gambling studies.  
 
7.2.1 Definition of responsible gambling (RG) 
Due to government and public pressures, RG was initiated using industry-based 
voluntary codes of practice (Blaszczynski, et al., 2011). Blaszczynski, et al. (2004, p. 
308) define RG as “policies and practices designed to prevent and reduce potential 
harms associated with gambling; these policies and practices often incorporate a diverse 
range of interventions designed to promote consumer protection, community/consumer 
awareness and education, and access to efficacious treatment”. The purpose of RG is to 
minimise gambling problem through consumer protection mechanisms, including 
awareness, education, harm minimisation techniques, and treatment (Dickerson, 2003). 
The generic term of RG incorporates concepts of customer protection, harm 
minimisation and harm reduction (Blaszczynski, et al., 2011). Furthermore, 
Blaszczynski, et al. (2004, p. 302) developed the US-based Reno Model of RG. This 
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model provides a “blueprint for action, to advance and coordinate strategies to limit 
gambling related problems”. Yet, this RG model is based on seven stated assumptions107. 
These assumptions are largely based on “business as usual” and “win-win” contexts. 
This is similar to the business case for CSR, that is corporations can both perform well 
in financial terms and be responsible to society (Kurucz, et al., 2008).  
 
This Reno Model comprises five key stakeholders: consumers, gambling operators, 
health services and other welfare providers, interested community and government 
(Blaszczynski, et al., 2004). RG appears to incorporate the concept of consumers and 
stakeholders. Stakeholders in the concept of CSR are similar to stakeholders in the 
concept of RG. This concept can be viewed as a subset of the wider field of CSR, 
concerned with how the gambling operators manage their social impacts (Hing, 2003).  
 
In Australia, parts of Europe and Canada, public health approaches appear to be 
committed to problem prevention and harm reduction, in form of informed choice and 
responsible play (Reith, 2007). Gambling operators operating in Canada, the US and 
Europe tend to implement employee education, awareness and assistance (Giroux, et al., 
2008). RG in North America represents a microcosm of what has been developing in the 
gambling industry worldwide. Eadington (2003) suggests a four-stage
108
 model to 
                                                     
107
 The Reno Model developed by Blaszczynski, et al. (2004, p. 309) is based on seven stated 
assumptions: (1) Gambling provides a level of recreational, social and economic benefits to individuals 
and the community; (2) a portion of participants, family members and others can suffer significant harm 
as a result of excessive gambling; (3) Scientific research can and should guide gambling harm reduction 
strategies; (4) safe levels of gambling participation are possible; (5) the total societal benefits of gambling 
must exceed the social cost; (6) Abstinence is viable and important, but not necessarily essential, goal for 
individuals with gambling-related problems; (7) for some gamblers who have developed gambling-related 
problems, controlled participation and a return to safe levels of play may be achievable goals.  
108
 This model is divided into four stages: (1) both government and the gambling industry denial and 
inaction; (2) lip service committed by government and the gambling industry; (3) a partial commitment 
by government and the gambling industry in response to RG (Eadington, 2003 cited in Smith, 2009). The 
final stage refers to unconditional acceptance and fully implementation of RG measures to minimise 
gambling related harms by government and the gambling industry (Eadington, 2003 cited in Smith, 
2009). 
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evaluate the commitment to RG (Eadington, 2003 cited in Smith, 2009).  
 
7.2.2 Critics of responsible gambling (RG) 
RG can be considered an important social issue for gambling operators; however, there 
are two general criticisms of applying RG. First, there is a lack of empirical evidence to 
show general consensus about the effectiveness and efficacy of RG programmes to 
prevent incidence or reduce gambling-related harms (Blaszczynski, et al., 2011). There 
have been only three scientific evaluations of the effectiveness of RG programmes in 
reducing harm to patrons; two studies were conducted in Canada (Ladouceur, et al., 2004; 
Giroux, et al., 2008) and another study was conducted in the US (LaPlante, et al., 2011).  
 
Second, the scope of RG seems to highlight the responsibility of the individual player, 
rather than the gambling operator or the state, which links to wider ideologies of 
neo-liberalism and emphasises individual freedom and choice (Reith, 2007) and human 
right policies (Blaszczynski, et al., 2004). Within the context of civil liberties, gambling 
companies cannot remove an individual’s right to make a decision so that individuals 
must be informed of the risk (Blaszczynski, et al., 2004). The emphasis appears to 
concentrate on gamblers’ responsibility to receive information, regulate their behaviours, 
and make the right decision, thus limiting how long and how much they play (Reith, 
2007). The notion of RG implies that anyone can be at risk and become a problem 
gambler (Cosgrave, 2010). Delfabbro and King (2012, p. 1553) state that policy reforms 
are limited by a “business as usual” discourse which holds a view that “problem 
gambling represents only a small minority of total gamblers, is attributable largely to 
individual behaviour and is unlikely to be influenced by the nature of the products 
themselves”. In the American literature, there is a tendency to view “problem gambling” 
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as an individual and psychological disorder, rather than a public health issue (Hing and 
McMillen, 2002). 
 
This problem does not imply gambling operators who have no responsibility to protect 
individuals. RG is generally referred to gambling operators to seek reducing harm 
(Dickerson, 1998 cited in Breen, et al., 2005). They have the responsibility to ensure that 
they do not make misleading claims, omit relevant information, develop products 
designed to foster excessive gambling, or target inappropriate subpopulations 
(Blaszczybski, et al., 2011, p. 4). RG engagement can be regarded as incompatible with 
economic objectives (Soriano, et al., 2012). Gambling companies provide RG ostensibly 
to help customers to be more responsible in their playing, which might increase 
customers’ trust in the gambling companies (Griffiths, et al., 2009). However, the 
gambling industry may do this to shift the public’s attention away from the need to 
assist problem gamblers to corporate philanthropy (Hing and McMillen, 2002). From 
the purest liberation grounds, the state should not try to prevent or discourage 
individuals from gambling as they wish (Collins, 2003). Yet, the determinant of 
participating in certain activities, for example gambling participation, is based on 
individual decision. By far the most important argument is made for the gambling 
industry. This argument is similar to that of the tobacco industry (Pava and Krausz, 
1997). Having said that, individuals can bear the responsibility for understanding the 
nature of gambling and potential risks associated with gambling
109
. 
 
Since the political economy of gambling has been increasingly deregulated, which in 
turn led to the expansion of commercial gambling in the 1980s, this industry has had 
                                                     
109
 However, individuals appear to find psychological, social, and cultural factors preventing them from 
seeking help (Hing and Nuske, 2011b). Pride, shame, and denial are the common barriers to help-seeking 
gamblers and non-help-seeking gamblers (Pulford, et al., 2009). 
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greater freedom. The obligation of gambling participation is widely based on both 
individual and corporate responsibility (Reith, 2007). Gamblers are regarded as rational 
consumers; whereas, the industry as the leisure provider, is a legitimated organisation in 
society. Blaszczynski, et al. (2004) use the Australian Productivity Commission’s report 
(1999, p. 16-45) to suggest that the government “specify in statue a duty of care by 
gambling providers that they take all reasonable and practical steps to protect their 
customers from gambling problems”. For example, gambling operators can possibly 
discourage vulnerable individuals from playing excessively in order to prevent from 
them losing when they cannot afford to play. Thus, governments play a vital role in 
taking responsibility for imposing legislation to determine the nature, extent and location 
of gambling, to maximise consumer protection and to monitor gambling operators 
(Blaszczybski, et al., 2011). The responsibility for minimising the harm arising from 
“problem gambling” by incorporating adequate consumer protection measures into 
gambling operations lies with governments and gambling operators, rather than with 
individual gamblers (Hing and McMillen, 2002). Thus, the responsibility for RG has 
been widely debated. RG appears to be complex and ambiguous. The extent of the duty 
held by governments, gambling companies or players is yet to be determined. 
 
7.2.3 Introduction of RG initiatives in legalised gambling countries 
RG has primarily focused on the problem gamblers. Some studies have shown that 
problem gamblers contribute around one-third of revenue from all types of gambling 
(The Productivity Commission, 1999; Williams and Wood, 2004). More importantly, 
roughly 2% of adults in the general population are considered pathological gamblers 
(Blaszczynski, et al., 2011; LaPlante, et al., 2011). Nevertheless, the mandatory and 
voluntary codes of RG vary greatly across countries, and even between gambling venues 
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within one country. RG initiatives involve different degrees of coercion and voluntary 
action (Hancock, et al., 2008). Even though many jurisdictions in the gambling industry 
around the world mandate the completion of RG training (The American Gaming 
Association, 2008), RG does not have one established norm for its implementation. 
Undoubtedly, the RG initiatives over the last two decades have been adopted mostly in 
developed countries, notably, Canada, the US, Australia, New Zealand, and the UK 
(Appendix 3). RG appears to regulate in local, rather than international, authorities. 
 
Legislation and voluntary codes of RG practice have been established to improve social 
responsibility in relation to gambling in various countries. Yet, the legislation and code 
vary greatly from country to country and so there is no one established form (Hing and 
Mackellar, 2004). Importantly, Blaszczynski, et al., (2004) argue that the promotion of 
RG faces other major difficulties, namely an unclear conceptualisation, different 
constructs of problem gamblers and no common framework of RG
110
.  
 
7.3 Responsible gambling (RG) 
Macao’s gambling industry employed RG as a means of managing stakeholders in order 
to enhance economic interest. The findings suggest that this industry tended to employ 
RG as a symbolic commitment in order to improve its social performance, particularly 
in relation to customers. However, RG could arguably be viewed as a profit-making tool 
to improve economic performance. 
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 First, these is a lack of conceptual clarity regarding the parameters of gambling-related harms and 
inconsistency in the definition of RG (Blaszczynski, et al., 2004). Second, how scientists measure 
gambling-related harms because public policy makers, gambling operators and clinicians have different 
perceptions of the construct of problem gamblers (Blaszczynski, et al., 2004). Consistent terminology 
needs to be developed that places gamblers into such categories as problem, compulsive, neurotic, 
excessive, and pathological gamblers (Blaszczynski, et al., 2004). Third, it is apparent that there is no 
common framework for identifying RG guidelines and there is no clear definition of either RG practices 
or a code of conduct (Blaszczynski, et al., 2004).  
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7.3.1  The contested concept of responsible gambling  
First and foremost, the term “Responsible Gambling” (RG) could be understood in 
different ways, thus Macao’s gambling industry tended to adopt a respectable 
euphemism. RG has been implemented in different gambling developed countries, for 
example Australia, Canada, and the US (Hing, 2001; 2003; Hing and Nuske, 2011a; b; 
Giroux, et al., 2008; LaPlante, et al., 2011); however, RG is relatively new in Asian 
countries, where there is relatively little literature subject (Chapter 2). These findings 
suggest that RG in Macao appeared to be a common practice in the gambling industry, 
and was “borrowed” from western countries. Taking some quotes from the findings as 
examples, “We had RG experience in the US” (Vice President, Company C, Translation) 
and “the US parent company has RG policies” (Officer, Company B, Translation). 
According to the responses from several internal stakeholders at senior, middle and 
junior management level, RG was recognised as a new concept in both the Chinese and 
the international gambling companies and they appeared keen to defend the obviously 
limited recognition of RG. 
 
“After the opening of gambling companies, this market is infant. Western gambling 
companies bring new concepts, particularly responsible gambling. … We need 
some time to understand this concept.” (Director, Company E, Translation) 
  
“RG is a new concept for local residents, visitors and employees. There is a 
cognitive gap.” (Officer, Company B, Translation) 
 
While another external stakeholder also claimed that: 
 
“Macao doesn’t have international experience of RG. The concept of RG 
originated in western countries.” (Counsellor 3, Translation) 
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It is not only internal stakeholders who alluded to having difficulty in understanding RG, 
but some external stakeholders were also particularly keen to emphasise the difficulty in 
promoting the concept of RG to the general public. There is a lack of problem gambling 
prevention, counselling and treatment centres in most Chinese societies (Tang, et al., 
2007). In Macao, there were no such centres until 2004 (Fong, et al., 2011). A 
counsellor noted that Macao’s gambling industry has been legal for over 150 years, 
while RG was introduced in 2009. Thus, the culture of gambling in Macao seemed to be 
stronger than the new culture of RG that has been promoted in recent years. 
 
“Perhaps, the whole community doesn’t have a concept of what RG is. … Macao 
has a long history of gambling for a few hundred years, not for few decades. The 
gambling culture is very strong. But, gambling addiction prevention is quite 
new.”(Counsellor 3, Translation) 
 
A RG academic highlighted that RG was designed to develop prevention or harm 
minimisation of gambling problem, rather than as a treatment for that problem. 
 
“The aim of RG is to prevent citizens from having additional gambling problem 
cases. RG is for prevention, but not for treatment. We hope that the promotion of 
RG may reduce the number of problem gamblers to a minimum level.” (Academic 
1, Translation) 
 
He further explained the difficulty in promoting the concept of RG to the general public. 
Any promotion of RG may be associated with the promotion of gambling activities. 
 
“Responsible Gambling has been promoted for 2 years [in 2009]. We overcame a 
number of difficulties. Some people believed that the promotion of responsible 
gambling was the promotion of gambling. … Actually, I didn’t agree. It is the same 
as the promotion of anti-smoking and responsible driving.” (Academic 1, 
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Translation) 
 
Nevertheless, a minority of the external stakeholders were sceptical about the concept of 
“Responsible Gambling111”. Responsible Gambling was often known as responsible 
gaming or rational gaming – which is a respectable euphemism increasingly used by the 
gambling industry. This view is similar to those of Reith (2007), which states that 
gaming is associated with its connotation of play and leisure, rather than financial loss. 
The difference between “responsible gambling” and “rational gambling” tends to relate 
to the classification of customers. The customers can be divided into four types: 
“non-gamblers”, “leisure gamblers”, “problem gamblers” and “pathological gamblers”. 
Responsible gambling refers to people who have been involved in gambling experiences, 
while rational gambling refers to people who are not involved in gambling activities.  
 
“‘Rational gambling’ is for local residents who are not involved in gambling 
activities. … Responsible Gambling is not going beyond self-limit. ‘Rational 
Gambling’ means gamblers think about it carefully. Gamblers know what they 
are doing and think about the consequences of gambling.” (Counsellor 4, 
Translation) 
 
“I think that the concept of Responsible Gambling is fine, but gamblers feel 
uncomfortable to be reminded of their own responsibility because the notion of 
gambling is irresponsible behaviour. Others called Responsible Gambling as 
‘Rational Gambling, which means not to gamble. … but it is difficult to get the 
social acceptance of RG.” (Academic 1, Translation) 
 
The findings indicate that RG is a relatively new concept in Macao; therefore, the 
government of Macao still has a few lessons to learn from Asian countries regarding RG 
polices (The Institute for the Study of Commercial Gaming, 2009). Historically, the 
                                                     
111
 The word “gambling” refers to its connotations of financial loss, whereas, the word “gaming” refers to 
its connotation of play and leisure (Reith, 2007).  
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term RG originated from industry, and a generic form of RG incorporates concepts of 
customer protection, harm minimisation and harm reduction (Blaszczynski, et al., 2011). 
However, the findings suggest that the term “Responsible Gambling” could be 
understood in a different way and is often known as “Responsible Gaming” or “Rational 
Gaming”, which is a respectable euphemism gradually employed by Macao’s gambling 
industry. The findings suggest that the concept of RG tends to be obscure and lacks a 
clear and precise definition. More importantly, the RG model is broadly based on one of 
the stated assumptions that “the total societal benefits of gambling must exceed the 
social cost” (Blaszczynski, et al., 2004, p. 309). Thus, the industry is likely to take 
advantage of this new concept of RG for its own and best interests. In other words, it 
could be argued that the industry’s RG adoption could fail to act in their stakeholders’ 
best interest, particularly problem gamblers within the society. 
 
7.3.2.  No apparent business conflict 
It was striking that in discussing the conflict between the pursuit of economic interest 
and the promotion of RG amongst the public, some internal stakeholders working at the 
senior management level recognised no apparent conflict in Macao’s gambling industry. 
These views reflected a belief that economic interest was likely to be compatible with 
RG. In their views, this industry took a proactive approach to admitting, rather than 
denying the negative consequences of gambling to the society. A CEO explained that: 
 
“I don't see that it is a conflict. … I think that the key issue is openness. Basically, 
the notion of the conflict is basically denial. It [The notion of conflict] says I am 
going to the gambling industry, therefore, I will think about the negative 
consequences. … It is not the conflict. It is a question of how to manage 
that.”(CEO, Company C) 
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However, this industry employed RG as a symbolic commitment to show its intention of 
expressing its concern for customers. The industry seemed to highlight the individual 
responsibility. The discourse was used to shift the responsibility for problem gamblers 
away from the industry. The industry attempted to seek alternative justifications to 
ensure its survival. An executive vice president expressed her belief that her job was to 
increase customer awareness of the danger of the gambling. 
 
“I think that it is not the gambling industry [that is] irresponsible. I believe it is 
individual awareness. So therefore, the job of a gaming company is to make 
individuals aware of their responsibility.” (Executive Vice President, Company D) 
 
A leading academic in RG and one government officer also agreed with the previous 
viewpoint. RG polices are not necessarily discerned to have a conflict of interests, since 
RG policies have been employed since 2009. RG was deemed as a means of promoting 
a healthy gambling business in Macao; however, it can be argued that RG was a 
symbolic commitment to tackling gambling problem and continue to operate business as 
usual. The government of Macao is heavily dependent on this industry so there was 
little incentive to the regulatory authorities to impose so much pressure on this industry. 
 
“Gambling operators may think that RG is in conflict with their interests from the 
beginning. In other words, RG may reduce gambling profits. But, nowadays, the 
evidence shows that there has been no adverse relationship between profit and 
responsible gambling. Therefore, they don’t have this weird idea.” (Academic 1, 
Translation) 
 
“We want to promote gambling as a positive thing because gambling is viewed 
negatively. If they earn more profit, they are happy. From the government’s 
perspective, we hope that they are running a healthy business, contributing to 
society and making profit.” (Government official 2, Translation) 
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In stark contrast, RG engagement could be seen as incompatible with economic 
objectives. These findings are similar to those of Soriano, et al. (2012) for the online 
gambling industry. This conflict seemed to show that the underlying nature of gambling 
companies is to make profit. This view was mostly recognised by a third of the external 
stakeholders and a few internal stakeholders working at junior management levels. 
 
“I think that it is difficult for the gamblers to be responsible in an absolute term. If 
I think about it, is it [contradicting], right? … I can understand the business. You 
know I think that it is a private company. The objective is to make money from 
gaming.” (Journalist 4) 
 
“If they don’t promote RG obviously and directly, it is ‘casting pearls before swine’. 
It is difficult to educate customers not to gamble. It is a conflict with their interests.” 
(Academic 2, Translation) 
 
“If our company employs a RG policy, everyone [customers] is reminded of the 
importance of a time limit. Can customers play for just an hour? … This policy 
may reduce the harm of gambling problem. It contradicts our business operation.” 
(Supervisor, Company C, Translation) 
 
These findings suggest that Macao’s gambling industry seemed to promote RG, which 
may lead to a business conflict. This introduces the question of why external and 
internal stakeholders, who worked at junior management level, suggested a conflict of 
interest, while senior managers, a government officer and a RG academic suggested that 
there was no conflict of interest. Customers are often considered the main source of 
gambling income. It is evident that VIP rooms account for over 60% of the revenue of 
Macao’s gambling industry, while the mass market accounts for over 50% of the profits 
(The Economist, 2013). However, a number of RG polices seem to assist customers to 
stop playing if they have any symptoms of gambling problem. Such customer RG 
polices seemed to contradict the gambling companies. Macao’s gambling industry has 
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employed a RG policy since 2009 and been involved in RG discourse; however, the 
terms of RG engagement were transformed. RG could arguably be seen as a symbolic 
commitment of gambling companies to tackle the gambling problem in order develop a 
safe and healthy gambling industry (Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990); however, the industry 
continued to operate its business as usual. It could be argued that real commitment to 
RG was a wrong approach, and it would not reduce the number of problem gamblers or 
minimise social impacts. 
 
7.3.3  Improved economic performance 
The motivation for Macao’s gambling industry to employ RG was often viewed as 
self-interest driven. RG could be viewed as a sustainable development tool to improve 
financial performance and perhaps ironically contribute to the long-term economic 
development in the industry. It seemed fair to suggest this industry manipulated RG to 
ensure that it presents a concern for customers; however, this industry wants customers 
to come back to play repeated games, rather than lose a large amount of money at one 
game. This view was expressed by a few internal stakeholders working at junior and 
middle management levels in Chinese and international gambling companies. 
 
“We want customers to lose some money. If we let them know the importance of 
Responsible Gambling, our company can make more profit. They come back to 
play next time rather than lose a million dollars at once.” (Supervisor, Company D, 
Translation) 
 
 
“If our company doesn’t attach importance to Responsible Gambling, our 
customers lose all their money at once. Under these conditions, it is only a 
one-time game, not a repeat game. So, this isn’t good for the long-term 
development.” (Supervisor, Company E, Translation) 
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A government official agreed with the internal stakeholders’ views. The government of 
Macao tended to persuade the gambling industry to employ RG, thus in turn to improve 
financial performance. Otherwise, the industry might show a great reluctance to RG. 
This persuasion revealed that the government of Macao was heavily dependent on this 
industry. 
“A RG guideline is a basic procedure to improve their [the gambling company’s] 
performance. … We use this attitude to push the gambling operators to promote 
RG.” (Academic 2, Translation) 
RG seemed to improve the gambling companies’ performance concerning their 
relationship with employees, thus enhancing mutual employer and employee benefits. 
The important issue was to prevent employees from getting addicted to gambling. 
Hence, RG was limited to a “win-win” situation by having responsibilities towards 
employees and by increasing financial performance. A manager expressed this idea: 
 
“I think that RG is mutually benefit and what I talked about before is one aspects 
of CSR. … If one person has a gambling problem, it will affect their families and 
colleagues. If you [employees] have gambling problems, you [employees] will ask 
your colleagues to lend you money and this will create a lot of conflict. It will bring 
about bad performance of the operation.” (Manager, Company D) 
These findings suggest that RG was viewed as a means of enhancing profitability, which 
is similar to the critics of CSR (Friedman, 1970). Macao’s gambling industry are under 
the institution of capitalism, which follows the financial initiative (Gray and Milne, 
2004; Carroll, et al., 2012). These findings lend weight to Chapter 6 – Section 6.2.4. RG 
could arguably be seen as a symbolic commitment of Macao’s gambling industry to 
improving its social performance, particularly in relation to customers; however, this 
industry actually employed RG as a sustainable development tool, perhaps ironically, to 
improve economic performance in the long term. This phenomenon becomes more 
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explicit with the understanding of this industry’s intention to let customers play repeated 
games, rather than one game. The industry is seen to engage in RG initiatives, while 
doing so has little real effect on customer protection. Yet, RG remains symbolically 
important in the business operation (Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990). The industry continues 
to pursue economic self-interest without changing the structure of capitalism. 
 
7.4  Responsible gambling as a symbolic commitment 
7.4.1  Changing the notion of responsibility 
Macao’s gambling industry employed RG as a means of changing stakeholders’ 
perception, by highlighting the individuals’ responsibility. The discourse of 
responsibility used to place more emphasis on gamblers’ responsibility for their 
gambling than on gambling operators’ responsibility. The determinant of gambling 
participation and treatment are highly associated with the ideology of neo-liberalism 
(Blaszczynski, et al., 2004; Reith, 2007) (Section 7.2.2). RG programmes seemed to 
place greater emphasis on the modification of an individual’s gambling behaviour, 
rather than that of Macao’s gambling industry itself. Importantly, the gamblers’ 
responsibility for managing their own gambling behaviour was recognised by most of 
the internal stakeholders at all management levels, in both Chinese and international 
gambling companies. 
 
“Actually, we can’t actively help customers. It really depends on customers. … We 
can’t make the first move to help customers. When customers are at the gaming 
table, we let them continue to gamble.” (Supervisor, Company E, Translation) 
 
“It is very difficult for gamblers not to gamble. Gambling operators are very 
passive and put the RG leaflets on site. Gamblers read the RG leaflets if they 
realise they have problems.” (Casino Accountant, Company B, Translation) 
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Thus, this industry tended to have its passive approach and provide a few possible RG 
practices to its customers. Any form of RG practices would normally meet the minimum 
requirement as proposed by the University of Macao, particular employee education and 
awareness programmes. 
 
“Our company is open for business, but we can’t stop customers from playing. … 
For example, we train our employees in customer service to ask customers to stop 
playing, but our company doesn’t encourage doing us to do so.” (Senior manager, 
Company D, Translation) 
 
By contrast, a third of external stakeholders speculated that the gambling operators 
could take some responsibility for protecting individual gamblers. The insufficiency of 
customer services was considered a serious issue. This theme tended to be divided into 
two aspects. First, an insufficient number of personnel provided to support customers. 
Gambling companies in developed countries tended to have independent gambling 
coordinators and counsellors, rather than employees at the gambling sites to help 
customers (Hing and Nuske, 2011b). Second, insufficient physical customers support in 
the environment by the gambling operators was recognised by the external stakeholders. 
Macao’s casinos employ a “Vegas-style” design, with a lack of windows, clocks, natural 
day light, but with bright colourful light and the sounds of winning (Hing, 2004; 
Williams, et al., 2007; The Independent, 2012). Several external stakeholders explained 
that examples of this type of physical support are needed, including rest rooms, clocks, 
and warnings about the potential risks of gambling, which give customers informed 
choices
112
 should be provided. 
 
                                                     
112
 Informed choice is a fundamental principle of human right policies (Blaszczynski, et al., 2004). 
Informed choice is designed to ensure that ‘individuals will retain the ability to decide whether and how 
they intend to gamble by providing them with information that is accurate and not misleading’ 
((Blaszczynski, et al., 2004, p. 312). 
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“If customers are sick or uncomfortable, gambling coordinators and counsellors 
take customers to a rest room. Gambling companies in Las Vegas provide this 
service for customers and Macao should do the same.” (Academic 4, Translation) 
 
“Casinos are high risk areas. … Gambling operators provide gambling places and 
resting areas for customers. … If customers have problems, gambling operators 
have responsibilities to help customers.” (Counsellor 3, Translation) 
 
“Casinos should have clocks and daylight [more windows] so that customers can 
know what time it is. These are some aspects of RG.” (Government official 3, 
Translation) 
 
“They generally hide away RG information in quiet areas and we need to search 
for this. Actually, customers’ informed choice is not enough and there is a lack of 
information regarding the probability of winning.” (Counsellor 2, Translation) 
 
Macao’s gambling industry employs RG as a means of changing stakeholders’ 
perception by highlighting their individual responsibility (Reith, 2007). These findings 
are in line with the views of Lindblom’s (1993) as expressed in point two. These 
findings indicate that this industry employing RG could reach strategic objectives by 
placing emphasis on individual gamblers’ responsibility for their gambling, rather than 
the gambling operators’ responsibility. This change of emphasis introduces the question 
of why internal stakeholders recognised as individual responsibility, whereas external 
stakeholders recognised as gambler operators’ responsibility. Wider ideologies of 
neo-liberalism, individual freedom, and choice can convince the public that the 
determinant of gambling participation and gambling treatment is individual’s choice and 
economic rationalism. This highly encourages a “right to gamble” argument. The 
gambling industry does not and cannot cause harm. Gamblers choose to play, and thus 
gamblers voluntarily choose to accept the risks of gambling. This assumption of the 
gambling industry is similar to that of Pava and Krausz (1997) and Moerman and Van 
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Der Lann (2005) for the tobacco industry. This argument shifts the responsibility away 
from the gambling industry, arguing that it is not directly responsible for the behaviour 
of gamblers. However, such argument made by the gambling industry was rendered 
ineffectual. Individuals can make rational choices if they have full access to unbiased 
information. Additionally, this industry is heavily reliant on gambling revenues from 
problem gamblers. It is fair to suggest that gambling operators can bear the 
responsibility to protect individual gamblers (Hing and McMillen, 2002). This RG 
engagement makes it ineffective to protect the community and provide precautionary 
policies (Campbell and Smith, 2003). Thus, the gambling industry engaged 
symbolically, but not substantively with RG practices but continued to seek the 
profit-making motivation (Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990). It is relatively difficult to sustain 
the exclusion of gambling operators’ responsibility from the RG discourse. 
 
7.4.2  Employee as the most vulnerable group 
RG can arguably be viewed as a means of educating stakeholders about Macao’s 
gambling operators’ intentions to improve its social performance. The RG model has 
five key stakeholders (Appendix 18). More importantly, some of Macao’s international 
gambling operators appear to interact with key stakeholders more than the Chinese 
gambling companies (Appendix 19). In general, all gambling operators appear to place 
importance on “employees” and “customers” and provide employee RG training and 
customer protection measures to meet the minimum RG standards proposed by the 
University of Macao (Appendix 20). Nevertheless, the evidence suggests that 
scepticism about whether or not Macao’s gambling industry can truly embrace RG 
remains. The findings suggest that the gambling industry tends to place a high emphasis 
on employees rather than customers. The target audience of the RG model in Macao is 
directed at gamblers and the general public, rather than gambling venue employees 
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(Blaszczynski, et al., 2011); however, there is possibly a grey area of gambling venue 
employees which can be a part of the community and gamblers.  
 
Particularly noteworthy were the responses from the internal stakeholders working at 
senior or middle management levels regarding employees as “the most vulnerable” 
group of people in Macao’s gambling industry. Thus, this industry tends to exert more 
efforts and resources on employee education, awareness and assistance programme. 
 
“We have to teach the team members first [because] employees are the most 
vulnerable. … We hired a third part, a social service organisation that specializes 
in telephone counselling.” (Manager, Company F) 
 
In particular, a director justified why the industry concentrated on employees as they 
received feedback from problem gambling counselling centres that the users of the 
services were employees, rather than customers. Casino front-line employees showed 
more vulnerability to gambling disorder than non-casino employees (Shaffer and Hall, 
2002). This is partly because casino employees are allowed to participate in gambling 
within, and gambling outside the casinos
113
 (Wu and Wong, 2008). Casino employees 
worked in stressful working conditions as they served rude customers in passive 
smoking workplace (Macao Workers’ Union, 2010). This vulnerability can be explained 
by the fact that only Macao residents can be employed as casino employees, particularly 
dealers in casinos, while expatriates can be employed as senior casino employees, such 
as croupiers’ supervisors, pit managers and shift managers. Approximately 60% of 
Macao’s employees work in posts directly related to gambling services (Wan, 2009; Wu 
and Wang, 2008). Hence, casino employees could be regarded as more vulnerable than 
                                                     
113
 For example mah-jong with friends, horse racing by telephone and internet gambling (Wu and Wong, 
2008).  
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customers. This view was explained by a director and a problem gambling counsellor. 
 
“In the early days, we attached importance to customers’ gambling problems. Our 
company gets feedback from social service organisations. Most users are 
employees working in the gambling industry rather than casino guests.” (Director, 
Company A, Translation) 
 
“Customers’ response rate is very low in our centre. We collaborated with one 
gambling company to introduce our counselling services and the workshop to 
management to check employee problems, such as, emotional, behavioural, and 
physical signs. If employees have problems, they can contact our centre. … We 
receive good responses from employees. … They care employees.” (Counsellor 2, 
Translation) 
 
More pertinently, another justification was that major customers are from mainland 
China, rather than from Macao. Problem and pathological gamblers seem to be exported 
from Macao to mainland China. Thus, the discourse of social impacts seemed to be 
removed by the gambling industry, which continues to operate its business as usual. 
 
“… A high percentage of gamblers coming through from this property [casino] are 
not from Macao. … 90% of the gamblers here are from PRC [mainland China]. 
They go home and they take the problems with them. We don’t have to see those 
people on the street” (Manager, Company A) 
 
“Responsible gambling is for employees. Nearly all the customers are from 
mainland China. Gambling companies will not exclude Chinese customers.” 
(Gambler 1, Translation) 
 
These findings show that Macao’s gambling industry attempts to educate stakeholders 
that employees are the most vulnerable people in the industry. These findings indicate 
that casino front-line employees showed more vulnerability to gambling disorders and 
stressful work conditions than non-casino employees, which are similar to those of 
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Shaffer and Hall (2002). Other justifications were the responses from problem gambling 
counsellors that the main users of problem gambling counselling services were not 
customers; but employees working for the gambling companies. Importantly, nearly 
90% of customers are mainly from mainland China, rather than from the local 
community (Appendix 2). Gambling problem and gambling addiction tends to be 
transferred from Macao to mainland China. The negative externalities tend to be 
removed by the gambling industry discourse. Yet, it is relatively difficult to sustain the 
exclusion of the negative externalities from this debate. Thus, the industry may focus on 
what it can do, rather than what it cannot do. This was possibly the reason why the 
industry tended to concentrated on employees, rather than customers. This industry 
employed RG as a means of distracting the public’s attention away from customer 
protection towards employee protection. These findings are consistent with the views of 
Lindblom’s (1993) point three. This strategic focus on employees can be regarded as a 
symbolic, rather than substantive, management technique (Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990). 
This adoption of RG can be regarded as legitimising strategy, which can be considered 
forestalling any real changes in corporate behaviour. These findings are similar to those 
of Deegan and Blomquist (2006) for the Australian mineral industry. However, RG 
could be seen as harmful if, through implementing it, this industry does not seem to act 
in the interest of particular groups, notably gamblers. 
 
7.4.3  Employee conflict - actual RG practices 
This section examines the findings in relation to the employees experienced conflict 
between companies’ “stated RG policies” and “actual RG practices”. Macao’s gambling 
industry provides a RG training programme which can offer some help to customers 
(gamblers) to be more responsible in their gaming and possibly increase customers’ trust 
261 
 
in the industry (Griffiths, et al., 2009). The stated RG polices referred to employee RG 
training to recognise the warning signs, or symptoms of problem gamblers and seek 
assistance; however, internal stakeholders’ responses appeared to show inconsistency 
with regard to actual RG practices. Particularly noteworthy was the uncertainty 
concerning identification of problem gamblers. The casino frontline employees, 
including dealers, supervisors and dealer inspectors, who were not professional 
gambling counsellors, were deemed as not qualified to recognise the warning signs or 
symptoms of gambling problems. Several internal stakeholders, for example, a vice 
president and an officer gave the following responses. 
 
“We constantly remind customers of how they seek assistance. But, we rarely 
contact customers who are addicted to gambling because we are not professional 
gambling counsellors.” (Vice President, Company C, Translation) 
 
“Responsible Gambling is a guideline. The frontline employees are not 
professional medical people and don’t have the professional knowledge to check 
problem gamblers.” (Officer, Company B, Translation) 
 
Nevertheless, the gambling operators tended to implement a passive approach and as 
few RG practices as possible for customers. Perhaps, customers tend to find 
psychological, social and cultural factors to prevent them from seeking help (Hing and 
Nuske, 2011b). Pride, shame and denial were the three major obstacles to help-seeking 
gamblers and non-help seeking gamblers (Pulford, et al., 2009). A director justified not 
approaching customers directly because customers seemed to be very sensitive towards 
gambling problem, with concerns about invasion of privacy and an admission of their 
gambling problem. This was deemed to prompt customers to stay away. 
 
“Our company is open for business. It is very difficult for us. Actually, some 
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customers don’t want to talk to us or don’t need help. … From the employees’ 
perspective, if they find some warning signs or symptoms, they at least can provide 
information for customers.” (Director, Company A, Translation) 
 
From the responses from the casino frontline employees, including dealers, supervisors 
and dealer inspectors, working at non-management and junior management, they 
appeared to have no obligation and no authority to recognise problem gamblers. Thus, 
they seemed to maintain their reticence to intervene and tended to place greater 
emphasis on “serving customers as the first priority”, rather than “asking customers to 
seek assistance”, thereby reducing their risk of making mistakes or receiving negative 
responses from customers. 
 
“We deal with ten thousand customers a day. You don’t know which customers have 
a gambling problem. If customers don’t have a problem, we ask them to contact our 
security officers for assistance. … We actually increase the risk of making 
mistakes.” (Supervisor, Company C, Translation)  
 
“But, we work Responsible Gambling in another way. If a customer is very sleepy, 
we won’t ask him/her to go home or take a rest. If we do that, we make them stay 
away. Providing the best customer service and satisfying customers’ needs are 
more important.” (Inspector, Company E, Translation) 
 
A leading social work academic argued that the changes in western management style to 
become professional triggered by the liberalisation of Macao’s gambling industry. 
Frontline employees may want to support problem gamblers; however, the power and 
presence of supervisors tends to discourage them from doing so. This causes a conflict 
for frontline employees between personal ethics and their individual employment 
situation. Although they are expected to smile, greet and call customers by their names, 
their job requirement is to keep their distance to avoid cheating and misconduct (Wan, 
2009). Thus, they tend to be reluctant to help people with a gambling problem. 
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“If dealers talk to customers, dealers are accused of fraud.… A supervisor is 
standing behind the dealers, who are at greater risk of being fired. It is an internal 
regulation. … Gambling operators are afraid of employee fraud. Employees ask 
customers to go to the toilet. They may get something from the toilet to commit 
some kind of misdeed.” (Academic 3, Translation) 
 
These findings indicate that Macao’s gambling industry seems to place importance on 
employee training in RG, through such means as employee education, employee 
awareness and employee training (Chapter 5). The training can offer some help to 
customers (gamblers) to be more responsible in their gambling, which might increase 
customers’ trust in the industry (Griffiths, et al., 2009). It may be possible to signal to 
the public that this industry is being less irresponsible when its social impact seemed to 
be minimised. However, this industry appears to show conflict experienced by 
employees between gambling companies’ “stated RG polices” and “actual RG 
practices”. In particular, this industry apparently does not minimise the harm, such as 
reducing the number of problem gamblers. On the basis on the interviews, it could be 
argued that there was probably avoidance of dealing with gambling problem. It is 
possible to suggest that such symbolic RG engagement seemed to shield the industry 
from having to involve in more substantive elements of RG (Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990). 
RG engagement enables the gambling industry to point to the evidence of doing 
something with regard to RG when not necessarily doing something substantive. 
 
7.4.4  Symbolic commitment of customer protection 
These findings show that customer education and assistance programmes appear to be 
an important step in RG. It is possible to be optimistic about the extent to which RG has 
found its way onto the RG guideline proposed by the University of Macao. Over a third 
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of the internal stakeholders working at all levels in the international gambling 
companies, but to a lesser extent by those working in the Chinese gambling companies, 
appeared to be committed to taking some measures to protect customers. Less than a 
quarter of external stakeholders held a similar view. This engagement signalled that the 
gambling industry gradually developed some form of responsibility; however, it was 
still limited in a win-win scenario. 
 
“… our company has a responsibility towards customers and employees through 
“Responsible Gambling”. Therefore, our company really operates in this direction. 
We make sure that we not only make a profit, but also are aware of what is 
happening. We do not hope that our customers have any bad gambling behaviour.”  
(Vice President, Company C, Translation) 
 
“I think that all these companies have an internal mechanism. For instance, it 
controls the people’s gambling and promoting the idea [of] not spending all their 
savings on gaming somehow.” (Journalist 4) 
 
Macao’s gambling industry provides a customer assistance programme, particularly the 
voluntary self-exclusion programme which is provided by the government of Macao 
and social service organisations. This programme is a good measure for assist customers 
(Giroux, et al., 2008) and might increase customers’ trust in the gambling companies 
(Griffiths, et al., 2009). However, the findings suggest that some scepticism remains 
about whether or not this industry is entirely embracing the voluntary self-exclusion 
programme. This programme is based on the assumption of individual responsibility 
(Reith, 2007). Customers have to ask to be signed up for this programme application 
form and they were almost impossible to enforce due to lack rigorous RG standards and 
absence of monitoring by the government of Macao. RG could arguably be seen as a 
symbolic commitment by organisations in the gambling industry to improve their social 
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performance. A supervisor explained how this programme works in the industry. 
 
“If customers cannot control themselves, they ask a social service organisation to 
put them on a voluntary self-exclusion programme for 6 months or 1 year. If they 
can control themselves, they can withdraw the application. … It works for people 
who volunteer, but not for others.” (Supervisor, Company D, Translation) 
 
However, an academic explicitly questioned the implementation of RG practices as 
window dressing. These findings are similar to the view of Eadington’s (2003) 
assessment of RG in North America, which indicates a partial commitment by the 
government of Macao and Macao’s gambling industry in response to RG. 
 
“What I see are a lot of activities that could be viewed as window dressing … [the 
gambling operators] want to show that they protect the community’s interest. We 
now spend our resources on taking care of problem gamblers.” (Academic 2) 
 
Apparently, gambling operators seem to play a significant role in promoting RG 
concerning customer protection. The findings suggest that organisations in Macao’s 
gambling industry used RG engagement to educate and persuade stakeholders that the 
gambling industry gradually developed some form of responsibility towards customers. 
These findings are in line with the views of Lindblom (1993) as expressed in point one. 
They have followed the minimum RG requirement with some customer measures, 
including assistance information, signage, and voluntary self-exclusion programme, 
proposed by the University of Macao (Appendix 19 and 20). First, the awareness of RG 
information and signage was not very high according to the responses from the external 
stakeholders. However, these findings are not in line with those of Hing (2004) for the 
Australian gambling industry. The RG information and signage were ineffective as they 
were placed in less predominant areas. A counsellor explained:  
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“We have an observation in the gambling industry. They generally put RG 
information in less predominant areas and we need to search for this information.” 
(Counsellor – Translation) 
 
The voluntary self-exclusion programme based on the assumption of an individual’s 
responsibility (Reith, 2007), a lack of rigorous RG standards and absences of 
monitoring by the government of Macao. Self-excluded gamblers could go to other 
casinos to gamble. These findings are similar to those of Breen, et al. (2005) for the 
Australian gambling industry. Thus, RG could arguably be seen as a symbolic 
commitment of gambling companies to improve customer protection or public health 
issues in order to fulfil social demands and expectations (Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990). It 
is possible that RG standards may dictate the level of responsibility. It is fair to suggest 
that the gambling industry employed RG as a symbol to maintain legitimacy to ensure 
its business operations. 
 
7.4.5  Shifting responsibility to the government of Macao 
On the basis on the findings, the discourse of Macao’s gambling industry tended to shift 
the responsibility away from the gambling industry to the government of Macao. This 
was recognised by several internal stakeholders working at senior and middle 
management levels. One senior manager defended himself and tended to blame the 
government’s lack of concern with RG in the early days. He persuaded the government 
authorities to promote RG practices in Macao in 2004; however, the government 
showed a great resistance to doing so and only started to promote RG in 2009. 
 
“I talked to the Chief Executives and the secretary of social services in 2004 … 
They [the officers] will be much more resistant [on RG] because the Macao 
Citizens are much more accessible to gaming. … the government said most of the 
gamblers are Chinese [from mainland China] and foreigners and we don’t need to 
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learn [RG], right? … Not because I am genius, but I actually experienced before 
[in Australia].” (CEO, Company C) 
 
The political position of the government of Macao, a lack of rigorous RG standards, and 
absence of monitoring of whether Macao’s gambling industry engages in RG. A 
supervisor compared Macao’s RG policies to Singapore’s. He believed that RG was 
viewed as a mere general guidance proposed by the University of Macao and the 
government. The responsibility for minimising the harm arising from gambling problem 
tended to incorporate adequate customer protection measures into gambling operations. 
It is possible to suggest that such customer protection measure lie with the government, 
rather than the gambling operators. Greater regulation of RG concerning age restrictions 
and financial transactions from the government are necessary. 
 
“The Singapore government set up a series of measures to protect local citizens 
from gambling addiction, for example an entrance fee for local citizens. … In 
contrast, the government of Macao doesn’t care about the local citizens and the 
gambling industry does what it wants.” (Supervisor, Company B, Translation) 
 
“The government of Macao should regulate the gambling operators. They would 
not break the laws. For example, ID registration for every customer. This 
procedure may prevent customers from coming to casinos and providing a fake ID. 
Now, there are too many ATMs and pawnbrokers on site. … More than 10 ATMs 
are located on every single gambling floor.” (Government Official 1, Translation) 
 
In particular, five of the external stakeholders felt that RG was generally a voluntary 
guidance for the gambling industry. One of the external stakeholders, an expert on RG, 
explained that RG was neither a regulation nor a policy address delivered by the Macao 
Chief Executive. In fact, RG has the status of a guideline
114
 to say that is a minimum 
                                                     
114
 In Macao, there are three types of laws and regulations. The first one is regulations. The second one is 
a policy that address delivered by the Macao Chief Executive. The third one is called Micro which is 
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requirement imposed by the government of Macao. But, this only applies in the 
gambling industry, not in other industries. 
 
“Responsible gambling is not a regulation. Basically, the government uses RG as a 
voluntary guideline. If gambling operators are doing more things, the government 
likes it.” (Academic 1, Translation) 
 
More importantly, one of Public Relations managers felt that there was little incentive to 
undertake the voluntary RG programmes as the regulatory authorities and social service 
organisations imposed so many impractical measures on the gambling industry. 
 
“It is very good to have intensive RG promotion as suggested by the government 
authorities and NGOs . … When you post RG posters and leaflets in a casino 
where there are a lot of distraction, this is not going to work. [Gamblers won’t look 
at them.]” (Manager, Company F) 
 
In some respects, the voluntary self-exclusion programme, a part of the RG programme, 
could have a positive bearing on responsibility towards customers. Yet, some internal 
stakeholders working at middle and non-management levels tended to defend a major 
obstacle to regulate RG due to a lack of a centralised party, the government of Macao. It 
seemed clear from the interviews that such discourses of RG were used to shift 
responsibility to the government away from the gambling industry. Using privacy 
protection regulation as a rationale, a manager, and an officer argued that it was 
impossible to work collaboratively to support RG. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                           
neither regulations nor a policy address delivered by the Macao Chief Executive, but it is the minimal 
requirements under government inspection. 
269 
 
“Unlike the US or Australia, [problem gamblers] to sign themselves [the voluntary 
self-exclusion programmes] in the black list. In Macao, there is no centralised 
party [to regulate RG] … The privacy protection code is not shared among the 
gambling operators.” (Manager, Company F) 
 
“But, the voluntary self-exclusion programme is only for our company, not for 
other companies. … Three casinos are fine for us. … There are 35 casinos in 
Macao. If the government of Macao can regulate the gambling industry, the power 
of responsible gambling is bigger than ours [our company power].” (Officer, 
Company B) 
 
However, this industry was deemed to lack self-discipline in relation to the voluntary 
self-exclusion programme, particularly insufficient main entrance security checks, to 
prevent problem gamblers and teenagers from entering. This was recognised by some 
external stakeholders, particularly gamblers and counsellors. 
 
“We helped problem gamblers to apply for the voluntary self-exclusion programme 
with the six gambling operators in Macao. If security doesn’t check their ID, 
problem gamblers can get into casinos.” (Counsellor 2, Translation) 
 
“Sometimes, 14 or 15 year olds 115  played in casinos. … Security officers 
sometimes allow them to enter the casino. Government officials [gambling 
inspectors] are usually working in casinos. If customers are underage, gambling 
operators are very sensitive.” (Gambler 3, Translation) 
 
A government official admitted that there was an absence of monitoring of the voluntary 
self-exclusion programme. The local community tended to lie with the government and 
the gambling industry, rather than individual gamblers. 
 
“A 16-year-old girl went to one of the gambling companies and won the jackpot. … 
but we don’t have regulations to monitor this area at the moment, so we will have 
                                                     
115
 In 2012, the legal age to enter casinos is 21.  
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regulations in the future. We are in discussion with the gambling companies. … 
Society blames the gambling companies and our department.” (Government 
official 2 - Translation) 
 
However, Macao residents appeared to find it easy to access gambling venues. 
Gambling companies seemed to locate their outlets in residential areas, which may 
increase the number of problem gamblers. Half of the external stakeholders implicitly 
tended to blame this on the gambling industry and the regulatory authorities. In contrast, 
Australia, France, and Malaysia do not allow residents to gamble at casinos (Williams, 
et al., 2007). This regulation in these countries ensures that gambling revenues are from 
outside the host country so as to protect residents from negative social impacts 
(Williams, et al., 2007).  
 
“There are too many casinos in Macao. Gambling companies are like ‘OK stores’ 
[convenience stores]. … Going to casinos is too convenient. Nowadays, Mocha 
[slot machines] and internet betting are so convenient.” (Journalist 1, Translation) 
 
“The citizens of Macao have much greater access to casinos and find it so easy to 
get into the casinos. The promotion of gambling advertisements and facilities are 
diversified and massive, for example gambling shuttle buses, billboards in every 
corner of the community and bus stops.” (Counsellor 2, Translation) 
 
It may be possible to suggest that Macao’s gambling industry was being more 
irresponsible when they located their companies, which were very close to primary 
schools, secondary schools and universities. Such locations might seriously affect future 
generations Macao.  
 
“One of the gambling companies opened slot machines in every corner of the 
community, close to primary and secondary schools and universities. … The 
gambling companies don’t care about this issue.” (Academic 4, Translation) 
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According to two gamblers and a counsellor’s responses, the gambling industry tended 
to prioritise customers’ gambling convenience over customers safety concerns. It 
seemed fair to suggest that it was a mistaken view that the industry would minimise the 
harm. However, it attempted to find every possible means to exploit customers in order 
to enlighten self-interest. 
 
“… The gambling industry doesn’t tell the public what responsibility they have 
because it doesn’t care about how customers get their money. Using a credit card is 
convenient for customers playing games.” (Gambler 2, Translation) 
 
“The gambling companies should not have too many ATMs. Banks should be 
located outside the casinos. … Now, banks are located inside our casinos and are 
next to each VIP room. … Customers can’t wait to lose their money.” (Gambler 3, 
Translation) 
 
Although the gambling industry provides RG initiatives for customers, the findings 
suggest that RG is currently not effective, particularly the evasion of voluntary 
self-exclusion programmes and the easy accessibility of gambling venues. These 
findings in Macao are similar to those of RG initiatives in North American (El-Guebaly, 
et al., 2005 cited in Smith, 2009). The debate of RG is limited to such an extent, that the 
government of Macao became apparently necessary for tackling the social impacts. It 
seems fair to suggest Macao’s gambling industry has instrumentally manipulated a 
symbolic measure of RG to ensure of social legitimacy. It is extremely unlikely that this 
industry has failed to recognise gambling problem. The discourse of this industry tended 
to shift responsibility away from the gambling industry to the government. It may be 
possible to suggest that, from a theoretical perspective, this industry seems to operate its 
business without very strong institutional pressure. These findings are not in line with 
those of institutional legitimacy literature (Chapter 2). Under-regulation poses a 
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powerful threat to implementing actual RG practices effectively. The industry appeared 
not to operate under great pressure from the external environment, particularly the 
government. These findings for Macao are not consistent with those of RG in developed 
countries, for example Canada, Australia, and the UK, which suggest that RG initiatives 
involve in mandatory, rather than voluntary actions (Appendix 3). The reason for this is 
not clear and it may related to political and economic issues. First, the government 
seems not to be inclined to apply rigorous RG standards since that would lead to it 
losing revenue, as the government is heavily dependent on this industry. These findings 
are in line with those of Smith’s (2009) study of other governments in developed 
countries. Second, Macao’s gambling industry has been the leading industry, as the local 
residents highly rely on the industry. Although RG may have prevention value to 
problem gamblers, it could be more effective if the government promoted mandatory, 
rather than voluntary RG practices. In other words, the government appears to rely on 
self-regulated voluntary RG practices. However, the level of obligation tends to be low. 
 
7.5  Sources of legitimacy 
7.5.1  The important role of the academic institution 
The liberalisation of Macao’s gambling industry was in 2003; however, the introduction 
of RG policies, related standards and guidelines
116
 only started in 2009 (The Institute 
for the Study of Commercial Gaming, 2009). The government of Macao recognised the 
increasing prevalence of problem gamblers from 4.3% in 2003 to 6.0% in 2007 (The 
Institute for the Study of Commercial Gaming, 2009; Appendix 2). The government has 
                                                     
116
 The Institute for the Study of Commercial Gaming (2009, p.1; 2010b, p.1; 2011, p.1) defines 
“Responsible Gambling occurs in a properly regulated environment where one’s involvement in gambling 
activities brings no harm to the gamblers, family members, friends, other gamblers or casino staff; nor 
would it lead to having negative consequences for the local community and residents. In other words, 
Responsible Gambling is a practice that confines the gambling-related damage to socially acceptable 
level”.  
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a very close relationship with the gambling operators, as the government is heavily 
dependent on this industry. Therefore, a third party – the University of Macao – 
involved in the RG programme has actually taken a significant role in standing, shaping 
and promoting RG through close work with the government. The academic institution is 
perceived as a credible institution in the eyes of the public and might bolster 
organisational legitimacy to enhance its survival, which refers to procedural 
legitimation (Richardson and Dowling, 1986). 
 
A leading RG scholar explained how he started to think about RG in 2007 and 
developed a Lotus
117
 Model of RG for the Chinese community, with five stakeholders 
according to historical, cultural and political economic context in 2009 (Appendix 18). 
However, this Lotus model was based on same stated social and economic benefit 
assumptions of The Reno Model of RG
118
 developed by Blaszcyynski, et al. (2004). 
The role of an academic institution was intended to promote the right values and 
collaborate with problem gambling counselling centres
119
. 
 
Macao’s gambling industry could maintain its existence through the support of RG 
programmes, including attending “Responsible Gambling Awareness Week” (RGAW), 
and RG training courses, organised by the academic institution and the government of 
Macao. This RG training course was for representatives of the gambling companies, 
who could receive practical RG training to educate their company’s team members. The 
industry was expected to express the support for RG. Such collaboration with the 
                                                     
117
 The lotus flower in full bloom is a symbol of the prosperity and success of Macao.  
118
 Blaszczynski, et al. (2004) developed The Reno Model of RG, which provides a blueprint for tackling 
gambling problem and suggests different tactics to alleviate gambling problems and related problems.  
119
 Professional gambling counselling service organisations in Macao are highly motivated to undertake 
and support RG in the community. Professional gambling counselling service organisations can be 
divided into three types of organisations according to their provider: the government of Macao, non-profit 
organisations or the gambling operators. 
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University of Macao could be argued to benefit the industry and legitimise current 
structures so as to increase its credibility. This was recognised by some internal 
stakeholders working at all management levels in both the Chinese and international 
gambling companies. 
 
“The “Responsible Gambling Awareness Week” is organised by the University of 
Macao and the government authority every year. We support the government. We 
think that RG is very important.” (Vice President, Company C, Translation) 
 
“I attended the two-week training course in ‘Responsible Gambling’ organised by 
the University of Macao and government authorities. … I attended a seminar and 
then I put what I had learnt into practice to teach my team members in our 
company. The course took 3 hours.” (Supervisor, Company C, Translation) 
 
Macao’s gambling industry attempted to engage in RG policies, which were proposed 
by a third party, the University of Macao. Such collaboration could be viewed as a 
major pillar in establishing credibility. These findings are similar to those of Palazzo 
and Richter (2005) for the tobacco industry. This industry justified RG engagement by 
referring to the neutral institution which developed a policy. Hence, this industry 
developed a strategic alliance and collaboration with the academic institution and the 
government of Macao; thus, this relationship can be seen as an important source of 
legitimacy. These findings are in line with Deephouse and Suchman’s (2008) idea, 
which states how organisations gain the sources of legitimacy from interorganisational 
relations (Chapter 2). A credible institution – the University of Macao – can bolster the 
gambling industry’s legitimacy so that this industry can be considered prudent and 
rational (see Elsbach and Sutton, 1992). Nevertheless, there is the danger of selecting 
the academic institution to develop RG policies. The University of Macao is indirectly 
through gambling revenue from the gambling industry (Appendix 2). The academic 
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institution tended to develop RG policies, standards, and guidelines with the stated 
social and economic assumptions. Thus, the industry can possibly achieve some form of 
responsibility under a “win-win” situation.  
 
7.5.2  The government of Macao 
Since the number of gambling licenses for Macao’s gambling industry is limited, 
these licenses could become valuable resources. The findings indicate that RG could 
be viewed as a means of maintaining a relationship with the government of Macao.  
The government was viewed as the authority to establish the regulations to control 
the industry, to undertake gambling inspections and grant gambling licenses to 
gambling operators (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Singh, et al., 1986; Baum and Oliver, 
1991; Deephouse, 1996). This view is expressed by more than a quarter of the 
internal stakeholders working at non-management, junior and middle levels, but less 
so by senior management and external stakeholders. 
“If we don’t promote it [RG], the government said that we affect the whole 
economy. The gambling industry is one of the major pillars of economic 
development in Macao.” (Manager, Company F) 
“The government of Macao should protect the community and prevent the 
gambling industry from dominating Macao. I think that the gambling companies 
are under pressure from the government to follow the RG guidelines because the 
gambling companies need licenses to operate.” (Officer, Company A, Translation) 
“They send employees to attend responsible gambling training courses. This can 
be seen by the government of Macao.”  (Gambler 1, Translation) 
Macao’s gambling industry employed RG programmes, particularly following the RG 
guidelines and sending representatives to attend RG training courses in the University 
of Macao. This approach could maintain a good relationship with the government of 
Macao so as to gain an important source of legitimacy to ensure the industry’s survival. 
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These findings are in line with the views of Deephouse and Suchman (2008), who claim 
that the government of Macao can be regarded as a critical source of legitimacy 
(Chapter 2). This argument lends weight to the previous argument in Chapter 6. In 
particular, organisations in Macao’s gambling industry employed RG as a means of 
preparing to renew for their gambling licenses to ensure their existence in 2020 and 
2022. These findings are similar to those of Deegan (2002). 
 
7.5.3  The Chinese central government 
Macao’s gambling industry appeared to employ RG to maintain a good relationship 
with the Chinese Government as a major source of legitimacy. The rapid development 
of this industry had major social impact on neighbouring countries, particularly 
mainland China (Fong, et al., 2011; Gu and Tam, 2011). This industry tended to employ 
RG to show the Chinese Government that they are tackling the problem of rising social 
impact from mainland China. This RG engagement could possibly persuade the 
government to grant more Free Travel Scheme Visas to citizens from other provinces 
and thus to increase its Chinese customer base. The industry tended to be heavily 
dependent on the political policies of China. Since 90% of gamblers are from China, 
rather than from Macao (The Government Information Bureau, 2010), problem and 
pathological gamblers seem to be resident in China, which is consistent with Gu and 
Tam’s (2011) views. These findings are similar to those of Garrett and Nichols’s (2005) 
study in the US (Garrett and Nichols, 2005 cited in Gu and Tam, 2011). A journalist and 
a gambler expressed this viewpoint. 
 
“The Central Chinese Government is under great pressure and receives much 
criticism. So, they reduced the number of Free Travel Scheme visas from China, 
mainly from the Guangdong provinces (Pearl River Delta), to prevent people from 
277 
 
gambling in Macao. Some enterprises went bankrupt, which as a result may 
experience negative social impacts.” (Journalist 4, Translation) 
 
“The Central Chinese Government doesn’t want its government officials to gamble 
in Macao. If gamblers lose money, they may commit suicide. The country may lose 
its talented people.” (Gambler 3, Translation) 
 
The above quotes may be indicative of an alternative view of the relationship between 
the Chinese government and Macao’s gambling industry. Most of the internal and 
external interviewees seemed to ignore the power of the Chinese government. The 
Chinese government could be regarded as another important authority which establishes 
the regulation that allows the legalisation of Macao’s gambling industry (Chapters 2 and 
4) and indirectly controls the way they should behave in Macao. These findings are in 
line with the views of Deephouse and Suchman (2008), who claim that the Chinese 
government can be regarded as a critical source of legitimacy (Chapter 2). Macao’s 
gambling industry attempted to employ RG to maintain a good relationship with the 
Chinese government to gain important source of legitimacy to seek critical resources, 
particularly Chinese visitors for its continued existence. They attempted to tackle 
problem gamblers from mainland China so that the Chinese Central government may 
increase the number of the Free Travel Scheme visas. This phenomenon is clear and it 
may have something to do with the political and cultural issues. First, Macao is the only 
place in mainland China where is legal to gamble in casinos (Vong, 2004; BBC, 2009; 
MarketLine, 2013c), while mainland China is limited in a form of a national lottery 
(Appendix 2). Second, owing to the influence on Chinese culture, historical background 
and tradition, the Chinese seems to show higher gambling participation rates than 
Caucasians (Raylu and Oei, 2004; Lau and Ranyard, 2005; Chapter 1). Otherwise, 
organisations in Macao’s gambling industry could not be so profitable. 
278 
 
7.6  Concluding remarks 
This chapter reports the extant findings related to RG, a subset of CSR (Chapter 5). The 
findings in this chapter concentrated on the motivation for Macao’s gambling industry 
to engage in RG. The following arguments in this chapter lend weight to my argument 
in Chapter 6. There are three main findings in this chapter. 
 
First, the concept of RG seems to be unclear, organisations in Macao’s gambling 
industry take advantage of its ambiguity for their own interest. Thus, RG could be 
viewed as a sustainable development tool, perhaps ironically, to enlighten self-interest 
as the industry wishes its customers to play repeated games, rather than only one game. 
It introduces the question of why internal stakeholders working at senior management 
level and a leading RG academic, recognised no apparent conflict between the pursuit of 
economic interest and the promotion of RG amongst the public, while external 
stakeholders tended to recognise this conflict. These findings are in line with prior CSR 
(RG) literature, which advocates CSR (RG) as an economic initiative, rather than an 
ethical one (Chapter 2). Thus, the industry can continue to operate on a “win-win” 
scenario, and in a “business as usual” context. 
 
Second, organisations in Macao’s gambling industry employ RG as a means of 
managing stakeholders by a number of legitimising strategies. First, these organisations 
employed RG as a means of changing stakeholders’ perception by highlighting the 
individual responsibility. This argument shifts the responsibility away from the 
gambling industry, by arguing that they are not directly responsible for the behaviour of 
gamblers. Second, the industry can be said to employ RG as a means of educating 
stakeholders, particularly in employee training and customer protection programmes. 
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However, with regard to employee RG training, the stated RG policies tended to show 
inconsistency in actual RG practices based on the internal stakeholder interviewees’ 
responses. This inconsistency was due to the frontline casino employees’ incompetence 
to identify problem gamblers and the customers’ sensitivity of admission gambling 
problem. Regarding customer protection, the awareness of RG signage was ineffective 
and the voluntary self-exclusion was based on the assumption of an individual’s 
responsibility, a lack of rigorous RG standards and absence of monitoring by the 
government. Organisations in Macao’s gambling industry seem to operate their business 
without strong institutional pressure. These findings present a challenge to the 
institutional legitimacy literature (Chapter 2). Third, RG is actually to protect the 
interest of the industry, rather than the interest of customers. However, the industry 
tends to distract stakeholders’ attention away from customer protection towards 
employee protection. The reasons are obvious and it may have to do with the vulnerable 
casino employees to gambling addiction and the major source of Chinese customers. 
The discourse of negative externalities seemed to be removed by this industry. 
 
Third, organisations in Macao’s gambling industry appear legitimate to the important 
external audiences, namely the University of Macao, the government of Macao and the 
Chinese government. These arguments lend weight to the arguments in Chapter 6. Each 
group can provide certain forms of political and social support through a granting 
greater access to critical resources, namely creditability, gambling licenses, imported 
labour, land and customers, to improve the likelihood of its survival in Macao. These 
findings are also in line with the idea of Deephouse and Suchman (2008), who suggest 
that the major source of legitimacy includes interorganisational relations and the 
authority. 
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Organisations in Macao’s gambling industry can be seen to have engaged in RG, while 
doing so has no major effect on their business operation and present how well the 
gambling industry enables to engage the RG debate. RG makes no real difference in 
practices; however, RG remains symbolically important. As a result, the 
industry-oriented discourse that emerges moves the RG debate away from its social 
impacts on problem gamblers and society to concentrate on how the industry can 
continue to operate in a win-win scenario and a business as usual context. However, it is 
relatively difficult to sustain the exclusion of social impacts from CSR or RG debate. 
Importantly, ignoring the negative externalities remains daunting as the social impacts 
of problem gamblers continue to deteriorate. 
 
The next chapter (chapter 8) considers the discussion of the research findings reported 
in Chapter 4 (content analysis) and Chapters 5, 6 and 7 (interviews) together with the 
literature review (Chapter 2), and research methods (Chapter 3) to answer the three 
research questions outlined in Chapter 2. 
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Chapter 8 
Discussion 
8.1 Introduction 
This thesis has explored how CSR operated in a novel setting and how the thesis might 
contribute to the understanding of CSR and legitimacy in a controversial industry, in 
this particular case, the gambling industry. This chapter is divided into six sections. 
Following this introduction, the second section examines how organisations in the 
gambling industry reshape CSR. The chapter then explores how RG can be viewed as 
CSR. The fourth section reflects on CSR as a source of strategic legitimacy. The fifth 
section considers the possible contributions of the thesis to the CSR and legitimacy 
literature. The final section summarises this chapter and leads into Chapter 9, which 
concludes the thesis. 
 
8.2 Reshaping CSR  
8.2.1 How CSR is perceived in the gambling industry  
According to the findings discussed in Chapter 5, CSR as practised in the gambling 
industry in Macao comprises a set of programmes incorporating corporate philanthropy, 
employee welfare, economic development, and a specific, industry-wide initiative 
known as RG (Chapter 7). Both Chinese and international gambling organisations in 
Macao’s gambling industry attempt to communicate their responsibility by obscuring 
certain impacts of their work, notably gambling addiction and health-related issues 
whilst highlighting others. Organisations in Macao’s gambling industry seem to either 
omit or exclude their corporate externalities on local community from their discourse. 
By CSR and RG, I refer therefore to a series of practices by which organisations in the 
gambling industry seek to shield their role in producing corporate externalities, and to 
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promote at least the appearance of an ethical stance.  
 
8.2.2 What differs from stakeholders accounts 
The stakeholder approach is elaborated on by Freeman (1984; 2010), Donaldon and 
Preston (1995), and Mitchell, et al. (1997) (Chapter 2). Freeman (2010) suggests that 
managers can employ the concept and framework of the stakeholder approach to 
manage their organisations effectively and through this lead them to be successful in the 
business environment. This aspect is linked to instrumental stakeholder theory as 
suggested by Donaldson and Preston (1995).  
 
Stakeholders are groups or individuals who may affect or be affected by the 
achievement of an organisation’s goal (Freeman, 1984; 2010) and broadly include two 
main groups: internal stakeholders (owners, customers, employees, suppliers) and 
external stakeholders (governments, competitors, consumer advocates, 
environmentalists, special interest groups and media) (Freeman, 2010). The concept of 
stakeholder has been widely discussed in the CSR literature. Corporations, especially 
MNCs are becoming increasingly influential in business and society such that they 
attempt to shape CSR to their advantage by choosing which of their stakeholders to 
favour and to seek to manage differently those which are beneficial, rather than harmful 
to their business operation.  
 
The findings discussed in Chapter 5 suggest that organisations in Macao’s gambling 
industry seem to place emphasis on social concerns, including corporate philanthropy, 
employee welfare and economic development, rather than gambling addiction and 
health-related issues. The gambling industry is the leading industry in Macao, with over 
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60% of local residents working in this or related industries, and with a gaming tax of 35 
percent, as well as 4 percent of its gross gaming revenue going to the government for 
other social and cultural activities (Appendix 2). Thus, organisations in Macao’s 
gambling industry are in a great position to choose particular aspects of socially 
responsible behaviour in ways which are beneficial to them and to give an account of 
CSR favourable to their activities. There are two examples to support this argument. 
First, the findings suggest that CSR in this industry is widely understood to concentrate 
exclusively on the philanthropic contributions to the local community. Responsibility 
towards the community enacted through philanthropic effect seems likely to gain 
acceptance and support from the community (Weaver, et al., 1999). Second, 
organisations in the gambling industry increasingly seem to share the roles and 
responsibilities of the government of Macao concerning local employees, for example 
employee welfare, to enhance a complementary relationship between the gambling 
industry and the local employees. These views are similar to those of Moon, et al.’s 
(2011) study in Asian countries. Additionally, Macao, which is a so-called developing 
country, tends to experience a weak institution, a weak enforcement and poor 
governance (see Matten and Moon, 2008).  
 
Surprisingly, the findings suggest that the concept of stakeholders is not prevalent in 
Macao’s gambling industry. The concept of stakeholders (Freeman, 1984; Donaldson 
and Preston, 1995; Mitchell, et al., 1997) seems to be understood only by a few 
managers and academics. The concept was far from being widely understood only by 
other interviewees in this study. An alternative explanation of the apparent lack of 
awareness of the stakeholder concept could be drawn from the unusual findings of the 
thesis that the organisations in the gambling industry seem to experience weak 
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stakeholder pressures, from NGOs (gambling counselling service organisations), media 
(journalists) and problem gamblers and their family members. Without such pressure, it 
is unlikely that the stakeholders could begin to have any substantive influence on the 
industry to encourage it to comply with voluntary CSR and RG practices. 
 
Professional gambling counselling service organisations could be viewed as 
stakeholders who can affect or be affected by the gambling industry. Yet, the findings 
(Chapters 5, 6 and 7) suggest that Macao’s gambling industry appears not to experience 
strong pressure from these counselling organisations. Even though these counselling 
organisations occasionally show concern for problem gamblers, the gambling industry 
itself tends not to regard them as bringing any major pressures for a greater social 
response. The reason is not clear, but it may be related to political issues. Especially, 
non-profit gambling counselling service organisations are indirectly subsidised by 
Macao’s gambling industry from the gambling tax revenue (Appendix 2). Gambling 
counselling service organisations appear to link to the government and the industry. 
Macao’s gambling industry seems to have developed an inter-organisational relationship 
with these counselling organisations (Deephouse and Suchman, 2008), which can help 
the industry to distance itself from criticism and attempt to promote itself as a good 
citizen. The interviews, however, seemed to suggest that the non-profit ones found it 
difficult to collaborate with the gambling industry to provide counselling services for 
their customers (gamblers). If these counselling service organisations request for greater 
assistance and protection for gamblers, this request may pose a threat to the funded 
counselling service organisations. This is mostly derived from the gambling industry 
itself. As discussed above, organisations in Macao’s gambling industry are becoming 
increasingly influential in the local community.  
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Similarly, organisations in Macao’s gambling industry seem not to be affected by the 
media - as was suggested by the evidence (Chapter 6). The local media appears to report 
gambling-related financial news, past community achievements and regulatory 
procedures, rather than community resistance and antigambling advocacy (see 
Humphreys, 2010). Although negative social impacts are sometimes reported in the 
local community, the industry is less likely to be affected by the negative information. 
The reason for this is not apparent, but it seems likely to be connect to the nature of the 
industry and, again, political issues. The government of Macao, local business and 
community are heavily reliant on the gambling industry. The main source of the media’s 
income, particularly advertisement, is mainly derived from the industry. Additionally, 
the international gambling companies in Macao’s gambling industry can be expected to 
have the experience to seek and maintain legitimacy in developed countries.  
 
The close relationship of the industry and counselling organisations, as well as the 
economic importance of these organisations in Macao, would suggest that problem 
gamblers and their family members seem to be the most vulnerable and marginalised of 
the stakeholders related to the gambling industry. They also seem to have less power to 
fight against the industry. More than 60 percent of residents work in the gambling 
industry and other gambling-related industries (Appendix 2). Organisations in Macao’s 
gambling industry seem to be successful in engendering a positive view among the local 
community by providing job opportunities, building infrastructure and giving taxation, 
rather than concentrate on gambling- and health-related issues (Chapter 5). Evidence of 
the latter is the prevalence of problem gambling amongst between 15 and 64 year olds 
increased from 4.3% in 2003 to 6% in 2007 (The Institute for the Study of Commercial 
Gaming, 2009). In particular, interviewees working in the gambling industry seldom use 
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the term “problem gamblers”, and much prefer that of “customers” in the interviews. 
These findings suggest that these organisations attempt to employ CSR to seek to shield 
their role in producing corporate externalities and seek to promote socially responsible 
activities. 
 
As discussed above, organisations in Macao’s gambling industry are in a strong position 
allowing them to base their CSR activities around stakeholders which are favourable to 
them. These findings are in line with those of Bondy, et al. (2012) for MNCs, that is to 
say the existence of CSR within MNCs shows a shift in the meaning of CSR away from 
stakeholder concerns towards profit-making concerns.  
 
8.2.3. Corporate Social Disclosure (CSD) 
The thesis can help academics in researching Corporate Social Disclosure (CSD) to 
understand the ways in which the construction of legitimacy is undertaken in the 
gambling industry. Given the contested nature of the gambling industry, organisations 
“which are considered to be more sinful than other others will be expected to disclose 
more social information than those which are considered to be less sinful” (see 
Campbell, et al., 2003: p. 561). Organisations in this industry have been facing an 
ongoing threat to its legitimacy: in the form of gambling addiction and health-related 
issues (Chapters 1 and 2). This threat can create a significant legitimacy gap, and thus 
these organisations can be expected to reduce this gap through deploying CSD more 
strongly (Campbell, et al., 2003). However, as examined in Chapter 4, CSD provided by 
all the sampled gambling companies appears to be relatively low. In particular, the role 
of RG, related to promoting consumer protection, awareness, and education, cannot be 
regarded as an important issue in annual reports. The reason for this is unclear, though it 
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might be related to the absence of adequate industry reporting requirements 
(Blaszczynski, et al., 2011). 
 
On the other hand, negligible or low RG disclosure concerning gambling addiction and 
health-related issues can perhaps be regarded as a proactive legitimising strategy. More 
importantly, organisations in the gambling industry rarely publish information on the 
nature or the extent of the gambling problem in relation to customers and public health 
in their annual reports in general (Chapter 4). These findings are consistent with those 
of Campbell, et al., (2003) for the UK’s tobacco industry, Tilling and Tilt (2010) for the 
Australian tobacco industry, and De Villiers and van Staden (2006) for South African 
mining industry, which found that reducing disclosure can be viewed as a legitimising 
strategy.  
 
However, these findings for the gambling industry are completely different from prior 
CSD literature on unforeseen crises, which found that organisations facing an expected 
disaster will try to repair and maintain legitimacy (Patten, 1992; 2002; Elsbach and 
Sutton, 1992; Elsbach, 1994; Deegan, et al., 2000; Chapters 2 and 4). Organisations in 
the gambling industry attempting to build legitimacy might feel that the costs of 
disclosure are higher than the benefits, and thus adopting the best strategy is simply to 
remain silent (Campbell, et al., 2003). These organisations can possibly restrict the 
negative information, for example gambling addiction and health-related issues, as long 
as they could (see O’Donovan, 2002). These findings support O’Donovan (2002) who 
claims that the lower the perceived legitimacy of the organisation, the less likely it is to 
bother providing CSD. Organisations in the gambling industry can be a socially 
constructed as illegitimate so that social disclosure would be of “no effective value” 
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(Campbell, et al., 2003). Therefore, these organisations seem not to need to develop 
some symbols of social legitimacy, CSD in general and more surprisingly RG disclosure 
in particular, to build their social legitimacy.  
 
8.2.4 Gambling in Macao and the CSR literature  
The thesis provides a more reflexive and critical perspective on the complexity and 
subtlety of corporations’ motivation of CSR engagement responding to the call for 
Bondy, et al.’s (2012) study.  
 
According to findings examined in Chapter 6, both Chinese and international gambling 
organisations in Macao’s gambling industry employ CSR as a part of the business case. 
These findings are consistent with prior CSR literature (Chapter 2), which suggest that 
CSR is typically seen as a win-win scenario (Banerjee, 2008). Organisations can do well 
by performing well in financial terms as a business operation and appear to be engaging 
with responsibility to create a better society at the same time (Kurucz, et al., 2008). 
There are three main findings in relation to the business case of CSR (Chapter 6). First, 
gambling has been historically linked to illegal activities, such as drugs, prostitution and 
crime (Collin, 2003; Reith, 2003; Chapter 1). The gambling industry’s rationale to 
engage in CSR seemed to be to promote a corporate image and to sanitise its reputation 
through obscuring the uncovered and illegal activities, thereby rebuilding, restoring, and 
reconstructing its corporate image to ensure that it wins trust, support and espousal from 
employees and the community. Second, CSR engagement in the gambling industry 
appeared to gain competitive advantage over other gambling competitors and other 
industries by attracting local talents as a main source. Third, cost reduction was likely to 
be illustrated as merely environmental protection in terms of saving energy.  
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The thesis attempts to investigate particular CSR and RG practices in the gambling 
industry. Macao’s gambling industry’s the underlying motivation for CSR engagement 
was often seen as self-interest rationales (Chapter 6). These organisations engage 
symbolically, rather than substantively, with CSR and RG practices in order to manage 
stakeholders’ perception by changing stakeholders’ perception, educating them and 
distract their attention from perceived problems (Section 8.4). They endeavour to appear 
“legitimate” and this is to be directed at two main audiences: internal audiences (the 
parent company) and external audiences (the public, the government of Macao, the 
Chinese government, the University of Macao, problem gambling counselling service 
organisations, and media) to gain sources of legitimacy in order to ensure the industry’s 
continuing survival (Section 8.4). Each group provides certain forms of political and 
social support through a granting greater access to critical resources, including 
acceptance, creditability, gambling licenses, land, imported labour and Chinese 
customers, without which organisations in the gambling industry would not be so 
profitable. This industry will not usually undertake CSR activities unless it meets its 
profitability criteria (see Banerjee, 2008). Therefore, CSR can be seen as a means of 
increasing corporate benefits, rather than advancing the interest of community.  
 
In particular, one of the most important mechanisms of this symbolic CSR is the RG 
Initiatives. This thesis has made a novel contribution in identifying RG, a further 
example of CSR, as a symbolic management technique and in turn to enhance the 
gambling industry’s economic interest.  
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8.3 Responsible Gambling as Corporate Social Responsibility  
8.3.1 What does Responsible Gambling mean in the gambling industry?  
In particular, the term “Responsible Gambling” (RG) is sometimes termed and 
alternatively known as “Responsible Gaming” or “Rational Gaming”, which is a 
respectable euphemism largely employed by this industry (Chapter 7). This view is in 
line with those of Reith (2007), who claims that gambling is linked to its connotation of 
play and leisure, rather than financial loss.  
 
The findings discussed in Chapter 7 suggest that the concept of RG appears to be vague 
and to lack a clear and precise definition. Organisations in the industry tend to take 
advantage of the ambiguity and to adopt their own interpretation of RG polices for their 
best interests. Based on responses from several internal stakeholders at the Chinese and 
international gambling companies, it could be argued that RG is a discourse and set of 
business practices deployed in the industry with the particular aim of improving 
financial performance and long-term development as the industry intended customers to 
come back to play games repeatedly, rather than lose a large amount of money on one 
game. Thus, RG can, perhaps ironically, contribute to the long-term economic 
development of Macao’s gambling industry. 
 
8.3.2 How the gambling industry employs responsible gambling 
The motivation for organisations in Macao’s gambling industry RG engagement was 
questionable. Arguably, these organisations endeavoured to manage their legitimacy. 
Chapter 7 suggests that some scepticism about whether or not organisations in Macao’s 
gambling industry have defined it in a particular manner to win legitimacy without 
changing their business practice remains. However, these organisations appear to 
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engage symbolically, rather than substantively. Stakeholders in RG with a range of five 
key stakeholders (Chapter 7; Appendix 18 and 19); however, these organisations appear 
to place more emphasis on the support of their employees than customers. Customer 
protection, a further example of RG programme, showed inconsistency in actual RG 
practices. In particular, the awareness of RG information and signage was not very high, 
while the voluntary self-exclusion programme is largely based on the assumption of the 
individual’s responsibility (Chapter 7). RG programmes in particular in order to manage 
stakeholders’ perception and gain sources of legitimacy in order to enhance its survival. 
These findings are consistent with the accounts of strategic legitimacy (Chapter 2; 
Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975; Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990; Lindblom, 1993; Suchman, 
1995). Organisations in Macao’s gambling industry can be said to employ a set of 
legitimising strategies to manage stakeholders’ perception by changing their perception, 
educating them and distracting their attention from perceived problems (Chapter 7). 
These interpretations are largely shaped by Lindblom’s (1993) framework (Chapter 2). 
 
Organisations in Macao’s gambling industry employed RG as a means of changing 
stakeholders’ perception by placing more emphasis on the individual responsibility 
(Reith, 2007). This responsibility introduces the question of why most of the internal 
stakeholders at all management levels in both Chinese and international gambling 
companies to place responsibility for gambling problem on the individuals, while 
external stakeholders place responsibility for gambling problem on the gambling 
operators. The determinant of gambling participation and treatment are linked to wider 
ideologies of neo-liberalism, freedom and choice (Chapter 1). This assumption of the 
gambling industry is consistent with the assumption of Pava and Krausz (1997) and 
Moerman and Van Der Lann (2005) for the tobacco industry, which suggests that 
292 
 
individuals have the right to choose their participation. This argument shifts the 
responsibility away from the gambling industry, arguing that it is not directly 
responsible for the behaviour of gamblers. RG engagement makes it ineffective to 
protect the community and provide precautionary policies (Campbell and Smith, 2003). 
However, these organisations are heavily reliant on gambling revenues and, inevitably, 
on gamblers. Some studies have shown that gamblers contribute approximately 
one-third of gambling revenues from all types of gambling (The Productivity 
Commission, 1999; Williams and Wood, 2004). In particular, VIP rooms accounts for 
over 60% of the gaming revenue of Macao’s gambling industry, while the mass market 
accounts for over 50% of the profits (The Economist, 2013). It is fair to suggest that 
gambling operators can bear the responsibility to protect individual gamblers, 
discourage gambling addiction and minimise the prevalence of gambling problem (Hing 
and McMillen, 2002; Chapter 1). The responsibility for RG has been widely debated in 
the academic studies and government policies. RG tends to be complex and highly 
contentious because the extent of responsibility held by governments, gambling 
operators or individual players is yet to be determined.  
 
Organisations in Macao’s gambling industry employ RG as a means of educating 
stakeholders about their intentions to improve social performance. Macao’s RG 
framework includes the government, gamblers, family members and friends, gaming 
operators, problem gambling prevention treatment centres
120
 and education and other 
community organisations (The Institute for the Study of Commercial Gaming, 2009, 
2010b, 2011). Both the Chinese and international gambling companies in Macao can be 
said to concentrate on two aspects: employee training and customer protection. More 
                                                     
120
 There were no professional gambling counselling centres for treatment and prevention until 2004 
(Fong, et al., 2011; see Appendix 2). 
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pertinently, international gambling operators would appear to be more active than the 
Chinese gambling operators on these two concerns (Appendix 20). 
 
Both the Chinese and international gambling operators provide employee education, 
awareness and assistance programmes (Chapter 7; Appendix 20). This training 
programme seems intend to support employees so that they can offer support to 
customers in order to help them to be more responsible in their playing; this in turn 
might increase customers’ trust in the industry (Griffiths, et al., 2009). It may be 
possible to educate and signal to the public that organisations in Macao’s gambling 
industry are being less irresponsible when their social impacts in relation to gambling 
addiction and health-related issues seem to be minimised. Even though the stated RG 
polices referred to employee RG training to recognise the warning signs, to recognise 
the symptoms of problem gamblers and to encourage such gamblers to seek assistance, 
internal stakeholders showed inconsistency in actual RG practices. The reasons for this 
inconsistency are twofold. First, the frontline casino employees, including dealers, 
supervisors and dealer inspectors, were not deemed sufficiently competent and trained 
to act as professional gambling counsellors such that they might recognise the warning 
signs or symptoms of problem gamblers. The frontline casino employees appeared to 
have no obligation and no authority to identify problem gamblers. They tend to maintain 
their reticence to intervene and prioritise “serving customers” over “asking customers to 
seek assistance”, thus minimising their risk of making mistakes or receiving negative 
responses from customers. Even if they may want to help problem gamblers, this causes 
a dilemma between personal ethics and individual employment situation. Their job 
requirement is to keep their distance to avoid cheating and misconduct, even though 
they are expected to smile, greet and call customers’ names (Wan, 2009). Second, 
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customers appeared to be very sensitive to gambling problem in relation to invasion of 
privacy and an admission their gambling problem. Pride, shame and denial were the 
three main barriers to help-seeking and non-help seeking gamblers (Pulford, et al., 
2009). On the basis on the interviews, it could be argued that such symbolic RG 
engagement seemed to shield organisations in the industry from engaging in more 
substantive elements of RG (see Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990). 
 
Both the Chinese and international gambling operators provide customer education and 
assistance programmes to protect customers, including RG assistance information, 
signage and voluntary self-exclusion programme (Chapter 7; Appendix 20). RG 
engagement signalled and educated stakeholders that organisations in Macao’s 
gambling industry in general steadily progressed some form of responsibility. However, 
the awareness of RG information and signage was not high based on the responses from 
the external stakeholders. Additionally, the voluntary self-exclusion programme is based 
on the assumption of individual’s responsibility, insufficient rigorous RG standards and 
absence of monitoring by the government of Macao.  
 
In summary, RG can be seen as a symbolic commitment of organisations in the 
gambling industry to improve customer protection or health issues so as to fulfil social 
demands and expectations (Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990). The symbolic pursuit of RG is 
employed to minimise the legitimacy threat in form of gambling- and health-related 
issues to ensure the likelihood of their survival in Macao’s gambling industry. 
  
8.3.3 Contribution to existing accounts of responsible gambling   
As discussed in Chapter 7, RG appears to improve the gambling companies’ 
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performance; in other words, what is ostensibly for the benefit of the employee is also, 
and possibly more importantly, a benefit for the employer. The awareness of RG can be 
enhanced to prevent employees from becoming gambling addicts in order to reduce the 
turnover rate of employees (see Hertz, 2001). These findings are similar to the business 
case in CSR. Corporations can “do well by doing good”, which means that they can 
perform well in financial terms in business operations and can be responsible to creating 
a better society (Kurucz, et al., 2008). 
 
However, Delfabbro and King (2012, p. 1553) state that RG is limited by a “business as 
usual” discourse which holds a view that “problem gambling represents only a small 
minority of total gamblers, is attributable largely to individual behaviour and is unlikely 
to be influenced by the nature of the products themselves”. In general, “problem 
gamblers” constitute approximately 2% of the general population (Blaszczynski, et al., 
2011; LaPlante, et al., 2011). However, gambling can cause psychological health crises 
(Quinn, 2001) and induce “problem gambling” (McMillen, 1996b). In particular, a 
problem gambler negatively influences an average of 10 to 17 people, such as family, 
friends and employers (Shaffer and Korn, 2002). Gambling problem can affect social 
relationship and loss of traditional routines, England and Albrechi, 1984; Korn and 
Shaffer, 1999; Chapter 1). This evidence suggests that corporate externalities on the 
local community cannot be omitted or excluded from the discourse of organisations in 
Macao’s gambling industry. Without such corporate externalities, these organisations 
would not be so profitable. 
 
In addition, this RG model is based on seven stated assumptions (Chapter 2), 
particularly, that the total societal benefits of gambling must exceed the social cost. RG 
296 
 
in this context is similar to the business case of CSR, with the assumption of making a 
good business and improving shareholder value (see Banerjee, 2008). Organisations in 
Macao’s gambling industry are profit-making corporations, rather than operated in the 
public interest. The design of an organisation in contemporary capitalism follows a 
financial initiative (see Gray and Milne, 2004). Thus, genuine RG engagement can be 
regarded as incompatible with an economic objective (Soriano, et al., 2012). RG can 
arguably be regarded as a long-term business development tool to improve financial 
performance (Chapter 7). 
 
8.3.4 Responsible gambling and stakeholders accounts of CSR  
Every corporation interacts positively or negatively with stakeholders (Carroll, et al., 
2012). The most common stakeholders generally include owners, employees, suppliers, 
customers, local community and government (see Freeman, 1984; 2010; Chapter 2) who 
can affect or be affected by the industry. As RG can be viewed as a subset of CSR, 
stakeholders in RG initiatives in Macao with a wide range of the population, including 
government, gamblers, family members and friends, gaming operators, problem 
gambling prevention and treatment centres, and education and other community 
organisations (Appendix 18). Stakeholders in the concept of CSR are similar to 
stakeholders in the concept of RG (Section 8.2). 
 
The findings examined in Chapter 7 lend weight to my argument concerning CSR in 
Section 8.2 (Chapters 5 and 6). Organisations in Macao’s gambling industry are so 
influential and powerful that they are in a great position to shape their discourses and 
practices of RG to be beneficial, rather than harmful to their business. In particular, the 
target audience of RG programmes usually aim at gamblers and the public 
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(Blaszczynski, et al., 2011). However, the findings indicate that this industry appears to 
prioritise the support and allocation of more resources to its employees over its 
customers in RG programmes. Both the Chinese and international gambling companies 
attempt to educate stakeholders that employees are the most vulnerable people in the 
industry as casinos front-line employees showed vulnerability to disorder gambling and 
stressful working conditions. Other justifications were, firstly, the feedback from 
problem gambling counselling centres that the users of the services were employees, 
rather than customers, and, secondly, the major source of customers are from mainland 
China, rather than Macao. Thus, the negative externalities appeared to be omitted by the 
gambling industry discourse. Organisations in Macao’s gambling industry may focus on 
what they can do (gamblers in Macao), rather than what they cannot do (i.e. gamblers 
from mainland China). 
 
Organisations in Macao’s gambling industry can be said to employ RG in relation to the 
protection of people, focusing on their ability to protect employees, rather than saying 
little on their inability to protect customers, thereby distracting the public’s attention 
away from customer protection towards employee protection. These organisations rarely 
use the term problem gamblers, representatives of the industry referring to all customers 
as customers in the interviews. This view is supported by the fact that preventing the 
community from focussing on unfavourable information. These organisations – in all 
probability - employ RG as a means of distancing themselves from potential challenge 
and minimising criticism of their social impacts on the community.  
 
As I argue in Chapter 6, Macao’s gambling industry employs CSR as a means of 
distracting the Macao public’s attention away from negative impact of the industry on 
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local community, while drawing attention to the positive impact of the industry, thus in 
turn creates a far more positive impression of the industry. These findings are in line 
with Lindblom’s (1993) third legtimation strategy. This strategy of the gambling 
industry is similar to the strategy of Moerman and Van Der Lann (2005) and Tilling and 
Tilt (2010) for the tobacco industry. The industry shifted attention from providing 
services for assisting problem gamblers to social involvements, which are similar to the 
findings of Hing and McMillen (2002) for the Australian gambling industry. The 
negative effects of this industry tend to be unrepresented in the interviews.  
 
In summary, RG is maintained as a symbolic commitment only is potentially harmful to 
certain stakeholders, particularly if the industry’s adoption of RG fails to act in the 
interests of certain groups, in particular consumers (gamblers), within society. The 
industry has endeavoured to shift in the meaning of RG away from key stakeholders 
(see Bondy, et al., 2012) concerns towards profit-making concerns and thus bolster its 
position as a legitimate organisation without really changing its operations. These 
findings suggest that questions remain about whether or not Macao’s gambling industry 
can truly embrace CSR and RG.  
 
8.4 CSR as a source of strategic legitimacy  
8.4.1 Source of legitimacy 
Organisations in Macao’s gambling industry not only manage stakeholders’ perceptions, 
but also gain different sources of legitimacy in order to enhance their survival. These 
organisations wish to appear “legitimate” to two main audiences: internal audiences and 
external audiences (Chapters 6 and 7). Each group provides certain forms of political 
and social support through better access to critical resources without which these 
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organisations would not be so profitable. 
 
The internal audiences are the parent companies (Chapter 6). In particular, the 
international companies operated in Macao seem to share CSR and RG polices, 
practices and guidelines with the parent companies. They tend to use the parent 
company as a point of reference, thereby increasing the companies’ reliability about 
their CSR and RG operations in Macao. This corporate culture can be viewed as an 
example of internal legitimacy, which suggests that a sub-unit adopting the 
“organisational structures, policies and practices institutionalized within the MNEs” will 
be likely to operate in a similar mode according to external legitimacy requirements 
(Kostova and Zaheer, 1999, p. 72). This is vital for the industry’s survival of a 
subsidiary because of its dependence on the parent company for continuing access to 
resources, for example capital, knowledge and technology (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  
 
The external audiences can be divided into six major groups. Organisations in Macao’s 
gambling industry appear to engage in efforts to maintain legitimacy despite such issues 
as gambling problem through identifying some symbols of social legitimacy through 
CSR engagement and RG initiatives. First, the support of the local community can be 
important in gaining acceptance and can enhance the complementary relations between 
corporations and community (Chapters 6 and 7). Several internal stakeholders mostly 
working at senior and middle management levels in the international gambling 
companies and to a lesser extent by those who working in the Chinese gambling 
companies expressed this view. Thus, these organisations appear to employ CSR and 
RG as a proactive strategy, which can be considered preventing the public’s resistance 
to their dominance in Macao so as to increase the likelihood of acceptability or possibly 
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reduced chances of opposition (Weaver, et al., 1999). These findings are similar to those 
of Palazzo and Richter (2005) for the tobacco industry. 
 
Second, the government of Macao could be viewed as an authority which establishes 
the regulations that control the way Macao’s gambling industry should behave in Macao 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Singh, et al., 1986; Baum and Oliver, 1991; Deephouse, 
1996). Several internal and external stakeholders expressed this view. More importantly, 
the government can determine the situations for the retention of gambling licenses to 
operate organisations in the gambling industry, and ensure their activities that will not 
act against citizens’ rights (Crane, et al., 2004). Thus, maintaining a good relationship 
with the government appears to be an important legitimating strategy for CSR and RG 
implementation to ensure the industry’s survival and gain sources of legitimacy 
(Chapters 6 and 7). This industry instrumentally manipulates CSR and RG in order to 
gain political support to enlighten self-interest through a better access to three main 
critical resources: renew gambling licenses in 2020 and 2022, land for business 
expansion and a steady stream of imported labour (Chapters 6 and 7).  
 
Third, the Chinese government appears to be another important source of legitimacy 
(Chapters 6 and 7). The Chinese government forms the regulations that permit the 
legalisation of Macao’s gambling industry (Appendix 2), and determine the conditions, 
and standards of behaviour for the industry (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Singh, et al., 
1986; Baum and Oliver, 1991; Deephouse, 1996). This view was expressed by external 
stakeholders, but to a lesser extent by internal stakeholders. It is possible to suggest that 
internal stakeholders did not explicitly discuss the relationship between their companies 
and the Chinese government. In particular, the Chinese government appears to indirectly 
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control the travel and visa schemes by which customers from mainland China 
(comprising 90% of the total customer pool) may travel to Macao. Macao is the only 
legal gambling place in mainland China (Vong, 2004; BBC, 2009; MarketLine, 2013c); 
whereas, mainland China is allowed to a limited form of a government lottery 
(Appendix 2). According to the findings discussed in Chapters 6 and 7, organisations in 
Macao’s gambling industry employ CSR to maintain a good relationship with the 
Chinese government in general and employ RG to tackle the problem of increasing 
social impact exported to mainland China in particular; thereby gaining critical 
resources (visitors) from mainland China through the “Free Travel Scheme” policy to 
ensure continued these organisations’ survival in Macao. Without these important 
customers, neither gaming income nor profits are possible. More pertinently, the 
Chinese tend to exhibit higher participation rates than Caucasians (Raylu and Oei, 2004; 
Lau and Ranyard, 2005; Chapter 1). Chinese culture has unique concepts of fate, chance 
and luck and gambling culture has been a part of Chinese lifestyle, history and culture 
(Raylu and Oei, 2004; Papineau, 2005). Hence, the gambling industry is under “the 
rules of the game” to make profit.  
 
Fourth, the University of Macao is an important mediator in the legitimacy of the 
industry (Chapter 7). The academic institution involved in the RG programme has 
actually taken an important role in standing, shaping and promoting RG polices, 
standards and guidelines through working closely with the government of Macao. 
Macao’s gambling industry could sustain its survival through supporting RG 
programmes, particularly attending “Responsible Gambling Awareness Week” (RGAW), 
and RG training courses. Such collaboration with the University of Macao could be 
seen as a major pillar to legitimise current structures so as to increase the gambling 
302 
 
industry’s credibility. These findings are similar to those of Palazzo and Richter (2005) 
for the tobacco industry, which suggests that the collaboration is between the tobacco 
company (Philip Morris) and a medicine professor (Ragnar Rylander) who dealt with 
the research in relation to the health effects of passive smoking. The academic 
institution is seen by the companies in the gambling industry as providing creditability 
for political support of other authorities bodies, such as the government of Macao. 
These findings are consistent with Deephouse and Suchman’s (2008) idea, which claims 
how organisations gain the sources of legitimacy from interorganisational relations 
(Chapter 2). However, there is the risk of appointing the academic institution to develop 
the RG agenda. This academic institution is largely funded by the gambling industry 
indirectly through gambling taxation (Chapter 7). It is possible to suggest that the 
University of Macao only have developed RG guidelines with the stated social and 
economic assumptions (Chapter 2) and thus the gambling industry can be expected to 
achieve some form of responsibility under a business as usual scenario. Thus, this 
industry’s approach to its legitimacy may have been indirect, complex, and subtle. 
 
Fifth, the second last source of legitimacy seem to be professional gambling counselling 
service organisations (Chapter 5). The government of Macao and the local community 
are heavily dependent on the gambling industry. The government and the gambling 
industry appear to associate with problem gambling counselling service organisations. 
Organisations in Macao’s gambling industry are likely to develop an 
inter-organisational relation with these counselling service organisations (Deephouse 
and Suchman, 2008), which can help these gambling companies to distance themselves 
from criticism and attempt to justify them to be good citizens. These counselling service 
organisations can be seen by organisations in the gambling industry as providing 
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creditability for community support or political support of other authorities, for example 
the government of Macao. The gambling industry can make use of these resources, for 
example, the feedback from problem gambling counselling centres that the users of the 
services were employees rather than customers (Chapter 7). These findings are similar 
to Deephouse and Suchman’s (2008) view, which claim that how organisations gain the 
sources of legitimacy from interorganisational relations (Chapter 2). However, there is a 
possible dilemma between helping problem gamblers and getting counselling service 
organisations’ funding. In particular, the non-profit counselling organisations are largely 
funded by the gambling industry indirectly through gambling taxation (Chapter 7). 
There is a possible risk that the non-profit counselling organisations tend to help 
employees rather than customers and thus the gambling industry can possibly achieve 
some form of responsibility.  
 
Sixth, the final source of legitimacy is the media (Chapter 6). Different forms of media, 
including newspapers, videos and TV shows, could educate, influence and shape the 
opinions of employees and the public about the industry’s past CSR achievements 
concerning community involvements in Macao’s gambling industry (see Fombrun and 
Shanley, 1990). This view was recognised by several internal stakeholders mostly in the 
international gambling companies and to a lesser extent by those who working in the 
Chinese gambling companies. This can be regarded as a communication strategy to 
enhance its organisational legitimacy. However, organisations in the international 
gambling industry simply do not need to develop some symbols, CSD and RG, to 
maintain social legitimacy. These organisations are to simply remain silent on the 
sensitive issues, which can be regarded as a proactive response (O’Donovan, 2002). 
These findings are consistent with those of Campbell, et al., (2003) for the UK’s 
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tobacco industry, Tilling and Tilt (2010) for the Australian tobacco industry, and De 
Villiers and van Staden (2006) for South African mining industry. 
 
8.4.2 Strategic legitimacy  
The construction of the gambling industry is contested for two reasons: the gambling 
industry may or may not be a legalised and gambling may or may not be a legitimated 
form of activity (Reith, 2007; Chapter 2). However, this industry has been linked to 
illegal activities (Chapter 1) and thus it was perceived to be negative. 
 
Organisations in Macao are gambling industry employ CSR as a means of managing 
stakeholders (Chapter 6). First, these organisations attempt to change stakeholders’ 
perception by balancing the perceived negative social impact against a positive and 
extensive CSR engagement in Macao, including community involvements, employee 
welfare and economic development. Second, these organisations tend to adopt symbolic 
CSR initiatives of social legitimacy. Third, these organisations attempt to distract the 
Macao public’s attention away from perceived negative impact of the industry on local 
community, while drawing attention to the positive impact of the industry, thus in turn 
changes the public’s attitude to the industry, making the public far more positive 
impression.  
 
More pertinently, organisations in Macao’s gambling industry attempt to identify 
symbols of social legitimacy, namely CSR, to signify falsely that their organisational 
performance has already changed; however, these organisations endeavoured to bolster 
their position as a legitimate organisation without really changing their operations. The 
legitimising activity could benefit the interests of the owners of the gambling industry, 
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rather than the interests of consumers. It could be argued that CSR is viewed as 
potentially quite harmful to certain stakeholders if the industry’s adoption of CSR fails 
to act in the interests of particular group or particular customers (gamblers), within 
society. It seems fair to suggest that this strategic focus on CSR without explicitly 
concerning gambling- and health-related issues can be viewed as a symbolic, rather than 
substantive, management technique (Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990) to reduce this 
legitimacy gap in order to ensure that the gambling industry presents a minimal threat to 
its business operation. These findings are similar to the legitimacy literature (Seith, 
1978; Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975; Lindblom, 1993) and the strategic legitimacy 
literature (Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990; Suchman, 1995) (Chapter 2).  
 
8.5 Contribution to the literature  
8.5.1 Critical perspective on CSR   
The thesis has responded to the calls from certain scholars in the CSR literature for 
much more critical examination of specific CSR practices (Banerjee, 2007; Devinney, 
2009). The complexity and subtlety of corporations’ reasons for CSR engagement need 
to be examined in reflexive mode. Relatively few studies have examined the tension 
between CSR and profit making in such controversial industries as tobacco (Pava and 
Krausz 1997; Palazzo and Richeter, 2005; Tilling and Tilt, 2010; Fooks, et al., 2013) 
and brewing (Quaak, et al., 2007). The gambling industry, a further example of a 
controversial industry, has received relatively little attention in the CSR literature. With 
this novel setting, examining CSR in the gambling industry provides an opportunity to 
examine the subtle and complex relationship between business and society. The 
understanding and CSR engagement of the gambling industry may have different and 
interesting contexts (Cai, et al., 2012; Soriano, et al., 2012). The thesis suggests that 
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CSR can be considered a cloak deployed by corporations to cover up their corporate 
externalities, such as gambling addiction and health-related issues. Corporations in the 
gambling industry are becoming increasingly influential in business and society. 
Corporations are likely to shape CSR to their advantage by choosing their own 
stakeholders which are beneficial to them. Corporations employ CSR in order to portray 
themselves as good businesses in order to create a stable, secure, and responsible 
business environment and thus in turn to ensure their survival, placate stakeholders and 
lobby government. The thesis has presented a potential case that the gambling industry 
appears to be a source of tension and conflict in deepening the understanding of CSR in 
this context. An analysis of this industry may enhance scholarly understanding of the 
nature and development of CSR. 
 
Organisations in Macao’s gambling industry engage in symbolic CSR and RG practices 
so as to manage stakeholders’ perceptions and in an effort to appear legitimate to a 
range of audiences to gain different sources of legitimacy to ensure their survival. More 
pertinently, the most essential mechanism in the gambling industry can be one of this 
symbolic CSR, which is called the RG Initiative. This thesis has made a particularly 
novel contribution in recognising the importance of RG, a further example of CSR, in 
the gambling industry. RG can be regarded as a symbolic management technique as 
discussed in the thesis and in turn to enhance the gambling industry’s economic interest.  
 
 
The thesis also has responded to the calls from scholars for how CSR is conceptualised 
differently in different countries (Blowfield and Frynas, 2005; Scherer, et al., 2009). The 
thesis has raised important questions about the meaning of CSR and its applicability in 
different cultural contexts (see Bondy, et al., 2012), since the thesis was primarily 
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conducted in Macao (mainland China), and the perception of CSR in Macao’s gambling 
industry. As a result, the thesis might help western academics to appreciate the ways in 
which the concept of CSR in a developing country, Macao (mainland China), may take 
on its own specific context-dependent meaning and may be different from or similar to 
that in developed countries (see Moon and Shen, 2010). However, this 
context-dependent meaning is a complex issue. Given Macao’s location within Chinese 
heritage culture, one might expect a strong influence of the traditional elements of 
Chinese culture. Interestingly, possibly and unexpectedly, the findings in the thesis 
suggest that the two Chinese cultural traits, “Confucianism” and “Buddhism”, were not 
widely recognised by interviewees in Macao. This may be due to Macao’s colonial 
history. As a result of migration of Catholicism and Protestantism to Macao in the early 
20th century (Appendix 2), this infusion of different religions could dilute or weaken 
the region’s eastern culture and in turn this may have profoundly influenced local 
residents (Appendix 2). Such insights can further these academics understanding of the 
nature and development of CSR in Asian countries, for example mainland China. 
 
8.5.2 Links between CSR and legitimacy literature  
Several studies have concentrated on CSR in the gambling industry without discussing 
legitimacy (Hing, 2001; Jones, et al., 2009; Lee and Park, 2009; Li, et al., 2011). The 
thesis has contributed to the CSR and legitimacy literature that how organisations in 
controversial industries, particularly the gambling industry, appears to have a similar 
nature to the tobacco industry to seek legitimacy (see Pava and Krausz, 1997; Campbell, 
et al., 2003; Moerman and Der Laan, 2005; Palazzo and Richer, 2005; Tilling and Tilt, 
2010; Fooks, et al., 2013). Relatively little prior CSR research relating to legitimacy has 
focused on organisations in the gambling industry; however, recent studies (Miller and 
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Michelson, 2012; Reast, et al., 2012) have examined legitimacy in this industry. The 
legitimacy-seeking strategies of organisations in Macao’s gambling industry have 
provided an in-depth investigation of how and why these organisations seek legitimacy.  
 
This thesis has contributed to the literature on legitimacy theory by investigating the 
gambling industry. This industry presents a case that pushes the boundaries of this 
theory, which has received relatively little attention in the controversial industries. This 
thesis has made two main contributions to the CSR and legitimacy literature.  
 
8.5.2.1. CSR in the strategic legitimacy literature  
Organisations operating in controversial industries receive much higher scrutiny than 
those uncontroversial industries (Reast, et al., 2012). A few studies pertaining to 
organisational legitimacy have concentrated on organisations in controversial industries 
(Reast, et al., 2012). The thesis can help to address organisational legitimacy in the 
international gambling industry in general, and Macao’s gambling industry in particular. 
The thesis contributes by exploring a novel case of the gambling industry.  
 
In the thesis, it can be argued that the construction of legitimacy in the gambling 
industry can be more subtle and complex than uncontroversial industries due to two 
main reasons: (1) the industry may or may not be a legalised and (2) gambling may or 
may not be a legitimated form of activity (Reith, 2007; Chapters 1 and 2). Organisations 
in the gambling industry are typically socially constructed an “illegitimate”, which is 
similar to those of the tobacco industry (see Campbell, et al., 2003). These organisations 
might seek the legitimacy implicit with adoption of CSR for two main reasons: 
continuity and creditability (Reast, et al., 2012, 2012). Continuity can achieve due to 
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key stakeholders providing significant resources to industries that appear to be 
“desirable, proper and appropriate within some socially constructed systems of norms” 
(Suchman, 1995, p. 574), while creditability might enhance how individuals understand 
the industry’s trustworthiness (Miller and Michelson, 2012). There has been a lack of 
research into tactics or strategies employed to gain legitimacy in the gambling industry. 
Several studies have investigated organisational tactics or strategies to gain or seek 
legitimacy in a number of such industries as tobacco (Tilling and Tilt, 2010), brewing 
(Campbell, et al., 2003) and minerals (Deegan and Blomquist, 2006). Yet, a few studies 
have examined maintaining legitimacy in the gambling industry. 
 
Organisations in the gambling industry continue to face ongoing threats to its legitimacy 
in the form of gambling addiction and health-related issues (Chapters 1 and 2). It could 
be argued that these organisations endeavoured to develop symbols of social legitimacy, 
including CSD, CSR initiatives, and RG practices. Some scepticism remains about 
whether or not the gambling industry and Macao’s gambling industry are actually 
engaging in CSD, CSR, and RG.  
 
Organisations in the international gambling industry tend to adopt proactive strategies in 
gaining legitimacy, rather than to take reactive strategies to repair legitimacy to respond 
an unforeseen crisis. They seem not to need to develop CSD and RG disclosure to repair 
their social legitimacy. These findings are entirely different from prior CSD literature, 
which suggest that corporations increase the volume of disclosure when they face a 
threat of their legitimacy. However, the findings for organisations in the gambling 
industry are not supporting this traditional view. The findings are similar to the 
controversial industries, which found that reducing disclosure can be viewed as a 
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legitimising strategy (Section 8.2.3). This view has received little examination in the 
academic literature. Furthermore, Macao’s gambling industry appears to engage 
symbolically, rather than substantively, in CSR initiatives in general and RG initiative in 
particular in order to manage stakeholders’ perception and gain sources of legitimacy in 
order to enhance the industry’s survival. These findings are consistent with the strategic 
legitimacy literature (Chapter 2; Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975; Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990; 
Lindblom, 1993; Suchman, 1995). This thesis has not only made a contribution to 
understand CSR in a novel setting of the gambling industry, but also to identify one of 
the important mechanism from the symbolic CSR, particularly RG initiative, to enhance 
the gambling industry’s financial interest. 
 
More pertinently, the most essential mechanism in the gambling industry can be one of 
symbolic CSR, which is called RG Initiative. This thesis has made a particularly novel 
contribution in recognising the importance of RG, a further example of CSR, in the 
gambling industry. RG can be regarded as a symbolic management technique as 
discussed in the thesis and in turn to enhance the gambling industry’s economic interest. 
 
8.5.2.2. CSR in the institutional legitimacy literature  
In the thesis, these findings of organisations in the international gambling industry 
(Chapter 4) and organisations in Macao’s gambling industry (Chapters 5, 6 and 7) are 
somewhat similar to those of the institutional legitimacy literature, which suggest that 
these organisations are shaped by and entirely conform to the institutional environment 
(Chapter 2). The thesis can also contribute to the institutional legitimacy literature as the 
gambling industry tends to lack institutional pressure at three levels: global, industry 
and regional. In the absence of strong institutional pressures, including coercive, 
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mimetic and normative pressures, these organisations can shape CSR in ways beneficial 
to them.  
 
First, at global level, organisations in the gambling industry appear to lack institutional 
pressure from international governmental organisations, such as the United Nations, the 
World Bank, or the OECD, to have some institutional forms, such as the UN Global 
Compact (Chapter 2). According to the findings discussed in Chapter 4, not all the 
sample gambling companies applied CSR reporting standards and RG reporting 
standards. However, these findings are not consistent with prior CSR literature, which 
found that MNCs operating across countries tend to be more likely to sign up to the 
standards of responsible business than those companies operating in a single country 
(Chapple and Moon, 2005). These organisations seem to lack weak self-regulation, 
which can be described as soft law with voluntary actions, since a company’s 
compliance with the standards is voluntary (Moon, et al., 2011; Chapter 2). These 
phenomena often depend on national governments to monitor, censure and prosecute 
companies, thus the absence of symbolic power of international organisations can 
weaken the significance of legitimacy at the global level (Moon, et al., 2011).  
 
The reason for this was not clear, but it may relate to the size of the corporation. There 
is no relationship between the size of the corporation and the volume of disclosure 
(Chapter 4). These findings are not consistent with the mainstream CSD literature 
(Andrews, et al., 1989; William, 1999; Gao, 2005); however, these findings are in line 
with those of CSR studies, which found no size effect (Lynn, 1992; Roberts, 1992; 
Bouten, et al., 2012). There are two possible explanations for this phenomenon. The 
industry uses local, rather than international, reporting practices and authorities as a 
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point of reference.  
 
The content analysis findings (Chapter 4) suggest that the sampled gambling companies 
appeared to comply with local or national reporting standards, such as The Companies 
Act 2006 (the UK), The Corporations Act 2001 (Australia) and The King III Code on 
Corporate Governance 2008 (South Africa). Furthermore, the gambling industry can be 
said to operate on a national, rather than international level with reference to local, as 
opposed to international authorities. Taking the UK and Australia as examples, the UK 
gambling companies appear to make references to local bodies, for example the 
Gambling Commission, the British Gambling Prevalence Survey and the Association of 
British Bookmarkers in their annual reports. The Australian gambling companies tend to 
refer to local authorities, for example the Australia Gaming Council, the Australasian 
Casino, and the Victorian Responsible Gambling Ministerial Advisory Council. 
 
However, the content analysis findings (Chapter 4) are not entirely in line with prior 
CSR literature which found that MNCs tend to response to the mimetic pressure of the 
“soft law” by adopting voluntary actions and self-regulation, which can be viewed as 
the “the new institutionalism” in CSR (Matten and Moon, 2008; Moon et al, 2011). 
Organisations in the gambling industry did not widely apply any multi-stakeholder CSR 
institutions or any global non-financial reporting standards, codes and guidelines, such 
as AA 1000 guideline, the Global Reporting Initiative’s (GRI) Sustainability Guidelines, 
and international standards on human rights (the International Labour Organisation) 
(Moon, et al., 2011; Chapter 2). These organisations are less likely to imitate industry 
peers that are perceived as influential or successful (Haveman, 1993) and viewed as 
examples of “best practices” (Matten and Moon, 2008). However, only some of the 
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gambling companies in the sample followed certain international reporting standards, 
for example ISO 9001, ISO 14001 (the UK and Australia), and ISO 26000. 
 
Additionally, the findings suggest that organisations in the gambling industry did not 
find normative isomorphic pressures at the global level. These organisations do not 
seem to have such education and professional authorities to provide training, for 
example auditor training for awarding certification, such as ISO 26000, workshops and 
seminars (Matten and Moon, 2004). These findings are similar to those of Bondy, et 
al.’s (2012) study which shows that MNCs did not find normative isomorphic pressure 
to be a significant driver in the UK context.  
 
Second, at industry level, there is no international gambling association which can be 
expected to develop an international RG standard, practice and guideline so that the 
gambling industry can follow RG (Chapter 4). In other words, in the absence of strong 
coercive pressure at the industry level, organisations in the gambling industry can 
follow their best interests. The reason behind this phenomenon is not apparent, but it 
might have something to do with the absence of adequate industry reporting 
requirements (Blaszczynski, et al., 2011). The unexpectedly weak pressure from 
international organisations was insufficient to regulate this industry. Indeed, the 
gambling industry is completely different from other industries, such as the Australian 
mineral industry, which has some guidelines for Sustainable Development (KPMG, 
2005; Deegan and Blomquist, 2006), and the tobacco industry, which has international 
standards of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) developed by the 
World Health Organisation (WHO), which sets international standards on issues, for 
example tobacco production, marketing and anti-smuggling (Moerman and Van Der 
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Laan, 2005) (Chapter 2). Therefore, the international gambling industry apparently does 
not follow any international RG standard, but a national, industry-based RG standard. 
Each company seems to apply a mandatory or voluntary RG standard developed by the 
host country.  
 
There is a rising trend in adopting CSR practices or reports in the developed countries 
and in industry so that the gambling industry is expected to mimic this process so as to 
learn and develop CSR and RG practices (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Suchman, 1995; 
Chapter 2). However, the findings suggest, among international gambling companies, 
there seems to be weak mimetic process of CSR and RG disclosure due to the absence 
of strong isomorphic pressure from peers at the industry level and strong coercive 
institutional pressures from the global and industry level (Chapter 4). The content 
analysis findings suggest that organisations in the gambling industry tend to neither 
keep pace with competitors at the industry level nor become CSR or RG leaders in the 
industry. Furthermore, even though RG disclosure may be regarded as “best practice” in 
the gambling industry, the strategic approach of RG disclosure appears to be at local, 
rather than industry level due to the variance of RG disclosure practices at national level 
and inadequate RG reporting requirements at industry level. These findings are not in 
line with those of prior CSD studies in other industries which suggest that organisations 
in the minerals industry appear to have strong a mimetic process of environmental 
reporting practices (Deegan and Blomquist, 2006).  
 
Furthermore, the findings also suggest that organisations in the gambling industry did 
not find normative isomorphic pressures at the industry level. There is little evidence to 
suggest that education and professional institutions provide RG training. Yet, RG 
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training does not have one established norm for its implementation and varies across 
different jurisdictions (Chapter 7; Appendix 3). 
 
Third, at regional level, organisations in Macao’s gambling industry in general do not 
have strong institutional pressure from the government of Macao to implement CSR as 
the government is heavily dependent on this industry (Chapters 5, 6 and 7). This 
phenomenon is partly due to weak and incomplete regulatory enforcement during the 
pre-liberalisation era of Macao’s gambling industry (Fong, et al., 2011). In other words, 
the government tends to regulate this industry in a relaxed legal environment, so this 
industry appears to be able to operate in a legal vacuum. Unexpectedly, the concept of 
legal responsibility (Carroll, 1979; 1991; Moon and Vogel, 2008) was not prevalent in 
Macao’s gambling industry (Chapter 5). It was unusual that the internal stakeholders did 
not feel much obligation to comply with regulations. The reason for this was not clear, 
but it may related to level of obligation. Importantly, this concept may intertwine, 
overlap, and interlink with other CSR concepts namely, employment practice and the 
obligation to pay taxes (Chapter 8). These concepts could be regarded as implicit CSR 
that is in the form of norms and rules without a deliberate, voluntary, and strategic 
decision (Matten and Moon, 2008). More pertinently, explicit CSR refers to voluntary 
corporate policies and tends to common in the multi-national gambling companies 
operating in Macao, which is a so-called developing country, where there are a weak 
institution, a weak enforcement, and poor governance (see Matten and Moon, 2008). 
 
Organisations in Macao’s gambling industry are effectively in a position to take 
advantage of Macao’s relatively loose regulation of the gambling industry for business 
operation and to move its investment to a place where local laws are suitable for this 
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industry. These findings in Macao are not in line with those of prior CSR studies in 
developed countries (Chapter 2), which suggest that regional and local governments 
which have developed CSR polices in European countries, such as the German province 
of North Rhine-Westphalia, the UK local government (Matten and Moon, 2008) and the 
French government (Igalens and Nioche, 1997 cited in Gond, et al., 2011). Gond, et al. 
(2011, p. 647) established “Five CSR-government configurations”. For categorising 
industry by relationship with government, there are five relationship types, namely CSR 
as self-government, CSR as facilitated by government, CSR as a partnership with 
government, CSR as mandated by government and CSR as a form of government (Gond, 
et al., 2011 p. 647 - 648). Interestingly, organisation in Macao’s gambling industry can 
be classified CSR as self-government category, rather than other relationship types 
(Gond, et al, 2011). The government of Macao seems to have a little interference in 
CSR in Macao’s gambling industry; however, CSR in this context is a typical case of 
CSR beyond legal requirement (see Gond, et al., 2011). These findings are common 
patterns in East Asia (Gond, et al., 2011).  
 
Similar to previous findings, organisations in Macao’s gambling industry do not have 
strong institutional pressure from the government of Macao to implement RG polices, 
practices and guidelines (Chapter 7). These findings are not in line with those of RG in 
developed countries, such as Canada, Australia and the UK (Chapter 2; Appendix 3), 
which shows that RG is a mandatory, rather than voluntary initiative (Chapter 2). The 
reason for this is not apparent, though it may have something to do with political and 
economic issues. Firstly, the government appears to be reluctant to apply stringent RG 
standards since that would lead to it losing revenue, as the government is heavily 
dependent on this industry. These findings are consistent with those of Smith’s (2009) 
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study of other governments in developed countries are highly dependent on the 
gambling industry. Secondly, the gambling industry is the leading industry in Macao. 
The vast majority of local residents, employees, and civil servants are heavily dependent 
on this industry. Thus, the government of Macao tends to rely on the initiative of 
gambling companies themselves to engage in self-regulated voluntary RG practices.  
 
However, the level of obligation tends to be low. There are two particular examples to 
illustrate this argument. First, the voluntary self-exclusion programme tends to be 
unsuccessful. Apparently, the limitation is due to the absence of a centralised party, 
particularly the government of Macao, to regulate RG. It is not possible for gambling 
companies to work collaboratively to support this programme due to the privacy 
protection regulation. Second, in addition to accessibility, Macao residents seem to find 
it easy to access gambling places. Macao’s gambling companies tend to locate their 
outlets in residential areas, which can be expected to increase the number of problem 
gamblers. This industry tends to attach more importance to customer gambling 
convenience than customer safety concerns in order to enhance its economic benefits. 
These findings are not in line with those of Williams, et al. (2007), who claimed that 
other countries, such as Australia, France, and Malaysia, do not permit residents to 
gamble at casinos. This policy is to ensure that gambling revenues are from outside of a 
host country in order to protect local residents from social harm (Williams, et al., 2007). 
 
Regarding mimetic pressure in Macao’s gambling industry, there is some evidence of a 
weak mimetic process of CSR and RG initiatives in the international gambling 
companies in Macao, but not in the non-international gambling companies. CSR and 
RG initiatives appear to come in from the international gambling organisations, 
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particularly from the US, via their parent company. The subsidiaries of international 
gambling companies operated in Macao were, in most cases, heavily dependent on the 
parent company for accessing critical resources with particular reference to CSR and 
RG knowledge and philosophy from the parent company in order to develop CSR and 
RG initiatives. These findings are in line with resource dependency theory (Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978). However, the interview findings suggest that CSR and RG in a 
subsidiary gambling company in Macao was not always entirely the same as the US 
parent company’s and was adapted to the local economic, social and political situation, 
and more importantly, and the local culture. The mimetic process from the industry 
peers tends to be weak in Macao. This interpretation is supported by the fact that there 
is some evidence from the field work that the general CSR and RG concepts, polices 
and initiatives were widely discussed to a greater extent by internal stakeholders 
working in international gambling companies rather than in Chinese gambling 
companies. One of the examples supports this argument. Environmental responsibilities 
were a relatively new concept in the Chinese gambling companies; however, there was 
little evidence to suggest that the Chinese companies attempted to imitate the 
international gambling companies to develop environmental management or practices 
due to the weak institution of environmental regulation in Macao.    
 
Organisations in the gambling industry appear not only to lack coercive, mimetic, and 
normative pressures at global, industry and national levels, but also to demonstrate 
weak normative pressure at regional level (Macao) based on the institutional legitimacy 
literature (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Chapter 2). According to the interview findings 
(Chapter 7), RG developed by the University of Macao plays a significant role in 
shaping and promoting RG policies, standards, and guidelines through working closely 
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with the government of Macao. The professional power is largely assigned by the 
government (see DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). In other words, an academic institution 
can be inferred to have a similar professional understanding of what proper action is 
(Boxenbaum and Jonsson, 2008) and can be viewed as an important centre to develop 
organisational norms and standardise the “skills and cognitive base” of managers and 
employees (DiMaggio and Power, 1983; Bondy, et al., 2012).  
 
The findings (Chapter 7) suggest that RG training courses were organised by the 
academic institution and the government of Macao. In particular, this RG training 
course was for representatives of the gambling companies, who could receive practical 
RG training to cascade these skills and practices to other team members of the company. 
Organisations in Macao’s gambling industry appear to express their support for RG 
training together with “Responsible Gambling Awareness Week” (RGAW). Such 
pressures are often related to education authorities which, as an external source, directly 
or indirectly set standards for legitimate organisational practices (Matten and Moon, 
2008). However, in Macao, RG can be considered a guideline, rather than a regulation 
because the government tends to rely on the voluntary RG engagement of the gambling 
industry. Thus, it would be more effective if the government promoted mandatory, 
rather than voluntary, RG practices. 
 
8.6 Concluding remarks  
This chapter provides a detailed discussion of how organisations in the gambling 
reshape CSR, how responsible gambling can be considered as CSR, CSR can be a 
source of strategic legitimacy and the possible contributions of the thesis to the CSR 
and legitimacy literature. The following chapter (Chapter 9) concludes with a 
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restatement of aims and the findings of the thesis, discusses implications of the thesis 
and also practical applications, and provides limitations of the thesis and some 
recommendations for future research. 
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Chapter 9 
Conclusion 
 
9.1  Introduction 
This chapter concludes this thesis and is divided into four sections. The first section 
introduces of this chapter. The second section provides a restatement of the aims and 
research questions. The third section discusses the implications of the thesis and 
practical applications. Finally, limitations and recommendations for future research are 
made at the end of the chapter. 
 
9.2  Introductory restatement of aims and research questions 
The purpose of this thesis is to respond to the call for further, critical examinations of 
specific CSR practices (Chapters 2). The gambling industry appears to be more complex, 
and contain conflict and tension than other uncontroversial industries in deepening the 
scholarly understanding of CSR in this context. The construction of legitimacy in the 
gambling industry is more complex than other industries due to theory due to laws and 
societal norms (Chapter 2). Legitimacy theory has been employed to provide a 
framework to analyse the findings. Organisations in the gambling industry have been 
facing the ongoing threat to their legitimacy, notably in the form of gambling addiction 
and health-related issues. These organisations can be expected to endeavour to minimise 
the legitimacy gap (Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975; Lindblom, 1993) through developing 
some symbols of social legitimacy, particularly Corporate Social Disclosure (CSD), 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and Responsible Gambling (RG). These three 
perspectives were set out in a form of three research questions (Chapter 2).  
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First, there has been a lack of exploration and guidance in prior CSD literature on the 
gambling industry (Chapter 2). Thus, the first research question relates to an initial 
exploration of the international gambling industry and investigates to what extent the 
gambling industry discloses CSR-related data. The initial exploration of this thesis is a 
preliminary examination into the social and environmental reporting practices of the 
gambling industry and its CSR engagement. Content analysis was employed to examine 
the extent to which organisations in the gambling industry disclose CSD-related 
information across six countries, namely, the UK, the UK, Australia, South Africa, 
Macao and Hong Kong. The selected sample was data from 28 companies, 82 annual 
reports and three years (from 2007 to 2009) (Chapters 3).  
 
According to the legitimacy theory (Chapter 2), organisations in the gambling industry 
can be expected to deploy legitimating disclosure more strongly in order to minimise 
the legitimacy gap (Seith, 1978) through developing symbols of social legitimacy, CSD, 
and RG disclosure. However, the content analysis findings suggest that CSD provided 
by all the sampled gambling companies appears to be relatively low. More pertinently, 
the role of RG seems to be considered as an unimportant issue in annual reports. The 
volume of RG disclosure ranges between relatively low and nothing. Additionally, these 
organisations seem to be reluctant to publish sensitive information on the extent of 
gambling addiction and health-related issues in their annual reports (Chapter 4). Thus, 
such companies are more likely to make low or no social disclosures, meaning 
stakeholders are being slowly neglected by such social non-disclosure (Campbell, et al., 
2003).  
 
These findings for the gambling industry are entirely different from previous CSD 
studies on unexpected disasters or crisis, which suggest that organisations attempt to 
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repair and maintain legitimacy (Patten, 1992; 2002; Elsbach and Sutton, 1992; Elsbach, 
1994; Deegan, et al., 2000). However, these findings are in line with those of Campbell, 
et al. (2003) for the UK’s tobacco industry, Tilling and Tilt (2010) for the Australian 
tobacco industry and De Villiers and van Staden (2006) for the South African mining 
industry, which found that reducing disclosure can be viewed as a legitimising strategy.  
Organisations repairing or maintain legitimacy might view disclosure completely 
different from those organisations building or establishing legitimacy (Campbell, et al., 
2003). Building legitimacy of organisations in the gambling industry might feel that the 
costs of disclosures are higher than the benefits, and thus adopting the best strategy is 
simply to remain silent (see also Campbell, et al., 2003). In addition, these findings are 
supported by O’Donovan (2002) who claims that the lower the perceived legitimacy of 
the organisation, the less likely it was to bother providing CSD. Another explanation 
could be that such companies can be a socially constructed as illegitimate so that social 
disclosure would be “no effective value” (Campbell, et al., 2003). Importantly, little 
unfavourable information is disclosed, supporting Owen and O’Dwyer’s (2008) view 
that voluntary social disclosure appears to illustrate favourable managerial accounts of 
positive information. It could be argued that organisations the gambling industry seem 
not to develop symbols, namely CSR and RG disclosure, to seek their social legitimacy. 
 
Second, the concept of CSR varies across nation, industry, and history. There have been 
relatively limited prior CSR studies aimed at the gambling industry (Chapter 2). Hence, 
the second research question has investigated how CSR is understood in Macao’s 
gambling industry. The subsequent exploration provides a detailed examination of 
stakeholders’ perceptions of current CSR in Macao’s gambling industry. 
Semi-structured interviews were employed to examine 30 internal stakeholders who 
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worked in various positions in major six gambling companies, while from 19 external 
stakeholders who may affect or be affected by the industry (Chapter 3). In terms of the 
understanding of CSR prevalent in Macao’s gambling industry, the thesis’s case study, it 
is argued that organisations in Macao’s gambling industry seem to communicate their 
responsibility by placing more emphasis on social concerns, for example, community 
and employee welfare, and the industry’s positive impact on local economic 
development in order to obscure such negative impacts as gambling addiction and 
health-related issues. Thus, these organisations can arguably shield their role in 
producing corporate externalities and promoting an ethical stance. It is possible to 
suggest that these organisations appear to either omit or exclude their corporate 
externalities from their discourse.  
 
Third, a few CSR studies have investigated CSR in the gambling industry in developing 
countries (Chapter 2). Therefore, the third research question examines why the gambling 
industry engages in CSR. The final examination provides a detailed investigation of the 
motivation for organisations in Macao’s gambling industry to engage in CSR and RG. 
Semi-structured interviews were employed to examine the final question based on the 
views of internal and external stakeholders (Chapters 6 and 7). These organisations 
engage symbolically, rather than substantively, with CSR and RG practices. In this 
thesis, they employ a set of legitimising strategies to manage stakeholders’ perception 
by changing their perception, by educating them and by distracting their attention from 
perceived problems. They wish to appear legitimate to two main audiences: internal 
audiences (the parent company) and external audiences (the public, the government of 
Macao, the Chinese government, The University of Macao, professional gambling 
counselling service organisations, and the media), in order to improve the likelihood of 
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their survival in Macao’s gambling industry. Each group provides certain forms of 
political and social support through a granting greater access to critical resources, 
including knowledge, acceptance, gambling licenses, land, labour, customers and 
creditability without which these organisations would not be so profitable. This 
conclusion is consistent with the strategic legitimacy (Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975; 
Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990; Lindblom, 1993; Suchman, 1995; O’Donovan, 2002).  
 
This thesis can be concluded that organisations in Macao’s gambling industry are in a 
great position but only to choose particular aspects of socially responsible behaviour 
which are beneficial to them, but also to give an account of CSR favourable to their 
activities rather than harmful to their business operations. The evidence suggest that 
these organisations place emphasis on social concerns, while obscuring others. This 
argument lends weight to the next argument that these organisations tend to place 
emphasis on the support of their employees, rather than their customers in the RG 
programme. These organisations bear some form of responsibility towards employees, 
but there is little concern for its customers. The existence of CSR within the gambling 
industry shows a shift in meaning of CSR away from stakeholders concerns towards 
profit-making concerns.  
 
9.3  Implications of the thesis or practical applications 
This thesis provides a general overview of the gambling industry. The findings, analysis 
and discussion of the thesis indicate that organisations in the gambling industry 
somewhat similar to those of the in the institutional legitimacy literature (Chapter 2). 
These organisations appear to lack institutional pressures, including coercive, mimetic 
and normative pressures, from the outside to drive CSR in the gambling industry at both 
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industry and regional levels (see Chapter 8). 
 
At industry level, on account of the unexpected a lack of coercive pressure from 
international gambling associations, there is insufficient pressure to regulate this 
industry. Without such an association, the gambling industry cannot be expected to 
develop an international standard of RG codes, policies, practices, and guidelines. RG 
legislation in the sampled countries has its own gambling regulations, authorities, and 
regulatory bodies. Due to historical, economic, and social backgrounds, it is not 
necessary for the gambling industry to follow or replicate RG legislation in one 
jurisdiction. Thus, there is a great need for a global or international organisation, such as 
the World Health Organisation, to develop international standards of gambling control. 
The nature of the gambling industry is somewhat similar to that of controversial 
industries. For example, the tobacco industry has international standards of the 
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) developed by the World Health 
Organisation (Moerman and Van Der Laan, 2005), while the Australian mineral industry 
has guidelines for Sustainable Development (KPMG, 2005). In the case of the gambling 
industry, an international governing organisation could set standards on such issues as 
gambling addiction prevention, advertising, and anti-money laundering. Such an 
enforcement mechanism could possibly also promote ethically responsible practices.  
 
In addition, there is a little evidence to suggest that few education and profession 
institutions can provide an award RG certification at the industry level. RG varies 
across different jurisdictions and does not have one established norm for it 
implementation (Appendix 3). There is a great need for educational or professional 
authorities at global level to provide auditor training for awarding RG certification, such 
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as RG training, workshops or seminars.   
 
The main form of transparency could be corporate annual reports disclosing positive 
CSR engagement, such as revenues, job creations and philanthropic involvements. 
However, organisations in the gambling industry seem to be reluctant to have an open 
discussion on gambling addiction and health-related issues. As long as corporate 
transparency is limited in this way, the general public suspect the industry’s ongoing 
CSR engagement in community projects. It is fair to suggest that they have little 
self-critique. According to the findings discussed in Chapter 4, transparency concerning 
sensitive areas remains unsatisfactory. The position of the gambling industry tends to be 
more contentious than the other industries, thus, it cannot simply employ the local 
reporting standards, practices and guidelines. These organisations need to develop a 
radical form of transparency, accountability and responsibility in order to show the 
integrity of their operations (see Soriano, et al., 2012). Thus, more disclosure can be 
done in relation to customer protection, public education, and public health care. They 
could do much more to promote RG. They can maintain legitimacy to improve the 
integrity of their operation, which requires transparency, consistency, and fairness. 
Given the relatively low and no volume of voluntary RG disclosure, voluntary RG has 
also failed to change corporate disclosure in practice. This thesis suggests whether some 
form of legal requirement of RG reporting is necessary in the gambling industry.  
 
At regional level, this thesis provides an in-depth analysis of CSR in Macao’s gambling 
industry. This thesis might have some implications for governments considering 
legalising gambling or other policy makers in relation to CSR engagement. The findings 
suggest that there is no sufficient institutional pressure or coervice force from the 
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government of Macao to ensure CSR and RG engagement in Macao’s gambling 
industry yet. Due to the political issues discussed in Chapter 8, there is a danger of the 
government of Macao to be too dependent on gambling revenue, while losing its 
priority of public interest. In addition, the government has the conflict of being a 
recipient of gambling revenue and the industry regulator at the same time. However, 
there is a great need for a legislative system to be implemented in Macao. Previous CSR 
studies in European countries, such as the UK, Germany and France (Matten and Moon, 
2008; Igalens and Nioche, 1997 cited in Gond, et al., 2011), would be of great help in 
the future planning of long term CSR implementation in Macao’s gambling industry. 
 
Due to the establishment of more stringent regulations by government authorities and 
greater pressure from stakeholders, organisations in the gambling industry will be more 
accountable, responsible for, and transparent to what they operate business in society. 
As a result, these organisations attempt to avoid grey areas, thus making profit at the 
expense of the community. This thesis can provide some insights into how these 
organisations may seriously influence individual perception, business ethics, and social 
norms. 
 
In particular, there is a lack of coercive enforcement, the rigorous standards and an 
absence of monitoring of whether or not Macao’s gambling industry complies with, or 
follows, the RG guidelines proposed by the University of Macao. This academic 
insitituion can be regarded as an important centre for delvoping RG training courses for 
managers and employees (Chapter 7) and RG guidelines for the gambling industry 
(Appendix 19); however, organisations in Macao’s gambling industry demonstrate weak 
normative pressure at regional level. RG can be considered a guideline, rather than a 
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regulation because the government of Macao is reluctant to introduce substantive 
regulatory changes due to its dependency on the gambling industry. Thus, RG is 
virtually meaningless in practice; however, RG remains symbolically important. A 
limitation is due to the absence of an efficient and effective legal mechanism. Thus, 
there is a necessity for coercion, rather than voluntary RG initiative in organisations in 
Macao’s gambling industry. There is a tendency amongst these organisations to adopt 
minimum RG requirements on customers and employees rather than a wide range of 
key stakeholders (Appendix 19 and 20). Voluntary RG initiatives seem to be less 
broadly adopted. Obviously, without the incentive of mandatory RG, some companies 
will not fully apply RG guidelines. There has been a paucity of RG studies in 
developing countries (The Institute for the Study of Commercial Gaming, 2009). 
However, the government of Macao can perhaps learn from developed countries, such 
as Canada, Australia, and the UK (Breen, et al., 2005; Miers, 2008; Smith, 2009; 
Delfabbro and King, 2012) regarding RG legislation, including RG signage and 
information, the gambling environment, onsite counselling service, voluntary 
self-exclusion programmes, age restrictions, financial transaction policies, and 
accessibility of gambling venues.  
 
Such an approach is necessary to avoid a number of grey areas, for example, the issue of 
secret collaboration with junket operators. It can be expected that mandatory RG will be 
more effective and efficient, which in turn would protect the vulnerable customers and 
the local community. Failure to do so jeopardises customer health, their family members 
and the welfare of the community. In other words, the government of Macao tends to 
play a vital role putting effective pressure on gambling companies for improved ethical, 
social and environmental concerns. 
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More importantly, the concept of RG is obscure, and thus can possibly lead to confusion, 
low public confidence and unaccountability. Organisations in Macao’s gambling 
industry widely employ the RG guidelines as a point of reference to the University of 
Macao. It would be easy to follow RG guidelines if RG was clearly and precisely 
defined, rather than open to interpretation.  
 
Apart from the mandatory RG and the concept of RG, an independent review of 
Macao’s gambling industry needs to be adopted. National reviews of gambling have 
been conducted in developed countries, namely Australia (The Productivity 
Commission, 1999), the US (Eadington, 2003 cited in Smith, 2009), and the UK (see 
Smith, 2009). These reviews can provide some guidelines for the government of Macao. 
Although the University of Macao has conducted several gambling-related social and 
economic research projects, the institution is not an independent reviewer as it is 
indirectly funded by the gambling industry (Appendix 2). An independent reviewer, for 
example CSR Asia, can offer such a review by placing emphasis on the public interest 
and forming the discourse for the debate.     
 
9.4  Limitations and recommendations for future research 
The analysis of content analysis findings in Chapter 4 attempted to provide a general 
overview of CSD in the gambling industry at the international level. The initial 
exploration of international gambling companies’ disclosure is not conclusive and is 
related to a specific period of time (from 2007 to 2009). Further research could extend 
the sample of gambling companies, the sample countries, and the sample period. 
Additionally, broadening the forms of media, such as stand-alone reports, integrated 
reports and corporate websites, should also be considered. Such approaches could offer 
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a more persuasive, reliable, and objective representation of international disclosure in 
the gambling industry and would establish trends of CSD in this industry over time. 
 
Findings for internal and external stakeholders’ perceptions of CSR in Macao’s 
gambling industry have been examined in Chapters 5 and 6. This thesis is based on a 
sector-specific industry. Further research could be undertaken on the development of 
CSR across industries or a study with similar industries leading to a deeper 
understanding of the extent to which CSR is understood in such “controversial 
industries” as tobacco or brewing. Additionally, this thesis is based on a number of 
interviews conducted in Macao. What is now needed is a cross-country or cross-region 
study, focusing on countries such as Singapore, Hong Kong or Australia, to compare 
and contrast the perceptions and practices of CSR in the gambling industry. 
 
Findings in Chapter 7 related to internal and external stakeholders’ perceptions of RG in 
Macao’s gambling industry. During the fieldwork, the vast majority of the interviewees 
tended to emphasise and elaborate on RG in most of the interviews. Although this thesis 
includes a wide range of internal and external stakeholders, this can obtain a general 
picture and deepen insight into CSR in Macao’s gambling industry. However, the 
sample was limited in terms of problem gamblers. I was unable to contact this group of 
people due to the privacy issue. Through the assistance of problem gambling 
counselling centres, only three problem gamblers were interviewed. There is a potential 
grey area how to define problem gamblers in Macao since most of problem gamblers 
seem to be from mainland China based on the findings. It would be interesting to 
explore local and non-local problem gamblers’ views of CSR and RG to compare 
experiences of casinos employees. This development would create the opportunity to 
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undertake an in-depth case study of a gambling company or multiple case studies to 
seek to explore the interaction between problem gamblers and the gambling industry. 
This could provide a valuable means for other gambling companies to have a better 
insight into the problem of implementing RG in this industry. 
 
Due to time constraints, content analysis and semi-structured interviews were conducted 
in this thesis. The issue of CSR in the gambling industry is an intriguing one, which 
could be usefully explored, in further research. Discourse analysis can be employed as it 
enables a close analysis of the content and language of annual reports or other forms of 
media. Such an approach can seek to understand how gambling companies construct 
their own interpretation of CSR through how they disclose in the annual reports and 
how they communicate with stakeholders. This approach will provide a deeper 
understanding of CSR in the gambling industry. 
 
The thesis is limited to land-based locations, notably casinos, in Macao’s gambling 
industry. Over the past few years, during the course of the thesis, Internet gambling has 
seen a substantial growth and has led to a new realm of gambling opportunity. Different 
forms of gambling are traditionally available in land-based locations, but now gambling 
acitivities are widely available in the Internet. Any individual can easily access the 
Internet, which is much more convenient than the past few decades. More research 
needs to explore Internet gambling. The link between online gambling and CSR or RG 
practices and the extent to which the regulatory and authority addresses the issue of 
gambling problem, unfair or illegal business practices and player practices need to be 
addressed. Further studies on Internet gambling are therefore recommended. 
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The thesis is an exploratory study of the gambling industry in general and Macao’s 
gambling industry in particular; however, the thesis did not explore or provide an 
in-depth investigation of any grey area in this industry. More pertinently, a potential 
question stems from the semi-structured interviews. The relationship between the junket 
operators and Macao’s gambling companies need to be addressed. The thesis found very 
limited information concerning these issues that there is nearly no chance for the 
gambling industry to be held accountable for this progress in this regard. Macao’s 
gambling industry tends to be secretive and sensitive in relation to the confidential 
information of “VIP high rollers” and “big customers”. Over 70% of Macao’s gambling 
revenues were mainly from VIP rooms (Eadington and Siu, 2007). These customers are 
largely from junket operators, who have signed joint-venture contracts with Macao 
gambling operators, which held concessionaries and sub-concessionaires to operate 
“VIP Gaming Rooms” in Macao should be included in CSR polices or RG polices, 
which need to be fully implemented, monitored and reported on. However, this question 
may be addressed through case studies and might possibly link to local mafia.  
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Appendix 1  
History of Gambling 
 
Artefacts and relics pertaining to different games of chance, for example throwing 
stones, drawing sticks and gaming boards, have found in the archaeological remains of 
the Sumerian, Egyptian, and Chinese cultures (Bloch, 1951). The historical context of 
gambling can be divided into three stages, the Protestant Reformation, the Age of 
Enlightenment, the Industrial Revolution (Reith, 2007). The Protestant Reformation 
refers to Games of chance alongside dancing and singing have been condemned as 
sinful for the work ethic, whereby effort were supposed to be rewarded with an proper 
level of wealth (Reith, 2007). The Age of Enlightment refers to Western societies 
criticised the element of irrationality to be embodied in games of chances. Beliefs are in 
luck and fate, rather than in personal effort, human reasoning, and loss in games (Reith, 
2007). The Industrial Revolution is an important stage. Discussions about gambling 
separated slightly from ideological discourses of religion to individual physiology of 
moral defects (Reith, 2007). In the past, the treatment for the “disease” was theological 
counselling and exhortation; however, when these methods failed, the individuals were 
subject to public ridicule, corporal punishment, or imprisonment (Aasved, 2003). A few 
psychiatrists had regarded gambling as an illness in the 1950s.  
 
During the 1970s, psychiatric treatment expanded quickly and The Gamblers 
Anonymous and The American Psychiatric Association (APA) established a treatment 
programme for gamblers, called Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder 
updated version (DSM-IV) and a number of assessment instruments. More than ten 
problem gambling assessment instruments are widely used in mental health care 
agencies. These assessment instruments include Gamblers Anonymous 20 questions 
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(GA-20), South Oaks Gambling Screen (SOGS) and Massachusetts Gambling Screen 
(MAGS), Diagnostic Interview for Gambling Severity (DIGS), Gambling Treatment 
Outcome Monitoring System (GAMTOMS) and National Opinion Research Centre 
DSM-IV Screen for gambling problems (Stinchfield, et al., 2007). These instruments 
have been developed for a wide range of purposes, such as screening, assessment and 
diagnosis (Stinchfield, et al., 2007). 
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Appendix 2 
The Macao context 
A2.1   Introduction 
Macao society has undergone massive change over the past decade. This section 
presents a general overview of Macao and discusses the distinctive features of Macao 
from a socio-economic perspective. In order to develop this overview, the section 
examines Macao’s social context, including demographics, education, health, and 
religion; and Macao’s economic context, including its industry, its historical background, 
its economic development up to the recent period, social impacts of the gambling 
industry on the local population, labour force and environment.  
 
A2.2   Macao’s social context  
A2.2.1 Demographics  
Macao’s resident population was a significant increase over the past decade from 
436,700 in 2001 to 557,400 in 2011 (Government of MSAR Statistics and Census 
Service, 2012a). The population density was 18,400 persons per square km (Macao 
Government Information Bureau, 2010). This gradual increase was mainly due to two 
reasons. First, immigration is largely based on non-resident workers and migrants from 
25,925 in 2001 to 94,028 in 2011, followed by immigrants from mainland China from 
4,621 in 2001 to 6,222 in 2011. There are 9,489 foreign nationals with legal residency in 
2009; however, there is a decreasing trend with 4,455 in 2010 and 2,812 in 2011 
respectively. In addition, 1,266 illegal Chinese immigrants are repatriated to mainland 
China. Second, natural factors, including an increasing birth rate (3.1%) and a steady 
mortality rate (0.3%), account for an increase population (Government of MSAR 
Statistics and Census Service, 2012a). The age structure is mainly dominated by 15-64 
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years old (79.5%), followed by under 15 years old (12.7%) and 65 years old and above 
(7.7%) (Macao Government Information Bureau, 2010). The major nationalities are 
Chinese (93.9%), Pilipino (2%) and Portuguese (1.7%) (Macao Government 
Information Bureau, 2010). The total number of households was 159,412, which 
account for 72.9% in private housing, 23.3% in rented housing and 3.8% in housing 
provided by employers (Macao Government Information Bureau, 2010). 
 
A2.2.2 Education  
The Macao SAR Government has continued to support compulsory education (aged 
from 5 to 15) and allocate more resources in 15-year free education system to enhance 
the development of both non-tertiary and tertiary education in Macao (Macao 
Government Information Bureau, 2010). Students in non-tertiary education have 
slightly decreased from 98,608 students in 2000/2001 to 71,832 students in 2010/2011, 
while students in tertiary education have increased a threefold, from 8,358 students to 
24,156 students, over the past decades (Government of MSAR Statistics and Census 
Service, 2012a). In particular, the number of students studied in bachelor degree, master 
degree and doctoral degree has significantly increased from 3660, 1427, and 8 students 
to 17,875, 2,963, and 192 students respectively (Government of MSAR Statistics and 
Census Service, 2012a). 
   
A.2.2.3 Health  
According to Government of MSAR Statistics and Census Service in 2011 (2012a), the 
ratio of doctors to residents was 2.6 to 1000, the ratio of nurses was 2.9 to 1000 and the 
ratio of hospital beds was 2.2 to 1000. The general mortality rate was 3.1 per thousand 
citizens, while the mortality rate for infants under one year old was 2.1 per thousand 
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live births. From 2006 and 2009, the average life expectancy was 82.4 years (Macao 
Government Information Bureau, 2010). According to International Classification of 
Disease Tenth Edition, Clinical Modification (ICD-10-CM), malignant tumours were 
the top rank disease (33.1%) in Macao, while circulatory diseases (26.5%) and 
respiratory disease (13.6%) was the second and the third widespread diseases (Macao 
Government Information Bureau, 2010).  
 
A2.2.4 Religion 
Macao is a cultural melting pot where Chinese and Portuguese cultures have mixed over 
400 years, thus leading to the diversity of religions. The primary religions of Macao’s 
local community are Buddhism, Taoism and Confucianism; however, Catholicism, 
Protestantism and Islam migrated in the early days so these religions coexist in Macao 
(Macao Government Information Bureau, 2010). Buddhism plays a significant role in 
the Chinese community and most Macao residents are profoundly influenced by 
Buddhism (Macao Government Information Bureau, 2010). Catholicism is the second 
important religion. 
 
A2.3 Macao’s economic context  
A.2.2.1  Industry  
Macao’s economy is with a range of industries, including manufacturing, construction, 
wholesaling and retailing, hotel, financial, real estate, public administration and social 
security, education, health and social welfare, gaming industries (Government of MSAR 
Statistics and Census Service, 2012a). In 1980s, manufacturing industry was the main 
industry; however, Macao’s economic development has changed to service industries in 
1990s (Macao Government Information Bureau, 2010). After the handover to mainland 
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China in 1999 (see Section A1.3.2), the government of Macao gradually changed the 
scope of economic development and expanded the gambling industry (Macao 
Government Information Bureau, 2010). Currently, the gambling industry is the leading 
industry in Macao, followed by the hotel industry.  
 
A.1.3.2  Historical background of gambling in Macao 
Macao, a Portuguese colony for more than four hundred years, has a unique mixture of 
Asian and Portuguese culture (Hannigan, 2007; Fallows, 2009) which has shaped the 
history of gambling in this region. Macao has experienced legalised gambling for over 
150 years and is the only place in mainland China where is legal to gamble in casinos 
(Vong, 2004; BBC, 2009; MarketLine, 2013c). There are different types of gambling 
activities in Macao
121
. Notably, mainland China continues to place legal restrictions on 
gambling; however, the only legal form of gambling is a government lottery
122
 (Cheng, 
2009). In contrast, in Hong Kong
123
, a lottery and horseracing gambling are both 
authorised.  
 
 
 
                                                     
121
 According to the information from Macao SAR Gaming Inspection and Coordination Bureau (2013b 
and 2013c), there are 7 different types of gaming activities, including Games of Fortune, Greyhound 
Racing, Horse Racing, Chinese Lottery, Instant Lottery, and Sports Lottery – Football and Sports Lottery 
– Basketball. In particular, Games of Fortune can be classified into 28 game types. There are six licensed 
concessionaries, and mainly with gaming tables and slot machines (Macao SAR Gaming Inspection and 
Coordination Bureau, 2013d and 2013e). 
122
 There are two administrative lottery institutions in China are the China Welfare Lottery Distribution 
Center founded in 1987 and the China Sports Lottery Administration Centre founded in 1994 (Li, et al., 
2011). 
123 Hong Kong was a British colony for more than one hundred and fifty years (Bond and King, 1985). In 
1997, Hong Kong was handed over to mainland China and became a Special Administrative Region 
(SAR) within the People’s Republic of China (PRC) (Song, 2002). This was the same as Macao. The 
agreement will be operated by local regulation and legislation for at least the next 50 years, implying that 
mainland China can manage “one country and two systems”, “Hong Kong people governing Hong Kong” 
with a high degree of autonomy, its own currency and customs. 
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Table 15: Timeline of gambling issue in Macao 
1557 Portuguese trading market between China and Japan 
1840 Legalised gambling 
1934 Monopoly held by Tai Heng Company 
1961 Stanley Ho purchased Macao’s gambling license 
1999 Macao handed over to China 
2002 Ending Stanley Ho’s monopoly and open to foreign countries 
2004 From 3 to 6 Concessionaries 
2013 35 casinos 
 
Table 15 shows that a historical background and transition of Macao’s gambling 
industry. Macao has been legalised gambling for more than 150 years. The Portuguese 
had their first colony in Macao in the mid-15
th
 century. Macao has been an official 
Portuguese trading market for China and Japan since 1557 (Hobson, 1995). In the 1840s, 
British banks and trading corporations flourished in Hong Kong. As a result, this 
flourishment had a negative impact on Macao’s economy. In order to maintain 
economic stability, the Portuguese government decided to legalise gambling (Fallows, 
2009). 
 
In the 20
th
 century, the ownership of Macao’s gambling industry had undergone a 
significant change. In the 1930s, Tai Heng Company held the monopoly on the 
gambling industry (Hobson, 1995). However, at the beginning of the 1960s, the 
ownership changed to Stanley Ho, who was a tycoon from Hong Kong and purchased 
Macao’s gambling license in 1961 (Gaylord, 2008). He owned the monopoly on this 
industry for nearly four decades. Gambling still dominated Macao’s economy (Fallows, 
2009). Additionally, he owned not only the gambling industry, but also transportation 
business, such as ferry, airport (33%), and Air Macao (14%) (Fallows, 2009).  
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This situation changed at the end of the 20
th
 century. In 1999, Macao was handed over 
to mainland China and became a Special Administrative Region (SAR) within the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC). This agreement is operated by local regulation and 
legislation for at least the next 50 years, implying that mainland China can manage “one 
country and two systems”, “Macao people governing Macao” with a high degree of 
autonomy, its own currency and customs (Macao Government Information Bureau, 
2010, p. 9). The Chinese government appointed Edmund Ho, not a relative of Stanley 
Ho, as Macao’s chief executive. Stanley Ho’s monopoly on Macao’s gambling industry 
ended in 2002 when it was opened to foreign companies (Fallows, 2009).  
A2.3.3   Economic development in Macao 
Table 16: Number of casinos in Macao in from 2004 to 2013 
CONCESSIONARIES
124
 2004 2013 
Concessionaires/ 
Sub-concession 
Concession 
contract
125
 
Ownershi
p 
Sociedade de Jogos de 
Macao, S.A. (S.J.M) 
13 20 
Concessions 31/03/2020 Macao 
Galaxy Casino, S.A. 1 6 
Concessions 26/06/2022 
Hong 
Kong 
Wynn Resorts (Macao) S.A. -  1 Concessions 26/06/2022 US 
Venetian Macao, S.A. 1 4 Sub-concession 
(Galaxy) 
- US 
Melco Crown Jogos 
(Macao) S.A. 
- 3 Sub-concession 
(Wynn) 
- Australia 
MGM Grand Paradise, S.A. - 1 Sub-concession 
(S.J.M.) 
- US 
TOTAL 15 35    
 
                                                     
124
 As Kaiser (2007, p. 2137) define concessionary as “Under a concessionary (royalty/tax) arrangement, 
the contract holder secures exclusive exploration rights from a private party or government for a specified 
duration, as well as an exclusive development and production right for each commercial discovery”.  
125
 In March 2002, SJM Holdings Limited signed gaming concession contract which will be valid until 
31 March, 2020 with Macao SAR Government (SJM Holdings Limited, 2010). In addition, Macao SAR 
Government signed two 20-year contract with concessionaires Wynn Resorts Ltd (Macao) Ltd and 
Galaxy Casino S. A., which will be valid from 27 June 2022 to 26 June 2022 respectively (Macao 
Government Tourist Office, 2010). In June 2004, MGM Mirage entered a joint venture with Pansy Ho 
Chiu-King, who is Stanley Ho’s daughter, to establish a hotel-casino resort in Macao and MGM Mirage 
signed a sub-concession agreement with S.J.M. (Fallow, 2009; MGM Mirage, 2005). Wynn Resort’s 
sub-concession is to Melco-PBL joint venture between Melco International Development Ltd, who is 
owned by Stanley Ho’s son, Lawrence Ho, and Australia Publishing and Broadcasting (Inside Asian 
Gaming, 2006). Furthermore, Galaxy Casino S. A. also issued a sub-concession with Las Vegas Sands 
(Inside Asian Gaming, 2006). 
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At that point, the government of Macao was permitted to increase the number of 
concessions
126
 from three to six concessions (Fallows, 2009). Macao’s SAR Gaming 
Inspection and Coordination Bureau (2013d) reported that there are six licensed 
operators (Table 16). MGM Grand Paradise, S.A. Las Vegas Sands, Wynn Resorts and 
MGM are the three largest gambling operators in the US (Ernst and Young, 2009). 
These companies employ a “Las-Vegas”127 style which integrates casinos, hotels and 
resorts. Table 15 shows that the total number of casinos increased from 15 in 2004 to 35 
in 2013. S.J.M dominates Macao’s gambling industry, showing a significant increase 
from 13 casinos in 2004 to 20 casinos in 2013 (Table 15). There is limited space in 
Macao, 29.9 Km
2 
with an estimated population 557,440 in 2011, compared to 17.4 Km
2 
in 1989, so the government of Macao expanded onto reclaimed land to construct casinos 
and integrated hotel resorts (Gaylord, 2008; Government of MSAR Statistics and 
Census Service, 2012b). Apart from the expansion of casinos, the number of gambling 
tables and slot machines has significantly increased from 1092 and 2254 in 2004 to 
5302 and 16056 in 2011 respectively (Government of MSAR Statistics and Census 
Service, 2012a). 
 
Despite the rapid economic development in Macao, the mainland Chinese Government 
is pleased with Macao both as a source of steady gambling revenue and as a close ally, 
but politically separated from mainland China (The Economist, 2010). Importantly, the 
central government supports Macao’s gambling industry and has operated a decisive 
policy called the “Free Travel Scheme” (FTS) to permit a large number of Chinese 
visitors to come to Macao for a week since 2003 (Gu and Tam, 2011). Subsequently, a 
                                                     
126
 According to Macao Government Tourist Office (2010, p.267), “the Legislative Assembly passed Law 
No. 6/82/M stipulating that the operation of casino gaming activities would be subject to a monopoly 
franchise or special concession system.” 
127
 However, these casinos are not sufficient windows, clocks, day night, but with bright and colourful 
light and the sounds of winning (Hing, 2004; Williams, et al., 2007).  
343 
 
“Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement” was signed between mainland China and 
Macao to enhance Macao’s economy (Gu and Tam, 2011). In 2010, nearly 90% of 
visitors were from mainland China, while 10% of visitors were from other countries 
(The Government Information Bureau, 2010). Nevertheless, Macao’s gambling industry 
faced two major difficulties in 2008. First, potential social costs in relation to 
pathological gambling have been exported to mainland China (Gu and Tam, 2011) and 
this situation is similar to American States, for example Nevada, New Jersey and 
Mississippi (Garrett and Nichols, 2005 cited in Gu and Tam, 2011). Second, the FTS 
policy has been tightened since 2008, thus constraining the number of residents from 
the main provinces
128
 able to gamble in Macao. In order to overcome this potential 
threat, Macao tried to diversify its economy by shifting from the commercial gambling 
to the MICE (meetings, incentives, conventions and exhibitions) sector (Gu and Tam, 
2011). 
 
However, the gambling industry remains the leading industry and plays a significant 
role in Macao. In 2012, Macao’s gross domestic product (GDP) per capital was £48,338, 
while Macao attracted more than 28 million tourists in 2011 (Government of MSAR 
Statistics and Census Service, 2012a). More importantly, over 70% of gaming revenues 
were mainly from the VIP rooms, rather than mass market (Eadington and Siu, 2007). 
In particular, all concessionaires and other sub-concessions should pay a gaming tax of 
35 percent
129
 and contribute additional 4 percent of its gross gaming revenue to the 
                                                     
128 According to the Government Information Bureau (2010), the residents of 49 provinces and cities had been 
extended to apply the Free Travel Scheme to visit to Macao in 2009. The following provinces and cities include all of 
Guangdong Province; Beijing; Shanghai; Nanjing, Suzhou and Wuxi in Jiangsu Province; Hangzhou, Ningbo and 
Taizhou in Zhejiang Province; Fuzhou, Xiamen and Quanzhou in Fujian Province; Chongqing; Tianjin; Chengdu; 
Jinan; Shenyang and Dalian in Liaoning Province; Nanning; Haikou; Changsha; Guiyang; Kunming; Nanchang; 
Shijiazhuang; Changchun; Hefei; Zhengzhou and Wuhan.  
129 In addition, all three concessionaires must pay 1.6 percent of its gross gaming revenue to the government public 
foundation, such as conducting academic research, charity and cultural activities (see the Government Information 
Bureau, 2010). SJM should contribute 1.4 percent of its gross gaming revenues to the government to support urban 
development, tourism and social security, while Wynn and Galaxy should contribute 2.4 percent (see the Government 
Information Bureau, 2010).  
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government for other social and cultural activities (The Government Information 
Bureau, 2010).  
 
Macao is located in the south of mainland China close to Hong Kong. Figure 18 shows 
a full picture of six gambling operators operating at the south end of Macao Peninsula, 
the centre of Taipa and Coloane (MSAR Gaming Inspection and Coordination Bureau, 
2013d). Each licensed operator owns different gambling properties as shown in the 
bottom left corner of the figure 
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Figure 17: Location of gambling companies in Macao 
 
 
Source: MSAR Gaming Inspection and Coordination Bureau (2013a) 
Source: http://www.dicj.gov.mo/web/en/information/map-03/map.html 
 
 
A2.3.4   Social impact 
According to LaPlante, et al. (2008), widespread adults of the general population of 
mainland China meet the criteria for pathological gambling (2%), with higher rates 
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between 2.5 and 4.0% in some jurisdictions in China (Loo, et al., 2008). According to 
The Institute for the Study of Commercial Gaming’s (2009) survey in Macao, the 
prevalence of problem gambling amongst between 15 and 64 year olds increased from 
4.3% in 2003 to 6.0% in 2007. This prevalence indicates a deteriorating trend. More 
importantly, the prevalence rate of the problem gambling issue is greater in Macao 
when compared to that in HK and Singapore in 2008 (4.5% and 2.9% respectively). By 
contrast, the prevalence rate of problem gambling is roughly 0.9% in the UK population 
(Wardle, et al., 2011) and approximately 1.5% in Australia (Miller and Michelson, 
2012). According to Fong, et al.’s (2011) study in Macao, the social cost130 of gambling 
in Macao rose from US$40 million to US$106 million from 2003 to 2007 and has major 
social impact on neighbouring countries, particularly mainland China. More pertinently, 
problem gamblers and pathological gamblers seem to be exported from Macao to 
mainland China (Gu and Tam, 2011). The authors explained that this sharp increase is 
due to both the increasing number of gambling operators over the past years and the 
historical effect of the monopoly system. 
 
A2.3.5   Labour force 
The labour force participation rate is 72.5% and with a low unemployment rate of 2.6% 
in 2011 due to the massive economic change in 2002 (see Section A.1.3.2) (Government 
of MSAR Statistics and Census Service, 2012a).  
 
Since there has been a rapid development of Macao’s gambling industry over the past 
decades, this industry has required an expansion labour force. Over 60% of Macao’s 
                                                     
130
 The social cost of gambling needs to fulfill three creiteria: “the cost has to be social, rather than 
private or personal; the cost has to result in a real decrease in societal wealth; and the cost has to result 
exclusively from gambling” (Fong, et al., 2011, p.45). Thus, the social cost of gambling include treatment 
cots, prevention costs, family or friends pshysical and psychological costs, legal costs, rent-seeking costs, 
regulatory expenses and public cost of training, and promotion and research (Fong, et al., 2011).  
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employees work in posts directly related to gambling and non-gambling activities (Wan, 
2009; Wu and Wang, 2008). Thus, Macao’s unemployment rate was relatively low at 
2.6% in 2011 (Government of MSAR Statistics and Census Service, 2012a). They 
average earn £18,240 annually in the gambling industry, which is significantly higher 
than average salaries in the manufacturing industry (£5,672), retailing industry (£9,698) 
and hotel and food industry (£10,341) (Government of MSAR Statistics and Census 
Service, 2012a). In particular, this industry continued to employ its employees during 
the financial crisis in 2008 with a number of schemes, such as reduced wages, reduced 
working hours and an unpaid leave (Vong, 2010).  
 
Notably, the supply of labour in Macao did not meet the demand of the gambling 
industry’s labour. Nearly 30% of non-resident workers worked in the gambling and 
hospitality sectors (Government of MSAR Statistics and Census Service, 2012a). In 
particular, managerial vacancies are often filled by those who can communicate with 
their foreign managers (Leong, 2008 cited in Wan, 2009), but there are relative few 
local residents with incompetent English language communication skills, since nearly 
73% of local residents are below senior secondary level. Thus, language differences can 
create misunderstanding between local employees and foreign supervisors; and the 
reward and promotion system of local employees are be thought as unfair (Wan, 2009). 
Additionally, casino front-line employees showed more vulnerability to gambling than 
non-casino employees (Shaffer and Hall, 2002). The casino front-line employees work 
in the most stressful working conditions as they serve some of the demanding Chinese 
customers (Macao Workers’ Union, 2010); however, they are expected to smile, greet 
and call customers’ name based on the job requirement (Wan, 2009). In order to release 
their stress, they tend to participate in casino gambling after work and gambling outside 
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casinos through mah-jong with friends, horse racing by telephone and internet gambling 
(Wu and Wong, 2008).  
 
A2.3.6   Environment 
There are not many green spaces in Macao which has a total green area of 7,703,995 sq 
meters and a per capita green area of 14.2 sq. meters (Macao Government Information 
Bureau, 2010). The government of Macao established the Environmental Law (Law No. 
2/91/M), guidelines and principles to protect Macao’s environment. In particular, there 
are a number of environmental laws
131
 to reduce and control pollution of water, 
atmosphere and light and arising from ineffective waste management, fuel and noise to 
achieve the aim of environmental protection (The Government Information Bureau, 
2010). The quality of air has deteriorated over the last decades (To, et al., 2011). The 
gambling industry, operated on 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, 365 days a year (a 
24/7/365 basis), uses a substantial amount of electricity for lighting, heating and power 
in casinos, hotels and shopping malls, and contributed to the consumption of electricity 
doubling between 2000 and 2010 (To, et al., 2011). However, the government did not 
have any environmental enforcement with regard to Macao’s gambling industry or other 
industries. In other words, there is weak sensitivity to the environment and weak 
environmental enforcement in Macao’s gambling industry.  
                                                     
131
 The Government Information Bureau (2010, p. 500) established legislation related to environmental 
issues including “Rules and Regulations on Water Supply and Drainage in Macao (Decree-Law No. 
46/96/M, 19 August 1996), Prohibition Against Discharging Harmful Substances in Marine Jurisdictions 
(Decree-Law No. 35/97/M, 25 August 1997), Provisions on the Import and Registration of Vehicles 
Consuming Unleaded Petrol (Decree-Law No. 44/94/M, 22 August 1994), Measures to Control and 
Minimise the Use of Substances Destructive to the Ozone Layer (Decree-Law No. 62/95/M, 4 December 
1995), Prevention and Control of Environmental Noise (Decree-Law No. 54/94/M, 14 November 1994), 
Provisions on the Sulphur Content of Vehicular Light Diesel Fuel Sold in the Macao Special 
Administrative Region (Executive Order No. 4/2006, 23 January 2006), and the Emission Limits of 
Exhaust Pollutants by Newly Imported Heavy and Light Motorcycles (By-law No. 1/2008)”.  
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A2.4  Summary 
This chapter covers the Macao context of the thesis and the distinctive features from a 
socio-economic perspective. The chapter provides a general overview of Macao. This 
general information will provide the context to examine Macao’s gambling industry in 
Chapters 5, 6 and 7. 
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Appendix 3 
Responsible Gambling (RG) initiatives in developed countries 
 
In Canada, a RG movement began in Ontario in 1983 under the Canadian Foundation 
on Compulsive Gambling (Ontario). The Gaming Control Act was enacted in 1992 and 
The Alcohol and Gaming Regulation and Public Protection Act (AGRPPA) was enacted 
in 1996 to ensure that legal games of chance are conducted with honesty, integrity and 
social responsibility (Smith, 2009) (see Appendix 4). In 2002, the RG regulated 
authority changed from Canadian Foundation on Compulsive Gambling (Ontario) to the 
Responsible Gambling Council (RGC) (Ontario), which more accurately reflected its 
increased emphasis on harm minimisation efforts (Smith, 2009). The alliance of RGC 
(Ontario) and an ad hoc advisory group of government agencies was created for RG 
(Campbell and Smith, 2003). In recent years, the RG strategy has focused on problem 
gambling treatment, prevention and education and research (Smith, 2009)  
 
In the US, the gambling industry has been promoted RG. In particular, the American 
Gaming Association (AGA) was established in 1995 to develop industry-wide RG
1
 
programmes (The American Gaming Association, 2010). Before the establishment of 
the AGA, Harrah's Entertainment, Inc. has been a leading company to promote RG 
since the 1980s through its Operation Bet Smart and (NCRG), the first organisation 
dedicated to funding scientific research on pathological gambling, treatment and 
education on RG (The American Gaming Association, 2010). The AGA developed 
several public and employee education programmes, for example, Responsible Gaming 
Education Week (RGEW), held annually on the first week of August since 1998 and 
launched RG Lecture Series, which gathers RG experts together to discuss gaming 
jurisdictions nationwide (The American Gaming Association, 2010). In 2005, the AGA 
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launched the “Keeping it Fun” campaign during RG Education Week, which aimed to 
help gambling industry employees, patrons and the public to show support for the 
importance of RG awareness (The American Gaming Association, 2010). In 2003, the 
AGA board of directors enacted the AGA Code of Conduct for RG, a comprehensive set 
of guidelines governing employee and customer education, underage gambling, alcohol 
service, advertising and research (The American Gaming Association, 2010). However, 
in 2008, these RG guidelines become regulations and vary across 20 states. RG is 
divided into seven general categories: alcohol service, credit/cash access, funding/ 
revenue sharing, self-exclusion, signage/help line/advertising/, training/education  
(employee training, employee problem gambling prevention, public awareness) and 
miscellaneous (loss limits/ limited stakes, direct mail/marketing) (The American 
Gaming Association, 2008, p. 5) (see Appendix 5). Particularly, the self-exclusion 
programme was a good measure assist customers (Giroux, et al., 2008). 
 
In Australia, RG code is the main highlight of different conferences where academics, 
gambling operators and regulatory representatives debate different perspectives on the 
issue, for example, the annual conferences of the National Association for Gambling 
Studies in Australia and the European Association for the Study of Gambling (Hing and 
Mackellar, 2004). Also, gambling operators and industry associations introduced 
voluntary RG policies, such as the Queensland Responsible Gambling Code of Practice 
in 2002 (Breen, et al., 2005) and the ClubSafe Programme in NSW (Hing and Mackellar, 
2004). However, each State and Territory has its RG legislation and its own gambling 
laws, regulatory and enforcement bodies in Australia (Delfabbro and King, 2012). The 
voluntary RG in Australia refers to three principles, including harm minimisation, 
informed consent and social responsibility and responsiveness (Breen, et al., 2005). The 
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Queensland RG Code of Practice with six priority actions: provision of information, 
interaction with customers and community, exclusion provisions, physical 
environments, financial transactions, advertising gambling providers to ensure 
responsible advertising and promotion (Breen, et al., 2005).   
 
In New Zealand, Hing and Mackellar (2004) note that governments have transformed 
legislation in order to integrate socially responsible initiatives into such gambling acts 
as, the Gambling Legislation Amendment (Responsible Gambling) Act 1999 NSW and 
The government formally recognised gambling as a public health and the New 
Zealand’s Gambling Act was approved in 2003. The objectives of this Act were to 
control the growth of gambling, to prevent and minimise harm from gambling, to ensure 
that money from gambling benefits the community and to facilitate community input in 
decisions about the provisions of gambling (Smith, 2009).  
 
In the UK, the Gambling Act of 2005 was designed to regulate strikethrough 
commercial gambling (Miers, 2008). The new legislation was fully applied in 2007 
(Soriano, et al., 2012). Additionally, the Gambling Commission introduced many codes 
of practices and regulatory statements (Miers, 2008). The statutory obligation of the 
Gambling Commission is to pursue methods of RG with regard to the Gambling Acts 
licensing three objectives: preventing crime and disorder, conducting in a fair and open 
gambling and protecting children and vulnerable groups (Miers, 2006; Light, 2007).  
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Appendix 4: Illustration of Enabling Gambling legislation in Canada 
Source: Smith (2009) 
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Appendix 5: Overview of Statutes and Regulations in relation to responsible 
gaming in the 20 states in the US. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: The American Gaming Association (2012) 
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Appendix 6: List of Companies Used in Final Sample for Content Analysis 
UK 
Company 2007 2008 2009 Note 
Ladbrokes PLC √ √ √  
William Hills PLC √ √ √  
The Rank Group PLC √ √ √  
Gala Coral Group Limited √ √ √  
The Tote √ √ √  
Camelot √ √ √  
     
US 
Company 2007 2008 2009 Note 
Ameristar Casinos, Inc √ √ √  
Boyd Gaming Corporation √ √ √  
Penn National Gaming. Inc. √ √ √  
Pinnacle Entertainment, Inc √ √ √  
Station Casinos., Inc √ √ √  
Harrah’s Entertainment, Inc. √ √ √  
     
Australia 
Company 2007 2008 2009 Note 
Ainsworth Game Technology √ √ √  
Aristocrat Leisure Limited X √ √ 2007 reports in PPT 
for 
Crown Limited √ √ √  
Tabcorp √ √ √  
SkyCity Entertainment Group Ltd √ √ √  
Tatts Group Limited √ √ √  
     
South Africa 
Company 2007 2008 2009 Note 
Sun International √ √ √  
Peermont Global √ √ √  
Tsogo Sun Gaming/Gold Reef City √ √ √  
     
Macao 
Company 2007 2008 2009 Note 
Wynn Resorts Ltd √ √ √  
Las Vegas Sands Corporation √ √ √  
MGM Mirage √ √ √  
Melco International Development Ltd √ √ √  
SJM Holdings Limited X √ √ Report only 
available in 2008 
Galaxy Entertainment Group Limited √ √ √  
     
Hong Kong 
Company 2007 2008 2009 Note 
The Hong Kong Jockey Club √ √ √  
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Appendix 7: The Decision Rules for the Categories of Social Disclosure
132
 
 
1. Economic Performance
133
 
Economic performance 
 Direct economic value generated and disturbed, including revenues, operating costs, 
retained earnings and payment to capital providers and government; 
 Significant financial assistance received from government; 
Market Presence 
 Procedures for local hiring and proportion of senior management fired from the local 
community at locations of significant operation 
Indirect Economic Impact 
 Development and impact of infrastructure investments and services provided 
Provided primarily for public benefit through commercial, in-kind, or pro bono 
engagement 
 Understanding and describing significant indirect economic impacts, including 
the extent of impacts 
 
2. Environment (decision rule) 
Environmental policy 
 Actual Statement of policy; 
                                                     
132
 Adapted from Gray, et al. (1995b), updated version from the CSEAR website, Hackston and Milne 
(1996), Williams and Pei (1999), Welford (2004), the Global Reporting Initiative’s (GRI) Sustainability 
Guidelines (2002) and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in Asia. Even though there are some 
overlaps and similarities between the academic studies and international guideline for social and 
environmental categories, all the items are considered and included in the decision rules for the categories 
of social disclosure.  
133
 Economic Performance is the new added decision rule of these categories from the Global Reporting 
Initiative’s (GRI) Sustainability Guidelines. This guideline is for voluntary use by organisations for 
reporting on the economic, environmental, and social dimensions of their activities, products, and services 
based on reporting principle (KMPG, 2005, p.43). Since the current study is looking at developing 
countries, Macao and South Africa, where economic is the key factor in corporate social responsibility.  
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 Statement of formal intentions;  
 General Statements of 'the company' will, the company does' nature. 
 
Environmental audit 
 Reference to environment review, scoping, audit, assessment including independent 
attestation; 
 Environnemental management system (ISO 14000, EMAS, etc); 
 Targets in general (specific detail likely to fall into next section). 
 
 
Waste, Environmental - Product Process Related 
 Waste(s); 
 Eco-efficiency; 
 Packaging and take-back; 
 Pollution and emissions - air, water, noise, visual and spills; 
(including any attempts to identify, improve, control, treat or prevent) 
 Recycling; 
 Carbon sequestration, climate change ; 
 Products and product development, improvements in products (including products 
that care for and help protect the environment) 
 Land contamination and remediation (financial below); 
 Except insofar as it is part of the business 
(e.g. waste disposal or environmental technology). 
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Environmental Financially- Related Data 
(Financial data, provision, liability, insurance, invest) 
 Reference to financial/economic impact; 
 Investment and investment appraisal; 
 Discussion of areas with financial/economic impact; 
 Discussion of environmental-economic interaction; 
 Contingencies and provisions; 
 
Sustainability 
 Any mention of sustainability 
 Any mention of sustainable development, UNCED, Rio, etc 
 Discussion of full cost accounting, EU 5th Action programme, formal consideration of 
Externalities, ecological footprint 
 
Energy 
 Energy Usage, (Spilt with climate change) 
 Energy saving and conservation (NB including research on this area134) 
 Use/ development/ exploration of new sources, efficiency and insulation 
 Except in so far as it is part of the business (e.g oil exploration companies) 
 
 
Environmental Other 
2
 
 Landscaping; 
                                                     
134
 Williams and Pei’s (1999) energy category is overlapped with Gray, et al. (1995b) and is focused on 
“Research on energy conservation / Research aimed at improving energy efficiency of products”. Thus, 
this is included in this thesis. 
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 Public amenity provision (NB overlap with sustainability135); 
 Involvement with initiatives; 
 Environmental education (NB care with overlap with community or sustainability136); 
 Environmental awards; employee training and awareness; partnership between 
Environmental research institutions and business
137
 
 
3. Consumer (and product) 
 Product and customer safety 
 Consumer complaints 
 Specific consumer relations (over and beyond our duty to the customer); 
 Provision for disable, aged, etc. customer; 
 Provision for difficult-to-reach customers 
 Responsible Gambling/Gaming138 
(General Statement related to protection, treatment, awareness to gamblers) 
 
4. Community 
Impact  
Monitor  
                                                     
135
 Public amenity provision is overlapped the idea of environmental (aesthetics) suggested by Hackston 
and Milne (1996) and Williams and Pei (1999). Environmental (aesthetics) refers to designing facilities 
harmonious with the environment, contributions in terms of cash or art/ sculptures to beautify the 
environment, and restoring historical building/ structure.  
136
 Hackston and Milne (1996) and Williams and Pei (1999) put Environmental education in 
Sustainability. Hackston and Milne’s (1996) study considers environment impact studies as a way to 
check how the company’s impact on the nature, while Williams and Pei’s (1999) study put Environmental 
Education Programs, Awards, and Studies under Sustainability.   
137
 These new subcategories are added to the decision rule of “environmental other”. These are found in 
some annual reports in the gambling industry and in the two studies of Hackston and Milne (1996) and 
Williams and Pei (1999).   
138
 This is a newly added to the decision rule of “customers”. Since this thesis looks at the gambling 
industry, “responsible gambling/gaming” was found in certain annual reports disclosing information 
related to consumers and this concept was also found in the literature around CSR and gambling. Thus, 
this subcategory was added with an agreement with her supervisor.   
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Charity 
 Donations in currency or in kind to registered charities within the Companies Act; 
 Donations ditto by/ through employees (e.g. GAYE schemes); 
 Include references and amounts of political donations (as they fall within the 
same Companies Act requirement) 
 
 
Community 
 Excluding charities; 
 Any reference to community and/ or social involvement outside the labour force; 
 Employee involvement with above if company support is apparent; 
 School, arts, sports, sponsorship and voluntary organisations; 
 YTS (or equivalent), Business-in-the-Community, Secondment of staff 
 
 
5. Employee related data 
 
Employee Data 
 Statutory average number employed by category and wages 
(including pension and social security costs) 
 Statutory numerical analysis of employees > 30,000 (update) 
 Average number employed by geographic area 
(Statutory discourse of director's emoluments) 
 
Pension Data 
 Statutory particulars of commitments for pensions whether provided or not. 
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Consultation with Employees
139
 (NOT include) 
 Statutory action with respect to informing employees, consulting employees, 
Encouraging (and engaging in) employee participation 
 Statutory increasing employee financial and economic awareness. 
 EXCLUDES Profit-sharing and ESOPs etc. 
 
South Africa (void since official end of apartheid)
140
 (NOT include) 
 Statement of compliance with code and/or submission to DTI. 
 Any information/reference to employment in Southern Africa other 
than as part of economic/review or employment data. 
 
Disabled Employment 
 Employment of disabled person (including retraining); 
 Distinction between registered/unregistered disabled is not relevant data. 
 
Value Added Statement
141
 (NOT include) 
 Any reference to the creation and distribution of value added. 
 Any statement headed Value Added or Added Value 
 Any statement with 'distribution' to employees and state > shareholders. 
 
Health and safety 
                                                     
139
 According to Gray, et al. (1995b) and the CSEAR decision rules, consultation with employees 
referred to disclosure of statutory particular commitment to employee pensions. There is no equivalent 
piece of legislation in relation to pension data in the sampled countries, namely, the USA, Australia, 
South African, Macao and Hong Kong. Thus, this category is not included in this thesis. 
140 According to Gray, et al. (1995b) and the CSEAR decision rules, compliance or any information to 
employment in Southern Africa is not related to the context in the gambling industry. Therefore, this 
category is not included in this thesis.  
141 According to Gray, et al. (1995b) and the CSEAR decision rules, value added statement is not related 
to the context in the gambling industry. Therefore, this category is not included in this thesis. 
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 Health and safety at work; 
 Toxic hazards (e.g.) to employees and the public; 
 Any reference to Health and Safety law and/or inspectorate; (COSHH) 
 Information to employees, training in Health and Safety Issues; 
 Accidents; Injuries 
 Reducing or eliminating pollutants, irritants or hazard in the work environment142 
 Conducting research to improve work safety and Receiving a safety award143 
 
Shares Ownership 
 Participation of employees in share schemes, profit sharing, ESOPs where employees 
means > directors 
 Schemes/Reference must be to employees (exclude if reference is to executive 
or directors only) 
 Loans for this purpose but not directors. 
 Save as you earn (SAYE) options. 
 
Equal opportunities 
 Equal opportunities; 
 Racial equality; 
 Sexual equality; 
 
Employee other 
                                                     
142
 This subcategory is a newly added to the decision rule of “Health and safety” under “Employee” 
according to Hackston and Milne (1999) and GRI.  
143
 “Conducting research” and “Health and Safety Award” are a newly added to the decision rule of 
“Health and safety” under “Employee”. These were sometimes found in some annual reports disclosing 
information related to employees.  
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 Anything else on employees not covered above 
 For example: SAYE beyond coverage in Share Ownership; Staff turnover; Thanks to 
employees; length of services; Racial and Sexual Equality (to be separated out); 
Pensioners; Pensions beyond coverage of statutory material; Employee trends/statistics 
by sex, age for more than 2 years and more than statutory; Statement of employment 
policy (ies) Redundancy; Changes in salaries or wages; whistleblower scheme
144
; 
Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining
145
; Industrial relations
146
; 
 
6. Director 
 Statutory disclosure of Directors' emoluments, remuneration, short-term benefits, 
bonuses including pensions 
 Directors'/Executive share option schemes and share benefits 
 Loans to directors 
 Interests in shares 
 Any options granted to directors 
 Long term incentive schemes (e.g. share related) 
 Any share-related issue or director 
 
7. Corporate Governance 
 General statement of compliance/non-compliance with various codes147; 
                                                     
144
 In the final sample, Macao and Hong Kong were included. CSR in Asia outlines the “whistleblower 
scheme” under “Employee” and this was also found in some annual reports in the sample. Hence, this is 
newly added to the decision rule of ‘employees other’ under “Employee”.  
145
 This is newly added to the decision rule of ‘employees other’ under “Employee”. This was found in 
the USA annual reports disclosing information related to employees. This is according to GRI – 
“Employee” – “human rights”. 
146
 This is newly added to the decision rule of “employees other” under “Employee” according to 
Hackston and Milne (1996) and Williams and Pei (1999). This was found in the USA annual reports 
disclosing information related to employees. 
147
 Various codes are included CSR in ASIA. Particularly, anti-corruption code/policy is largely relevant 
in the gambling industry.   
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 Separate report by auditors on corporate governance; 
 Section (s) in main audit report indicating compliance/ non-compliance with codes 
 
8. General other 
 Anything else; 
 For example: corporate objectives, mission statement; statement of 
social responsibility; code of practice on behaviour beyond including 
trans-nationals; Ethics; Political statements 
(need/approval/disapproval of government policy, control of unions); 
value of trans-national corporations TNCs/ companies -misunderstood; 
Value of company to community, society, nation, economy, money transaction 
with government/inland revenue; 
 SA8000; 
 AA1000. 
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Appendix 8  Summaries of Primary Disclosure Categories of Analysis 
 
Total CSR: 
 
Economic + Environment + Consumer + Community + 
Employee + Director + Corporate Governance + Others 
  
Economic Disclosure Economic Performance Beyond Tax + Market Presence + 
Indirect Economic Impact 
  
Environmental 
Disclosure 
Environment Policy + Environment Audit + Waste, Pack, 
Pollution + Financial Data and Provision + Sustainability 
+ Energy + Environmental Other 
  
Consumer Disclosure Consumer / Customers + Responsible Gambling 
Protection 
  
Community Disclosure Charity and Political Donation + Community + Dialogue 
and Consultation 
  
Employee Disclosure Employee Data + Pension Commit + Disabled + Health 
and Safety + Shares Employees + Equal opportunities + 
Employee Others 
  
Directors Directors 
  
Corporate Governance Corporate Governance 
  
Others Others 
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UK  
 
Mandatory Total 
Employee (Employee Data + Pension Commit + Disabled 
+ Health & Safety + Shares Employees) + Directors + 
Corporate Governance 
Voluntary Total Economic + Environment + Consumer + Community + 
Employee (Equal Opportunities + Employee Others) + 
General Other 
  
US  
Mandatory Total Environment + Employee (Pension Commit + Shares 
Employees) + Directors + Corporate Governance 
Voluntary Total Economic + Environment + Consumer + Community + 
Employee (Employee Data + Disable + Health and Safety 
+ Equal Opportunities + Employee Others) + General 
Other 
  
Australia  
Mandatory Total Environment (Energy) + Employee (Pension Commit + 
Shares employees + Employee others + Employee 
benefits) + Directors + Corporate Governance 
Voluntary Total Economic + Environment (all except Energy) + Consumer 
+ Community + Employee (Employee Data + Disable + 
Health and Safety + Equal Opportunities + Employee 
Others) + General Other 
  
South Africa  
Mandatory Total Environment (Environment Policy) + Community (Black 
Economic Empowerment) + Employee (Pension Commit 
Health & Safety + Shares Employees + Equal Opportunity 
+ Employee Other + Whistle Blowing) + Directors + 
Corporate Governance 
Voluntary Total Economic + Environment (Except Environmental Policy) 
+ Consumer + Community (Charity and Political 
Donation + Dialogue and Consultation) + Employee 
(Employee Data + Disable + Employee Others) + General 
Other 
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Macao  
Mandatory Total Employee (Pension Commit + Shares Employees + 
Employee Others + Employee Benefits) + Directors + 
Corporate Governance 
Voluntary Total Economic + Consumer + Community + Employee 
(Employee Data + Disable + Health and Safety + Equal 
Opportunities + Employee Others) + General Other 
  
Hong Kong  
Mandatory Total Employee (Pension Commit + Shares Employees + 
Employee Benefits) + Directors + Corporate Governance 
Voluntary Total Economic + Environment + Consumer + Community + 
Employee (Employee Data + Disable + Health and Safety 
+ Equal Opportunities + Employee Others) + General 
Other 
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Appendix 9  Corporate Social Reporting By legislation in different countries 
CSR required by legislation and professional guidance in the UK 
Area of Disclosure Information to be disclosed Relevant legislation 
Employee Data 
Information about employee 
numbers and costs 
The Companies Act 2006, 
Section 411 
   
Employee Pension 
Disclosure of contribution by a 
company in relation to any pension 
scheme established for the purpose 
of providing pensions for persons 
employed by the company 
Companies (Amendment Act) 
1986 
 
Interests to be disregarded: 
residual interest under pension 
scheme or 
employees’ share scheme 
The Companies Act 2006, 
Section 139 
 
Interests to be disregarded: 
employer's rights of recovery 
under pension scheme or 
employees' share scheme 
The Companies Act 2006, 
Section 140 
 
Pension scheme (in Chapter 1 of 
Part 18) 
The Companies Act 2006, 
Section 675 
 
Exception to pre-emption right: 
securities held under employees' 
share 
scheme 
The Companies Act 2006, 
Section 672 
 
Residual interest under pension 
scheme or employees’ share 
scheme 
The Companies Act 2006, 
Section 1166 
   
Disabled employee 
policy 
Details on the employment policy 
for disabled persons 
The 1974 Health and Safety at 
Work Act; Employment Act 
1982 
   
Employee Share 
Ownership 
“Employees' share scheme” 
The Companies Act 2006, 
Section 566 
   
Directors 
Information about directors' 
benefits: remuneration; advances, 
credit and guarantees 
The Companies Act 2006, 
Section 412 and Section 413 
   
Corporate 
Governance 
Corporate governance rules 
The Companies Act 2006, 
Section 1269 
 
The Financial Services Authority’s 
listing requirements requires 
organisations to report on 
governance and internal controls, 
which cover, among other things, 
material non-financial issues 
The Combined Code 
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CSR required by legislation and professional guidance in the US 
Area of Disclosure Information to be disclosed Relevant legislation 
Employee Data 
Requires annual filling by the US Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission 
regarding employment records, 
including the racial and gender profiles 
of employees 
The Equal Employment 
Opportunity -1 Survey 
   
Employee Pension 
Employees' disclosures about pension 
plans and other postretirement benefit 
plans. It requires additional disclosures 
to those in the original statement 132 
about the assets, obligations, cash flows, 
and new periodic benefit cost of defined 
benefit pension plans and other defined 
benefit post-retirement plans. Financial 
Accounting Standard Board (FASB- 
Statement No. 132) 
Financial Accounting 
Standard Board (FASB- 
Statement No. 132) 
   
Employee Share 
Ownership 
To measure the cost of employee 
services received in exchange for an 
award of equality instruments based on 
the grant-date fair value of the award. 
Financial Accounting 
Standard Board (FASB- 
Statement No. 123) 
   
Directors ---  
   
Corporate 
Governance 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 - SOX 
mandates include the requirement of 
independent audit committees, the 
restriction of corporations' purchases of 
non-auditing services from their 
auditors, the prohibition of corporate 
loans to officers, increased disclosure of 
off-balance sheet transactions, and the 
executive certification of financial 
statements 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
2002 
   
   
Environment 
Structural incentive within the 
superfund process seem to encourage 
[the] EPA to required more protective 
approaches: it is the PRPs [potentially 
responsible parties] that are supposed to 
pay, and the public generally chooses to 
err on the side of safety 
The Comprehensive 
Environmental 
Response Compensation 
and Liability Act 
(CERCLA) (Better 
know as the Superfund 
Act) in 1980; The 
Superfund Act - 
Statement of Financial 
Accounting Standards 
(SFAS NO 5. guideline - 
a potentially responsible 
party (PRP) 
Environmental 
(listed companies) 
Disclosure of an administrative or 
judicial processing related to 
compliance with federal, state or local 
The United States 
Securities Exchange 
Commission (SEC) 
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environmental laws where the 
proceeding is:                     (a) 
Material to the issuers' business or 
financial condition,                                     
b) Involves penalties and associated 
charges exceeding 10 per cent of the 
current assets of the issuer and its 
subsidiaries on a consolidated basis or                         
c) Involves a governmental authority s a 
party and potential monetary sanctions 
exceeding $100,000 
Regulation S-K (SEC 
Regulation S-K Item 
103) 
Environmental 
(listed companies) 
Items 303(3)(i) requires that in the 
registrant's Management Discussion & 
Analysis ("MD&A") there be a 
description "of any unusual or 
infrequent events or transactions or any 
significant economic changes that 
materially affected the amount of 
reported income from continuing 
operation"                                        
It is conceivable that in today's financial 
climate, a consumer boycott or NGO 
campaign targeting the company for 
alleged environmental or social 
indiscretions could qualify as such an 
"unusual or infrequent event" 
(SEC Regulation S-K 
Item 303 (3) i 
 
Companies with more than 10 full-time 
employees to submit data on emissions 
of specified toxic chemicals to the 
Environmental Protection Agency. 
The Toxic Release 
Inventory (TRI) 
   
Social and 
Environmental 
Risk 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 also plays 
a role in bringing about external 
transparency on social and 
environmental risks by ensuring that 
companies have adequate internal 
transparency processes. By requiring 
chief executive officers and chief 
financial officers to certify to the 
existence of internal controls that assure 
adequate information flow, so that 
internal systems reliably identify and 
allow for evaluation of material risk 
(including material environmental and 
social as well as financial risks) on the 
part of company officers and others. 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
2002 
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CSR required by legislation and professional guidance in Australia 
Area of Disclosure Information to be disclosed Relevant legislation 
Employee Pension 
Obligation to give employer a Product 
Disclosure Statement in relation to 
certain superannual products and RSA 
products 
The Corporations Act 
2001, 1012I OR 764A - 
The Retirement Saving 
Accounts Act 1997 + 
The Superannuation 
Industry (Supervision) 
Act 1993; The 
Corporations Act 2001, 
764A - The Life 
Insurance Act 1995 and 
The Workplace 
Relations Act 1996 
   
Employee 
share-based scheme 
It requires an entity to reflect in its profit 
or loss and financial position the effects 
of share-based payment transactions, 
including expenses associated with 
transactions in which share options are 
granted to employees 
Australian Accounting 
Standard Board (AASB) 
2 OR AASB 2008-1 
   
Employee 
Remuneration 
Remuneration and reimbursement for 
officer or employee 
The Corporations Act 
2001, Section 211 
   
Employee Benefits 
The objective of this Standard is to 
prescribe the accounting and disclosure 
for employee benefits. The Standard 
requires an entity to recognise: (a) a 
liability when an employee has provided 
service in exchange for employee 
benefits to be paid in the future; and (b) 
an expense when the entity consumes the 
economics benefits arising from service 
provided by an employee in exchange 
for employee benefits. 
Australian Accounting 
Standard Board (AASB) 
119; (local law) 
   
Directors --- 
The Corporation Act 
2001; (CLERP9) 
   
Corporate 
Governance 
--- 
The ASX Corporate 
Governance Council 
   
Environment 
(Energy) 
1. Reporting of greenhouse gas 
emissions, energy consumption and 
production by large companies.                                                                        
2. Public disclosure of corporate level 
greenhouse gas emissions and energy 
information.                                                                                        
3. To provide consistent and comparable 
data for decision making, in particular, 
to assist the development of the Carbon 
Pollution Reduction Scheme. 
The National 
Greenhouse and Energy 
Reporting Act 2007 
(Cth) 
(COMMONWEALTH) 
(NGER Act) 
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CSR required by legislation and professional guidance in the South Africa
148
 
Area of Disclosure Information to be disclosed Relevant legislation 
Employee Pension 
(4) A medical scheme, or a pension scheme 
including a provident scheme, for the benefit 
of the past or present employees of a 
company is an unsecured creditor of the 50 
company for the purposes of this Chapter to 
the extent of— 
(a) any amount that was due and payable by 
the company to the trustees of the scheme at 
any time before the beginning of the 
company’s business rescue proceedings, and 
that had not been paid immediately before 
the beginning of those proceedings; and 55 
and 252 
(b) in the case of a defined benefit pension 
scheme, the present value at the 
commencement of the business rescue 
proceedings of any unfunded liability under 
that scheme. 
The South African 
Companies Act (1973 or 
2008 - 144(4) 
   
Employee - Health 
and Safety 
To provide for the health and safety of 
persons at work and for the health and safety 
of persons in connection with the use of 
plant and machinery; the protection of 
persons other than persons at work against 
hazards to health and safety arising out of or 
in connection with the activities of persons at 
work; to establish an advisory council for 
occupational health and safety; and to 
provide for matters connected therewith. 
The Occupational 
Health and Safety Act 
(No. 85/ 1993) OR 
(OSHACT) (1996） 
   
Employee Share 
Ownership 
--- 
The South African 
Companies Act (1973 or 
2008 - 97(1) 
   
Employee - 
Discrimination 
Diversity and No discrimination- This 
requires timely submission of the annual 
employment equity report and plan to the 
Department of Labour, consultation with 
employees, communication of the report and 
plan to employees, regular policy and 
facility audits to ensure that no barriers to 
employment equity exist (Peermont , 2009) / 
Making the disclosure reasonably believed 
at the time of the disclosure that the 
information showed or tended to show that a 
company or external company, or a director 
or prescribed officer of a company acting in 
that capacity, has (b)(iv) unfairly 
discriminated, or condoned unfair 
discrimination, against any person, as 
The Employment 
Equity Act (No 55 of 
1998) 
                                                     
148
 All disclosures are for the government. The public cannot access the information unless they 
disclosure in their annual reports.  
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contemplated in section 9 of the constitution 
and the 15 promotion of equality and 
prevention of unfair discrimination Act 2000 
(Act No. 4 of 2000) 
Employee - 
Whistle-blower 
The aim of Protected Disclosures Act (PDA) 
2000 is: "to make provision for procedures 
in terms of which employees in both the 
private and the public sector may disclosure 
information regarding unlawful or irregular 
conduct by their employers of other 
employees in the employ of their employers; 
to provide for the protection of employees 
who make a disclosure which is protected in 
terms of this Act; and to provide for matters 
connected therewith" 
The South African 
Companies Act (1973 or 
2008 - 1503(b)(iii) and 
The Protected 
Disclosures Act No 26 
of 2000 
   
Directors --- 
The South African 
Companies Act (1973 or 
2008 - 69(8)) 
   
Corporate 
Governance (Only 
for listed companies) 
Every company should report at least 
annually on the nature and extent of its 
social, transformation, ethical, safety, health 
and environmental management policies and 
practices. The board must determine what is 
relevant for disclosure, having regard to the 
company's particular circumstances. 
Code of Corporate 
Practices and Conduct 
(The King Code III
149
) 
paragraph 5.1.1 
   
Environment 
To provide for co-operative, environmental 
governance by establishing principles for 
decision-making on matter affecting the 
environment, institutions that will promote 
co-operative governance and procedures for 
co-ordinating environmental functions 
exercised by organs of state; and to provide 
for matters connected therewith. 
The National 
Environmental 
Management Act 
(NEMA) (No 107 of 
1998) OR (No 14 of 
2009) 
   
Community 
investment 
(corporate 
philanthropy- double 
check) 
The Broad-Based Black Economic 
Empowerment (BBBEE) act when: (a) 
determining qualification criteria for the 
issuing of licenses and concessions …; (b) 
developing and implementing a preferential 
procurement policy; c) Developing criteria 
for entering into partnerships with the 
private sector; d) developing criteria for 
entering into partnerships with the private 
sector 
Broad-Based Black 
Economic Empower 
Act 2003
150
 
 
                                                     
149
 The King Code III is a voluntary code. It does according to Johannesburg Stock Exchange Regulation 
7.F.5, all listed corporations are required to apply all of the King Code III principles or explain why.   
150
 Only relevant for companies are doing business with government or associated with companies doing 
business with government.  
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CSR required by legislation and professional guidance in the Macao – Companies 
listed on HK Stock Exchange 
   
Area of Disclosure Information to be disclosed Relevant legislation 
Employee Pension 
Accounting and Reporting by 
Retirement Benefit Plans 
HKAS 26/ IAS 26 
   
Employee 
Share-based 
payment 
Share-based Payment 
HKFRS 2 (Amendment) 
/ IFRS 2 / 01/01/2009 
   
Employee Others 
Employee Benefits - Short term - Long 
Term+ Termination benefits Employee 
benefits include: 
 
 
(a) Short-term employee benefits, such 
as wages, salaries and social security 
contributions, paid annual leave and 
paid sick leave, profit sharing and 
bonuses (if payable within twelve 
months of the end of the period) and 
non-monetary benefits (such as medical 
care, housing, cars and free or 
subsidised goods or services) for current 
employees; 
HKAS 19 (Amendment) 
/ IAS 19 / 10-2008 
 
(b) Post-employment benefits such as 
pensions, other retirement benefits, 
post- employment life insurance and 
post-employment medical care; 
HKAS 19 (Amendment) 
/ IAS 19 / 10-2008 
 
(c) Other long-term employee benefits, 
including long-service leave or 
sabbatical leave, jubilee or other 
long-service benefits, long-term 
disability benefits and, if they are not 
payable wholly within twelve months 
after the end of the period, profit 
sharing, bonuses and deferred 
compensation; and 
HKAS 19 (Amendment) 
/ IAS 19 / 10-2008 
 (d) Termination benefits. 
HKAS 19 (Amendment) 
/ IAS 19 / 10-2008 
   
Directors Directors' Remuneration 
HONG KONG 
LISTING RULINGS - f) 
S161 of the Companies 
Ordinance 
Corporate 
Governance 
Corporate governance practices 
HONG KONG 
LISTING RULINGS 
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CSR required by legislation and professional guidance in the Macao – Companies 
listed on New York Stock Exchange 
Area of Disclosure Information to be disclosed Relevant legislation 
Employee Pension 
Employees' disclosures about pension 
plans and other postretirement benefit 
plans. It requires additional disclosures 
to those in the original statement 132 
about the assets, obligations, cash flows, 
and new periodic benefit cost of defined 
benefit pension plans and other defined 
benefit post-retirement plans. Financial 
Accounting Standard Board (FASB- 
Statement No. 132) 
Financial Accounting 
Standard Board (FASB- 
Statement No. 132) 
   
Employee Share 
Ownership 
To measure the cost of employee 
services received in exchange for an 
award of equality instruments based on 
the grant-date fair value of the award. 
Financial Accounting 
Standard Board (FASB- 
Statement No. 123) 
   
Directors ----  
   
Corporate 
Governance 
These requirements include rules 
relating to a Company's board of 
directors, including audit committees 
and Independent Director oversight of 
executive compensation and the director 
nomination process; code of conduct; 
shareholder meetings, including proxy 
solicitation and quorum; review of 
related party transactions; and 
shareholder approval, including voting 
rights. Exemptions to these rules, 
including phase-in schedules, are set 
forth in Rule 5615. 
NASDA Stock Market 
Listing Rule 
 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 - SOX  
mandates include the requirement of 
independent audit committees, the 
restriction of corporations' purchases of 
non-auditing services from their 
auditors, the prohibition of corporate 
loans to officers, increased disclosure of 
off-balance sheet transactions, and the 
executive certification of financial 
statements 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
2002 
   
Environment 
Structural incentive within the 
superfund process seem to encourage 
[the] EPA to required more protective 
approaches: it is the PRPs [potentially 
responsible parties] that are supposed to 
The Comprehensive 
Environmental 
Response Compensation 
and Liability Act 
(CERCLA) (Better 
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pay, and the public generally chooses to 
err on the side of safety 
know as the Superfund 
Act) in 1980; The 
Superfund Act - 
Statement of Financial 
Accounting Standards 
(SFAS NO 5. guideline - 
a potentially responsible 
party (PRP) 
Environmental 
(listed companies) 
Disclosure of an administrative or 
judicial processing related to 
compliance with federal, state or local 
environmental laws where the 
proceeding is:                     (a) 
Material to the issuers' business or 
financial condition,                                     
b) Involves penalties and associated 
charges exceeding 10 per cent of the 
current assets of the issuer and its 
subsidiaries on a consolidated basis or                         
c) Involves a governmental authority s a 
party and potential monetary sanctions 
exceeding $100,000 
The United States 
Securities Exchange 
Commission (SEC)
Regulation S-K (SEC 
Regulation S-K Item 
103) 
Environmental 
(listed companies) 
Items 303(3)(i) requires that in the 
registrant's Management Discussion & 
Analysis ("MD&A") there be a 
description "of any unusual or 
infrequent events or transactions or any 
significant economic changes that 
materially affected the amount of 
reported income from continuing 
operation"                                        
It is conceivable that in today's financial 
climate, a consumer boycott or NGO 
campaign targeting the company for 
alleged environmental or social 
indiscretions could qualify as such an 
"unusual or infrequent event" 
(SEC Regulation S-K 
Item 303 (3) i 
   
Social and 
Environmental 
Risk 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 also plays 
a role in bringing about external 
transparency on social and 
environmental risks by ensuring that 
companies have adequate internal 
transparency processes. By requiring 
chief executive officers and chief 
financial officers to certify to the 
existence of internal controls that assure 
adequate information flow, so that 
internal systems reliably identify and 
allow for evaluation of material risk 
(including material environmental and 
social as well as financial risks) on the 
part of company officers and others. 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
2002 
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CSR required by legislation and professional guidance in the Hong Kong 
   
Area of Disclosure Information to be disclosed Relevant legislation 
Employee Pension 
Accounting and Reporting by 
Retirement Benefit Plans 
HKAS 26/ IAS 26 
   
Employee 
Share-based 
payment 
Share-based Payment 
HKFRS 2 
(Amendment) / IFRS 2 / 
01/01/2009 
   
Employee Others 
Employee Benefits - Short term - Long 
Term+ Termination benefits Employee 
benefits include: 
 
 
(a) short-term employee benefits, such as 
wages, salaries and social security 
contributions, paid annual leave and paid 
sick leave, profit sharing and bonuses (if 
payable within twelve months of the end 
of the period) and non-monetary benefits 
(such as medical care, housing, cars and 
free or subsidised goods or services) for 
current employees; 
HKAS 19 (Amendment) 
/ IAS 19 / 10-2008 
 
(b) post-employment benefits such as 
pensions, other retirement benefits, post- 
employment life insurance and 
post-employment medical care; 
HKAS 19 (Amendment) 
/ IAS 19 / 10-2008 
 
(c) other long-term employee benefits, 
including long-service leave or 
sabbatical leave, jubilee or other 
long-service benefits, long-term 
disability benefits and, if they are not 
payable wholly within twelve months 
after the end of the period, profit sharing, 
bonuses and deferred compensation; and 
HKAS 19 (Amendment) 
/ IAS 19 / 10-2008 
 (d) termination benefits. 
HKAS 19 (Amendment) 
/ IAS 19 / 10-2008 
   
Directors Directors' Remuneration 
HONG KONG 
LISTING RULINGS - 
f) S161 of the 
Companies Ordinance 
Corporate 
Governance 
corporate governance practices 
HONG KONG 
LISTING RULINGS 
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Appendix 10  Structure of Grid Used to Measure Volume of Disclosure 
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Appendix 11  Quality Categorisation 
 
News categorisation and types of disclosure are adopted from Gray, et al. (1995b) 
and the CSEAR (2011) website: 
 
News Categorisation 
The categorisation of “news” must be subjective but it generally complies with the 
following (in terms of meaning conveyed to the receiver): 
 
 Neutral: Statement of policy or intent within statutory minimum with no details of 
what or how; Statement of facts whose credit/discredit to the company is not obvious - 
which are unaccompanied by editorialising. 
 Good: Statements beyond the minimum which include (for example) specific 
details where these details have a creditable or neutral reflection on the company; Any 
statements/ (photos/ analysis/discussion), which reflect credit on the company; Upbeat 
analysis/discussion/statements. 
 Bad: Any statement which reflects/might reflect discredit on the company. Include, 
for example numbers made redundant (if redundancy is spoken of as a human rather 
than an economic act) and any increase in accidents (or figures that indicate a 
discreditable trends) 
 
Types of disclosure 
Disclosure was classified as: 
 Monetary quantitative: Disclosure was classified as “monetary quantitative” if it 
contained and was primarily related to financial disclosure of actual financial numbers. 
 Other Quantitative: “other quantitative” if it contained and was primarily related 
to actual numbers of a non-financial nature. 
 Declarative: “Declarative” does not fit the first two categories and it is mainly 
qualitative in nature. 
 
Auditable:  Disclosure is further categorised as “auditable” if, given access to the 
organisation, it would be possible to confirm the statements. (Information can be 
audited and verified by a third party). This does not require that the data is confirmed. 
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Appendix 12 Content Analysis Form 
STRUCTURE OF THE DATABASE RECORDS 
NAME: CODE 
(YEAR/OA): 
TOTAL 
PAGES/ACCPP: 
CATEGORY PAGES EVIDENCE AUDIT NEWS MEMO 
Economic Performance      
Economic Performance      
Market Presence      
Indirect Economic Impact      
      
Environment      
Environment Policy      
Environment Audi,      
Waste, Pack, Pollution, Recycle, 
Product, Land      
Financial Data, Prov, Liab, Ins, Invest      
Sustainability      
Energy      
Environmental Other      
      
Consumer/product      
Responsible gambling/gaming      
      
Community      
Charity and political      
Community      
Dialogue and consultation      
      
Employees      
Employee data      
Pension Commit      
Disabled      
Health & Safety      
Shares employees      
Equal opportunities      
Employee Other      
      
Directors      
      
Corporate Governance      
      
General Other      
 
 
 
 
     
381 
 
Appendix 13 Ethical Approval Form  
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Appendix 14 Semi-structured interview guide for internal stakeholders 
 
Personal details 
 How would you describe your role in the organisation? 
 How long have you been in this position? 
 What background and experience do you bring to this position? 
 Could you provide some background information to your department? 
(When and why did your company establish a CSR department if any) 
 
Have you heard this term Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)? 
Yes – Case 1 
No – Case 2 
 
Case 1 – Internal Stakeholder Interviewees recognise the term ‘Corporate Social 
Responsibility’ 
 
What do you understand by the term ‘Corporate Social Responsibility’ (CSR)? 
 Where are you being informed about this term ‘CSR’? 
 How do you know this term? 
 
What do you think CSR as an important issue in your company? 
 Why is it important? 
 Could you explain the importance of CSR in the gambling industry? 
 What do you think whether the current CSR practices are effective or not? 
 
Why does your company engage in CSR? 
 What has leaded your company to implement a CSR policy (or not implement CSR 
policy)? 
 What has motivated your company to develop ‘Responsible Gambling’ (If any)? 
 What social issues does your company engage in? 
 Who are the main audience for CSR? 
 
Would you be willing to discuss your company’s experience of engaging in CSR? 
 What obstacles may your company encounter when they carry out CSR? 
 What issues would your company be less likely to engage in? 
 Could you give me some examples? 
 
Is there any specific issue to the gambling industry or special challenges? 
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 How do you understand the potential conflict between the (danger) of gambling 
and the notion of responsibilities? (If I know the interviewee) 
 Can gambling companies be socially responsible? 
  
Case 2 - If internal stakeholder interviewees do not recognise the term, what do they 
perceive CSR implicitly? 
(Certain business practices, organisation routines or business ethics can reveal some 
extent CSR) 
 Tell me about your job and daily operation in your company. 
 What do you think about your company? 
 What does your company contribute to the society? 
 What responsibilities does your company have? 
 Can gambling companies be socially responsible? 
 
General 
 Is there anything else you wish to add? 
 
A list of sub-questions will be included for checking purposes. The present researcher 
would have ideally covered all the above questions if the time is permitted. 
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Appendix 15 Semi-structured interview guide for external stakeholders 
 
Personal details 
 How would you describe your role in the organisation? 
 How long have you been in this position? 
 What background and experience do you bring to this position? 
 Could you provide some background information about your department? 
 
Have you heard this term Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)? 
Yes – Case 1 
No – Case 2 
 
Case 1 – External Stakeholder Interviewees recognise the term ‘Corporate Social 
Responsibility’ 
 
1. What do you understand by the term ‘Corporate Social Responsibility’ (CSR)? 
 Where have you been informed about this term ‘CSR’? 
 How do you know this term? 
 
2. How do you view of CSR in the gambling industry? 
 What do you think of the current CSR policy/activities in the gambling industry? 
 Could you give me some examples of those CSR policy/ activities? 
 How do you view ‘Responsible Gambling’? (If they mention)? 
 How does the gambling industry deal with social issues (ex. gamblers)? 
 
3. In what ways do you think the gambling industry’s participation in CSR affects 
society? 
 How do you experience? 
 Could you give me some examples? 
 What sorts of socially related issues does your organisation encounter? 
 Why do you think about it? 
 
4. Would you be willing to discuss the impact of the gambling industry, if any, on 
your organisation (problem gambling counsellors/ journalists) /university 
(academics)? 
 Does it have an impact on your organisation? 
 What sort of impact does it have? Why? 
 Could you give me some examples? 
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5. Do you have any thoughts on whether the gambling industry faces any specific 
issues or special challenges? 
 How do you understand the potential conflict between the (danger) of gambling 
and the notion of responsibility? (If I know the interviewee) 
 Can gambling companies be socially responsible? 
 
Case 2 - If external stakeholder interviewees do not recognise the term, what do they 
perceive CSR implicitly? 
(Certain personal ethics or local culture can reveal to some extent CSR) 
 
 Tell me about your job and daily operations in your organisation. 
 How do you view the gambling industry? 
 What does the gambling industry contribute to the society? 
 What responsibilities does the gambling industry have? 
 Would you be willing to discuss the impact of the gambling industry, if any, on 
your organisation? 
 Can the gambling industry be socially responsible? 
 
General 
 Is there anything else you wish to add? 
 
A list of sub-questions will be included for checking purposes. The present researcher 
would have ideally covered all the above questions if time permitted. 
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Appendix 16  Topics of disclosure – an international comparison 
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Appendix 17 Industry Sectors at global level and national level 
Corporate Responsibility Reporting at the Global Level - Companies by sector 
(G250) 
 
Source: KPMG Global Sustainability Services (2008:14) 
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Appendix 18: Key stakeholders in RG policies, related standards and guidelines 
The Reno Model of RG 
(Blaszczynski, et al., 2004) 
RG Guideline in Macao 
(The Institute for the 
Study of Commercial 
Gaming, 2009, 2010b, 
2011) 
Semi-Structured 
Interview Findings of RG 
in Macao 
 Consumers 
 Gambling operators 
 Health services  & 
other welfare 
providers 
 Interested 
community 
 Government 
 Government 
 Gamblers, family 
members and 
friends 
 Gaming operators 
 Problem gambling 
prevention & 
treatment centres 
 Education and other 
community 
organisations 
 Employees 
 Customers 
 Academic 
institutions 
 Government 
 Problem gambling 
prevention & 
treatment centres 
 
 
In Macao, the liberalisation of the gambling industry was in 2003, while the 
introduction of RG policies, standards and guidelines was started in 2009
151
. The 
government of Macao recognised the increasing trend of problem gamblers. Since the 
government has a very close relationship with the gambling operators, the third party - 
an academic institution - was involved in promoting the RG polices in 2009. This RG 
guideline includes five key stakeholders, including government, gamblers, family 
members and friends, gaming operators, problem gambling prevention and treatment 
centres
152
 and education and other community organisations (The Institute for the 
Study of Commercial Gaming, 2009, 2010b, 2011), which is similar to the Reno Model.  
 
Appendix 18 shows that three sources, namely the Reno Model of RG from gambling 
studies literature (left), RG guidelines in Macao (middle) and semi-structured interview 
findings concerning RG (right), of the key stakeholders in RG gambling polices, related 
standards and guidelines are very similar. RG is generally considered to include five key 
stakeholders, including consumers, gambling operators, health services providers, 
community and governments, which is commonly referred to as the Reno Model of RG 
(Blaszcyynski, et al., 2004). Particularly noteworthy is that the role of government 
concerning RG varies by jurisdiction, historical, cultural, ideological and political 
economic context (McMillen 2007 cited in Smith, 2009). 
                                                     
151
 However, it is inadequate community and government audit on CSR (and RG) in Macao’s gambling 
industry (Vong, 2010). 
152
 In the Chinese community, there is insufficient problem gambling prevention, counselling, and 
treatment centres (Tang, et al., 2007). Yet, there were no professional gambling counseling centres for 
treatment and prevention until 2004 (Fong, et al., 2011). 
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Appendix 19: RG polices adopted by each of gambling operators in Macao 
 Company A 
– Western 
Company B 
– Western 
Company C 
– Western 
Company D 
- Western 
Company 
E - Chinese 
Company 
F - Chinese 
Employees Re-inductio
n, RG 
training, 
signage, 
video 
Re-inductio
n, RG 
training, 
employee 
assistance 
programme
, sponsor 
employees 
to be RG 
counsellor 
RG training 
(including, 
rejection of 
underage, 
problem 
gambling 
symptoms, 
employee 
assistance 
programme
) 
RG training, 
brochures, 
signage, 
video 
RG 
training 
RG 
training 
Customers RG 
information
, voluntary 
Self-exclusi
on, removal 
from GP 
list at 
patron’s 
request 
Voluntary 
Self-exclusi
on 
RG 
signage, 
RG 
including 
corporate 
policy, 
limit credit 
borrowing 
RG 
information, 
Voluntary 
Self-exclusio
n, RG 
ambassador, 
Third-Party 
Exclusion 
Programmes 
RG 
informatio
n 
RG 
promotion 
Government RG 
information 
RGAW   RGAW  
University  Donation 
for research 
  RGAW  
Social Service 
organisations 
RG 
information 
Donation     
Others  Attending 
problem 
gambling 
conference 
    
Source: The Institute for the Study of Commercial Gaming, University of Macao (2011, 
p.20-25) Note: RG refers to Responsible Gambling; RGAW refers to Responsible 
Gambling Awareness Week 
 
It is important to note that the awareness of RG information and signage is high based 
on Hing’s (2004) in the Australian gambling industry. However, if the RG information 
and signage is place in unnoticed area, this measure can be regarded as ineffective 
(Hing, 2005). Additionally, according to Breen, et al.’s (2005) study in Australia, the 
self-exclusion programme is not effective as the self-excluded gamblers can go other 
casions to gamble. The easy accessibility of gambling venues is another reason for the 
evasion of voluntary self-exclusion programmes (El-Guebaly, et al., 2005 cited in Smith, 
2009).  
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Appendix 20: RG Guidelines proposed by the Institute for the Study of Commercial 
Gaming at the University of Macao 
Pledge for employees Pledge for customers 
1. Provide Responsible Gaming 
Awareness training for each new 
employee as a regular pat of new-hire 
orientation. 
1. Make Responsible Gaming information 
available to patrons who seek assistance. 
2. Distribute to brochures describing 
responsible gaming and provide 
information on where to find assistance, 
and will continue to make information 
available to employees going forward. 
2. Display Responsible Gaming 
information in gaming areas on where to 
seek assistance should the patron desire 
this advice. 
3. Post Responsible Gaming Signage that 
include help-line telephone numbers at 
various locations where employees 
congregate 
3. Removal from gaming 
promotion/marketing mailing list at 
patron’s request. 
 4. Make diligent efforts to prevent 
underage persons from entering gaming 
area. 
Source: The Institute for the Study of Commercial Gaming, University of Macao (2009, 
p. 21) 
Importantly, two international gambling companies (see Company A and B) rather than 
Chinese gambling companies not only provide employee training in orientation week, 
but also provide re-induction RG training programmes, RG video at working places and 
employee assistance programmes. From “customer” aspects, all Macao’s gambling 
operators provide RG related information to customers; however, some international 
gambling companies (see Company A, B, D) provide ‘self-exclusion programmes153’. 
Interestingly, Company D also provides “RG ambassador” and “Third-Party Exclusion 
Programmes
154”, while Company C provides “limit credit borrowing” services for 
customers. 
 
                                                     
153
 According to the Article 6, Clause 1 of Law No 10/2012 – “Regulation the Conditions of Entering, 
Working and Gaming at Casinos” upon the application of an individual to exclude himself/herself from 
casinos. The Director of DICJ may prohibit the person from entering all or some of the casinos for a 
maximum period of two years (Macao SAR Gaming Inspection and Coordination Bureau, 2013f). 
154
 According to the Article 6, Clause 1 of Law No 10/2012 –“Regulation the Conditions of Entering, 
Working and Gaming at Casinos”. The confirmation of an exclusion request made by his/her spouses, 
ascendant, descendant, or a family member related to him/her within the second-degree kinship by blood, 
The Director of DICJ may prohibit the person from entering all or some of the casinos for a maximum 
period of two years (Macao SAR Gaming Inspection and Coordination Bureau, 2013f). 
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